Legal Sidebari 
 
The Supreme Court Temporarily Blocks 
Citizenship Question on the 2020 Census 
Mainon A. Schwartz 
Legislative Attorney 
Benjamin Hayes 
Legislative Attorney 
Updated July 3, 2019 
UPDATE: On July 2, 2019, the Department of Justice announced that the 2020 census form will not 
include a citizenship question. This development likely renders moot all pending challenges to the 
Department of Commerce’s decision to add a citizenship question to the 2020 census. Nonetheless, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Department of Commerce v. New York
 could have important implications 
for administrative law and election law, as well as for any future effort to add a citizenship question to the 
census.   
The original post from June 28, 2019, is below. 
On June 27, 2019, the Supreme Court issued its decision i
n Department of Commerce v. New York—the 
case involving several challenges to the decision by the Secretary of the Department of Commerce 
(Commerce), Wilbur Ross, to add a citizenship question to the 2020 census. Chief Justice Roberts 
authored the opinion for a majority of the Court, though different combinations of Justices comprised the 
majority for different parts of the opinion. In that opinion, the Supreme Court held that the Secretary’s 
decision did not violate the Enumeration Clause of the U.S. Constitution or the Census Act, and that the 
Secretary’s decision was supported by evidence before the agency. However, the Chief Justice—joined by 
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan—concluded that the Secretary’s decision was unlawful 
because the reason he gave for adding the citizenship question was not the actual reason for his decision. 
The Court thus instructed that the case be sent back to Commerce to allow the Secretary to provide a non-
pretextual justification for his decision. But the window for the agency to provide that justification is 
closing: the United States has represented that the deadline for finalizing the 2020 census questionnaire is 
the end of
 June 2019 while the plaintiffs have suggested that the deadline is the end of
 October 2019. 
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CRS Legal Sidebar 
Prepared for Members and  
 Committees of Congress 
 
  
 
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Moreover, at least one ongoing lawsuit challenging the Secretary’s decision involves a legal argument not 
addressed by the Supreme Court’s decision, thus presenting another possible barrier to the addition of a 
citizenship question to the 2020 census. 
This Sidebar provides an overview of the legal framework governing the census and the legal challenges 
to Commerce’s decision to include a citizenship question on the 2020 census. The Sidebar then discusses 
the Supreme Court’s decision, identifies issues left unresolved by the decision, and addresses potential 
considerations for Congress. 
Legal Framework for the Census 
Article I, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, as amended by
 Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
requires that an “actual Enumeration” be taken—that is, that “the whole number of . . . persons” in each 
State be counted—“every . . . Term of ten Years, in such Manner as [Congress] shall by Law direct.” The 
results of the
 decennial census ar
e used to determine the number of seats each state will have in the U.S. 
House of Representatives for the next decade and t
o allocate certain federal funds among the states. 
In line with the Constitution’s directive, Congress, through the Census Act, ha
s required the Secretary of 
Commerce to “take a decennial census of population” and grants the Secretary discretion to do so “in 
such form and content as he may determine” and to “obtain such other census information as necessary.” 
The discretion conferred by the Census Act, however, is not unlimited. Though the Secretary has
 authority 
to “prepare questionnaires” to obtain information by means of 
“direct inquir[y],” Section 6(c) of the Act 
instructs the Secretary to first attempt to obtain such information from federal, state, or local government 
administrative sources “[t]o the maximum extent possible” and “consistent with the kind, timeliness, 
quality and scope” of the information needed. Moreover, to facilitate congressional oversight, Section 
141(f) of the Act
 directs the Secretary to “submit [reports] to the [appropriate] committees of Congress” 
identifying 
1.  the “subjects proposed to be included [on the census questionnaire], and the types of 
information to be compiled”;  
2.  “the questions proposed to be included in [the] census”; and  
3.  if “new circumstances exist” that require the “subjects, types of information, or 
questions” to be modified, a report containing those modifications.  
To help ensure accurate census data, federal l
aw requires individuals to respond to the census 
questionnaire. Those who refuse, willfully neglect to respond, or willfully give false answers, may be 
subject to monetary penalties. And to protect personal privacy, federal l
aw prohibits Commerce 
employees (which
 includes Census Bureau employees) from using, publishing, or allowing others to 
“examine” census information (except in narrowly defined circumstances). Violator
s may face monetary 
penalties and imprisonment. 
Legal Challenges 
Many prior decennial censuses have included a question related to national origin or citizenship. With one 
exception, a question about citizenship was asked of at least some of the population as part of every 
census from
 1820 through 1950, though that question was removed from the general census questionnaire 
after the 1950 census. From
 1970 through 2000, a citizenship questi
on was included in a longer version of 
the decennial census form sent t
o a fraction of the population. This “long form survey” was later
 replaced 
by t
he American Community Survey—an annual survey sent to only
 a portion of the population—which 
has included a citizenship questi
on since 2005. 
  
