Legal Sidebar 
 
The Open App Markets Act 
June 8, 2022 
Efforts to reform competition law proceed at different levels of generality. Som
e bills woul
d tackle 
antitrust writ large. Others are mor
e focused, applying
 special rules to 
a handful of Big Tech companies. 
The Open App Markets Act (OAMA) is narrower still, targeting one segment of the digital economy—
mobile software application (app) stores—with sectoral regulation.  
While limited in scope, the legislation would reshape key technology markets. Last year, the two largest 
app stores—Apple’s App Store and Google Play—generated combined sales of $133 billion, which 
reportedly contributed 
a fifth of the operating profits at Apple and at Google parent Alphabet. The OAMA 
(S. 2710, H.R. 5017, and H.R. 7030) would require these firms to make major changes to their business 
practices in the name of protecting app developers and consumers from alleged abuses of monopoly 
power.  
This Sidebar provides an overview of
 S. 2710, a version of the OAMA which the Senate Judiciary 
Committee advanced with amendments in February 2022.  
Competition Issues in the App Industry  
App stores are considered
 critical nodes in the digital economy, enabling software developers to distribute 
their apps to mobile-device users. In turn, those apps allow consumers to perform a sweeping array of 
tasks, ranging from messaging to gaming to ordering food.   
The app-store market i
s dominated by Apple and Google, which also control
 the leading mobile operating 
systems (iOS and Android). Both the app-store market and the market for mobile operating systems 
contain high entry barriers and exhibit strong
 network effects, potentially giving Apple and Google 
significant power to shape the app industry.   
Global competition authorities have investigated several ways in which the firms have allegedly abused 
that power. The practices motivating the OAMA’s proponents include: 
  
Restrictions on the Availability of Rival App Stores. Apple and Google have allegedly 
leveraged control of their operating systems to favor their own app stores over 
alternatives. In Apple’s case, the alleged self-preferencing is straightforward—Apple’s 
App Store is th
e only app store available on iOS devices. Google’s policy is less 
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CRS Legal Sidebar 
 
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prescriptive, but some commentators
 argue that the firm’s conduct has nevertheless 
harmed competition. While Google allows users of Android devices to download 
competing app stores, it has
 required device manufacturers to pre-install the Google Play 
Store as a condition of licensing the Android operating system. Critics
 contend that this 
pre-installation requirement gives Google Play major advantages over rival app stores, 
because consumer
s tend to stick with pre-installed options. Market participants have also 
alleged that Google has implemented measures that make downloading competing app 
stores unnecessarily difficult.  
  
In-App Payment Processing and Anti-Steering Provisions. Apple and Google have 
developed tools for collecting payments from users who make purchases within apps 
downloaded from their app stores. The firms al
so require that
 developers use these tools 
as a condition of participating in their app stores. The requirement has not been cheap. 
Befor
e recent changes, Apple and Google charged fees of up to 30 percent for processing 
in-app purchases (IAPs). Apple had al
so required developers to abide by anti-steering 
provisions that prohibited communications with customers about alternative payment 
options. Some observer
s argued that these measures harmed competition in the market for 
IAP processing, injuring both developers and consumers.    
  
Technological Self-Preferencing. The firms have also allegedly favored their own apps 
over rivals. Some of the putative self-preferencing
 involves access to technology—in 
particular, application programming interfaces (APIs). Developers of mobile operating 
systems create APIs to allow apps
 to access a device’s features, like its camera or 
microphone. Apple makes many APIs for iOS publicly available, but has also created a 
variety of private APIs. Some developers hav
e accused Apple of unfairly favoring its own 
apps by allowing them to access these private APIs while denying similar opportunities to 
rivals. The alleged favoritism may also extend to other device functionalities. For 
example, Apple allows its payment app (Apple Pay) to access technology enabling 
communications between devices and payment terminals, but
 blocks such access for 
third-party payment apps.  
  
Self-Preferencing in Search. Some commentators have made similar allegations 
regarding App Store search results. Separate investigations by
 The New York Times and 
The Wall Street Journal have concluded that Apple’s apps are often ranked higher than 
more relevant and popular rivals in the App Store, leading to claims of favoritism. (Apple 
has
 denied its search algorithm preferences the company’s own apps.)  
  
