Legal Sidebari 
 
Supreme Court Invalidates California Donor 
Disclosure Rule on First Amendment Grounds 
July 13, 2021 
On July 1, 2021, the Supreme Court
 struck down part of a California
 regulation requiring
 charitable 
organizations registered in the State to disclose their major donors to the State Attorney General’s 
office—information the federal Internal Revenue Service (IRS) also collects. In 
Americans for Prosperity 
Foundation v. Bonta, the Court
 ruled that the State’s disclosure requirement violated the donors’ First 
Amendment right to freedom of association. This Legal Sidebar provides an overview of the relevant 
constitutional standards, a summary of the case and the Court’s decision, and a discussion of the 
decision’s potential consequences for federal and state donor disclosure requirements.  
Freedom of Association and Disclosure Requirements 
The
 First Amendment does not explicitly mention the “freedom of association.” The Supreme Court, 
however, has long
 considered the “freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and 
ideas” an “inseparable aspect of . . . freedom of speech.” This freedom includes, to some extent, the right 
to speak and associat
e anonymously. Thus, the “compelle
d disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged 
in advocacy” implicates protected associational rights. Although they are not the only Supreme Court 
cases on t
he compelled disclosure of affiliations, two decisions in particular are important for 
understanding the Justices’ positions in 
Americans for Prosperity: the Court’s 1958 decision in
 NAACP v. 
Alabama ex rel. 
Patterson and its 1976 decision i
n Buckley v. Valeo.  
NAACP involved an Alabama court’s contempt order against the NAACP for refusing to disclose the 
names and addresses of its Alabama members in a dispute involving the organization’s compliance with 
state business registration requirements. In
 evaluating whether disclosure of the organization’s “rank-and-
file members” to the State would violate the First Amendment, the Court
 recounted the “uncontroverted” 
evidence that on past occasions, publicly identified NAACP members were subject to “economic reprisal, 
loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility.” It was 
“apparent” to the Court that the threat of these harms could lead current members to leave the NAACP or 
discourage others from joining it.  
The Court
 held that Alabama had not advanced an
 interest “sufficient to justify the deterrent effect” of the 
disclosures. The Court
 explained that knowing the NAACP’s “ordinary” members’ identities was 
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unnecessary for the State to verify compliance with the registration requirement—its sole justification for 
obtaining the lists—because the NAACP acknowledged its presence and activities in the State and 
provided the names of its directors and officers, the total number of its Alabama members, and the 
amount of their dues. 
While 
NAACP concerned an organization’s 
membership, 
Buckley involved the chilling effects associated 
with the disclosure of an organization’s 
donors. The 
Buckley Court
 considered a federal election law 
requiring political committees and candidates to submit quarterly reports to the Federal Election 
Commission (FEC). The statut
e required the reports to include the names, addresses, and contributions of 
each person who contributed more than $100 in a single year, and required the FEC to make this 
information publicly available. The Court held that the First Amendment protects contributors’ 
anonymity
, reasoning that “the invasion of privacy of belief may be as great when the information sought 
concerns the giving and spending of money as when it concerns the joining of organizations, for 
‘[f]inancial transactions can reveal much about a person’s activities, associations, and beliefs.’” The Court 
interpreted 
NAACP and subsequent decisions t
o require “exacting scrutiny” and a “‘substantial relation’ 
between the governmental interest and the information required to be disclosed.” 
Applying this standard, the 
Buckley Cour
t reasoned that the FEC disclosure requirements “directly 
serve[d]” three “substantial” interests. First, disclosure would hel
p voters make informed decisions at the 
polls by understanding “where political campaign money comes from and how it is spent” by candidates. 
Second, disclosure would “deter actual
 corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption by exposing 
large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity.” (The Court later
 held that this anti-
corruption rationale does not encompass the general influence of lobbyists, but only the deterrence of 
“quid pro quo” exchanges.) Third, the 
Buckley Court
 recognized the government’s interest in “gathering 
the data necessary to detect violations” of campaign contribution limits set forth elsewhere in the law. 
Balancing these competing interests, the Court
 concluded that the disclosure requirements were justified 
in relation to the burden they placed on individual rights. The Court
 emphasized that “any serious 
infringement on First Amendment rights” was “highly speculative” because the plaintiffs offer
ed no 
evidence of “harassment on a similar scale” to the history of reprisals in 
NAACP v. Alabama. However, 
the Court
 suggested that minor parties or contributors could succeed in a future as-applied challenge to a 
disclosure requirement if they could show burdens commensurate with those in 
NAACP. 
Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta 
California law requires charitable organizations operating in or soliciting funds in the State to
 register 
with the State and to file certai
n documents with the State Attorney General on an annual basis. These 
documents include Form 990—th
e IRS’s “primary tool for gathering information about tax-exempt 
organizations”—along with any applicable 
“attachments and schedules.” Starting i
n 2010, the State 
Attorney General began to send deficiency notices to organizations that did not file 
“Schedule B” to 
Form 990, which generally
 lists the names, addresses, and total contributions of donors who gave $5,000 
or more to the organization during a single tax year. Facing
 suspension of their registrations for continued 
withholding of Schedule B information, two organizations
 filed lawsuits challenging the Schedule B 
requirement on First Amendment grounds.  
In both cases, the district court
 held after a trial that California’s Schedule B requirement violates the First 
Amendment as applied to the plaintiff-organizations and permanently enjoined the State Attorney General 
from enforcing the requirement against them. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in 
a consolidated appeal
, holding that the Schedule B requirement survived exacting scrutiny because it is 
“substantially related to an important state interest in policing charitable fraud.”  
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit. In a 6-3 decision, the Court ruled that California’s 
Schedule B requirement violated the First Amendment. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice John 
  