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On March 26, 2018, Secretary Ross issue
d a memorandum stating that the Census Bureau would add
 a 
citizenship question to the 2020 decennial census form that would be distributed to every household. As 
the sole basis for the inclusion of this question, Secretary Ross
 explained that he made this decision 
because the Department of Justice (DOJ) had requested the inclusion of a citizenship question to facilitate 
enforcement of
 Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA). Section 2 of the VRA prohibits voting 
practices that
 dilute minority voting power and a plaintiff making a “vote dilution” clai
m must show 
(among other things) that the 
“eligible voters” of a minority group—who usually must be citizens—are “a 
majority in a single-member district” capable of electing their candidate of choice. 
After the memorandum was released, several plaintiff groups filed lawsuits in federal district court in 
California, Maryland, and New York, challenging the Secretary’s decision. They argued, among other 
things, that the decision violated (1) t
he Enumeration Clause, (2) t
he equal protection component of the 
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, (3
) Sections 6(c) and 141(f) of the Census Act, and (4) the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 
On January 15, 2019, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York issued a 277-page 
opinion concluding
 that Secretary Ross’s decision to add a citizenship question to the 2020 census was 
unlawful.
 First, the court ruled that the Secretary’s decision violat
ed Section 6(c)’s requirement that 
Commerce rely “[t]o the maximum extent possible” on state and federal administrative records to obtain 
desired information.
 Second, the court held that the Secretary violat
ed Section 141(f) by failing to timely 
report to Congress that citizenship would be a “subject” addressed on the census questionnaire
. Finally, 
the court concluded that Secretary Ross’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, reasoning that his 
reliance on the DOJ’s request was pretextual
 because he “made the decision to add the citizenship 
question well before DOJ requested its addition in December 2017.” The court further held that Secretary 
Ross unjustifiably departed from certain administrative procedures and failed to fully consider possible 
alternatives in light of the evidence before him. To reach these conclusions, the district court relied on 
evidence outside the administrative record that the plaintiffs had obtained through discovery—an action it 
justified (in part) by
 concluding that the Secretary had likely acted in bad faith by not disclosing the true 
basis for his decision. Finally, the court
 concluded the plaintiffs had not produced sufficient evidence to 
support their equal protection claim. In so doing, the court dispensed with the last of the plaintiffs’ 
constitutional claims, having
 dismissed their Enumeration Clause claim in a prior order. 
Though district court decisions are normally appealed to a federal court of appeals,
 the United States 
asked the Supreme Court to directly review the Southern District of New York’s decision, based on its 
representation that the census questionnaire must be finalized by the end of June 2019. The Supreme 
Court
 agreed. After federal district courts i
n California and Maryland concluded that the addition of a 
citizenship question would violate the Enumeration Clause, the Supreme Court
 expanded the scope of its 
review to include that issue. However, though the Maryland district court (like the Southern District of 
New York) had al
so rejected the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim, the Supreme Court did not review that 
issue.  
The Supreme Court’s Decision 
On June 27, 2019, the Supreme Court issued it
s decision in 
Department of Commerce v. New York. Chief 
Justice Roberts’s opinion garnered a majority of the Court, though the Justices comprising the majority 
for each issue varied. The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ Enumeration Clause and Census Act claims, while 
also concluding that the Secretary’s decision to reinstate a citizenship question could be supported by the 
evidence before him. However, the Court also recognized that agencies are required to disclose the 
reasons for their decisions in order to facilitate meaningful judicial review. Upon reviewing the evidence, 
the Court determined that the Secretary’s stated reason for reinstating the citizenship question—to 
provide DOJ with citizenship information for VRA enforcement—was not the actual reason for his 
decision. On that basis, the Court ruled that the Secretary’s decision was unlawful. 
  
