President Reagan's START Proposal: Projected U.S./U.S.S.R. Ballistic Missile Forces

CongressionaI Research Service The Library of Congress Washmgton. D.C. 20540 PRESIDENT REAGAN'S START PROPOSAL P r o j e c t e d U.S./U.S .S .R. B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e F o r c e s COMPLIMENTS O F Gene Snyder A. A. T i n a j e r o S p e c i a l i s t i n N a t i o n a l Defense F o r e i g n A f f a i r s and N a t i o n a l Defense D i v i s i o n J u n e 9 , 1982 PRESIDENT REAGAN'S START PROPOSAL - P r o j e c t e d U.S./U.S.S.R. B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e Forces* During h i s a d d r e s s a t t h e Eureka C o l l e g e , on May 9 , 1982, P r e s i d e n t Reagan summarized t h e s t r a t e g i c weapons p l a n t o be proposed by h i s A d m i n i s t r a t i o n t o t h e S o v i e t Union d u r i n g forthcoming S T r a t e g i c Arms R e d u c t i o n T a l k s (START). R e p o r t e d l y , under t h e f i r s t phase of t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s START p r o p o s a l , t h e S o v i e t Union and t h e United S t a t e s would be l i m i t e d t o about 5,000 warheads on no more than 850 i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l land-based SLBMs). and sea-based m i s s i l e s (ICBMs and Within t h e a g g r e g a t e l i m i t of 850 b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s , n e i t h e r s i d e could have more t h a n 2,500 warheads on land-based ICBMs. Reductions from t h e c u r r e n t i n v e n t o r i e s of deployed weapons would t a k e p l a c e over a 5-to-10 period. year ( P r e s e n t e d i n F i g u r e I a r e g r a p h i c i l l u s t r a t i o n s of t h e q u a n t i t i e s of ICBMs v e r s u s SLBMs allowed, and t h e t r a d e o f f s p e r m i t t e d between t h e a g g r e g a t e number of ICBM-launched and SLBM-launched r e e n t r y v e h i c l e s . ) Under t h e second phase, t h e implementation of which would be decided d u r i n g t h e forthcoming START n e g o t i a t i o n s , t h e a g g r e g a t e m i s s i l e "throw weight " of b o t h n a t i o n s would be almost e q u a l i z e d . The United S t a t e s w i l l propose t o t h e S o v i e t Union t h a t t h e c e i l i n g on a g g r e g a t e ICBM throw weight i s t o be no l a r g e r t h a n t h e a g g r e g a t e throw weight of t h e p r e s e n t U.S. P r o j e c t e d U.S. ICBM f o r c e . and S o v i e t B a l l i s t i c Missile Force S t r u c t u r e s There a r e many p o s s i b l e numerical combinations between t y p e s of I C B M s and SLBMs t h a t can y i e l d r e s u l t s which s a t i s f y t h e proposed c e i l i n g s on b a l l i s t i c missiles and warheads. * However, t h e U.S. b a l l i s t i c missile force structures Prepared by A. A. T i n a j e r o , S p e c i a l i s t i n N a t i o n a l Defense - FIGURE I BALLISTIC MISSILE AND WARHEAD CEILINGS UNDER THE REAGAN START PROPOSAL C o m b i n a t i o n s of SLBMs a n d ICBMs 0 0 ' 100 500 200 300 1000 400 500 SLBMs 1500 600 2000 2500 SLBM WARHEADS 700 3000 800 850 3500 4000 4500 5000 that meet the ceilings depend on the number of M-X ICBMs and Trident I1 SLBMS that would be deployed and on the number of warheads each of these missiles would carry. Shown in Table I and Table I1 are projections of U.S. ballistic missile force structures with a 100 M-X ICBM force and 200 M-X