App Pre-Installation and Default Settings. As discussed, some observers have argued 
that pre-installation of the Google Play store on Android devices harms competition in 
the app-store market. Some developers have criticized pre-installation of certain Apple 
and Google 
apps on similar grounds. In 2020, the majority staff of the House Judiciary 
Committee’s Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law
 found 
that Apple pre-installed roughly 40 of its own apps on the latest iPhone models. Several 
of those apps were also set as th
e default options for Apple devices. Google has similarly 
required device manufacturers to pre-install and give default status to some Google apps, 
including Google Search.   
  
Sherlocking. Some commentators hav
e accused Apple of exploiting its control of iOS 
and the App Store to collect competitively sensitive information from app developers. 
The firm has
 allegedly used such information from popular apps to build competing 
offerings and integrate certain functionalities into iOS—a practice dubbed “sherlocking.” 
Similarly, the House Antitrust Subcommittee’s 2020 report
 concluded that Google has 
used data from third-party apps to support its own competing offerings.  
  
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The Legislation 
The OAMA would prohibit many of the practices described above. The bill would impose the following 
prohibitions and requirements on firms that own or control app stores wit
h more than 50 million U.S. 
users.  
  
Section 3(a): Exclusivity and Tying. S. 2710 would prohibit covered companies from 
requiring app developers to use their IAP processors as a condition of participating in 
their app stores. The bill would also prohibit “most favored nation” pricing requirements, 
whereby app-store operators dictate that developers price their offerings on terms that are 
equal to or more favorable than those the developers offer in other app stores. Likewise, 
covered companies could not take “punitive action” against developers based on prices 
offered in other app stores or via other payment systems.  
  
Section 3(b): Interference with Legitimate Business Communications. S. 2710 would 
buttress these prohibitions by preventing covered companies from imposing restrictions 
on app developers’ communications with users concerning “legitimate business offers,” 
including pricing terms. Accordingly, app developers could inform users of the benefits 
of using alternative payment options for IAPs.  
  
Section 3(c): Nonpublic Business Information.
 S. 2710 would prohibit sherlocking by 
making it unlawful for covered companies to use non-public business information 
derived from third-party apps for the purpose of competing with those apps.  
  
Section 3(d): Interoperability. The legislation would also impose certain requirements 
intended to prevent covered companies from favoring their own apps and app stores over 
competitors. In particular
, S. 2710 would require covered companies that own or control 
the operating systems on which their app stores run to allow users to:  
  Choose third-party apps and app stores as defaults;  
  Install apps or app stores through means other than the covered company’s app store 
(commonly called “sideloading”); and  
  Hide or delete pre-installed apps and app stores.  
  
Section 3(e): Self-Preferencing in Search. Under the bill, covered companies would be 
barred from “unreasonably preferencing or ranking” their own apps over rivals in their 
app stores’ search results.   
  
Section 3(f): Open App Development. Finally
, S. 2710 would prohibit certain forms of 
technological self-preferencing. The bill would require covered companies to provide 
developers access to their operating-system interfaces, development information, 
hardware, and software on terms that are functionally equivalent to those they offer to 
their own internal development teams or business partners.  
These requirements and prohibitions would not be absolut
e. S. 2710 would offer covered companies 
several affirmative defenses. In particular, a covered company would not be in violation of any of the 
provisions discussed above for an action that is: 
  Necessary to achieve user privacy, security, or digital safety;  
  Taken to prevent spam or fraud;  
  Necessary to prevent unlawful infringement of preexisting intellectual property; or  
  Taken to prevent a violation of, or comply with, federal or state law.  
  