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The Majority Opinion 
On the merits, the Chief Justice—joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh—first 
concluded that the Secretary’s decision to reinstate a citizenship question did not violate the Enumeration 
Clause. In particular, the Court observ
ed that “demographic questions have been asked in 
every census 
since 1790” 
and that “questions about citizenship in particular have been asked for nearly as long.” Based 
on this 
“consistent historical practice”—combined with the 
“‘virtually unlimited discretion’” given 
Congress to conduct the census—the Court
 determined that the Enumeration Clause does not prohibit the 
Secretary of Commerce from inquiring about citizenship on the census questionnaire. 
Next, these Justices disagreed with the district court’s determination that the Secretary’s decision was 
contrary to the evidence. The Court
 concluded that the Secretary’s decision to rely on both administrative 
records and a citizenship question to obtain accurate citizenship data—rather than relying 
solely on 
administrative records—was a reasonable exercise of the Secretary’s discretion in light of the available 
evidence. Either option, the Court
 concluded, “entailed tradeoffs between accuracy and completeness,” 
and, where the 
“choice [is] between reasonable policy alternatives,” the Secretary has authority to choose. 
The Court al
so decided that the Secretary had reasonably weighed the costs and benefits of reinstating the 
citizenship question. The Court noted that the Secretary
 had explained why the “risk[s] w[ere] difficult to 
assess,” and concluded that he 
had reasonably “[w]eigh[ed] that uncertainty against the value of obtaining 
more complete and accurate citizenship data.” In the end, the Court was unwilling to second-guess the 
Secretary’s conclusion, particularly as 
“the evidence before [him] hardly led ineluctably to just one 
reasonable course of action.” 
The same Justices also
 ruled that the Secretary’s decision did not violate the Census Act. With respect to 
Section 6(c), the Court
 determined that the Secretary reasonably concluded that exclusive reliance on 
administrative records to obtain citizenship data “would not . . . provide the more complete and accurate 
data that DOJ sought.
” Thus, because administrative records alone would not supply the “kind and 
quality” of “‘statistics required,’” the Court ruled that the Secretary had complied with Section 6(c)’s 
requirement to rely “to the maximum extent possible” on administrative records. The Court also 
determined that the Secretary complied with Section 141(f) of the Census Act. Though the Secretary had 
not included “citizenship” as a “subject” in his initial report to Congress, the Court
 concluded that by 
listing “citizenship” as a “question” in a later report, the Secretary had complied with the Census Act’s 
procedures for modifying an earlier report. Regardless, the Court
 reasoned that any violation “would 
surely be harmless” as “the Secretary nonetheless fully informed Congress of, and explained, his 
decision.” 
Lastly, the Chief Justice—joined now by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan
—held that the 
Secretary’s sole stated reason for adding the citizenship question to the census (
i.e., providing the DOJ 
with citizenship data for VRA enforcement) was not the real reason for his decision. The Court
 began by 
reaffirming that agencies are required to disclose the actual reasons for their decisions in order to facilitate 
effective judicial review. And, while court
s normally accept as true an agency’s stated reason for its 
acti
on, courts may review evidence outside the agency record to probe the justifications for an agency 
action if there has been a strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior by the agency. 
Based on these principles, the Court first
 determined that evidence outside the agency record was properly 
considered in evaluating the lawfulness of the Secretary’s action because some of the evidence suggested 
that the Secretary’s stated reason for adding a citizenship question was pretextual. The Court then 
conducted its own review of the evidence, a
nd noted that while the Secretary “began taking steps to 
reinstate a citizenship question about a week into his tenure,” there was 
“no hint that he was considering 
VRA enforcement” at that time. In addition, the Court
 observed that Commerce had itself gone “to great 
lengths to elicit the request [to add a citizenship question] from DOJ.” In the end, “viewing the evidence 
  