ICBM force, respectively. These projections serve to illustrate some of the more plausible ballistic missile force structures that the U.S. could eventually develop under the Reagan START proposal once M-X and Trident I1 deployments are complete. reader to readily compare the U.S. To enable the and Soviet force structures, Tables I and 11 include the projected Soviet ballistic missile force structure. Tables A-I through A-IV, presented in Appendix A, illustrate how the transition could occur from the current U.S. and Soviet forces to the force structures projected in Table I. Graphic comparisons of the projected inventories of ballistic missiles and warheads that would be possessed by the United States and the Soviet Union are shown in Figures I1 and 111. The following assumptions are used in making the projections: o Reductions in the number of ICBMs and SLBMs from those currently deployed would begin in 1984. o The ceilings of 850 ballistic missiles and aggregate of 5,000 warheads would have to be met by the end of 1988. o Deployment of the M-X ICBM and the Trident I1 SLBM would take place (on schedule) in 1986 and 1989. o Each M-X ICBM and Trident I1 SLBM would be deployed with 10 warheads. TABLE I - ESTIMATED U.S./U.S.S.R. BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCES UNDER THE REAGAN STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION PROPOSAL (100 M-X ICBMs U.S. Option) U.S. U.S.S.R. ICBMs: Warheads 70 Minuteman I11 (3 MK-12) 300 Minuteman 111 (3 MK-12A) loo M-X (10 MK-12A)1/ - 210 900 1000 Warheads 300 SS-19 (6 Warheads) 70 SS-18 (10 warheads) 1800 700 Sub-Totals 470 2110 SLBMs : 288 Trident I1 (10 MK-12A)1/ (on 12 OHIO SSBNs) 2880 60 SS-N-20 2/ (on 3 T ~ H O O NSSBNs)3/ 240 SS-N-18 41 (on 15 D ~ T A 111s) 64 SS-N-17 5/ (on 4 SS~N-XS) 108 SS-N-8 51 9 DELTA IS) - (on - 600 1680 64 108 - Sub-Totals 288 TOTALS 758 1/ The number of warheads each M-X ICBM and Trident I1 SLBM would carry under the ~ e a ~ aSTART n proposal has not been disclosed by the Department of Defense. In the projection shown, it is assumed each missile would carry carry 10 MK-12A warheads. 21 - Assumes 10 warheads per missile. 31 The Soviets could deploy more TYPHOON SSBNs than shown. However, to do so they f;ould have to retire some additional DELTA-class SSBNs not to exceed the aggregate number of SLBMs and SLBM-launched RVs. Also, the Soviets could deploy a new submarine (SSBN-X, equipped with 16 SS-N-17 SLBMs) to replace DELTA I and DELTA I1 SSBNs. Herein it is assumed that DELTA I1 SSBNs (not shown in the table) have been replaced by SSBN-Xs. -41 Assumes -5 1 Assumes seven warheads per missile. one warhead per missile. TABLE I1 - ESTIMATED U.S./U.S.S.R. BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCES UNDER THE REAGAN STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION PROPOSAL (200 M-X I C B M s U.S. O p t i o n ) U.S.S.R. U.S. ICBMs : Warheads Warheads 300 Minuteman 111 ( 3 MI(-12A) 200 M-X ( 8 ABRVs)6/ Sub-Totals 500 900 1600 300 SS-19 ( 6 Warheads) 70 SS-18 ( 1 0 Warheads) 1800 700 2500 370 2500 SLBMs : 144 T r i d e n t I1 ( 6 ABRVs)6/ (on 6 O H I O SSBNs) 192 T r i d e n t I ( 8 Warheads) (on 1 2 LAFAYETTE SSBNs) 864 1536 60 SS-N-20 7 1 600 ( o n 3 TYFHOON SSBNs)8/ 240 SS-N-18 9 / ( o n 1 5 D ~ L T A1 1 1 s ) ' 64 SS-N-17 1 0 1 (on 4 SSE-XS) 64 - 108 SS-N-8 - (on 9 Sub-Totals 336 2400 472 2452 TOTALS 4900 842 4952 836 101 1680 DETA Is) 108 6 / The number of warheads e a c h M-X ICBM and T r i d e n t I1 SLBM would c a r r y u n d e r t h e ~ e a ~ START a n p r o p o s a l h a s n o t been d i s c l o s e d by t h e Department of Defense. In t h e p r o j e c t i o n shown, i t i s assumed t h a t t h e M-X would c a r r y 8 Advanced B a l l i s t i c R e e n t r y V e h i c l e s (ABRVs) and t h e T r i d e n t I1 would c a r r y 6 ABRVs. 