Legal Sidebari 
 
Following the Money: Should Federal Law 
Require Litigants to Disclose Litigation 
Funding Agreements? 
May 31, 2018 
On May 10, 2018, several Members of the 115th Congress introduced th
e Litigation Funding 
Transparency Act of 2018 (S. 2815) (the Act), which would require litigants in
 certain types of
 cases to 
disclose whether any commercial enterprise has a contingent
 right to receive payment in the event that 
litigant ultimately obtains monetary relief in the lawsuit. The Act is the latest development in
 an ongoing 
debate over whether federal law should mandate disclosure of third-party litigation funding agreements—
and, if so, to whom and under what circumstances.  
This Sidebar analyzes the Act and its significance to federal litigation. After providing a brief overview of 
litigation funding generally, the Sidebar discusses the ongoing debate over whether federal law should 
require litigants to disclose litigation funding agreements to their opponents and/or to the court. The 
Sidebar concludes by describing the relevant provisions of the Act, as well as provisions of another bill 
currently pending before the 115th Congress that would likewise impose similar disclosure requirements. 
Background on Litigation Funding 
Third-party litigation funding, also known as litigation finance, occurs when a third party
—rather than the 
parties themselves, their insurers, or their counsel—agrees to cover some or all of the costs of a litigant’s 
lawsuit.
 In exchange, the litigant agrees to
 pay that third party a percentage of any settlement the parties 
ultimately negotiate in the case, or of any judgment the court ultimately awards against the opposing 
party. 
As litigation funding has becom
e increasingly prevalent in the United States in recent years, 
commentators have debated whether the practice is socially desirable.
 Supporters of such arrangements, 
emphasizing that some litigants lack the economic resources necessary to adequately pursue a meritorious 
claim, argue that litigation funding ensures that injured parties can “bring legitimate claims that otherwise 
might not be brought.” Proponents further contend that, “by putting plaintiffs on 
‘more equal financial 
footing against deep-pocketed defendants,’” litigation funding reduces the likelihood that economic 
difficulties will force litigants to accept suboptimal settlement offers.
 Opponents, however, maintain that 
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the ready availability of litigation funding undesirably increases the volume and length of litigation by 
incentivizing litigants to initiate and prolong lawsuits even where doing so would otherwise not be 
economically rational. According to critics, the “prolonged litigation” engendered by litigation funding 
“hurts defendants, who are forced to divert additional time and money from productive activity to 
defending litigation.” 
In addition to disagreeing over whether litigation funding is socially ben
eficial, proponents and
 opponents 
of litigation funding also disagree regarding the extent to which litigation funding agreements create 
unacceptable conflicts of interest between
 attorneys, their clients, and third-party funders. Critics of 
litigation funding argue that, because the third-party funder holds the purse strings to the litigation, the 
funder may
 exert control over a party’s litigation strategy in ways that are not in that party’s best interests. 
Critics similarly assert that “when funders are fronting the fees for the claimants’ lawyers,” those lawyers 
will be motivated to place the funder’s intere
sts ahead of those of their clients. Proponents of litigation 
funding, by contrast, maintain that litigation funding arrangem
ents do not pose any greater risk of ethical 
conflicts than other capital arrangements that critics of litigation funding find unobjectionable, such as 
when banks hold security interests in law firms’ fee receivables. Amidst this debate
, some federal courts 
have begun scrutinizing litigation financing agreements to assess whether they create improper conflicts 
of interest, and a few federal courts have required parties to disclose litigation funding agreements to their 
opponents. 
Should Federal Law Require Litigants to Disclose Litigation Funding 
Agreements? 
Litigan
ts generally try to keep litigation funding arrangem
ents secret from th
eir opponents. After all, if a 
party knows whether its opponent was receiving third-party litigation funding—and, if so, how much—
that party would then have an insight into the size of its adversary’
s litigation budget. In turn, that 
knowledge could conceivably provide that party 
a tactical advantage in settlement negotiations and other 
aspects of the litigation. 
Although, as noted above, some federal courts have required parties to disclose litigation funding 
agreements to the court itself to enable the court to examine whether conflicts of interest exist, federal 
courts have only
 rarely required litigants to disclose litigation funding agreements to their opponents. 
Thus, although
 some states have enacted laws requiring parties to disclose litigation funding agreements 
to their opponents, federal law presently imposes
 no systematic requirement that litigants divulge their 
financing arrangements to their adversaries. 
Commentators have accordingly
 debated whether federal law should require litigants to
 disclose third-
party litigation funding agreements—and, if so,
 when and to whom. Some commentators
—as well as 
several Members of Congress—have advocated requiring attorneys to disclose litigation funding 
agreements to the court and to all parties at the outset of the case so that the court may take appropriate 
steps to
 protect the client’s interests by monitoring the funder’s potential influence over the case. Those 
who oppose the mandatory disclosure of litigation funding arrangements, by contrast, argue that 
automatic disclosure requirements would give opposing parti
es an unfair advantage by
 exposing their 
adversaries’ litigation budgets. Opponents further contend that requiring parties to disclose litigation 
funding agreements would embroi
l courts and
 litigants alike in costly and time-consuming discovery 
disputes. 
  
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The Litigation Funding Transparency Act of 2018 
In response to this debate, several Members of Congress introduced th
e Litigation Funding Transparency 
Act of 2018 (S. 2815) (the Act) on May 10, 2018. The Act, which would apply i
n class action cases and 
multidistrict litigation, would require litigants to: 
  
disclose in writing to the court and all other parties the identity of any commercial 
enterprise that h
as a right to receive payment that is contingent on the receipt of monetary 
relief in the action by settlement, judgment, or otherwise; and 
  produce agreement creating such a contingent right 
for inspection and
 copying.  
The Act’
s sponsors maintain that the Act “will shed light on third party litigation financing agreements to 
ensure that the court and opposing parties are made aware of who is financing the litigation and whether 
or not there are any conflicts of interest.
” Opponents of the Act, by contrast, contend that “requiring 
plaintiffs to disclose their sensitive financial arrangements to defendants” will “create expensive and 
time-wasting frolics and detours in litigation” and will be misused “as a tactical device by defendants.” 
The Act is presently
 pending before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. 
Other Pending Legislation 
The Act is not the only bill pending in the 115th Congress that would mandate disclosure of litigation 
funding agreements. Th
e Fairness in Class Action Litigation and Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency 
Act of 2017 (H.R. 985) (FICALA) would similarly require plaintiffs’ attorneys i
n class action cases to 
“promptly disclose in writing to the court and all other parties the identity of any person or entity, other 
than a class member or class counsel of record, who has a contingent right to receive compensation from 
any settlement, judgment, or other relief obtained in the action.” As of the time of this writing, FICALA 
has passed the House and is pending in the Senate. 
Non-Legislative Options 
Congress is not the only entity that possesses authority to alter the rules governing the disclosure of 
litigation funding agreements. A few federal courts have issued
 standing orders mandating the disclosure 
of litigation funding arrangements in certain types of cases, and th
e Advisory Committee on Rules of 
Civil Procedure has also considered whether to modify the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to require 
such disclosures. As noted above, however, at present th
ere is no nationwide requirement that would 
uniformly mandate disclosure of litigation funding agreements in federal litigation. 
  
Author Information 
 Kevin M. Lewis 
   
Legislative Attorney  
 
 
 
  
Congressional Research Service 
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