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as a whole,” the Court
 concluded that “the decision to reinstate a citizenship question [could not] be 
adequately explained in terms of DOJ’s request for improved citizenship data to better enforce the VRA.” 
Given this 
“disconnect between the decision made and the explanation given,” the Court agreed with the 
Southern District of New York that the Secretary’s decision violated the APA because the Secretary had 
not disclosed the actual reason for his decision. However, the Court wa
s clear that it was “not hold[ing] 
that the [Secretary’s] decision . . . was substantively invalid,” but was instead requiring the Secretary to 
disclose his reason for that decision. And to give the Secretary this opportunity, the Court
 directed the 
district court to send the case back to the Department of Commerce.  
Justice Thomas’s Dissent 
Though various Justices dissented from portions of the Court’s opinion, the most immediately 
consequential portion of the Court’s ruling—that the Secretary’s stated reason for reinstating the 
citizenship question was pretextual—prompted a dissent from Justice Thomas that was joined by Justices 
Gorsuch and Kavanaugh.  
Justice Thomas first
 argued that the Court was wrong to rely on evidence outside the administrative 
record to assess whether the Secretary’s justification was pretextual. Under the APA, Justice Thomas 
explained, judicial review of an agency decision is normally based on “the agency’s contemporaneous 
explanation” for its decision, and courts may not invalidate the agency’s action even if it 
“ha[d] other, 
unstated reasons for the decision.” And though Justice Thomas
 acknowledged that review of extra-record 
materials may be permissible upon a showing of bad fait
h, in his view this case did not meet that 
standard. Moreover, Justice Thomas
 concluded that, even if such review were appropriate, none of the 
evidence established that the Secretary’s stated basis for his decision 
“did not factor 
at all into [his] 
decision.” In Justice Thomas’s view, the evidence
 showed “at most, that leadership at both the 
Department of Commerce and the DOJ believed it important—for a variety of reasons—to include a 
citizenship question on the census.” Finally, Justice Thomas criticized the Court’s decision as being the 
“the first time the Court has ever invalidated an agency action as ‘pretextual,’” and contended that the 
Court had 
“depart[ed] from traditional principles of administrative law” and 
“opened a Pandora’s box of 
pretext-based challenges in administrative law.” 
Post-Supreme Court Issues and Claims 
Though the Supreme Court’s decision resolved most of the plaintiffs’ claims, it still left some issues 
unresolved. To begin, the Court’s decision appears to leave open the possibility that the citizenship 
question could still be added to the census. The Court made clear that it had not deemed the Secretary’s 
decision “substantively” unlawful, and so the Secretary may be able to reinstate the citizenship question if 
he provides a non-pretextual explanation for doing so. In the event the Secretary again decides to add a 
citizenship question to the 2020 census, that decision (like his first) could be challenged in federal district 
court. If it is, the losing party could still appeal that decision to the court of appeals or seek expedited 
review in the Supreme Court.  
In addition, although the Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs’ Enumeration Clause claim, it did not 
address the lower court’s rulings that the plaintiffs failed to establish a violation of the equal protection 
component of the Due Process Clause. In the Maryland case, the plaintiffs had appealed the dismissal of 
their equal protection claim to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, but they later sought to 
have that claim reevaluated by the district court in light of
 new evidence allegedly indicating that 
Secretary Ross had a discriminatory motive for reinstating the citizenship question. The Fourth Circuit 
recently
 granted this request so the district court could conduct further proceedings. Once the district 
court issues a ruling on this claim, the non-prevailing party may seek review in the Fourth Circuit or the 
Supreme Court. In the meantime, the plaintiffs in the Maryland case have requested that the district court
  
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 enter an order preventing the United States from adding a citizenship question to the census while their 
equal protection claim is being adjudicated. 
These ongoing proceedings could pose practical challenges for the inclusion of the citizenship question on 
the 2020 census. The United States has
 represented that the census questionnaire must be finalized by 
June 30 of this year, though some of the plaintiff
s have contended that October 31 is the actual deadline. 
Whether the Department of Commerce will be able to add a citizenship question to the 2020 census could 
depend on which of these deadlines holds true. However, even if the October 2019 date applies, the 
parties may have difficulty obtaining full judicial review—from a court of appeals and/or the Supreme 
Court—of any rulings from the district courts before that deadline. 
Considerations for Congress 
Though Congress has delegated significant responsibility for the census to the Secretary of Commerce, 
the Constitution makes clear that Congress has ultimate authority over how it is conducted. Congress thus 
has the authority to pass legislation, subject to presidential veto, that would either require or prohibit the 
inclusion of a citizenship question or other demographic questions in the future or impose additional 
restraints on the Secretary’s
 existing authority to add questions to the decennial census. Alternatively, 
Congress could include language in the appropriations bill for the Department of Commerce regulating 
the manner in which funds may be used to implement a citizenship question on the 2020 census. 
Congress could also enact more general guidance. For example
, bills introduced in the 116th 
Congress would mandate a certain amount of research, study, and testing for any new questions 
or design features, and also require the Secretary to submit detailed statements on such testing to 
Congress and the general public. Though such requirements would not necessarily prevent the 
inclusion of a citizenship question on future census forms, they could require more extensive 
analysis before any question may be added to the census, thus providing Congress with more 
complete information about the consequences of doing so.  
 
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