Civil Defense and the Effects of Nuclear War

This Info Pack contains material on nuclear weapons and on the anticipated physical, economic, and social consequences of nuclear attacks on the United States, basic information on the civil defense program, and material discussing some of the arguments, pro and con, surrounding the civil defense issues.

Congressional Research Service The Library of Congress Washington, D.C. 20540 CIVIL DEFENSE AND THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR IP0174C We h a v e r e c e i v e d a n i n c r e a s i n g number o f r e q u e s t s f o r i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e United S t a t e s c i v i l d e f e n s e program and on t h e e f f e c t s o f n u c l e a r war. T h i s I n f o Pack c o n t a i n s m a t e r i a l on n u c l e a r weapons and on t h e a n t i c i p a t e d p h y s i c a l , economic, and s o c i a l c o n s e q u e n c e s o f n u c l e a r a t t a c k s on t h e United S t a t e s , b a s i c i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e c i v i l d e f e n s e program, and m a t e r i a l d i s c u s s i n g some o f t h e a r g u m e n t s , p r o and c o n , s u r r o u n d i n g t h e c i v i l defense issue. Those w i s h i n g more s p e c i f i c i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e c i v i l d e f e n s e program should w r i t e t o : F e d e r a l Emergency Management Agency O f f i c e of P u b l i c A f f a i r s 1725 I S t r e e t , N . W . Washington, D . C . 20472 We hope t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n i s h e l p f u l . Congressional Reference Division March 12, 1982 This paper o u t l i n e s t h e F i s c a l by t h e F e d e r a l Emergency Management emergency-related programs spanning response, and r e c o v e r y - - i n peace o r Year 1983 c i v i l defense program requested Agency (FEMA), which i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e f u l l range o f m i t i g a t i o n , preparedness, war. R e v i t a l ized C i v i 1 Defense Program - Fol l o w i n g t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s r e v i e w o f c i v i 1 defense programs and p o l i c i e s , P r e s i d e n t Reagan, on October 2, 1981, announced h i s i n t e n t i o n t o "devote g r e a t e r resources t o i m p r o v i n g o u r c i v i l defenses," as p a r t o f h i s p l a n " t o r e v i t a l i z e o u r s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s and m a i n t a i n America's a b i l i t y t o keep t h e peace we1 1 i n t o t h e n e x t c e n t u r y . " The fundamental purposes o f t h e N a t i o n a l C i v i l Defense Program a r e : It (1) Tn save American l i ~ icn t h e event o f a n u c l e a r a t t a c k . w i l l save 1 i v e s by a l s p e r s I ng people i n t o r u r a l areas where t h e y w i l l be l e a s t a f f e c t e d by t h e b l a s t and t h e r m a l e f f e c t s o f t h e n u c l e a r e x p l o s i o n s , l e a v i n g r a d i a t i o n as t h e m a j o r hazard f o r t h e d i s p e r s e d p o p u l a t i o n . Our goal i s t o double t h e number of Americans t h a t would s u r v i v e f r o m a m a j o r S o v i e t a t t a c k on t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . ( 2 ) To make n u c l e a r war l e s s l i k e l y by i m p r o v i n g o u r a b i l i t y t o det e r t h e S o v i e t Union f r o m an a t t a c k on t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . I n conjunction with o u r s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s , C i v i l Defense can h e l p t o persuade t h e S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p t h a t t h e u l t i m a t e outcome o f an a t t a c k by them on t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s would be worse f o r them t h a n f o r us. It a l s o reduces t h e a b i l i t y o f t h e S o v i e t s t o coe r c e t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s d u r i n g a p e r i o d of i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i s i s . ( 3 ) To p r o v i d e an improved c a p a b i l i t y f o r S t a t e s and l o c a l i t i e s t o deal w i t h t h e day-to-day. emergencies t h a t o c c u r as a r e s u l t o f n a t u r a l and t e c h n o l o g i c a l hazards. These "dual -use" b e n e f i t s o f t h e c i v i l defense program were r e c o g n i z e d by t h e Congress i n December 1981 amendments t o t h e Federal C i v i l Defense Act. FY 1983 C i v i l Defense Proaram FEMA's budget f o r 1983 r e q u e s t s $252,34O,OOO f o r c i v i l defense a c t i v i t i e s --about $1.10 p e r c a p i t a . As t h e f i r s t y e a r o f a moderate, m u l t i y e a r program i n t e n d e d t o d e p l o y p o p u l a t i o n p r o t e c t i o n c a p a b i l i t i e s , t h e r e q u e s t e d FY 1983 budget i s a f i r s t s t e p t o w a r d r e b u i l d i n g reasonable p r o t e c t i o n f o r o u r people. The program w i l l be deployed i n an o r d e r l y way--not as a c r a s h e f f o r t - - a n d i n f u l l p a r t n e r s h i p w i t h S t a t e s and l o c a l i t i e s . The t h r u s t of t h e program i s t o p r o t e c t t h e U.S. p o p u l a t i o n by r e l o c a t i n q ( e v a c u a t i n g ) p e o p l e from l a r g e r c i t i e s and o t h e r p o t e n t i a l r i s k areas over- a p e r i o d o f s e v e r a l days d u r i n g an a c u t e c r i s i s , and p r o v i d i n g them w i t h f a l l o u t p r o t e c t i o n and s u p p o r t . Capabi 1 iti es w i 11 a1 so be improved t o p r o t e c t p e o p l e i n - p l a c e ( a t o r near t h e i r homes, s c h o o l s , o r p l a c e s of work) s h o u l d t i m e o r circumstances p r e c l u d e c r i s i s r e 1 o c a t i on. S t u d i e s i n d i c a t e t h a t a balanced, moderate-cost c i v i l defense program emphasi z i ng c r i s i s r e 1 o c a t i on m i g h t save--i n a 1a r g e - s c a l e a t t a c k preceded by s t r a t e g i c warning--up t o t w i c e as many Americans as t h e 40 p e r c e n t expected t o s u r v i v e under p r e s e n t c i v i l defense. Such a balanced program i n c l u d e s b o t h p l a n s f o r c r i s i s r e l o c a t i o n o f people from p o t e n t i a l r i s k areas, and o p e r a t i o n a l systems and c a p a b i l i t i e s f o r e x e c u t i o n o f r e l o c a t i o n p l a n s and f o r p r o t e c t i n g t h e p o p u l a t i o n from f a 1 l o u t . Based on e x t e n s i v e r e s e a r c h and on e x p e r i e n c e i n peacetime e v a c u a t i o n s , c r i s i s r e l o c a t i o n c o u l d be h i g h l y e f f e c t i v e i f two c o n d i t i o n s e x i s t e d : ( 1 ) Completion of h i g h qua1 i t y o l a n s , t o g e t h e r w i t h development o f o p e r a t i o n a l systems and c a p a b i l i t i e s ; ana ( 2 ) s e v e r a l days o f w a r n i n g t i m e i n which t o move and p r o t e c t t h e b u l k o f t h e a p p r o x i m a t e l y 145 m i l l i o n people l i v i n g i n o u r l a r ger c i t i e s o r n e a r i m p o r t a n t m i l i t a r y i n s t a l l a t i o n s . . S u r p r i s e a t t a c k i s c o n s i d e r e d h i g h l y u n l ik e l y Most e x p e r t s be1 i e v e t h a t an a t t a c k on t h e U.S. would come o n l y i n t h e c o n t e x t of a l e n g t h y p e r i o d o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i s i s . Moreover, i t i s 1 i k e l y t h a t we would have s u f f i c i e n t warni n g t i m e because t h e S o v i e t s must p r o t e c t t h e b u l k o f t h e i r urban p o p u l a t i o n by e v a c u a t i on. E v a c u a t i o n e x p e r i e n c e i n b o t h peacetime and World War II i s t h a t most p e o p l e w i l l comply w i t h o f f i c i a l i n s t r u c t i o n s , p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e s e a r e unders t a n d a b l e and make sense i n terms o f i m p r o v i n g chances f o r s u r v i v a l . I n fact, i n a t h r e a t e n i n g s i t u a t i o n , many p e o p l e w i l l l e a v e p o t e n t i a l danger areas on t h e i r own, whether o r n o t t h e y have been a d v i s e d t o do so. The FY 1983 program w i l l p r o v i d e a b a s i s f o r a c t i o n , i n f u t u r e y e a r s , t o p e r m i t f u l l deployment o f r e q u i r e d c a p a b i l i t i e s . The FY 1983 program w i l l acc o r d i n g l y a c c e l e r a t e a c t i v i t i e s a1 ready underway (e.g., c r i s i s r e 1o c a t i o n p l a n development o f S t a t e and l o c a l Emergency O p e r a t i n g C e n t e r s ) whi l e y a t t h e ning, same t i m e , i m p r o v i n g t h e q u a l i t y o f