The Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Cases Part 5: The Bar on Reexamining a Jury’s Findings of Fact
Legal Sidebari
The Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Cases Part 5:
The Bar on Reexamining a Jury’s Findings of
Fact
December 22, 2022
This Legal Sidebar is the fifth in a five-part series that discusses a unique feature of the American legal
system—the constitutional right to a jury trial in federal civil cases at law. During the Constitution’s
ratification, the Anti-Federalist, known by the pseudonym the “Federal Farmer,” argued that the
Constitution should expressly provide a right to civil jury trials because “the well born,” who would
comprise the judiciary, “are generally disposed, and very naturally too, to favour those of their own
description.” Included as part of the Bill of Rights, the right to civil jury trials, according to a 2020 study,
is seen by many judges as well as plaintiff and defense attorneys as providing a fairer way to resolve
lawsuits than bench trials or arbitration. The use of jury trials to resolve civil cases, however, decreased
from 5.5% in 1962 to less than 1% in 2013 with some attributing this to damage caps and mandatory
binding arbitration. Members of Congress interested in civil litigation or federal court operations may find
the constitutional right to jury trials in civil cases of interest. (For additional background on this topic and
citations to relevant sources, see the Constitution of the United States of America, Analysis and
Interpretation.)
The Seventh Amendment’s Reexamination Clause prohibits reexamination in any federal court of a “fact
tried by a jury” other “than according to the rules of the common law.” In 1913, in Slocum v. New York
Life Insurance Co., the Supreme Court held that a federal appeals court lacked authority to order the entry
of a judgment contrary to a trial court’s verdict. Even though the Court agreed that the trial court should
have directed a verdict for the defendant before the case was submitted to the jury, the Court reasoned
that, once the trial court declined to do so and the jury found for the plaintiff contrary to the evidence, the
only course open to either court was to order a new trial. Although plainly in accordance with the
common law as it stood in 1791, the five-to-four decision was subject to significant criticism. Slocum,
however, was then limited, if not completely undermined, by subsequent holdings.
In the first of these cases, the Court in Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman held that a trial court had the
right to enter a judgment for the plaintiff on the jury’s verdict after having reserved decision on the
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defendant’s motion for directed verdict. The Court distinguished Slocum, noting its ruling qualified some
of its assertions in Slocum.
In Lyon v. Mutual Benefit Ass’n, the Court sustained a district court in rejecting the defendant’s motion for
dismissal and in peremptorily directing a verdict for the plaintiff. The Supreme Court held that there was
ample evidence to support the verdict and that the trial court, in following Arkansas’s procedure in the
diversity action, acted consistently with the Federal Conformity Act.
In Galloway v. United States, which involved an action against the government for benefits under a lapsed
war risk insurance policy, the trial court directed a verdict for the government on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. Both the appeals court and the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s order.
Justice Hugo Black, joined by Justices William Douglas and Frank Murphy, asserted in dissent: “Today’s
decision marks a continuation of the gradual process of judicial erosion which in one-hundred-fifty years
has slowly worn away a major portion of the essential guarantee of the Seventh Amendment.” Perhaps
unsurprisingly, the Court has occasionally experienced difficulty in harmonizing the historic common law
covering the relations of judge and jury with the notion of a developing common law.
The Seventh Amendment’s clause prohibiting reexamination of any fact found by a jury is not restricted
in its application to suits at common law tried before juries in federal courts. The Supreme Court has held
that it applies equally to cases tried before a jury in a state court and brought to the Supreme Court on
appeal. However, the Supreme Court has indicated that, in cases involving a claim of a denial of
constitutional rights, it is free to examine and review the evidence upon which the lower court based its
conclusions, a position that under some circumstances could conflict with the principle of jury autonomy.
This Legal Sidebar is the fifth in a five-part series that covers the right to a jury trial in civil cases at law.
Part 1 provides historical background on civil jury trials. Part 2 discusses the meaning of the Seventh
Amendment qualifying language “Suits at common law” and how civil cases to which the right applies
are identified. Subsequent Legal Sidebars Parts 3 and 4 examine the distinction between legal and
equitable claims, the treatment of cases that combine elements of both, and the roles of the judge and jury
in civil cases.
Author Information
Wen W. Shen
Legislative Attorney
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