Hot Pursuit Doctrine and Fleeing Misdemeanor Suspects: Case-by-Case Analysis Required
Legal Sidebari
Hot Pursuit Doctrine and Fleeing
Misdemeanor Suspects: Case-by-Case
Analysis Required
July 22, 2021
On June 23, 2021, the Supreme Court issued an opinion in Lange v. California holding that under the
Fourth Amendment, the pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanor suspect does not categorically qualify as an
exigent circumstance justifying a law enforcement officer’s warrantless entry of a home. In a 9-0
decision, authored by Justice Kagan, the Court determined that the need for a warrant in these types of
scenarios will depend on the totality of the circumstances and a case-by-case analysis of the exigencies
present.
Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects the “right of the people” to be free from
“unreasonable searches and seizures,” and that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” This
right hinges on an individuals’ reasonable expectation of privacy in the place to be searched or the thing
to be seized. Applying this principle, the Supreme Court has held that homeowners possess a privacy
interest that extends inside their home and the immediately surrounding curtilage. The Court also has held
that warrantless searches and seizures inside a home are presumptively unreasonable, but because
reasonableness is the cornerstone of the Fourth Amendment, the presumption may be overcome in some
circumstances and, as such, the warrant requirement is subject to exceptions.
One exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement is the “exigent circumstances” exception,
which applies when “the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling
that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” The Court has
identified several exigent circumstances that may justify a warrantless entry of a home which include:
“preventing violence and restoring order,” “rendering emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to
protect an occupant from imminent injury,” preventing the destruction of evidence or some other
consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts, or hot pursuit of a fleeing felony
suspect.
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The “hot pursuit” doctrine provides that police may pursue a fleeing felony suspect into a home, without a
warrant, when they have probable cause to make an arrest and when they set that arrest in motion in a
public place. Lower courts were divided on whether the “hot pursuit” doctrine extended to the pursuit of
misdemeanor suspects. Some courts adopted a categorical rule that the Fourth Amendment permits an
officer’s warrantless search of a home during the hot pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanor suspect. Other
courts rejected a categorical rule and instead employed a case-by-case analysis of the exigencies arising
from a fleeing misdemeanant. Prior to Lange, the Court had not addressed the issue of the hot pursuit
doctrine as applied to the pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanant.
Background
Lange involves a California State Highway Patrolman’s attempt to effectuate a traffic stop. Prior to the
attempt, the officer heard loud music and “unnecessary” honking coming from Arthur Lange’s vehicle in
violation of California law. The officer followed Lange’s car and subsequently activated the patrol car’s
overhead lights, signaling Lange to pull over. Lange, who failed to stop, drove to his driveway and
entered into his garage. Without obtaining a warrant, the officer entered the garage and proceeded to
question Lange. After witnessing signs of intoxication, the officer asked Lange to perform several field
sobriety tests, and a later blood test showed that Lange’s blood alcohol content exceeded the legal limit.
The State of California charged Lange with driving under the influence, a misdemeanor offense. Lange
moved to suppress the evidence obtained after the officer entered his garage, arguing that the officer’s
warrantless entry into his garage violated the Fourth Amendment. California courts denied Lange’s
motion, finding that the officer had probable cause to arrest Lange due to his failure to comply with a
police signal, a misdemeanor. The courts further found that the officer’s warrantless entry into Lange’s
garage was lawful because the officer was in hot pursuit of a misdemeanor suspect, and the pursuit of a
fleeing misdemeanor suspect always qualifies as an exigent circumstance authorizing a warrantless home
entry. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict between courts over whether the
Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless entry under these circumstances.
U.S. Supreme Court Decision
Balancing the sanctity of the home versus the interests of law enforcement, the Court rejected employing
a categorical rule for fleeing misdemeanants. In reaching its decision, the Court relied on its precedent
and the Fourth Amendment’s common law roots to determine that a case-by-case assessment of exigency
is necessary when deciding whether a suspected misdemeanant’s flight justifies a warrantless home entry.
According to the Court, “[w]hen the totality of circumstances shows an emergency—such as imminent
harm to others, a threat to the officer himself, destruction of evidence, or escape from the home—the
police may act without waiting.” However, “when the nature of the crime, the nature of the flight, and
surrounding facts present no such exigency,” “officers must respect the sanctity of the home—which
means they must get a warrant.”
Central to its decision, the Court considered the gamut and breadth of misdemeanor offenses and
offenders. The Court explained that while some misdemeanor offenses involve violence, they also cover
minor offenses such as public intoxication, traffic offenses, and disorderly conduct. The Court also noted
that it previously held “that when a minor offense alone is involved, police officers do not usually face the
kind of emergency that can justify a warrantless entry.” The Court recognized that misdemeanants may
attempt to “flee” for various reasons such as fear or diminished capacity as opposed to wanting to destroy
evidence or harm others. According to the Court, in these instances, waiting for a warrant would not
hinder law enforcement efforts. As a result, the Court was reluctant to establish a bright-line rule
expanding the “hot pursuit” doctrine to include misdemeanants unless some other exigency exists.
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The Court explained that this view followed the Fourth Amendment’s common law roots, when officers
had more latitude to enter a home when pursuing a felon. At that time, the definition of a felony offense
was limited to those offenses “punishable by death,” and there did not appear to be an “all misdemeanor-
flight rule.” Thus, the Court held that “the common law . . . does not support a categorical rule allowing
warrantless home entry when a misdemeanant flees.”
While the Justices unanimously agreed on vacating and remanding the case, several Justices wrote
concurrences. Justice Thomas (joined in part by Justice Kavanaugh) wrote separately to emphasize that
the majority opinion announcing a general case-by-case rule was subject to “historical, categorical
exceptions.” Justice Thomas also wrote that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable to evidence discovered
during a hot pursuit and does not require the suppression of evidence.
The Chief Justice’s concurrence (joined by Justice Alito) argued that it is the “hot pursuit” that creates the
exigency in the “hot pursuit doctrine” and not the underlying offense. The Chief Justice stated that the
case-by-case analysis was confusing, impractical, and potentially dangerous to officers and the public at
large. According to the Chief Justice, while an officer was assessing a particular situation to determine
whether the underlying offense was a felony or misdemeanor, the suspect could be long gone or could
cause harm to the occupants of the home. The Chief Justice ultimately concurred in the judgment to
vacate and remand to allow Lange the opportunity to argue that his case is the “unusual case” in which
the general “hot pursuit” rule should not apply, and that his actions did not constitute a flight.
Justice Kavanaugh wrote a separate concurrence, reasoning that there is little practical difference between
the Court’s reasoning and the Chief Justice’s concurrence. According to Justice Kavanaugh, in most
instances of a hot pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanant, there will also be a recognizable exigent
circumstance such as the destruction of evidence, risk of harm to others, or risk of escape, that will justify
warrantless entry into a home.
Author Information
Alison M. Smith
Legislative Attorney
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