p l a n s and systems. The program w i l l f e a t u r e g r e a t e r p a r t i c i p a t i o n by S t a t e and l o c a l governments i n managing t h e implementat i o n and achievement o f n a t i o n a l g o a l s and o b j e c t i v e s . FEMA w i l l a l s o commence new programs i n FY 1983 (e.g., s u r v i v a b l e , h i gh-perfqrmance warning and communi The FY 1983 program a l s o p r o v i d e s f o r analyses and p i l o t acc a t i o n s systems). t i v i t i e s i n t h e area o f p r o t e c t i o n o f key i n d u s t r i e s and r e l a t e d work f o r c e s . - FY 1983 Proaram H i ~ h l i a h t s I n t h e area o f n u c l e a r c i v i l p r o t e c t i o n f o r t h e people, t h e FY 1983 r e quest p r o v i d e s f o r a c c e l e r a t i ng development o f c r i s i s r e 1 o c a t i on o l ans. By end-FY 1983, augmented S t a t e p l a n n i n g s t a f f s should have compietea about 56 per-.. c e n t o f t h e i n i t i a l CRP's r e q u i r e d by l o c a l j u r i s d i c t i o n s t h r o u g h o u t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . FEMA a1 so proposes t o a c c e l e r a t e t h e N a t i o n a l S h e l t e r Survey, which p r o v i d e s d a t a needed as a b a s i s f o r c r i s i s r e l o c a t i o n p l a n n i n g . The most i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r i n e f f e c t : ve c r i s i s re1 o c a t i o n i s publ i c coopera t i o n which, i n t u r n , depends upon t h e publ i c ' s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f o f f i c i a l adv i c e and i n s t r u c t i o n s . FEMA t h e r e f o r e i n t e n d s t o work w i t h t h e S t a t e s t o p r o v i d e a d d i t i o n a l c r i s i s r e l o c a t i o n maps and i n s t r u c t i o n s . These i n s t r u c t i o n s i r e i n t e n d e d t o be p l a c e d i n l o c a l t e l e p h o n e d i r e c t o r i e s i n areas where c r i s i s r e 1 o c a t i o n p l a n s have been completed. By end-FY 1983, such i n s t r u c t i o n s s h o u l d be publ i s h e d i n t e l e p h o n e d i r e c t o r i e s i n j u r i s d i c t i o n s i n c l u d i n g about 25 p e r c e n t o f t h e t o t a l U.S. r i s k p o p u l a t i o n . A d d i t i o n a l FY 1983 a c t i v i t i e s w i l l i n c l u d e resumption o f s e l e c t i v e s h e l t e r mark-ing (suspended i n 1973), as w e l l as work t o p r o v i d e a b a s i s f o r f u t u r e quant i t y procurement o f a u s t e r e s h e l t e r s u p p l i e s and v e n t i l a t i o n k i t s . S h e l t e r s i g n s i d e n t i f y f o r t h e c i t i z e n t h o s e b u i 1d i n g s p r o v i d i n g p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t n u c l e a r a t t a c k e f f e c t s , w h i l e s h e l t e r s t o c k s p e r m i t people t o remain i n s h e l t e r s u n t i l t h e d e c l ine of r a d i a t i o n l e v e l s p e r m i t s emergence f r o m she1 t e r . FEMA's FY 1983 r e q u e s t w i l l improve t h e coverage o f t h e e x i s t i n g N a t i o n a l Warning System, w h i l e p r e p a r i n g f o r deployment o f a s u r v i v a b l e r a d i o - w a r n i n g system and o f a s u r v i v a b l e system f o r communications between t h e N a t i o n a l , Reg i onal , S t a t e and State-Area 1eve1 s. FEMA proposes t o a c c e l e r a t e t h e program s t a r t e d i n FY 1981 t o p r o v i d e matching funds f o r development o f S t a t e and l o c a l Emerqencv O ~ w a t i n gCenters. EOC's a r e p r o t e c t e d s i t e s , w i t h necessary communications, f r o m which key l o c a l and S t a t e o f f i c i a1 s d i r e c t c o o r d i n a t e d o p e r a t i ons i n peacetime o r a t t a c k emergenci es ,FEMA proposes a1 so_>& a c c e l e r a t e t h e program t o ._ecau.ide-fa-l.louL-bnd electroma-qnetic p u l ~ p r-o t e~c t i o~n f o~r b-rocddcast ~ s t a t i o n s , as well as an e ~ ~ e a ~ - p a wgee nr e r a t o r . Such p r o t e c t e d s t a t i o n s p r o v i d e a c r i t i c a l compon e n t o f r e a d i n e s s , t h e a b i l i t y t o p r o v i d e a u t h o r i t a t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n and i n s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e p u b l i c i n an emergency. Matching funds w i l l a l s o be p r o v i d e d t o enhance e x i s t i n g S t a t e and l o c a l networks f o r emergency communications. . The FY 1983 request a l s o p r o v i d e s f o r s u p p o r t of p r o f e s s i o n a l R a d i o l o g i c a l Defense O f f i c e r s a t t h e State-Area l e v e l , and e x t e n s i o n o f t h e S t a t e - l e v e l RDO s t r u c t u r e b e i n g developed i n FY 1982. F u l l - t i m e s u p e r v i s o r y RDO's a r e t h e keystone i n d e v e l o p i n g r a d i o l o g i c a l defense systems and c a p a b i l i t i e s . I n add i t i o n , c a p a b i l i t i e s w i l l be developed t o produce and deploy, i n f u t u r e y e a r s , about 7 m i l l i o n s e t s o f i n s t r u m e n t s r e q u i r e d f o r t h e s h e l t e r and p o s t - s h e l t e r periods. * I n t h e area of t r a i n i n g , t h e FY 1983 r e q u e s t p r o v i d e s f o r r e s t o r i n g capab i 1i t i e s t o p r o v i d e simulated-emergency e x e r c i q e s f o r l o c a l and S t a t e o f f i c i a 1 s. E f f e c t i v e e x e c u t i o n of p l a n s t o deal w i t h peacetime o r a t t a c k emergencies r e q u i r e s t h a t key o f f i c i a l s know what t o do i n case of emergency, and e x p e r i e n c e has shown t h a t e x e r c i s i n g i s t h e most e f f e c t i v e way of p r o v i d i n g t h i s knowledge. Other c i v i 1 defense t r a i n i n g a c t i v i t i e s w i l l 1 i n c l g e - i - n - c r e a s i n g capabi 1 i t i to p r o v i d e s u r v i u a l in-formation t o t h e pub1 i c d u r i n g _a.garj4-d_Z=ek-e-1.oping-~-cisis, s t a r t i n g t r a i n i n g i n t h e area of s h e l t e r management, and a c c e l e r a t i n g t r a i n i n g of r a d i o 1 o g i c a l defense personnel . F i n a l l y , t h e FY 1983 request p r o v i d e s f o r a r e a l i n c r e a s e i n m a t c h i n g - f u n d s u p p o r t f o r t h e S t a t e and 1ocal c i v i 1 preparedness s t r u c t u r e . T h i s would p e r m i t new j u r i s d i c t i o n s t o e n t e r t h e program, and a d d i t i o n a l personnel t o be s u p p o r t e d i n j u r i s d i c t i o n s now p a r t i c i p a t i n g . T h i s w i l l , i n t u r n , improve c a p a b i l i t i e s f o r management o f b o t h peacetime and a t t a c k emergencies. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD Reprinted by the Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, December 1981 . - HOUSE In September of 1979 the House passed my amendment to the Department of Defense authorization bill that embodied the thrust of Presidential Decision 41. I t set out the goals and elements that were to be included in an enhanced civil defense program, authorized a 5-year program and, most importantly, it stated that civil defense would be considered part of the U.S. strategic defense. Unfortunately. this amendment died tn the conference committee that year in 1979. In 1980 we renewed this effort and we were successful in a similar amendment, minus the 5-year authorization. It was adoped by both Houses of Congress. It was signed into law by the President. Thus, the House, the Senate, and the administr.