71 - Assumes 1 0 warheads p e r m i s s i l e . 8 1 The S o v i e t s c o u l d d e p l o y more TYPHOON SSBNs t h a n shown. However, t o do s o t h e y would have t o r e t i r e some a d d i t i o n a l DSLTA-class SSBNs n o t t o exceed t h e a g g r e g a t e number of SLBMs and SLBM-launched R V s . A l s o , t h e S o v i e t s c o u l d d e p l o y a new submarine (SSBN-X, equipped w i t h 1 6 SS-N-17 SLBMs) t o r e p l a c e DELTA I and DELTA I1 SSBNs. H e r e i n i t i s assumed t h a t DELTA 11 SSBNs ( n o t shown i n t h e t a b l e ) have been r e p l a c e d by SSBN-Xs. 91 101 - Assumes s e v e n warheads p e r m i s s i l e . Assumes one warhead p e r m i s s i l e . FIGURE I1 - PROJECTED U.S./U.S.S.R. BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCES UNDER THE REAGAN START PROPOSAL A g g r e g a t e B a l l i s t i c Missiles 1983 85 87 Year 89 91 92 U.S. U.S.S.R. . I 1983 85 87 89 91 92 Year A g g r e g a t e SLBMs +t (d 400 . 200 . U g 0 , 1983 U.S.S.R. U.S. 85 87 89 Year 91 92 FIGURE I11 (0 - PROJECTED U.S./U.S.S.R.t. DEPLOYED BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS IE REAGAN START PROPOSAL UNDER THE a ~lO,OOO, f Aggregate Aggregate Ballistic Ballistic Missile Missile Warheads Warheads 0 4 .d $ 4,000. rl rl rl (d F4 2,000, rl (d U ," 0 1983 , 1 I 85 1 . I 1 87 Year 89 L 91 92 000 000 - 000 . 000 r Aggregate ICBM Warheads -c---.-------------- ----7--U.S. 0 1983 I I 1 1 85 a 87 Year * 89 I I 91 4 92 10,000, ro a a Aggregate SLBM Warheads 8,000- a) 6,000. ---< ---U.S. 4,000- $ d a k 2,000, @ w -------------- , u.s.s.R.~ 0 H 0, 1983 1 85 & J B 87 Year 89 91 92 Some Major Goals of the Reagan START Plan Some of the major goals that the Administration expects its START proposal - to achieve are: 111 o Permit the U.S. to develop and possess sufficient military capability to deter the Soviet Union and to execute the U.S. national military strategy, taking into account the military capability that would be allowed the Soviet Union. o Establish equality in the provisions of any future strategic arms limitation agreement. o Promote strategic stability by reducing the vulnerability of U.S. tegic forces. o Establish effective verification with the necessary counting rules, collateral constraints, and cooperative measures. o Substantially reduce the number of currently deployed strategic nuclear weapons to equal ceilings. stra- Major Critical Views of the Reagan START Proposal Some of the major critical views of the Reagan START proposal are that: o The Administration has not stated ceilings on sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMS), and bombers. o The Soviets probably will not agree to scrap 1,498 of their 2,348 ballistic missiles while the U.S. scraps only 770. o The Administration has not presented a way to verify either the number of Soviet ballistic missiles or warheads to be limited under its proposal. o Unless the entire U.S. ICBM force is retired or the Trident I1 missile is armed with a small number of warheads, the