Jones v. Mississippi, the Eighth Amendment, and Juvenile Life Without Parole
Legal Sidebari
Jones v. Mississippi, the Eighth Amendment,
and Juvenile Life Without Parole
April 26, 2021
On April 22, 2021, the Supreme Court decided Jones v. Mississippi, holding that the Eighth Amendment’s
ban on cruel and unusual punishments does not require a finding that a juvenile offender is permanently
incorrigible before the juvenile may be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. This
Sidebar provides a basic discussion of the Eighth Amendment jurisprudence related to juvenile life
without parole sentencing, then outlines the majority opinion, concurrence, and dissent in Jones. A
previous Legal Sidebar provided additional background on the issue of juvenile life without parole
sentencing, outlined the relevant precedents that the Supreme Court considered in Jones, and discussed
the legal arguments presented in the case.
The Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” The Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth Amendment to
impose a categorical ban on the use of certain forms of punishment. In addition, the Court has held that
certain punishments that are permissible in some circumstances are nonetheless unconstitutional as
applied to particular classes of defendants.
One class of offenders that has been the subject of considerable Eighth Amendment litigation is juvenile
offenders. In the past decade and a half, the Supreme Court has issued several opinions outlining
constitutional limitations on punishing juvenile offenders. First, in the 2005 case Roper v. Simmons, the
Court held that juvenile offenders may not constitutionally be sentenced to death. Five years later, in
Graham v. Florida, the Supreme Court held that juveniles may not be sentenced to life without parole for
non-homicide offenses. In the 2012 case Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment forbids any sentencing scheme that mandates life without parole for juvenile offenders upon
conviction for certain offenses; however, the Court held that sentencers who consider an offender’s youth
and attendant characteristics may impose discretionary juvenile life without parole sentences in homicide
cases. Finally, in the 2016 case Montgomery v. Louisiana, the Court held that Miller’s prohibition on
mandatory life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders applied retroactively to convictions that
were final before Miller was decided. Justice Kennedy, joined by five other Justices, explained that Miller
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had announced a new substantive rule by “bar[ring] life without parole . . . for all but the rarest of juvenile
offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.”
The Jones Case and the Supreme Court’s Decision
Jones v. Mississippi involved the Eighth Amendment claims of Brett Jones, who was sentenced to life
without parole for a murder he committed at the age of fifteen. Jones initially received a mandatory life
without parole sentence, but later sought resentencing based on Miller. The state circuit court resentenced
Jones to life without parole. In doing so, the court did not find that Jones was permanently incorrigible or
otherwise explicitly consider his capacity for rehabilitation. The court did, however, state that it had
“considered each of the Miller factors” and discussed various mitigating and aggravating factors
including the circumstances of the crime, Jones’s home environment, and his maturity level. Following
unsuccessful state-court appeals, Jones filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court,
which was granted on March 9, 2020.
Before the Supreme Court, Jones argued that the Eighth Amendment, as interpreted in Miller and
Montgomery, “prohibits sentencing juvenile homicide offenders to life without parole unless they are
permanently incorrigible.” To comply with that prohibition, he contended, “[w]hen a juvenile homicide
offender asserts that he is not permanently incorrigible, . . . a court must resolve the question of
corrigibility before it may impose a life-without-parole sentence.” The State of Mississippi countered that
the Eighth Amendment “does not require a ‘finding’ of permanent incorrigibility,” but simply mandates
“that sentencers consider youth and its attendant characteristics before sentencing a juvenile to life
without parole.” Because Jones received individualized review of his sentence during his resentencing
proceeding, the State argued that his sentence satisfied the requirements of Miller and Montgomery.