^tion went on record in support of an enhanced civil defense program. This year we fared just as well during the authorization process. The Houze in the Department of Defense authorization bill approved $174 million for fiscal year 1982, an increase of $41.2 million over the administration's request. This was an endorsement of the House Armed Senlces Committee judgment that this level of funding is needed to implement the D-prime program, a 7-year funding effort to imCIVIL DEFENSE: prove population surpival in the event The SPEAXER pro tempore. Under of nuclear war, thereby enhancing dea previous order of the House. the gen- terrence and crisis stability. is tleman from Missouri (Mr. SKELTON) Unfortunately, we have not met recognized for 60 minutes. with equal success in the appropriMr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker. I have ation process over this same period. often taken the floor of this House to Our attempts to get adequate funding talk on the subject of civil defense, in for the citll defense prograxn have offering amendments to authorization been frustrated at every turn. In the and appropriation legislation and a t decade prior to the fiscal year 1981 a p other times during general debate propriation, we saw the resources allowhen the subject of civil defense cate&for civil defense decline steadily. Last year. we did manage a real inarose. I have asked for this special order crease of 10 percent over the fiscal today because I believe it necessary year 1980 level. Although this fiscal once again that the Members of this year 1981 fuixiing of $123 million was body have the opportunity to express far less than the $167 million needed their support for this vital program. to begin D-prime last year, a number .this program of civiI defense. I want to of us were encouraged. We thought thank my colleagues who are here that a t least we had turned the comer and could build on the initiatives pertoday to join in this effort. To begin this discw&on. Mr. Speak- mitted by this increase, move toward er, it would be appropriate to review full implementation of PD-41, and what has happened to civil defense have a truly nationwide, comprehenand the civil defense program in sive civil defense program. Needless to say, our hopes have not recent years. both in terms of legislative action here in Congress and been fulfilled by what has happened within the various administrations. In so far this year on ciW defense fundagencies September,' 1978, then President ing. The =-independent Carter issued Presidential 'Directive appropriatlon bill for fiscal year 1982 PD-41 which directed that t h e Na- funds civil defense at $128.8 million, tion's civil defense p r o m should en- an amount that is even below the hance the survivability of the Amerl- $132.8 million requested in the origican population and their leadersfrip. nal Carter budget, and endorsed by thus enhancing deterrence and stabil- the Reagan administration. We have ity and reducing the possibility of been told that the new administration Soviet coercion during a time of crisis. has endorsed PD-41. but so far this adPD41, Presidential Decision 41, also ministration. like its predecessor, has contemplated a "dual use" civil de- not joined the fight to secure funding fense to help deal with peacetime dis- that !s sufficient to make the lofty goals of that document a reality. asters and emergencies. G( October 1, 1981 If given a chance, civil defense will work. I t will save lives both during nuclear war and natural disaster. An enhanced US. civil defense program will serve to restore a measure of the strategic ba.lance of power with the Soviet Union which has an active, well funded. and by all accounts a workable civil defense program. Moreover, an enhanced civil defense p r o m is affordable, even with today's tight budgets. There can be no greater priority for spending tax dollars than to spend them on a program that will save the lives of US. citizens. The total cost of the 7-year D-prime program would be a modest 32.3 billion. The 5-year version of the plan, known a s the D program. would cost around $2 billion. In either case, it is a small price to pay for the lives that would be saved. Mr. Speaker, there is support for an enhanced civil defense program here in Congress and among the population a s a hole. The number of Members participating in this special order reflects that fact. In addition, on this floor on July 17, the chairman of the House Appropr~ations Subcommittee on --Independent Agencies, Mr. BOLAND, told me in a colloquy concerning the D and D-prime programs, "I would be willing to fund a program at that level over that period if it has the administration's support. If we are going to put into place a civiJ defense program that is going to protect the people of the United States, not only in time of war but also against natural disasters, this type of program is necessary We have much to do, h4r. Speaker. and out time is m g short. We must begin an enhanced civil defense program soon, and we must deal with the related areas of command, control. and communications. early warning systems, air defense, and ballistic missile defense. The time for study and reevaluation is over. The time for action is now. Mr. MITCXELL of New York Mr. Speaker, will be gentleman yield? Mr. SKELTON. I yield to my friend, the gentleman from NEW York (Mr. ." MITCHELL). Mr. MITCHELL of New York. I thank the gentleman for yielding. Mr. Speaker. I wish to commend my good friend and colleague, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. SKELTON) on his holding of this special order on civil defense. He has been a long and strong supporter of an improved civil defense program for our Nation. It is my belief one of the most pressing and unmet needs facing our Nation is for an adequate civil defense pro---one which is responsive to existing threats and prepares us for future challenges. To respond to this need. I proposed a comprehensive, 7-year civil defense program. Its cost of approximately $2.6 billion, represents but a fraction of our estimated tot,al, defense expenditm*s for the period covered-the fn- October 1, 1981 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --Hot JSE crease in fnnding over our present proamounts to approximately onetenth of 1 percent of our Department of Defense annual budget. The p r o m I am advancing is one that will give us. for the first time in t b nuclear era. the protection we must be assured of as we face our ideological adversaries who lack our cornmitment for the pursuit of peace, Simply put. my goal is to help to balance the strategic scales but, if there should be a war, to guarantee the surviva1 of our Nation. We have no such guarantee today. It is time we d i d The 7-year plan would concentrate the use of the funds requested for: Crisis evacuation: research and development: emergency operating centers. training and education: a d management and coordination. In each one of these crittcal areas our present civil defense program fails the test of adequacy. This p r o m was not developed by me. rather i t emerged ov'er an extended period of time after protrscted study by d ~ l ldefense experts who have earned respect and a rtgtional reputation for their w r k in this area I t is a product of serious. well-intentioned people r h o share a cancern about our present. have learned from lessons of the past and are determined to prepare us to live in peaee. I t is the p r o m D-prhne recommendation of the civil defense wori;shops which were held in Rosslyn. Va. in the tall of 1977 by the Systems Planning Corporatfon for t h e Defense Clvil Prcparedness Agency. We are in trouble. ~ h e s o v - f e tlrave s an excellent civil defense system. We do nut. Neither nation had an adequate program in the midsixties But for more than a decade the Soviets have been spending over $1 btllion a year on civil defense. We have averaged less than $100 million. They have a three-track program: Individual prscemion. communitg shelters, and p o g utation evacuation W e have only one. community shelters, and it is in disarray in spite of the dedicated and dogged efforts of rmury professional and amateur civil defense leaders. Why fs this a problem? Because it destroys t h e strategic balance. The best hope far peace, w e are told, is the maintenance of' the strategic bdance. There are varying estimates on the effect of an all-out nuclear war. If the Soviets have time to put their civil defense program intc~operatiorb4 o r 4 days prior to the holocaustthe results would be far more destructive tc the United States, W c h does not have a P ~ - - - o w ~100 W o n deadthan the Soviet Union-5 to 20 milli4n We& ShoaM. w e adopt the I3-prime Plan of the lnteragencp Stan Civil Defense, developed under t h e aegis of the National Security Council. they estimate we can save up to 85 percent of our population. Should t h e Soviets target populatian. they estfmate up to txxk4hird.s of our population_will be preserved. Most experts agree we eRjoy "rough equivalence" with the Soviets in weap Onrp. F'mm my perspective it appears to get mugher each gear. But if Soviet weapons have a far greater destructive effect on us than our weapons on them. it is as though they had far more weapons. This makes 2 mockery of the strategic balance. I t does not exist. Once the balance of tenor is gone t h e Soviets have an awesome edge in any confrontation, whether it be at the bargaining table, an act of adventurism in Europe. Africa. the Mideast or in all-outnuclear war. I t hss been said that “eternal vigilanco is t h e of liberby." Euenh in Iran and the invasion of Afghanistan have shown tha&to be true, If R u s i a is able to grab up one or two more countries, w e may b e forced into warwith a strong possibility that the flict could develop into a nuclear confrontation. Why