Legal Sidebari  
Three Strikes, You’re Out: Supreme Court to 
Consider Limit on Prisoner Litigation 
Updated June 8, 2020 
UPDATE: The Supreme Court issued its opinion in Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez on June 8, 2020. The full 
Court agreed that “[t]he text of Section 1915(g)’s three-strikes provision refers to any dismissal for 
failure to state a claim, whether with prejudice or without.” 
The original post from February 20, 2020, is below. 
The Administrative Office of the United States Court
s reports that in 2018, state and federal prisoners 
filed nearly 54,000 suits in federal district court. Such litigation, which often chal enges the conditions of 
confinement in federal and state prisons, may al ow prisoners t
o vindicate fundamental rights but can also 
place a heavy burden on the federal courts that hear the cases and the government officials who must 
defend against them. T
he Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) seeks to balance those competing 
interests, 
“ensuring that the flood of nonmeritorious claims does not submerge and effectively preclude 
consideration of the al egations with merit.” On February 26, 2020, the Supreme Court is scheduled to 
hear oral argument in the latest dispute over the PLRA,
 Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez. The case concerns the 
scope of the PLRA’s “three strikes” provision, which aims to limit meritless litigation  by prisoners. This 
Sidebar outlines the applicable legal regime, explaining how the PLRA modified the law related to 
prisoner litigation. The Sidebar then summarizes the litigation  in 
Lomax and presents key considerations 
for Congress. 
Statutory Background 
Proceedings In Forma Pauperis 
By statute, a person who files suit in federal court must general y prepay a filing fee, which currently 
totals
 $400 for most civil actions brought in district court. Charging filing fees is understood to benefit the 
judiciary not only by helping to cover the courts
’ operating costs, but also 
by deterring excessive 
litigation:  if litigants must pay hundreds of dollars every time they file a lawsuit, they may be less 
inclined to initiate time- and resource-consuming litigation with a low probability of success.  
T
o ensure that filing fees do not prevent indigent litigants from bringing potential y meritorious lawsuits, 
in the late 19th century Congress enacted legislation al owing litigants who submit an affidavit of 
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indigence to procee
d in forma pauperis (IFP) and commence suit without prepaying court fees. However, 
as the Supreme Court ha
s noted, “a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, 
unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or 
repetitive lawsuits.” T
he federal IFP statute thus contains provisions designed to discourage frivolous 
litigation  and reduce the burden on the courts, such as a requirement that courts dismiss certain IFP suits 
that are futile or lack merit.  
The PLRA and Indigent Prisoner Litigation 
Prior to 1996, prisoners proceeding IFP were subject to the same rules as other indigent litigants. That 
year, however, Congress enacted the PLRA based on a finding that “prisoner suits . . . represented a 
disproportionate share of federal filings.” The PLRA contains multiple provisions general y intended to 
“reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits.” For example, the PLRA limits the scope 
of
 prospective relief available  in lawsuits concerning prison conditions, meaning that courts may only 
grant a
n injunction related to prison conditions if it “is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary 
. . . , and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of [a] Federal right.” The statute 
also contains a
n exhaustion provision that bars prisoners from filing suits related to prison conditions 
before seeking al  available  remedies through the prison grievance system. Furthermore, the PLRA 
requires courts to dismiss any acti
on related to prison conditions or any prisoner complai
nt against a 
governmental entity if the complaint is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may 
be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune. 
The PLRA  also specifical y modifies the IFP requirements for prisoners. First, the PLRA provides that 
prisoners proceeding IFP—unlike non-prisoners—general 
y remain liable for the full filing fee. While 
indigent  prisoners need not prepay the full fee before pursuing litigation, they must pay the fee in 
instal ments based on the amount of funds in their prison trust account. A prisoner with no available assets 
can bring suit without paying a partial filing fee, but may be required to make instal ment payments later 
if funds become available. (T
he courts of appeals have split on the question of whether a prisoner remains 
liable  for fees assessed under the PLRA after release.) In addition, as relevant in 
Lomax, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(g) (known as the PLRA’s three strikes provision) provides: 
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding 
under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained 
in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the 
grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, 
unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. 
Each time a prisoner has a suit dismissed on one of the enumerated grounds, the dismissa
l counts as a 
“strike.” Prisoners who incur three strikes ordinaril
y may stil  file lawsuits, but must either prepay the full 
filing fee or demonstrate that they are in imminent danger of serious physical injury. 
  
