Legal Sidebari 
 
NLRB Adopts New Standard for Identifying 
Covered Employees 
February 19, 2019 
The classification of workers as employees rather than independent contractors is critical for purposes of 
most federal labor and employment laws.  In general, the rights and protections afforded by these laws are 
available only to employees and not independent contractors.  A majority of t
he National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB or Board) recently concluded that a group of drivers who provide services for the shared-
ride van company SuperShuttle are independent contractors and not employees for purposes of the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the federal law that provides collective bargaining rights to most 
workers in the private sector.  As a result of the Board’s determination, SuperShuttle will not be obligated 
to negotiate with the drivers over employment-related subjects like wages and benefits. 
Notably, in reaching its decision in
 SuperShuttle DFW, the Board majority emphasized the drivers’ 
entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss, a factor the agency previously identified as only one of 
several that should be considered when evaluating employee status.  Contending that entrepreneurial 
opportunity is a “prism” through which it would now examine all of the common law factors that have 
traditionally been considered when making employee status decisions, the Board overruled a prior 
standard that it adopted in 2014.  This new approach h
as been criticized by some because it could deny a 
growing number of workers, such as those providing services in the gig economy, collective bargaining 
rights.  Concern over how workers are classified for purposes of the NLRA prompted the introduction of 
legislation in the 115th Congress that would have made it more difficult to designate workers as 
independent contractors.  T
he Protecting Workers’ Freedom to Organize Act, for example, would have 
amended the NLRA to establish a presumption of employee status unless specified criteria were satisfied.  
In light of 
SuperShuttle DFW, it may be possible that similar measures will be introduced in the 116th 
Congress. 
Employees v. Independent Contractors 
Under section 2(3) of the NLRA, the term “employee” is defined to exclude “any individual having the 
status of an independent contractor[.]”  To determine whether a worker is an employee or independent 
contractor, the NLRB has applied a common law agency test that examines various factors, including the 
control exercised by a company over the worker, whether the worker is engaged in a distinct occupation 
or business, and the level of skill required by the worker to provide services.  The Board has indicated 
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that no one factor is determinative, and that the relationship between a company and an individual should 
be evaluated in its entirety.  In
 NLRB v. United Insurance Company of America, a 1968 case involving the 
employment classification of a group of insurance workers, the U.S. Supreme Court further observed: 
[T]here is no shorthand formula or magic phrase that can be applied to find the answer, but all of 
the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and weighed with no one factor being decisive.  
What is important is that the total factual context is assessed in light of the pertinent common-law 
agency principles. 
The party asserting an individual’s classification as an independent contractor has the burden of 
establishing that worker status. 
In 2014, applying the common law agency test to a group of FedEx Home Delivery drivers, a majority of 
the Board indicated that it would also consider whether an alleged independent contractor has an actual 
entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss.  While the Board acknowledged its past consideration of a 
worker’s entrepreneurial opportunity, it attempted in
 FedEx Home Delivery to “more clearly define the 
analytical significance” of this factor.  In 
FedEx Home Delivery, the Board explained that it would give 
weight to only actual and not theoretical entrepreneurial opportunity, and that any constraints imposed by 
a company on an individual’s ability to pursue such an opportunity would be considered. 
Applying the common law agency test to the FedEx drivers, the Board concluded that they had little 
entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss because the company exercised significant control over the 
drivers’ ability to sell their delivery routes.  The Board also noted that the drivers’ work commitment to 
the company made it difficult for them to pursue other outside business activities.  In addition to having 
little entrepreneurial opportunity, it was determined that the drivers satisfied most of the common law 
factors for finding them to be employees and not independent contractors.  For example, the Board found 
that FedEx exercised pervasive control over the drivers’ day-to-day work, the drivers performed duties 
that were a regular part of FedEx’s business, and no special skills were required for the drivers to perform 
their duties. 
In 
SuperShuttle DFW, a majority of the Board criticized the approach taken in 
FedEx Home Delivery.  
The majority contended that the 2014 standard focused too heavily on economic dependency and a 
company’s control over workers, minimizing consideration of entrepreneurial opportunity: “Large 
corporations such as FedEx or SuperShuttle will always be able to set terms of engagement . . . but this 
fact does not necessarily make the owners of the contractor business the corporation’s employees.”  The 
majority indicated that employee status determinations should continue to require consideration of the 
various common law factors, but emphasized that a worker should be deemed an independent contractor 
when a qualitative evaluation of the factors demonstrate an opportunity for economic gain or loss.  
According to the 
SuperShuttle DFW majority, entrepreneurial opportunity will “help evaluate the overall 
significance of the [common law] agency factors.” 
Applying its new standard, the majority concluded that the SuperShuttle drivers were independent 
contractors and not employees.  Citing the drivers’ ability to work as much as they choose, their discretion 
in choosing assignments, and their entitlement to the money earned from their chosen assignments, the 
majority maintained that the drivers have a “significant opportunity for economic gain and significant risk 
of loss.”  Moreover, the majority contended that these factors were not outweighed by any countervailing 
factors that might support the conclusion that the drivers were SuperShuttle employees. 
In a dissenting opinion, the last remaining NLRB member to be appointed by President Obama criticized 
the standard adopted by the majority in 
SuperShuttle DFW.  The dissent maintained that the standard’s 
focus on entrepreneurial opportunity was inconsistent with how the common law agency test was meant 
to be conducted.  The dissent contended that by emphasizing entrepreneurial opportunity, the new 
standard applied the kind of “shorthand formula” that was criticized by the Court in 
United Insurance.  
Even when the drivers’ entrepreneurial opportunity was considered, the dissent argued that such 
  
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opportunity was “minimal at best.”  The dissent noted that the fares charged by the drivers are fixed and 
cannot be adjusted.  In addition, the drivers are prohibited from working for competing transportation 
companies.  Ultimately, the dissent observed, SuperShuttle “creates, controls, and constrains that 
‘opportunity.’” 
A Presumption of Employee Status? 
Critics of the new employee classification stand
ard contend that it will likely deny the NLRA’s 
protections to a greater number of workers.  That view may prompt the reintroduction of legislation that 
would presume an individual’s status as an employee unless specified criteria are satisfied.  Under four 
bills introduced in the 115th Congress – the Protecting Workers’ Freedom to Organize 
Act (S. 2069), the 
Workplace Action for a Growing Economy 
Act (S. 2143/H.R. 4548), the Workplace Democracy 
Act (S. 
2810/H.R. 5728), and the Workers’ Freedom to Negotiate 
Act (S. 3064/H.R. 6080) – an individual 
performing any service for a company would have been presumed to not have the status of an 
independent contractor unless the following factors were satisfied: 
(1)  the  individual  is  free  from  control  and  direction  in  connection  with  the  performance  of  the 
service, both under the contract for the performance of service and in fact; 
(2) the service is performed outside the usual course of the business of the employer; and 
(3)  the  individual  is  customarily  engaged  in  an  independently  established  trade,  occupation, 
profession, or business of the same nature as that involved in the service performed. 
Supporters of this kind of approach to employee classification contend that it would deter 
misclassification and ensure that workers are not deprived of their rights.  Organizations like the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce hav
e criticized the approach, however, as simply an effort to 
increase union membership.  Earlier this year, the Bureau of Labor Statisti
cs reported that the 
2018 union membership rate for private-sector employees was 6.4 percent.  To date, legislation 
that would presume employee status for purposes of coverage under the NLRA has not been 
introduced in the 116th Congress.  
Author Information 
 Jon O. Shimabukuro 
   
Legislative Attorney  
 
 
 
  
Congressional Research Service 
4 
 
 
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