not provide at least minimal protection for our civilians? W h y not teach them t o survive? W h y have we not done someWling about civil defense? Chiefly because far too many Americans are the vlctims of three mk.conceptions--the first being the overkill fallacy, wherein the casualties per kiloton in Hiroshima and Nagasaki are multiplied by the number of kilotons in the world's arsenal. This implies that by some means we can collect the entire target populations in t h e same density as existed in HiroshimP aab Nagasskt and keep them unwamed and vnlnersble. A statement of identical validity is that the world's inventory of snail arms ammunition, or for that matter, kitche n knives. can also kill the human pogulation several times over. Another widely held misconception is that much of t h e world's population would be destroyed by-fallout fmm a l-sde nudear war. "On the Beach" reflects how this t M g o r i g h & d The Naaional Academy of Science e s t h a k s that the long-term effect of this fallout would only amount to a 2 - p e r e w t increase in t h e cancer rate over a S y e a r period, This increase could be countered by not rebuilding many of t h e cigarette plants that would be destroyed in such a hol- H 6777 Soviet superiority-they M longer claim it does not exist-is to retarget our weapons. Retargeting would supposedly balance through civil def e n s e t h e potential saving of American lives rather than the potential destruction of Soviet citizens We must begin today to rebalance the strategic equation. How do you deter an attack unless you can convince an enemy t h a t you will win the war t h a t he is sbrtln(L? I find it doubtful that anyone aware to the strategic imba.Lance belleves we would fire any nucIear weapons if it meant t b destruction of our society. Without a cinl defense system that is precisely what It means. v y . this $2.6 billion grogram requves the authorization of the Federal Emergency Management Agenc;' to increase from $174 minion in I282 to $487 million in 1988. For the Ffrst time ever the Ecme Anned Skrvhs Snbcammittee on Military bstahtioas designated D-prime as the desired program for civil defense in the United States. The $17.1 million authorized for 1982 represents the frst y e s i s cost of this 7-year comprehensive program. The committee language is an follows: The level of funding in the authorization of appropriations in subsection (a1 represents Lbe first year of a comprehensive 7year u p w e d funding program for civil de- Which b t Y W l l aS the D-prhne fsbssedu~the~ofsehf~scomm e s f P e populrrti0~relocsticnr ~ i l i t p f o r time of crisis The mmun o r k m a k i in executive branch studies in the dvil defense area that provided the basis for Presidentfal directive 41. issued in September 1978. and f- consistent with the action of Cmgress In enacting title V of the Federal Court Defense Act of 1950 in Public Law 96-342 The Congress of the United States will spend approximately $225 billion for our offensive capability. Without the $174 million for civil defense we are doing almost nothing t o protect American citiz* Does it not make good sense to spend a little more t o provide a plan that would help prevent wax. but in the event. of war, would help protect all Americans? I urge my colleagues to join me in ocaust. Pinally. victims of the doomsday sce- helping to implement t h e D-prime pronario feel. mistakenly, that survivors gram. Our totai nation& defense dea f a &ge-aak nuclear war woad mands no less W e tcs Eve undfor weeks at U 1746 a tirme. Not so, our scientists tell us, Mr. 0BEBSTA.R. Mr. Speaker, will An individual can protect himseU from the most dangerous type of radiation the gentleman yield? because it travels like light. in a Mr- SICELTON. I yield. straight Line. A -ef. folded Mr. OBEBSTAR. Mr. Speaker. I aver six or eight tima can m e ru m Would like to commend the gentleeffective gas mask to provide pwfer?. frem Missoarl for taking this special tfonfmnr t h e less dangerous type of order on t h e vital issue of civil dersdiation fense. and cangratulate him and the That is t h e bad news. The good news gentleman from New Yorh (Mr. is i t isnot too late do something about M m x m ~ for ) the contribution both it, A relatively inuruensive remedy is of them made as recognized national to dwelop a civil defense system af leafiers la alerting this country t o the our oam. Some: of our defense leaders need of rebuilding civil defense. and suggest the way to cornpensae for fighting on the House floor for imis CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOIJSE clear war is winnable and that should be a sobering thought for all of us. I am committed, as I believe this Congress is, to the restoration of this Nation's military posture. However, I believe, as does my colleague from Missouri, that an intricate element in our overall strategic strength lies in a no-nonsense "emergency preparedness program. I would therefore urge both my colleagues in the House and the administration to continue the progress made to date in the civil defense of the United States. Mr. SKELTON. I thank the gentleman from Maryland for his remarks. He has been a strong supporter of civil -rrlrr \ uka1u./ Mr. DYSON. Mr. Speaker, I would defense since he has been in Congress. like to take this opportunity today to I thank him for his contribution &-.aa.. uay. applaud my distinguished colleague's w Mr. McDONALD. Mr. Speaker, will efforts on behalf of a strong home de- the gentleman yield? fense for the United States. Let me Mr. SKJ3LTON. I yield to my coljoin him in requesting from the Presi- league from Georgia. dent the continued commitment he (Mr. McDONALD asked and was and his party have made for an effec- given permission to revise and extend tive civil defense program. his remarks.) It is my concern, however, that perMr. McDONALD Mr. Speaker, I haps during our current budget diffi- thank the gentleman from Missouri culties, the administration, with the for yielding. I would like to applaud consent of the Congress. will make his havrncr a mecia1 order to review !his country's emergency preparedness and extr~melysimportanttopic that, a casualty of the budget ax. unfortunately, our Nation has disreFor fiscal year 1982, the budget for garded for too long. We can see from the Federal Emergency Management the great interest by the news galleries Agency is $128.8 million, which trans- over our heads, that is symptomatic of lates into 57 cents per capita that this the problems that we face, that for Government is spending to protect the whatever reason, the news media of life and property of the American this country have been active propopeople from nuclear attack and assist nents by its sense of omission or comthem during times of natural and mission of the MAD policy of mutual manmade disasters. assured destruction. I realize that this subject is one of Mr. McDONALD. Mr.-Speaker, the little interest to many of my col- subject of civil defense looms larger leagues and, to some degree, the each day and becomes important with American people who view the ques- each passing hour as the United States tion of survivability in a nuclear moves into "the window of vulnerabilattack impossible. Yet I believe the ity" to our strategic forces. Our only role of a nation's emergency prepared- hope to change the pathetic situation ness has a dual function. The question as regards to civil defense in this counof survivability is essential but also a try, is to change the basic public attiviable and comprehensive program of tude that has been built up by our civil defense will clearly demonstrate opinion makers that we are in for to our adversaries that t h e United mutual assured destruction and that States will yield no strategic advan- no one will survive, so why even distage to the Soviet Union or any other cuss it. This attitude is the grossest nation. nonsense of all time. The United I believe that it is important to again States has to survive and continue if remind the Members of this House civilization, as we know it, is to continand the American people'that it is not ue. Can we expect the athiest Marxists the United States which has embarked with their 100-percent materialism to on the most ambitious and aggressive preserve civilization if they prevail or civil defense program during peace will they turn t h e entire Earth planet time, but the Soviet Union, and my into one vast Gulag? I think we all question is, why? know the answer to thatThe theory of mutual assured deStudes conducted by our own experts show that the Soviets spend 20 struction has done more than cripple times as much for civil