Legal Sidebar 
 
Stablecoins: Legal Issues and Regulatory 
Options (Part 2) 
June 9, 2022 
As discussed in the first
 part of this two-part Legal Sidebar series, stablecoins are cryptocurrencies whose 
value is
 pegged to a reference asset like the U.S. dollar. While stablecoin issuers attempt to maintain these 
pegs i
n different ways, most of the regulatory attention has focused on coins that are putatively backed 
with reserves of assets denominated i
n fiat currency. Often, those assets underwrite an issuer’s 
commitment to redeem its stablecoins for a fixed value upon demand.  
That structure raises familiar risks. Like banks and money market mutual funds (MMFs), stablecoin 
issuers are
 vulnerable to runs if their customers
 lose faith in the adequacy of the assets backing their 
demandable liabilities. Unlike banks and MMFs, however, most stablecoin issuers are not subject to 
federal regulations and protections designed to instill faith in those liabilities, such as deposit insurance 
and portfolio restrictions.  
In November 2021, the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets (PWG)
 recommended that 
Congress enact legislation limiting stablecoin issuance to insured depository institutions. Other 
commentators have advocate
d different regulatory strategies, ranging from a bespoke federal licensing 
regime to an outright ban on stablecoin issuance.  
This Legal Sidebar—the second in a two-part series—explores regulatory options for stablecoins. The 
first
 part of the Sidebar series provides an overview of the existing legal framework governing 
stablecoins.   
Options for Congress and Regulators  
Commentators have proposed a broad range of measures that Congress and federal regulators could take 
to address the possible risks and benefits of stablecoins.  
Bank Regulation  
As noted, the PWG has
 recommended that Congress adopt legislation limiting stablecoin issuance to 
insured depository institutions. Several lawmakers in the 116th Congress sponsored legislation that would 
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have imposed that requirement
. H.R. 8827, the Stablecoin Classification and Regulation Act, would have 
prohibited the issuance of stablecoins by entities other than insured depository institutions that are 
members of the Federal Reserve System.   
Advocates of such measures
 argue that bank regulation is needed to minimize the risk of runs on 
stablecoin issuers. Bank regulation would also respond to
 worries about Big Tech firms and other large 
companies extending their power into the financial industry via stablecoin issuance. The
 Bank Holding 
Company Act (BHCA) generally prohibits companies that own banks from also owning commercial 
enterprises. Bank regulation may thus help check potentially troublesome concentrations of economic 
power by bringing stablecoin issuers under the BHCA umbrella.  
For their part, critics of the bank-regulation strategy maintain that such regulations would be both 
unnecessary and unworkable for stablecoin providers. In particular, some commentators have
 suggested 
that narrower regulations targeting the composition of stablecoin reserves would be sufficient to obviate 
run risk. Observers have also
 argued that existing
 leverage ratios for banks would make it infeasible for 
stablecoin issuers to limit their investments to safe reserve assets, which could call into question the 
viability of their business models. (A stablecoin provider that limited its reserves to cash and cash 
equivalents without engaging in more profitable lending activities may have
 difficulty attracting the 
equity capital needed to comply with bank leverage rules, which treat safe assets as if they have the same 
risk profile as consumer and business debt.)  
Regulation of Stablecoin Reserves  
As the above discussion suggests, some lawmakers have proposed prudential regulations and disclosure 
requirements involving the composition of stablecoin reserves. For example, the Stablecoin Transparency 
Act 
(S. 3970 a
nd H.R. 7328) would require covered stablecoin issuers to hold their reserves in short-term 
U.S. Treasury securities, fully collateralized repurchase agreements, or fiat currency. The bill would also 
require covered issuers to publish audited reports detailing their reserves every thirty days. 
Federal Licensing Regime 
While the Stablecoin Transparency Act would impose standalone reserve requirements on stablecoin 
issuers, other proposals would couple such requirements with a federal licensing regime. Senator Pat 
Toomey has released a discussion draft to that effect titled the
 Stablecoin Transparency of Reserves and 
Uniform Safe Transactions (Stablecoin TRUST) Act. Among other things, the draft proposes: 
  
Authorizing the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) to license firms as 
“national limited payment stablecoin issuers” (NLPSIs); 
  