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Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez 
The question presented in 
Lomax is whether 
all dismissals for failure to state a claim constitute strikes 
under the PLRA. As background, a court faced with a defective complaint may dismiss the complaint 
either with or without prejudice. If a complaint suffers from potential y curable defects, the court may 
dismiss 
without prejudice, al owing the plaintiff to remedy the issues and attempt to bring the same claims 
again in a new complaint. For example, unde
r Heck v. Humphrey, a person may not sue for damages for 
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment unless the chal enged conviction has already been reversed 
on appeal  or otherwise invalidated. If a person whose conviction has not been invalidated brings a civil 
suit chal enging the conviction, the court wil  general y dismiss w ithout prejudice under 
Heck, leaving the 
plaintiff the opportunity to bring suit again if and when the conviction is overturned. By contrast, if a 
complaint suffers from incurable defects or a plaintiff repeatedly fails to remedy potential y curable 
defects, the court may dismiss 
with prejudice. For instance, dismissal with prejudice may be appropriate if 
a complaint is
 frivolous—containing al egations that are “clearly baseless,” “fanciful,” or “delusional”—
and could not be “remedied through more specific pleading.” Dismissal with prejudice bars the plaintiff 
from attempting to bring the same claims again in the future.  
While there appears to be no dispute that dismissal 
with prejudice for failure to state a claim counts as a 
strike under the PLRA, the
 courts of appeals have split on whether dismissal 
without prejudice for failure 
to state a claim counts as a strike. 
Petitioner Arthur James Lomax is incarcerated in Colorado. In 2018, 
he sued several corrections officials, 
raising constitutional claims arising from his expulsion from a sex offender treatment program. The 
district court ordered Lomax to show cause why he should not be required to prepay the full filing fee 
because he previously had three suits dismissed for failure to state a claim. One of Lomax’s prior 
complaints was dismissed with prejudice; Lomax did not contest that that dismissal was a strike. 
However, his two other complaints were dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim under 
Heck. Lomax contended that the two dismissals without prejudice did not constitute strikes. The district 
court disagreed a
nd denied Lomax leave to proceed IFP. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit (Tenth Circuit
) affirmed the denial. Lomax also argued before both the district court and the 
Tenth Circuit that he was eligible for IFP status because he faced imminent danger of serious physical 
injury. However, both courts rejected that argument, and the Supreme Cour
t granted certiorari only as to 
the question of whether “a dismissal without prejudice for failure to state a claim count[s] as a strike” 
under the three strikes provision. 
Before the Supreme Court, Loma
x argues that his two complaints that were dismissed without prejudice 
for failure to state a claim do not count as strikes because the PLRA’s three strikes provision mirrors the 
language i
n Federal Rule of Civil  Procedure 12(b)(6) governing “failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted.” Courts presume that a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) i
s with prejudice unless the issuing 
court specifies otherwise. Likewise, Lomax contends, Congress’s use of the phrase “fails to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted” in the PLRA implicitly  applies only to the default form of dismissal—
dismissal with prejudice. 
Lomax also asserts that the PLRA’
s broader structure supports his position because the other grounds for 
dismissal that count as strikes “apply to actions that cannot succeed,” rather than complaints suffering 
from curable defects. Similarly, Lomax claims that the PLRA’s
 legislative history supports his position 
because the Congress that enacted the PLRA “sought to weed out and deter only truly meritless and 
frivolous actions,” rather than “potential y ‘legitimate claims’ that were dismissed without prejudice 
because of some pleading error or procedural barrier.” Lomax argues that interpreting the three strikes 
provision to include dismissals without prejudice would improperly restrict prisoners’ right of access to 
federal court 
by imposing strikes for legitimate claims that suffer from curable flaws. He also contends 
  