defense as the our civil defense. It has amost crippled United States-nearly $2 billion annu- our national yill to survive. I t has con: aily. Why does a nation which cannot vinced the man in the street that provide its people with basic consumer there is no use in civil defense as each goods devote substantial resources to side has enough bombs to kill each civil defense? Are they afraid of a U.S. other 10 times over anyway. MAD has further, and insidiously in my view, sneak attack or is it mere paranoia? I would argue that it is neither, but prevented our Nation from having a rather a calculated element of their real strategic goal in m y future conoverall strategic philosophy that nu- flict with the Soviet Union in that it proved funding for the civil defense efforts. I have supported their efforts in the past and will continue to support them in the future. I hope all of our colleagues will pay close attention to the very substantial information that is being presented here in the course of this s ~ e c i aorder. l Mr.'S?XELTON. I thank the gentleman from hlmnesota very much. Mr. DYSON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield7 Mr. SKELTON. I yield to my friend from Maryland. (Mr. DYSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend h s re- October 1, 1981 assumes an awesome exchange of weapons followed by little else than just clouds of radiation. Before every new conflict, we are told that weapons are so awful that the war will last not longer than a few days or weeks. The invention of the machine gun was supposed to make World War 1 very short. It did not, as armies learned to dig in deeply. World War II was supposed to be very short as the invention of the bomber plane would make it impossible to fight longer than a few weeks. Now, of course, we talk of the 3-week war or even in shorter terms because of nuclear weapons. It is a strange thing that we do not find talk of mutual assured destmction emanating from Moscow. What we do find is that the defense hierarchy of Moscow talks of fighting and winning a nuclear war. We also find a vast system of civil defense that is building factories out in the country, has deep shelters in its cities, spends several billions on training civil defense personnel and plans to evacuate as many people as it can. Could it be that the Soviet Government values its citizens more that we do? The People's Republic of China also has a vast shelter system to protect its people and, obviously, intends to try and survive a nuclear Strike. And, while neither the Soviet nor the Communist Chinese civil defense systems are perfect, they will be able to save a lot of people and much of their industrial capacity in any nuclear exhange. As in the case of the infantw in World War I, we need to dig deeply into the earth and let that be our a m o u r against a nuclear attact, We, too, need a shelter system, an evacuation plan, and a system to protect our industrial capacity. For a few hundred million dollars, we could start a serious civil defense program, start training the necessary personnel and start taking the steps necessary to our Nation's sunival and abandon the MAD doctrine which can only lead to our Nation's destruction and/or surrender. Otherwise, we are doomed to live in the valley of the shadow for the next 5 years at least, our very existence dependent upon the whims fo the Politburo in Moscow. Mr. Speaker, let me once again commend my colleague from Missouri for this most important special order on the subject of civil defense. Mr. SKIELTON. I thank my friend and colleague from Georgia f o r p i s contribution today. Mr. BRINECLCI. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield? Mr. SF;ELTON. I yield to my-friend and colleague from Georgia. Mr. BRINECLCI. Mi. Speaker, I thank the gentleman very much. If the roll is called of civil defense and civil defense issues, the name of the gentleman from Missouri would head the list in terms of those who have made such a fine contribution to the October 1, 1981, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD remedial legislation designed in the interests of the American citizen in time of war. Following Mr. S~ELTON'S name certainly would be the gentleman from New York (Mr. MrrCKELL). Mr. W H I T E ~ J Rof S TVirginia, Mr. DICKINSON of Alabama, and many others of us who have felt for a long time that civil defense has been neglected. Mr. MITCof New York. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield? Kr. BRINKUZ. Of course. Mr. MITCHELt of New York. I would just like to add that very nearly at the top of that list would be the gentleman from Georgia because of the splendid job he has done not only to develop the civil defense system. but in the leadership he has provided as chairman of the subcommittee that has jurisdiction over this subject. Mr. BRINKLEY. I thank my friend and fellow pilot from the State of New York. Where I am coming from is just a tad different. The Whiteman Air Force Base. I believe, you have Instruments of war there that would be targeted by the Soviet Union; is that not correct? Mr. SICELTON. That is absolutely correct. We have 150 ICBM misslle sllos that are at or in the Fourth Congresslonal District of Missouri that I represent. The gentleman is correct. Mr. BRINIZLFY. If I recall correctly, in the gentleman's district in the recent paat. -there has been severe flooding which we would term as a natural disaster. Mr. SKELTON. Yes, we had-and of course I have told the gentleman of these because of his interest in the dual use of civil defense--we had a killer flood in the western part of my district, the Fourth District of Missouri, and we have had killer tornados on two occasions in which civil defense played a very important part. Mr. BRINRLGI. And ttus brings me to the structure of which I speak. which is one of dual use which would provide a future in-place system of civil defense that would be tested and exercised by the Vikings. the Berserkers--the natural disasters that do certainly come along from time to time, which would provide us an adequate preparedness on which we could depend should that dire day ever come. 0 1750 - ' So I have been something of a mis- sionary. I have preached the gospel of dual use. not only because of the certainty of natural disasters but because it would give us some self-confidence in our attack preparedness. I also believe. Mr. Speaker, it would provide an important peacetime dividend, a cost-effective mechanism that would give us more bang for the buck. I t would give us two for the price of one. If we are getting the utility of civil defense in peacetime, we also have it standing in the wings for a time of war. -HOUSE I think that success is a matter of mafafns. I think that that capability which better Prepares itself just a little bit more in a state of readiness would stand it in good stead in the event of war. So I do speak for a dual use System. and I would say to the Members of the Eouse that our subcommittee has at this time grafted in the defense aut h o e t i o n bill language which does bring natural disaster preparedness up to the same status, as a matter of statutory law, as that in the civil defense system. We are in conference right now, but we are trusting that that w i l l become a matter of law and that this will be helpful to our civil defense system because of the fact that it serves as a powerful incentive. I t would motlvate our local and State people who are .charged with the needs of a natural disaster situation. it would encouarage them to do their job. and then we would have them in place in the event the attack disaster would come along. Finally, Mr. Speaker. I might mention the item which the last speaker referred to, and that is the doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD). I t has been said that the Soviet Union has sufficient firepower to kill every human being on E a r t h and that we in the United States have sufficient firepower to kill every human being o n Earth. Why is it, then. that we cornPete more and more in this anns nrce in which we are engaged? Well. that is not exactly right. Those Rresumptions, those beliefs, would presume that on bombing day all the people of the world would go into the cities to which that firepower is targeted. The Soviet Union has different plans. I t has a dispersal system which would take the people away from the Population centers and thus save the lives of millions. That is the goal toward which the gentreman from New York (Mr. MXTCEELL)has pointed. If we should go to r continental system such as the prime or the followon, it would serve the American people well