U.S. would probably have a relatively small number of ballistic missile-launching submarines which could become vulnerable to Soviet anti-submarine warfare (ASW). o The 5,000 warhead ceiling could create an incentive toward a breakout of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems. o The proposal itself does not alleviate the U.S. ICBM vulnerability problem. (Under the proposal, M-X missiles need to be deployed in a survivable basing mode in order to close the "window of vulnerability.") - 111 Haig, Alexander, Secretary of State. The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks. Current Policy No. 389. May 11, 1982. U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C. The ICBM S u r v i v a b i l i t y I s s u e Of t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d by t h e Reagan START p r o p o s a l , ICBM s u r v i v a b i l i t y i s The d i s c u s s i o n below p r o v i d e s some b o t h t h e most c o n t r o v e r s i a l and c r i t i c a i . information relevant t o t h i s debate. Under t h e Reagan START p r o p o s a l , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and S o v i e t Union c o u l d e a c h h a v e 2,500 ICBM-launched warheads. would p o s s e s s a h a r d t a r g e t c a p a b i l i t y . Many e x p e r t s b e l i e v e t h e s e warheads I f t h i s belief is c o r r e c t , then ( d e p e n d i n g o n how t h e I C B M s a r e b a s e d ) b o t h t h e U.S. and t h e S o v i e t ICBM f o r c e s c o u l d b e v u l n e r a b l e t o a t t a c k by b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s . The v u l n e r a b i l i t y o f t h e U.S. and S o v i e t I C B M f o r c e s p r o j e c t e d i n T a b l e I i s h i g h l y dependent on how t h e y a r e b a s e d . d e c i d e d how t o b a s e ICBMs i n t h e f u t u r e . ICBM basing: The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n h a s n o t y e t Analyzed below a r e t h r e e o p t i o n s f o r ( 1 ) f i x e d deployment i n e x i s t i n g s i l o s ; ( 2 ) d e c e p t i v e deployment among e x i s t i n g s i l o s ; a n d , ( 3 ) deployment i n t h e " c l o s e l y s p a c e d b a s i n g system" (CSB) -- p o p u l a r l y known a s "dense pack" -- now proposed f o r t h e M-X. 121 Option ( 1 ) - I f both s i d e s deployed t h e i r ICBMs i n c u r r e n t l y e x i s t i n g s i l o s , and a l l empty s i l o s were d i s m a n t l e d t o s i m p l i f y v e r i f i c a t i o n , t h e S o v i e t s c o u l d t a r g e t 940 o f t h e i r 2 , 5 0 0 ICBM-launched I C B M s , and t h e U.S. warheads a g a i n s t t h e 470 U.S. c o u l d t a r g e t 740 of i t s 2,500 ICBM-launched t h e 370 S o v i e t ICBMs. F o r t h o s e who b e l i e v e t h a t U.S. warheads a g a i n s t and S o v i e t ICBMs p o s s e s s 12/ The l a t e s t A i r F o r c e p r o p o s a l f o r b a s i n g t h e M-X i s t o d e p l o y t h e miss i l e s i n c l o s e l y s p a c e d ( 1 , 8 0 0 f e e t a p a r t ) s i l o s w i t h i n a t r i a n g u l a r a r e a of about 12 square m i l e s . Each m i s s i l e s i l o , c a p a b l e o f w i t h s t a n d i n g p r e s s u r e s up t o 5 , 0 0 0 pounds p e r s q u a r e i n c h , would c o n t a i n o n e M-X m i s s i l e . According t o t h e A i r F o r c e , S o v i e t n u c l e a r warheads would t e n d t o n e u t r a l i z e e a c h o t h e r ( b e c a u s e o f t h e