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that the Court should not adopt such an interpretation because it would rais
e constitutional questions 
involving the right of access to court by prisoners and indigent litigants. 
The respondent corrections officials and the United States a
s amicus curiae assert that dismissal for 
failure to state a claim is a strike, whether the dismissal is with or without prejudice. The corrections 
officials argue that the
 plain meaning of the word “dismissed” as used in the three strikes provision 
embraces al  dismissals, whether with or without prejudice. They note that Congress has enacte
d other 
statutes that apply only to dismissals with (or without) prejudice, and assert that the Court should not 
imply  such a limitation  if Congress did not expressly impose it in the PLRA. The corrections officials also 
contend that the PLRA’
s legislative  history supports their interpretation of the statute because the 
Congress that enacted the PLRA hoped to relieve courts from “the crushing burden of . . . frivolous suits.” 
Final y, they argue that their interpretation of the three strikes provision woul
d not unduly limit  prisoners’ 
access to court, either as a matter of public policy or constitutional law. 
Possible Outcomes and Considerations for Congress 
As noted above, the federal appel ate courts have split with respect to the issue presented in 
Lomax. The 
Third a
nd Fourth Circuits have construed the three strikes provision to encompass dismissals for failure to 
state a claim only if entered with prejudice. Those court
s reasoned that a dismissal for failure to state a 
claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is presumed to be rendered with prejudice, so “a dismissal without prejudice 
for failure to state a claim does not fal  within the plain and unambiguous meaning” of the three strikes 
provision. By contrast, a majority of appel ate courts that have considered the issue held tha
t dismissal 
without prejudice counts as a strike under the PLRA. Those courts general y relied on the fact that the text 
of the three strikes provision does not expressly limit its effects to dismissals without prejudice.  
In deciding 
Lomax, the Supreme Court may consider whether the three strikes provision—particularly an 
interpretation of the provision that would place more stringent limits on prisoner litigation—raises 
constitutional concerns. However, federal courts have general y recognized few constitutional constraints 
on civil filing fees. The Supreme Court ha
s emphasized that “a constitutional requirement to waive court 
fees in civil cases is the exception, not the general rule,” and exists only when a “fundamental interest” is 
at stake. Moreover, while the Supreme Court has not previously considered the constitutionality of the 
three strikes provision, numerous federal appel ate courts ha
ve concluded the provision is constitutional. 
To the extent 
Lomax hinges on a pure question of statutory interpretation, Congress could amend the 
PLRA  (before or after the Supreme Court rules) to clarify how the three strikes provision should apply. 
The parties’ arguments in 
Lomax invoking competing canons of statutory interpretation—such as 
presumptions about the three strikes provision’s plain meaning or the invitation to construe the word 
“dismissed” in light of its meaning in Rule 12(b)(6)—suggest key considerations Congress could take 
into account if it sought to amend the statute. Ultimately, though, the interpretive arguments that both 
sides raise with respect to the three strikes provision could be overcome with express language specifying 
whether a dismissal without prejudice constitutes a strike.  
Lomax takes place against a background of broader policy debates about the PLRA. Some commentators 
object that the PLRA places too many limits on prisoner litigation and contend that Congress should 
reform the law 
or repeal the statute altogether. Other
s counter that prisoners continue to file high volumes 
of meritless cases and suggest that ongoing burden may warrant more rigorous controls on prisoner 
litigation. While the Supreme Court has not previously taken up the issue presented in 
Lomax, it has 
considered the PLRA in other contexts, with varying results for each side of the policy debate. The Court 
previously invoked the three strikes provision’s plain text a
nd the statute’s purpose “to filter out the bad 
claims and facilitate consideration of the good” in holding that a covered dismissal counts as a strike even 
while any appeal from the dismissal remains pending. That decision disagreed with a majority of courts of 
appeals and adopted an interpretation of the three strikes provision that imposed more stringent limits on
  
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prisoner litigation. On the other hand, the Supreme Court ha
s invalidated court rules requiring prisoners to 
demonstrate compliance with the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement in their complaints, explaining that 
“the policy and purpose underlying the PLRA” did not justify “adopting different and more onerous 
pleading rules” than those required by the statute. The differing results in these cases and the ongoing 
disputes over the meaning of the PLRA may suggest a role for Congress in resolving many of the legal 
and policy debates surrounding prisoner litigation. 
The Supreme Court wil  likely issue a decision in 
Lomax by June 2020. 
 
Author Information 
 Joanna R. Lampe 
   
Legislative Attorney  
 
 
 
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