because we would disperse the people and we would save millions. countless millions of lives. Finally, in conclusion. I am going to explore with our subcommittee the addition of language whichwould permit the President to institute a volunteer system with reference to State and local governments under the authority of the Federal civil defense umbrella which might come into play and trigger the energies of national groups chartered by the Federal Government. I am speaking of those charters held by veterans' groups. Gold Star Wives, and others who might be an important backup in any dispersal-system that we might have. Once again, Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. SKEZTON) for taking this time to emphasize the importance of civil defense and the fact that it is time that we "fish or cut bait." Mr. SECGLTON. Mr. Chsirman, I thank the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. BRINKLEY), and I do appreciate the gentleman's participating in our s ~ e c i aorder l this evening. -The gentleman from- Georgia has shown extraordinary leadership as chairman of the subcommittee in assisting civil defense, and he has in all meanings of the word been the "father of dual usen--dual use of civil defense, including natural disasters, along with the protection against nuclear attack. The gentleman from Georgia should certainly be thanked for the hard work he has done in this area Mr. gRAMER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield? Mr. SICELTON. I yield to my friend. the gentleman from Colorado. Mr. gRAMER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding. Let me first begin by saylng how much I personally appreciate-and I am, hopefully. speaking on behalf of the people of the congressional district of which I have the privilege to be the Represertative, the Mfth Congressional District of Colorado-and how much we appreciate the work of the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. S~ELTON). the work of the gentleman from New York (Mr. MITCRELL), and the work and efforts of our distinguished subcommittee chairman, the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. BBIXKLEY) in bringing to the followu~stage this most critical and vital issue. The MAD doctrinemutual assured desttuction-under which this country has operated its strategic umbrella now for almost two decades is, in my judgment. a dixredited policy. I t is one by which the acronym. MAD, truly and very characteristically identifies the significance of this policy, because it is a policy that emphasizes the disprotection of the American homeland and the American people. I t is a policy that in effect holds American POpulatiOns ap unwitting pawns in a game of strategic balance and counterbalance. I t pur~osely puts the American population at risk; because it says that to be able to protect yourself and your citizens is somehow destabilizing or is somehow goto upset potentially the other side. Thus it has come about that we have no protection against incoming hostile bombers, we have no protection aealnst incoming hostile missiles, and we have no way today of which I am aware of protecting the American people in the event that some calamitous or purposeful or inadvertent event is somehow triggered. Since the gentleman has brought these matters to our attention during the course of our subcommittee meetings. I have often since reflected and wondered, what would happen if an American President faced a crisis of this kind. As I understand it. it would take about 4 days for the Soviets to fully implement the Soviet civil defense policy. What would an American CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- HOUSE President do at a time when a crisis arose between us and the .Soviet Union, when tensions were running high, if the Soviet Government imple mented its civil defense policy 1 day at a time, knowing that if that policy were successfully implemented, the potential exists, as I understand the figures, that if an exchange were then to Lake place between us and the Soviet Union, the United States would lose upward to 150 million people from its population and the Soviets, although they would suffer a tremendous loss, could nevertheless minimize that loss to about 15 million, less than the number that was lost by the Sovlets in World War XI? With those kinds of mtios staring an American President in the face and with a Soviet ultimatum then following, what action would an American President take? Would he capitulate to Soviet demands,or would he have the capability of resisting? Quite frankly, if I were an American President in that situation I do not know what I would do, and I hope that no American President is ever put in that situation. But until we pay attention to the capability of reversing the discredited doctrine of MAD and turning to the defense of the American homeland and the American people, that risk is one that we run against a very dangerous time fuse and a very dangerous time clock. And o u r ' mbcommfttee chairman has. I think. put it very artfully in terms of the statement. that the "time is now to fish or cut bait." Many have stated, "Well, the American people really don't mre about civil defense. It is not an issue." Well, we can tell, I think, from the news attention that this matter is getting that it is not an Issue. But I would submit that it is not , an issue because the American people, as we sit here in this room. honestly believe that they do have a capability of protecting themselves, and the gentleman is doing a marvelous job of educating them so that they no longer believe that. 0 1800 They do have a civil defense program that is capable of defending American populations, and that is the reason that so little excitement seems to be generated over the issue. I really truly believe that the gentle man from Mtssouri (Mr. -#) does us a real service by educating us, by laying out these cold, bleak, hard facts as to just what great risks there are if we continue on this policy. We can no longer continue to be solely an offensive country. building weapons that are capable of destroying people without.some consideration of protecting ourselves and our people against those same weapons or types of weapons being directed against us... I am privileged to be a part of this special order and again I commend the gentleman for bringing this vital issue to the attention of the American lars a year to keep alive chronically ill people. people. Here is a society which beMr. SKZLTON. I the gentle- lieves in setting u p kidney treatment man vem much. I appreciate the gen- centers at a cost of over $1 billion a tlemsn from Colorado's continued and year. very helpful support in the area of Mr. SICELTON. If I may reclaim my civil defense. The gentleman has been time for a moment, I know the gentleso sincere and working hard, and we man would be interested in knowing do appreciate the gentleman partici- that in the year 1977 and the year pating today. 1978 .the U.S. Government, through Mr. GINGRICB. Mr. Speaker, wLU the .U.S. Atr Force, spent $124 million the gentleman yield? to harden 150 ICBM silos in western Mr. SEELTON. I yield to my friend Missouri, in my district. the Fourth fmm Georgia (Mr. Gmmm). District of Missouri. Mr. GINGRICH. I thank my friend During that same year, less than from Missouri for recognizing me. I $100 million was spent to protect the appreciate the gentleman taking the people of this Nation from the very leadership to speak today on an issue same eventualfty that they spent $124 that is only of importance should war million to harden those silos. I t is come, but then is of such Fmportance rather ironic. That is exactly what the that it should concern aU of us In gentleman is saying. And I yield to peacetime. again. The question I think every American him Mr. GINGRICH. I thank my colshould ask is what is the cost of insur- league for enlightening me. I had no ance and what is it worth to have it. of those numbers and I think the I t is very clear to anyone who has idea is right. We harden mislooked at any field that the Sovlet gentleman but we do not harden human Union does believe that nuclear war is siles, an instrument of political pohcy. I t ~s beings. We protect control centers but very clear from anyone who has ever we do not protect people. There is probably no single cause in studied history that accidents do happen, rmstakes are made, political terms of the amount of attention it leaders do frankly goof. and the net does not get that deserves more attention, more investment, more thought. result-can be a war no one wanted. If we were to invest in civil defense and more commitment than the cause on the scale that is reasoned, and le- of civil defense. I challenge the Reagan administragitimate and necessary, and nothing ever happened, we might at most have tion and I believe this Congress will ulwasted some money. Id we f a i l to timately join in challengipg the invest in civil defense and something Reagan administration to build a prohuman, prosurvival, propopulation, happens, we wlll have wasted lives. policy that is the equal to its r would far rather be the man who strategic faced my grandchfldren and said, yes, weaponry, its hardware, and its strateI was too cautious, yes, .I cared too gic offensive policy, because if we look much, Yes. I did too much, than be the at the real world it is inconceivable to man who faces the survivors and tries me, as I am sure it is inconceivable to to e x p b why we did not do t h e my colleague, that any President would use any kind of strategy or.