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Roberts, Jr.
 reasoned that while California has an “important interest in preventing wrongdoing by 
charitable organizations,” there is a 
“dramatic mismatch” between that interest and its 
“up-front,” 
“blanket demand” for Schedule Bs. The Cour
t credited the district court’s finding that “there was not ‘a 
single, concrete instance in which pre-investigation collection of a Schedule B did anything to advance 
the [State] Attorney General’s investigative, regulatory or enforcement efforts.’” The Cour
t concluded 
that “California’s interest is less in investigating fraud and more in ease of administration,” which, 
according to the Court, is an insufficient governmental interest to justify the burden that the Schedule B 
requirement placed on donors’ association rights. The Court also concluded that the disclosure 
requirement was not appropriately tailored to the government’s interest
, reasoning that California “cast[] a 
dragnet for sensitive donor information” without exploring narrower alternatives such as subpoenas or 
audit letters.  
Five of the six Justices in the majority
 concluded that the Schedule B requirement violated the First 
Amendment “on its face
” because “a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional.” F
or 
those Justices, the “lack of tailoring to the State’s investigative goals is categorical—present in every 
case—as is the weakness of the State’s interest in administrative convenience.
” Justice Clarence Thomas 
would have held only that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiffs in the case.  
While all six Justices in the majority agreed that the Schedule B requirement was unconstitutional, they 
disagreed over the level of scrutiny that the Court should apply to this and other disclosure requirements. 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Brett Kavanaugh and Amy Coney Barret
t determined that 
Buckley’s 
exacting scrutiny test applies, not just to campaign finance and election cases, but to all “compelled 
disclosure requirements” that implicate the freedom of association. They, along with the other three 
Justices in the majority
, held that under exacting scrutiny, the disclosure requirement must be both: 
(1) “substantially related” to a “sufficiently important” governmental interest; 
and (2) “narrowly tailored” 
to that interest. Unlike the “strict scrutiny” that applies to certain restrictions on speech, however, 
“exacting scrutiny” does 
not demand that the disclosure requirement be the 
“least restrictive means” of 
achieving the government’s interest
. Justice Thomas would have applied strict scrutiny, which he views as 
more consistent with the Court’s precedents on compelled disclosures of association
. Justices Samuel 
Alito and Neil Gorsuch reasoned that because the Schedule B requirement clearly fails exacting scrutiny, 
it “necessarily” fails strict scrutiny too. Accordingly, they deemed it
 unnecessary to decide in 
Americans 
for Prosperity which standard applies to this or other circumstances involving the compelled disclosure of 
associations.  
Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote th
e dissent, which Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan joined. The 
dissent would hav
e upheld California’s Schedule B requirement under a mor
e flexible exacting scrutiny 
test “whereby the degree of means-end tailoring required is commensurate to the actual burdens on 
associational rights.” In the
 dissent’s view, the majority “discard[ed]” the Court’s “decades-long 
requirement that, to establish a cognizable burden on their associational rights, plaintiffs must plead and 
prove that disclosure will likely expose them to objective harms, such as threats, harassment, or 
reprisals.” The Court’s analysis, the dissent
 posited, “marks reporting and disclosure requirements with a 
bull’s eye” b
y presuming that “all disclosure requirements impose associational burdens,” thereby 
requiring “close scrutiny” whenever a litigant expresses “a subjective preference for privacy.”  
Potential Consequences of the Decision 
Americans for Prosperity generated interest from some
 Members of
 Congress because of its potential to 
clarify or change the First Amendment standards for evaluating donor disclosure requirements at the 
federal level, including
 election-related disclosure requirements. This section explores the potential 
ramifications of the decision.  
  