phenomena known a s " f r a t r i c i d e " ) and t h e o r e t i c a l l y b e u n a b l e Some s h o r t t i m e a f t e r t h e t o d e s t r o y a s u b s t a n t i a l p o r t i o n o f t h e M-X f o r c e . i n i t i a l S o v i e t a t t a c k , b u t b e f o r e a second wave o f S o v i e t warheads c o u l d a t t a c k , t h e r e would be a "window" ( l a s t i n g s e v e r a l m i n u t e s ) t h r o u g h which t h e U-S- c o u l d l a u n c h t h e M-X m i s s i l e s t h a t s u r v i v e d . CRS- 1 0 a h a r d t a r g e t c a p a b i l i t y , t h e t a r g e t i n g o f two warheads a g a i n s t e a c h I C B M would g i v e high assurance of t a r g e t d e s t r u c t i o n . Thus, under t h i s a s s u m p t i o n , t h i s o p t i o n would n o t p r o v i d e f o r ICBM s u r v i v a b i l i t y u n d e r t h e Reagan p r o p o s a l . - If Option ( 2 ) t h e number o f s i l o s c u r r e n t l y e x i s t i n g on b o t h s i d e s a r e - n o t r e d u c e d , 1 3 1 and t h e s m a l l e r number o f ICBMs p r o j e c t e d i n T a b l e I a r e deployed among them, o p t i o n ( 2 ) g i v e s c o n s i d e r a b l y l e s s i n c e n t i v e t h a n o p t i o n ( 1 ) f o r one n a t i o n t o a t t a c k t h e o t h e r n a t i o n ' s ICBMs, Assuming t h a t two warheads a r e r e q u i r e d t o have a h i g h a s s u r a n c e ' o f d e s t r o y i n g e a c h t a r g e t e d ICBM, t h e n , t o a t t a c k t h e e n t i r e p r o j e c t e d U.S. ( b a s e d i n 370 s i l o s ) and 100 M-Xs silos), &/ I C B M f o r c e , c o n s i s t i n g of 370 Minuteman 111s (assumed t o be based among 630 Minuteman t h e S o v i e t s would h a v e t o a t t a c k t h e 1 , 0 0 0 U.S. 2,000 of t h e i r 2,500 ICBM-launched warheads. p r o j e c t e d S o v i e t ICBM f o r c e , 70 SS-18s and 300 SS-19s ICBM s i l o s w i t h Similarly, t o attack the e n t i r e (assumed t o be based among 308 s i l o s ) - (assumed t o be based among 1 , 0 9 0 m o d i f i e d s i l o s ) , 15/ t h e U.S. would need t o p l a c e on t a r g e t 2,796 warheads ( b u t would o n l y have 2500 ICBM warheads i n i t s f o r c e ) . Thus, under t h e a s s u m p t i o n s s t a t e d , i t c o u l d be a r g u e d t h a t n e i t h e r n a t i o n would h a v e a s t r o n g m i l i t a r y i n c e n t i v e t o s t r i k e f i r s t . The U.S. would n o t have enough ICBM-launched warheads t o t a r g e t a l l t h e S o v i e t s i l o s ; and t h e S o v i e t s would, f o r a l l p r a c t i c a l p u r p o s e s , d e p l e t e t h e i r ICBM f o r c e i n a t t a c k i n g t h e e n t i r e p r o j e c t e d U.S. ICBM f o r c e . 131 Launchers a r e n o t counted under t h e Reagan START p r o p o s a l . C o n s e q u e n t l y , However, i f t h i s h a v i G s u b s t a n t i a l l y more s i l o s t h a n ICBMs may be p e r m i t t e d . were t h e c a s e , a v e r i f i c a t i o n p r o c e s s would seem d i f f i c u l t t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t would a c c u r a t e l y count t h e number o f m i s s i l e s i n s i l o s y e t p r e s e r v e d e c e p t i o n ( n e c e s s a r y f o r s u r v i v a b i l i t y ) a s t o which s i l o s had m i s s i l e s i n them. - 141 T i t a n I1 s i l o s a r e n o t counted b e c a u s e i t i s assumed t h e y would no l o n g e r exist. 