&things that were necessary. I t is clear that the Defense Depart- plomacy knowing that a Soviet first ment looks too narrowly a t the ques- strike, even if it allowed the MX to tion of stratemc weapons and strategic survive, would, in the process, have defense. We are on the verge of de- killed literally millions of Americans siglllng an MX mtsdle system which from fallout, not from t h e blast. not will guarantee that after an all-out from the immediate effect, but from Soviet first strike. missiles will survive the careless, wanton lack of preparabut cities will not. Any reasonable ex- tion on t h e part of our Government amination of the plans for the MX and its leaders. I simply want to close by saying mobile basmg system will indicate clearly an assumption that it is m i - again to my colleagues, I know that it ble that the Soviet Union might one is a long and lonely vigil. I know the day, for reasons of policy, explode 100. gentleman and the dean of the Geor200, 1,000, 3,000 hydrogen warheads gia delegation have led the fight. I on the North American Continent. In want to commend both of you because that environment, the fallout, the ra- I tb.ink literally there may be in our diation, the downwind effect on the lifetime no single cause that saves Midwest, on Chicago, on Detroit. and more American lives than the cause of in some drcumstances on Washington. civil defense that the two of you have would be so phenomenal that the so eloquently espoused. I thank the impact on human befngs would be so gentlemen. Mr. SKELTON. I thank the gentleincredible that w r s t a n d a chance of saving literally millions of human man for his very appropriate comments. beings. The gentleman reminds me that Here is a society which will 8pend over $ 1 million to keep alive a person during the 1930's. beginntng about who has been in a car wreck and 1934, there was a Member of Parliawhose brain has ceased to function. ment in the United gingdom that Here is a society which will spend lit- spoke of a great danger across the erally hundreds of thousands of dol- English Channel, and that great October 1, 1981 danger and the great new fact. of which this Member of. Parliament spoke was the fact that Germany was building a tremendous air fleet. Few paid attention. Few paid attention to him until about 1938, and pe6ple did begin to pay attention to Winston Churchill. They did begin to build Hurricane fighters and Spitfire fighters. But what is more important, they began to make preparation for the use of the tunnel system, the subway system of London. should the e-ventu: ality ever come to pass that London were bombed, and thank goodness he was heeded. He was heeded. and because of that literally thousands of British people are alive today because they had that protection, not just from the intercep tors that were built, but by the use. the proper use of those tunnels, and the proper use of the subways in London. Mr. Speaker. a number of our colleagues have spoken today and expressed. as I have attempted to, the sincere desire to have a strong civil defense for our Nation. I represent the 4th Congressional District of Missouri. In that district is Whiteman Air Force Base, which is the control center of 150 ICBM missiles, Minutemen II missiles. These missiles, as we all know, are targets of Soviet missiles should the unthinkable come to pass. I want the people of western MLssouri to be safe, But there are other Whiteman Air Force Bases in this Nation and ,there are other missile fields in this Nation; there are other strategic airfields and there are other strategic submarine bases, some 39 strategic first-strike areas that we think would be targeted first. The people that live in those areas, as well as the people that live in our cities -and towns all across our Nation. deserve Protection should the unthinkable come to pass. Let it not be too late. Mr. Speaker. I intend to presevere. Mr. Speaker. I intend that we eventually have a strong civil defense progtam that is properly funded and one that we in America can be proud of and one that will be part in t ~ t and h fact of our strategic defense. With the help of the Members of this body we will have such a civil defense in the days ahead. I=. F'LIPPO. Mr Speaker I would like to associate myself with the remarks that have been made by my colleagues about civil defense. The problem with civil defense has been that no one ever needs it. no citizen spends much time thinking about it, no pressure groups breath down our necks to do something until it is too late-until there is a disaster. Only then will our constituents turn to us and say, with justification: "Why didn't you plan for this?" There is nothing politically expedient or glamorous about civil defense; NGRESSIQNAL RECORD - HO only the mundane, long-haul planning about $2.6 billion over 7 years. or that all of us pray we will never nee& about $1.67 per person per year. This Congress can be proud that in the system, called a "Crisis Relocation would cost about $1.8 billion last few years we have made a start in Pl-" plannlng for national emergencies. We more than the current civil defense have done our homework and found system, yet save about 90 million more that civil defense has more uses than human beings than current capabiliwe thought. Not orily will an effective ties could. In the words of the FZW.4 plan provide stability during time of report: "This works out to $20 per life crisis and enhance our survivability, saved. which many consider an attracbut the mere promise of stability and tively low insurance premium." survivability provides a deterrent to The benefits of such a system our patential enemies and a powerful extend well beyond those in the event psychological weapon in our arsenal. of nuclear conflict, which we must A strong civil defense network can make every conceivable effort to be efficiently adapted to natural dis- avoid. First, such a system could actuasters so that we can marshal1 our re- ally deter the occurrence of conflict, sources to provide a coordinated re- by improving our defense. Second, it sponse for floods, hurricanes, torna- could reduce the Soviet's powers of codos, blizzards, or nuclear and chemical ercion, by reducing a genuine civil deaccidents. fense gap between the United States We need to do more in this area. We and U.S.S.R. Third, in the event of can not afford to postpone our efforts natural disasters, nuclear powerplant to some unspecified future date.. incident, or other peacetime emergenMr. HUGRES. Mr. Speaker, I Fel- cy, a civil defense evacuation plan come this opportunity, offered by my could prove invaluable. distinguished colleague IKE SKELTON,So let us not be shortsighted as we to discuss the vital subject of our Na- consider means to provide for our Nation's civil defense. In the past, when conventional war- tion's defense. Although a good ofmay be the best defense, a good fare was the sole source of confronta- fense tion between nations, conventional defense should not be forgotten means for defending a nation's citizen- , We cannot forget the need to alleviry were sufficient. We could hide from ate some of the terror of the nuclear enemy bombs and bullets using the age. to attempt to prevent the feared same facilities we would use to hide eventuality, and to save as many from tornaches or natural disasters in American lives as possible should the this country. In addition, our natural leaders of the Soviet Vnion o r oar own geographie~i9alationfrom our enemies leaders ever think the unthinkable, provided sufficient disincentive to dis- and plunge us into an irreversably courage our enemies from major tragic confrontation; Let us support attack with the exception of the civil defense.. .