Prohibiting the issuance of stablecoins by any entity other than a NLPSI, state-regulated 
money-transmitting business, or insured depository institution;  
  
Requiring all stablecoin issuers to make certain disclosures concerning their reserves and 
redemption policies, and to undergo quarterly attestations by a registered public 
accounting firm;   
  
Authorizing the OCC to adopt capital, liquidity, and governance requirements for 
NLPSIs; 
  
Requiring NLPSIs to hold cash, cash equivalents, or
 level 1 high-quality liquid assets 
with a market value equal to or greater than the par value of their outstanding stablecoins; 
and  
  
Clarifying that covered stablecoins are not securities under federal law.  
  
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To address concerns about the compatibility of stablecoin issuance with bank leverage ratios, the draft 
propose
s allowing insured depository institutions to issue stablecoins via separate legal entities that would 
be subject to the same tailored regulatory standards as NLPSIs.  
Representative Josh Gottheimer has also released a discussion draft proposing that stablecoin issuers be 
allowed to opt into a federal supervisory framework. The draft—titled the
 Stablecoin Innovation and 
Protection Act—would allow banks and non-banks to issue 
“qualified stablecoins,” which would fall 
outside the scope of the securities and commodities laws. Under the draft, non-banks could elect to 
become 
“nonbank qualified stablecoin issuers” (NQSIs) subject to OCC supervision. NQSIs would be 
required to back their stablecoins with U.S. dollars, securities issued by the federal government, or other 
assets that the OCC determines appropriate. The bill would also
 empower the OCC to adopt various 
prudential rules for NQSIs a
nd direct the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to establish an insurance 
fund for such issuers.   
The
 Responsible Financial Innovation Act—a draft version of which Senators Cynthia Lummis and 
Kirsten Gillibrand released in June 2022—would combine restrictions on stablecoin reserves with an 
option for stablecoin issuers to submit to federal oversight
. Section 601 of the bill would require both 
bank and non-bank stablecoin issuers to maintain specified types of liquid assets equal to at least one 
hundred percent of the face value of their stablecoin liabilities. The legislation would also
 empower the 
OCC to charter national bank associations for the exclusive purpose of issuing stablecoins and allow the 
agency to adopt tailored capital requirements for such entities.  
Other stablecoin-licensing legislation is drafted in more general terms
. Section 311 of
 H.R. 4741, the 
Digital Asset Market Structure and Investor Protection Act, would task the Treasury Department with 
administering a federal licensing regime for stablecoin issuers. The bill would prohibit the issuance of 
stablecoins by unapproved entities and allow the Treasury Department to grant applications for approval 
“under such terms and conditions as the [Treasury] Secretary determines necessary and appropriate.”  
SEC Oversight 
Others have suggested that Congress pass legislation giving the SEC a lead role in stablecoin regulation. 
(For an overview of the ambiguities surrounding the SEC’s current legal authority over stablecoins, see 
the first
 part of this Sidebar series.) One commentator has
 proposed amendments to the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 that would require stablecoin providers to be regulated as “limited purpose 
investment companies.” Those draft amendments include restrictions on the reserve portfolios of such 
entities.  
Some lawmakers have also proposed legislation to clarify the SEC’s legal authority over stablecoins. In 
the 116th Congress,
 H.R. 5197, the Managed Stablecoins are Securities Act, would have provided that 
stablecoins qualify as securities under federal law.   
FSOC Designation  
Finally, regulators may have existing tools to address stablecoins outside of the securities and banking 
laws. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, t
he Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC)—an interagency 
group of regulators—can
 designate certain conduct as a “systemically important” payment, clearing, or 
settlement activity. That designation allows financial regulators to establis
h risk-management standards 
for institutions that engage in the relevant activity.  
FSOC also has the authority to designate
 financial market utilities a
nd nonbank financial companies as 
“systemically important” and subject designated institutions to heightened regulatory standards. 
  
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The PWG’s November 2021 report
 recommends that FSOC consider using these authorities to designate 
stablecoin activities and issuers if Congress does not enact stablecoin legislation. 
 
Author Information 
 Jay B. Sykes 
   
Legislative Attorney  
 
 
 
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