151 The S o v i e t Union c u r r e n t l y h a s 1 , 3 9 8 I C B M s i l o s ; 308 of t h e s e s i l o s can l a u n s t h e SS-18 and 360 can l a u n c h t h e SS-19. I t i s assumed t h a t 730 o t h e r s i l o s c u r r e n t l y equipped t o launch t h e SS-17, SS-11, and SS-13 ICBMs would be m o d i f i e d t o l a u n c h t h e SS-19. I f ICBM a c c u r a c y and r e l i a b i l i t y were improved s u f f i c i e n t l y t o g i v e a h i g h d e g r e e of a s s u r a n c e t h a t a s i l o c o u l d be d e s t r o y e d w i t h o n l y one warhead, t h e n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o n l y would need r o u g h l y h a l f o f i t s ICBM f o r c e t o dest r o y t h e S o v i e t ICBM f o r c e . The same would h o l d t r u e f o r t h e S o v i e t Union. Thus, under t h i s a s s u m p t i o n , b o t h t h e U.S. and S o v i e t s may h a v e m i l i t a r y incentives t o s t r i k e f i r s t . Option ( 3 ) t h e M-X - Not enough i s known a b o u t t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s p l a n f o r b a s i n g t o make s t r o n g judgments a s t o w h e t h e r t h e b a s i n g w i l l e n s u r e s u r v i v a - ICBM f o r c e . b i l i t y of t h e U.S. However, assuming t h e c l o s e l y s p a c e d b a s i n g (CSB) approach i s f o l l o w e d , i t a p p e a r s t h a t t h e M-X would h a v e t h e same s u r v i v a b i l i t y p r o p e r t i e s w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e Reagan START p r o p o s a l was i n e f f e c t . The s u r v i v a b i l i t y o f t h e M-X i n t h e CSB mode r e l i e s on " f r a t r i c i d e " e f f e c t s of t h e f i r s t S o v i e t warheads d e t o n a t e d i n t h e v i c i n i t y o f a g r o u p of M-X and on t h e s t r a t e g y o f l a u n c h i n g t h e s u r v i v i n g M-X the i n i t i a l attack. shelters, m i s s i l e s a s h o r t time a f t e r I t must be n o t e d , however, t h a t b o t h o f t h e s e mechanisms would be about e q u a l l y e f f e c t i v e r e g a r d l e s s o f w h e t h e r t h e S o v i e t s would r e t a i n t h e a p p r o x i m a t e l y 5,000 ICBM warheads c u r r e n t l y d e p l o y e d , whether t h e y i n c r e a s e t h e number of warheads s u b s t a n t i a l l y , o r whether t h e y r e d u c e t h e number o f warh e a d s t o t h e 2,500 ICBM-warhead c e i l i n g s p e c i f i e d i n t h e Reagan START p r o p o s a l . The SLBM S u r v i v a b i l i t y I s s u e Some c r i t i c s of t h e Reagan START p r o p o s a l a r g u e t h a t t h e s u r v i v a b i l i t y o f t h e U.S. f l e e t of b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e - l a u n c h i n g t h e Reagan p l a n . sea-based submarines would b e r e d u c e d u n d e r They contend t h a t a reduced number o f SSBNs would make t h e l e g of t h e s t r a t e g i c t r i a d v u l n e r a b l e t o S o v i e t a n t i - s u b m a r i n e w a r f a r e (ASW), and t h a t t h e U.S. would l o s e a s u b s t a n t i a l p o r t i o n of i t s sea-based s t r a t e g i c warheads f o r e a c h SSBN d e s t r o y e d by t h e S o v i e t s . Whether t h i s c r i t i c i s m i s j u s t i f i e d depends i n p a r t on what t h e SSBN f l e e t would c o n s i s t o f i n t h e f u t u r e i f t h e Reagan START p r o p o s a l were implemented. F o r example, i f t h e U.S. SSBN f l e e t was d e s i g n e d around a T r i d e n t I1 m i s s i l e t h a t c a r r i e d 10 warheads, and assuming t h a t 100 M-X I C B M s were deployed and 370 Minuteman I11 I C B M s were r e t a i n e d , t h e n , a s T a b l e I i l l u s t r a t e s , t h e SSBN f l e e t c o u l d c o n s i s t o f 12 Ohio-class be a t s e a i n peacetime. Of t h e s e , s i x t o e i g h t would n o r m a l l y A l t e r n a t i v e l y , i f t h e U.S. w i t h 6 w a r h e a d s , d e p l o y s 100 M-X ICBMs, t h e n t h e U.S. - boats. 