Supreme Court Reiterates Congress’s Exclusive Role in Regulating Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction
Legal Sidebari
Supreme Court Reiterates Congress’s
Exclusive Role in Regulating Lower Federal
Court Jurisdiction
November 29, 2017
The Supreme Court’s first signed opinion from the October 2017 term addressed the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure (FRAP), a body of procedural rules created by the Supreme Court (under statutory
authorization) that supplements statutory rules governing federal appellate litigation. In Hamer v.
Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago, the Court assessed whether FRAP 4(a)(5)(C), which governs
the timeliness of an appeal, is jurisdictional in nature or, rather, a mandatory claim-processing rule. When
a rule is jurisdictional, a party’s failure to comply with it deprives the court of jurisdiction to hear the
matter. Conversely, a claim-processing rule is designed to streamline litigation by requiring parties to do
certain things at certain times (e.g., a rule laying out the procedures and timeline for filing a notice of
appeal) but, if not followed, does not interfere with a court’s jurisdiction. In Hamer, the Supreme Court
unanimously reversed the Seventh Circuit’s holding that FRAP 4(a)(5)(C) is a jurisdictional rule requiring
a lawsuit’s dismissal if the appellant untimely files a notice of appeal. In doing so the Court sent a clear
message that Congress, and only Congress, may create rules governing the jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts, and thus, court-made rules—even if made pursuant to legislative authority—will never be
construed as jurisdictional.
Article III of the Constitution vests “[t]he judicial power of the United States . . . in one Supreme Court,
and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” Congress first
exercised this constitutional authority by enacting the Judiciary Act of 1789, which established the federal
district and circuit courts, and has since created additional rules governing those courts in Title 28 of the
U.S. Code. One of the rules is found in 28 U.S.C. § 2107, which establishes time limits for filing a notice
of appeal. According to that rule, a notice of appeal generally must be filed within 30 days, or, if one of
the parties is part of the federal government, within 60 days. Failure to file within the statutorily
prescribed period will deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction to review the appeal. However, under
§ 2107(c), the district court may, upon request within 30 days after the initial filing deadline, extend the
time for filing a notice of appeal if the movant demonstrates “excusable neglect or good cause.”
The Supreme Court also plays a role in managing the federal courts. In particular, 28 U.S.C. § 2072
authorizes the Supreme Court to create procedural rules for the lower federal courts. The Court has
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exercised this authority by adopting the FRAP. FRAP 4(a) establishes procedures for filing an appeal in
federal court. On top of the statutory filing requirements found in 28 U.S.C. § 2107, FRAP 4(a)(5)(C)
additionally mandates that the extension of time granted by the district court for the filing of an appeal
may not exceed the longer of 14 days after the motion is granted or 30 days after the original deadline.
Hamer involves a so-far unsuccessful employment-discrimination lawsuit brought by Charmaine Hamer
against her former employers. A district judge in Chicago granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendant employers on September 14, 2015, making the appeal filing deadline 30 days later on October
14, 2015. A week before the filing deadline expired, Hamer requested an extension of time to file a notice
of appeal. The court granted the request, extending the deadline by 61 days to December 14. Hamer filed
the notice of appeal on December 11.
On its own initiative, the Seventh Circuit asked the defendants to brief whether Hamer’s appeal was
timely given that she filed her notice of appeal beyond the 30 days allowed for an extension authorized in
FRAP 4(a)(5)(c). In response the defendants argued that Hamer’s appeal was untimely and, as a result, the
Seventh Circuit lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. Hamer countered that the timing rule was not
jurisdictional and that, because the defendants failed to raise the issue on their own, the defendants had
waived their right to contest the timeliness of the appeal. The Seventh Circuit ultimately concluded that
FRAP 4(a)(5)(C) is a jurisdictional rule, given the Supreme Court’s mandate that “the statutory
requirement for filing a timely notice of appeal is ‘mandatory and jurisdictional,’” and that FRAP
4(a)(5)(C), according to the Seventh Circuit, “is the vehicle by which § 2107(c) is employed.”
Accordingly, because Hamer filed the notice of the appeal beyond FRAP 4(a)(5)(C)’s 30-day window, the
Seventh Circuit concluded that it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.
Thus, the crux of the issue before the Supreme Court in Hamer was whether FRAP 4(a)(5)(C) is
jurisdictional or, rather, a mandatory claim-processing rule. If FRAP 4(a)(5)(C) is a claim-processing rule,
rather than a jurisdictional rule, the Seventh Circuit potentially could have reviewed Hamer’s appeal
despite the fact that she filed the notice of appeal outside of FRAP 4(a)(5)(C)’s 30-day limit.
The Supreme Court concluded that the Seventh Circuit had misapplied relevant Supreme Court precedent
concerning when a rule governing the timeliness of an appeal is jurisdictional. The Court conceded that in
some past cases it had “mischaracterize[ed] claim-processing rules . . . as jurisdictional limitations,
particularly when that characterization was not central to the case.” But the Court stressed that the
distinction is “critical,” given that a party’s failure to comply with a jurisdictional time limit deprives the
presiding court of jurisdiction over the case. Accordingly, in Hamer the Court emphasized that only
Congress may create rules governing the lower federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Further, the
Court reiterated precedent holding that “[i]f a time prescription governing the transfer of adjudicatory
authority from one Article III court to another appears in a statute, the limitation is jurisdictional;
otherwise, the time specification fits within the claim-processing category.” Accordingly, the Court
concluded that “[i]n conflating Rule 4(a)(5)(C) with [28 U.S.C.] § 2107(c), the Court of Appeals failed to
grasp the distinction our decisions delineate between jurisdictional appeal filing deadlines and mandatory
claim-processing rules.”
The key takeaway for Congress from Hamer is the Supreme Court’s reminder that only the legislative
branch may make rules governing the inferior federal courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction. Accordingly,
Congress has the authority to codify FRAP 4(a)(5)(C)’s time limits or to establish other jurisdictional
limits for federal litigation.
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Author Information
Sarah Herman Peck
Legislative Attorney
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