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To prevail under these defenses, a covered company would need to show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that its action was non-pretextual, applied consistently to all apps, and “narrowly tailored and 
could not be achieved through a less discriminatory and technically possible means.”  
S. 2710 would grant enforcement authority to the Federal Trade Commission and state attorneys general. 
The bill would also provide a private right of action for treble damages to injured app developers, with the 
exception of app developers owned or controlled by a foreign state.  
Analysis 
There are several strategies for addressing concerns about excessive market power. First there is 
antitrust, 
a common law system of adjudication that requires courts to apply broad principles—
no unreasonable 
restraints of trade, monopolization, or unfair methods of competition—to specific fact patterns. This 
approach is already being deployed to combat allegedly anticompetitive conduct in the app economy. 
Developers, consumers, and state attorneys general have brought antitrust lawsuits against
 Apple and 
Google that are currently working their way through the courts.  
Ex ante regulation represents a second approach to market power. While antitrust lawsuits require courts 
to determine after the fact whether challenged conduct violates certain general standards, regulation 
identifies specific practices as lawful or unlawful before a firm engages in them.     
There are also a variety of approaches that lie somewhere between antitrust and regulation. One scholar 
has employed the term
 administration to describe systems that rely primarily on informal solutions and 
negotiated agreements between regulated parties and their regulators. T
he Hart-Scott-Rodino 
merger-review regime—in which regulators and merging parties can agree to bespoke remedies that 
ameliorate competition concerns—is one example. Another commentator has identified an 
agency-oversight model in which a specialist regulator is tasked with implementing general standards and 
exercising ongoing supervision over regulated entities.  
Each modality has potential costs and benefits for different stakeholders. Antitrust is flexible, but can be 
slow and may not produce guidance that can be generalized for use by non-parties. Policymakers also 
may not like prevailing antitrust doctrin
e at any given point in time. For its part, regulation may be faster 
and provide greater certainty than antitrust lawsuits
, but can err by being over-inclusive. Finally, 
intermediate approaches that combine ongoing agency oversight with flexible legal standards can work 
quickly and potentially avoid the error costs of regulation, but may create institutions that are vulnerable 
t
o regulatory capture.  
This rough taxonomy offers a framework for evaluating the OAMA and its alternatives. The bill embraces 
the regulatory approach to promoting competition in app markets, prohibiting covered companies from 
engaging in specified categories of conduct. Accordingly, the legislation may have efficiency advantages 
over antitrust litigation, which can be costly and time-consuming. The OAMA would also hedge against 
the possibility that plaintiffs will not prevail in such litigation. (A game developer is currently
 appealing a 
lower-court decision rejecting its federal antitrust claims against Apple.)  
At the same time, regulation arguably entail
s higher potential error costs than antitrust. While a court 
adjudicating an antitrust dispute can delve deeply into a detailed factual record, bright-line rules
 apply 
broadly and may condemn some procompetitive conduct. For example, Apple has
 argued that rules 
requiring it to allow app sideloading and the use of alternative IAP processors will threaten the security of 
iOS devices. Likewise, some commentators hav
e argued that a categorical prohibition of sherlocking 
would be on net anticompetitive. (When Apple or Google integrates a feature into their operating systems 
that was previously supplied by third parties for a fee,
 consumers may benefit even if third-party 
developers suffer.) 
  
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More generally, supporters of Apple and Google have argued that existing app-store revenue models 
produce several benefits that the OAMA would disrupt. In particular, the current commission-based 
model may
 subsidize upstart developers by forcing popular apps to bear most of the costs of maintaining 
the relevant platforms. Observers have also argued that the revenue Apple and Google derive from their 
app ecosystems may allow the firms to lower prices elsewhere. Google, for instance, ha
s argued that pre-
installation of its search engine allows it to monetize Android, which it otherwise might not license to 
device manufacturers for free. One scholar has similarly
 suggested that Apple may charge less for its 
devices because of the revenue it earns from apps and IAPs. 
While antitrust and regulation have recognized costs and benefits, intermediate approaches to digital 
competition have received less attention in the United States. The United Kingdom (U.K.), however, is 
developing one such strategy. The U.K.’s Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has established a 
Digital Markets Unit (DMU) to oversee firms with “strategic market status.” While Parliament has yet to 
adopt legislation empowering the new unit, the CMA’
s proposal envisions a regime in which the DMU 
would develop firm-specific codes of conduct to achieve the general objectives of “fair trading,” “open 
choices,” and “trust and transparency.”  
Other countries have gone in a different direction. South Korea recently
 adopted rules prohibiting 
dominant app stores from forcing developers to use their in-app purchase processors. The European 
Union is also considering
 comprehensive legislation that would impose 
ex ante regulations on digital 
“gatekeepers,” with several of the rules mirroring provisions in the OAMA. Congress thus has several 
possible models to draw from in developing its approach to competition issues in app markets.      
 
Author Information 
 Jay B. Sykes 
   
Legislative Attorney  
 
 
 
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