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The scope of the 
Americans for Prosperity ruling addresses only the constitutionality of California’s 
Schedule B requirement. The Court’s reasoning, however, potentially calls into question the 
constitutionality of other states’ Schedule B requirements. At least
 three other states
—Hawaii, New 
Jersey, and New York—have a Schedule B disclosure requirement similar to California’s. In a 2018 
decision, 
Citizens United v. Schneiderman, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
 held that the 
State of New York had a sufficient interest in “preventing fraud and self-dealing in charities” to justify 
requesting Schedule B filings from nonprofit organizations. A key factor in the 
Schneiderman analysis 
was the State’s policy to keep Schedule B informati
on confidential. Because the Supreme Court in 
Americans for Prosperity found that the confidentiality of the California filings did not completely 
eliminate the chill on associational interests, the decision could provide new grounds for charities to 
challenge Schedule B disclosure requirements, requiring a state to demonstrate, based on its use of 
Schedule Bs, that its disclosure requirement is narrowly tailored to an important government interest.  
The decision could have implications for donor disclosure requirements in federal tax law as well. Certain 
nonprofit organizations that are exempt from federal taxation under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal 
Revenue Code (such as the plaintiffs in 
Americans for Prosperity) must file
 Schedule Bs with the IRS on 
an annual basis. Additionally, certain political organizations described i
n Section 527 of the Internal 
Revenue Code must also report information about their donors who contributed at least $200 in a calendar 
year on Schedule A of
 Form 8872. Because the federal government is responsible for enforcing federal 
income tax laws, it may be able to assert different regulatory or law enforcement interests than California 
to support its donor disclosure requirements. In an amicus filing in 
Americans for Prosperity, the United 
States
 argued that the federal disclosure requirement for 501(c)(3) organizations is a permissible condition 
on a federal benefit; that is, the federal government’s subsidization of 501(c)(3)s through tax-exempt 
status and deductions for charitable contributions. 
Beyond the tax context, the decision has potential ramifications for how courts evaluate First Amendment 
challenges to reporting and other disclosure requirements. The decision suggests that, at least where the 
disclosur
e might chill protected association, those requirements could be subject to exacting scrutiny, 
including a narrow-tailoring analysis. For example, as som
e legal scholars hav
e suggested, the decision 
might affect the constitutionality of
 campaign finance disclosure requirements, which t
he Supreme Court 
has not subjected to a narrow-tailoring analysis. There are, however, two circumstances where a different 
level of scrutiny may apply. Whether characterized as a disclosure, disclaimer, reporting, or labeling 
requirement, if the compelled disclosure requires an organization to transmit th
e government’s message, a 
court could review that law under strict scrutiny, requiring the government to show that it is the least 
restrictive means of achieving a compelling governmental interest. By contrast, if the compelled 
disclosure involves commercial speech, describes the regulated entity’s
 own products or services, and 
requires 
“purely factual and uncontroversial” information, it may be subject to 
a less stringent form of 
review than exacting scrutiny. 
 
Author Information 
 Victoria L. Killion 
   
Legislative Attorney  
 
 
  
Congressional Research Service 
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