On April 22, 2021, a majority of the Supreme Court rejected Jones’s challenge to his sentence and
affirmed the decision of the state court. Justice Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion, which Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett joined. The majority held that “a separate factual
finding of permanent incorrigibility is not required” before a juvenile may be sentenced to life without
parole. Rather, a state sentencing scheme that gives the sentencer discretion whether to impose a life
without parole sentence for a juvenile homicide offender “is both constitutionally necessary and
constitutionally sufficient.” In reaching its conclusion, the majority opinion repeatedly cited Miller and
Montgomery, relying in particular on statements in Montgomery that “Miller did not impose a formal
factfinding requirement” and that “a finding of fact regarding a child’s incorrigibility . . . is not required.”
Each of the separate opinions addressed the question of whether the Court’s decision was consistent with
stare decisis, and in particular the 2016 Montgomery decision. Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment
but argued that the majority opinion had “[o]verrule[d] Montgomery in substance but not in name” by
purporting to follow Montgomery but holding that “Jones is not entitled to a determination whether he
falls within a constitutionally protected category of offenders.” Justice Thomas argued that the Court
should instead expressly overrule Montgomery because that decision is “irreconcilable with Miller . . . and
the Constitution” and “demonstrably erroneous.”
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan, filed a dissent arguing that the majority’s
decision was inconsistent with the Court’s prior decisions in Miller and Montgomery. Quoting from those
decisions, Justice Sotomayor asserted:
Sentencing discretion is “necessary to separate those juveniles who may be sentenced to life without
parole from those who may not,” . . . but it is far from sufficient. A sentencer must actually “make
th[e] judgment” that the juvenile in question is one of those rare children for whom [life without
parole] is a constitutionally permissible sentence.
The dissent further argued that the majority opinion was inconsistent with the way the Court construed
Miller in Montgomery. Justice Sotomayor objected that “Montgomery’s interpretation of Miller is binding
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precedent, just as Miller itself is,” and that the majority provided no justification for any departure from
precedent. Notwithstanding those concerns, the dissent asserted that “[f]or present purposes, sentencers
should hold this Court to its word: Miller and Montgomery are still good law.”
While acknowledging the dissenters’ view “that we are unduly narrowing Miller and Montgomery,” the
majority responded that its decision “carefully follows both Miller and Montgomery” and “does not
overrule” those cases, and asserted that “we, by contrast, think that the dissent would unduly broaden
those decisions.”
Considerations for Congress
Jones involved a challenge to a state sentencing proceeding, and the Supreme Court’s decision in this
case did not articulate any new Eighth Amendment protections. Thus, it is not clear that the Supreme
Court’s decision in Jones will directly affect the small number of federal inmates currently serving
juvenile life without parole sentences. However, Congress could pass legislation to alter juvenile life
without parole sentencing under federal law. (While Supreme Court decisions articulating substantive
constitutional rights bind the states as well as the federal government, Congress lacks the constitutional
authority to alter state criminal law, which is traditionally considered an area of state and local concern.)
Any legislation Congress might enact would be subject to the constitutional limits articulated in Miller,
Montgomery, and any other applicable cases. Thus, Congress could place additional limits on juvenile life
without parole sentencing, but could not narrow the scope of Eighth Amendment protections announced
by the Supreme Court. For example, Congress could enact legislation requiring federal courts to make
certain explicit findings before imposing a juvenile life without parole sentence or otherwise limiting the
availability of such sentences under federal law. Congress could also expand resentencing options for
federal offenders serving juvenile life without parole sentences. For example, a proposal from the 116th
Congress entitled the Next Step Act of 2019 would have allowed courts to reduce the sentence of a federal
juvenile offender tried as an adult if the offender had served at least 20 years in prison and the court found
that (1) the offender did not pose a safety risk and (2) the interests of justice warranted a sentence
modification. Similarly, the Second Look Act of 2019 would have allowed federal inmates sentenced to
more than ten years in prison to petition for sentence reductions. The Second Look Act would not have
limited such petitions to juvenile offenders, but would have directed courts to consider factors including
“the diminished culpability of juveniles as compared to that of adults, and the hallmark features of youth,
including immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences, if the defendant was
a juvenile at the time of the offense.”
Author Information
Joanna R. Lampe
Legislative Attorney
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