16/ d e p l o y s t h e T r i d e n t I1 SLBM m i s s i l e s and r e t a i n s o n l y 30 Minuteman I11 would be allowed t o have 27 Ohio-class - SSBNs. 171 This number o f SSBNs would y i e l d a p e a c e t i m e deployment a t s e a i n t h e r a n g e o f 14 t o 18 bo2ts. Of t h e two a p p r o a c h e s j u s t d i s c u s s e d , t h e l a t t e r would seem t o c o u n t e r t h e c r i t i c i s m t h a t t h e Reagan START p r o p o s a l would undermine SSBN f o r c e s u r v i v a b i l i t y s i n c e i t c o u l d a l l o w f o r a s u b s t a n t i a l number o f SSBNs. It would, however, c o s t c o n s i d e r a b l y more t h a n t h e f i r s t approach s i n c e i t i n v o l v e s p r o c u r i n g and o p e r a t i n g many more SSBNs. I f t h e f i r s t approach was u s e d , SSBN s u r v i v a b i l i t y c o u l d s t i l l be a n open i s s u e n o t amenable t o s i m p l e a n a l y s i s . However, t h e f o l l o w i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are relevant : o Even w i t h a reduced number of U.S. s e a r c h t h e same a r e a of o c e a n , SSBNs, t h e S o v i e t s would have t o Thus, t h e p r o b a b i l i t y a t h a t U.S. SSBN would be 161 The a c t i v e U.S. SSBN f l e e t c u r r e n t l y c o n s i s t s of 31 L a f a y e t t e - c l a s s b o a t s a n d one Ohio-class b o a t . Some o f t h e P o l a r i s SSBNs have been s c r a p p e d ; o t h e r s a r e being r e t i r e d . 171 Assuming c u r r e n t SSBN p r o d u c t i o n c a p a c i t y , i t i s d o u b t f u l t h a t t h e U.S. w o u l d b e a b l e t o produce 27 Ohio-class SSBNs and 648 T r i d e n t I1 SLBMs by t h e end of 1992. d e t e c t e d a t s e a would be c o n c e p t u a l l y a b o u t t h e same r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e number of U.S. SSBNs deployed. However, i f t h e U.S. SSBN f l e e t c o n s i s t s o f o n l y a few b o a t s , once t h e S o v i e t s f i n d one o r more o f t h e SSBNs t h e y c o u l d c o n c e n t r a t e a h i g h e r p e r c e n t a g e o f t h e i r ASW a s s e t s a g a i n s t them. o The l o s s of one SSBN would r e p r e s e n t t h e l o s s o f a much h i g h e r p o r t i o n of t h e sea-based l e g of t h e s t r a t e g i c t r i a d . (assuming t h a t t w o - t h i r d s I n t h e examples shown above o f t h e SSBN f o r c e i s a t s e a ) , l o s s o f o n e SSBN would r e p r e s e n t a l o s s of 12.5 p e r c e n t of o u r a t - s e a T r i d e n t I1 c a s e ( 1 2 SSBNs, e i g h t SSBNs a t s e a ) . c a p a b i l i t y f o r t h e 10-warhead I n c o n t r a s t , f o r t h e 6-warhead T r i d e n t I1 c a s e ( 2 7 SSBNs, 1 8 SSBNs a t s e a ) , l o s s of one SSBN would r e d u c e o u r a t - s e a SLBM a s s e t s by 5.5 p e r c e n t . CRS-14 APPENDIX A - TABLE A-1 PROJECTED U.S. BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCES UNDER THE REAGAN PROPOSAL (100 M-X IChNs U.S. Option) By t h e e n d of c a l e n d a r y e a r 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 ----- * ICBMs : T i t a n I1 Minuteman I1 Minuteman 111 (MK-12) Minuteman 111 (MK-12A) M-X Sub-Totals SLBMs : Poseidon (Lafayette-class) Trident I (Lafayette-class) Trident I (Ohio-class) T r i d e n t I1 (Ohio-class) Sub-Totals Totals * I t i s p r o j e c t e d t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s would ( a ) r e t i r e no l e s s t h a n 100 Minuteman I C B M s p e r y e a r from 1984 t h r o u g h 1987 and ( b ) r e t i r e a l l t h e L a f a y e t t e - c l a s s SS8Ns by t h e end of 1990. Ohioc l a s s SSaNs c a r r y 24 SL3Ms and L a f a y e t t e - c l a s s SSBNs c a r r y 1 6 SLBMs . APPENDIX A (continued) TABLE A-I1 - PROJECTED U.S. ICBMISLBM DEPLOYED WARHEADS UNDER THE REAGAN PROPOSAL (100 M-X ICBMs U.S. Option) By the end of calendar year 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 - - , --- 1988 ___ 1989 1990 1991 1992 ICBMs: Titan I1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Minuteman I1 450 350 250 125 0 0 0 0 0 0 Minuteman 111 (3 MK-12) 750 750 750 750 675 330 330 330 300 210 Minuteman 111 (3 MK-12A) 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 0 250 750 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 M-X (lo MK-12A) Sub-Totals 52 0 - 52 0 52 - 2152 2052 1952 2025 2325 SLBMs : Poseidon (9 Warheads) 2736 2160 1584 576 Trident I (8 Warheads) 2112 2496 2688 3072 3008 Trident 11 (10 MK-12A) 0 0 0 0 0 0 ----Sub-Totals 4948 4656 4272 3648 3008 ----Totals 7000 6708 6224 5673 5333 ----- I _ - 2230 2230 2230 2200 2110 . APPENDIX A (Continued) - PROJECTED TABLE A-111 SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCES UNDER THE REAGAN PROPOSAL By t h e end of c a l e n d a r y e a r 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 - 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 - * ICBMs : SS-18(10Warheads) SS-18(8Warheads) SS-18 ( 1 Warhead) 100 150 58 100 150 58 100 150 SS-lg(6Warheads) SS-19 ( 1 Warhead) 300 60 SS-17 ( 4 Warheads) SS-17 ( 1 Warhead) 98 0 0 70 0 0 70 58 100 150 58 300 60 300 60 300 40 300 0 300 0 120 32 120 32 120 32 U 0 0 0 SS-13 ( 1 Warhead) 60 60 60 0 SS-11 ( 1 Warhead) 518 268 18 0 70 0 0 70 0 0 70 0 0 30U 0 300 0 300 Ci 300 0 0 0 0 0 0 U 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 u 0 0 0 0 ----Sub-Totals 0 0 ----- 1398 1148 898 648 398 370 370 370 370 370 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 304 224 160 96 32 0 0 0 0 0 950 850 750 650 548 472 472 472 472 472 2348 1998 1648 1298 946 842 842 842 842 842 * SLBMs : SS-N-20 (Typhoon) SS-N-18 (Delta 111) SS-N-6 (Yankee I ) Sub-Totals Totals * It i s p r o j e c t e d t h a t t h e S o v i e t s would r e t i r e no l e s s t h a n 250 I C B M s and 100 SLBMs p e r y e a r s t a r t i n g i n 1984. APPENDIX A (Concluded) TABLE A-IV - PROJECTED SOVIET ICBMISLBMDEPLOYED WARHEADS UNDER THE REAGAN PROPOSAL By t h e end of c a l e n d a r y e a r 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 - ICBMs : SS-18 (10 Warheads) SS-18 ( 8 Warheads) SS-18 ( 1 Warhead) SS-19 ( 6 Warheads) SS-19 ( 1 Warhead) SS-17 ( 4 Warheads) SS-17 ( 1 Warhead) SS-13 ( 1 Warhead) SS-11 ( 1 Warhead) Sub-Totals SLBMs : SS-N-20 ( 1 0 Warheads) SS-N-18 ( 7 Warheads) SS-N-17 ( 1 Warhead) SS-N-8 ( 1 Warhead) SS-N-6 ( 1 Warhead) Sub-Totals Totals ---- 1988 1989 1990 1 9 9 1 1992 _ I _