-Mr. SAM B. HALL, JR. Mr. Speakbombing of Pearl H ~ r b o r . Nuclear weapons and accurate mis- er. I commend the gentleman from sile guidance Systems have changed Missouri for securing a special order to our countries defense needs. Now, we give House Members an additional o g can no longer afford to soley concen- portunity to discuss the posture of or trate on weaponry designed for attack Nation's civil defense. His concern or defense from conventional attack. over the possibility that Congress may nor can we assume that our most sig- compromise our civil defense capabilinificant enemy, the Sbviet Union, can ty by reducing its budget commitment be wholly prevented from penetrating for this program is to be appreciated. our defenses in the case of a nuclear Indeed I share fully his commitment conflict. SO, at a time when we are to maintaining a level of approprispending record amounts on weapons ations adequate to preserving civil desystems which we hope will discourage fense as an essentail and integral part the Soviet Union from ever b e w - g of our overall national defense policy. a conflict, we must also plan for a pos- The civil defense effort should not be sibility which we fervently hope will surrendered or reduced. In the process of reviewing and escever become reality-nuclear attack. In the event of a full-scale nuclear tablishing defense priorities civil deconfrontation between the United fense always seems to be the odd man States and U.S.S.R.. there is onehines- out. Offensive hardware attracts atcapable reality-millions of human tention away-from the very real need beings would die and life as we h o w it to maintain passive defense programs. would be inalterably disrupted. But including civil defense. Neither effort knowing that, we must not forget that should take from the other. They the tragedy which would befall the must be mutually supportive in their United States in such an event could roles 'of deterring soviet aggression be significantly mitigated in the event and the aggressive acts of other potenO f an attack hCSllions of Uves could be tial adversaries. saved at a surprisingly low social cost. The result of this conscious disenAccording to data provided by the chantment with passive defense has Federal Emergency Management been the erosion of our civil defense Agency G"EMA), a system of civil de- posture over a period of years to the fense which could save approximately point where it no longer is a credible 80 percent of our population from element within our strategic force death in a nuclear war would cost structure. Civil defense, in my judg- CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ment, must once again be considered in conjunction with our offensive and defensive forces if our national security is to be preserved. To erase it from our strategic formula is to threaten the very mission and purpose of our strategic nuclear force; namely the deterrence of nuclear war. We no longer have the luxury of assured force superiority over the Soviets. Those days are long behind us and it is questionable today whether or not a balance of strategic military poweroften referred to as a "rough equivalence"--exists. At best, we can say that, for the present time, the real strength and preparedness of the US. strategic Triad remains credible to the Soviet Union. However, the future of relative United States-Soviet strategic balance is cloudy. United States development and deployment of modem strategic weapons just are not keeping pace with the Soviet Union and our defense capability, in the eyes of the Soviets. may be waning. The facts speak for themselves. To understand the extent of our vulnerability to Soviet nuclear attack requires only a brief review of the relative United States-U.S.S.R. strategic balance. The current US. B-52 bomber force will require modernization beyond the mounting of cruise missiles. We cannot afford continued reductions in fleet size for the purpose of cannibalization of aircraft to keep remaining B-52's on line. Current land-based ICBM forces will become more vulnerable with time as Soviet missile accuracy and MIRV capability improve. The submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) force represents the only US. strategic delivery system being modernized. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union is modernizing a large portion of its forces, hardening its facilities and continuing its intensive research and development. Since 1970, according to information provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the United States has put into production one variant of an existing intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), one new type of submarine and submarine-launched ballistic missile system, and no new strategic bomber systems. In the same period, Soviet efforts to improve and enlarge its strategic forces have brought them from a Position of clear inferiority to one of superiority in many measures of capability. The Soviets have. modernized the ICBM force through new deployment modifications to deployed systems which have incorporated greater throw weight, more reentry vehicles per misstle, and increased accuracy. T h e Joint Chiefs of Staff now report that the Soviets possess a "clear and growing advantage in ability to kill hard targets." Too, the Soviets continue to diversif y and improve other elements of their strategic element structure. They continue to build modern, nuclear- - HOUSE October 1, 1981 powered ballistic missfle submarines our ability to implement the US. demore quicgly than the United States. terrence strategy. new genemtions of longer range subWe have to o w n u p to the fact that marine-launched ballistic missiles the worse case scenario might occur. (SLBM) thereby expanding the patrol Should it occur in the near future, the area of the Soviet submarines making Soviet Union has a first strike capabilthem and their missiles less accessible ity of inflicting on currently unproto U.S. interception. F'urther, while re- tected Americans something in the taining their existing intercontinental order of 1.60 million fatalities. Enbomber forces, the Soviets have de- hanced civil defense efforts providing ployed over 100 Bacbfire bombers and for a greater degree of survivability are adding about 30 each year. This and' continuity of government will bomber has sufficient range to be used serve to improve our deterrence posas an intercontinental bomber against ture. the United States. In the interest of world peace, the While the United States can claim Soviets cannot be permitted to believe advantage in state-of-the-art tecMol- that their civil defense system will imogy, technology not employed or de- prove their ability to wage war and enployed does nothing to improve our hance Soviet survival of a nuclear exdefense posture. We need, instead, to impress These trends, which must be viewed change. upon the Soviets the ability of the with serious concern, have created United States to recover quickly from what the President often refers to as the effects a nuclear attack, and in the "window of vulnerability." The a conditionofpermitting a U S , retalivery size of that so-called window atory attack of a nature to inflict catamakes survivability a top priority con- strophic damage to the Sollet Union. cern. It is more than clear that the Currently, our civil defense program strategic military balance between the lacks and I join my colUnited States and U.S.S.R. continues leaguecredibility. and friend in this opporto shift toward our potential adversary tunity to express mytaking endorsement in a very big way. Zndeed, the imbal- for maintaming a firmfull budget commitances are of sucn magnitude measured for a strong and viable civil dequantitatively and qualitatively a s to ment confront the United States with the fense.. Mr. LQTT. Mr. Speaker, I certainly prospect of facmg such imbalances agree my colleagues on the floor well into the future. T h i s is particular- today with are spealung to the imporly true in light of the Soviets willing- tance who civil defense as an integral n w to continue to invest heavily to ,part ofofour defense posture. keep the momentum going in their We must takeNation's caution against any misfavor. The realities of the United States- conceptions regarding the viability of Soviet strategic balance render it es- civil defense. sential that civil defense be main- Over the last 15 years. the Soviets tained as a critical element in our na- have spent almost $2 billion per year tional defense structure. The Soviets to const,ruct a comprehensive civil deare approaching a first strike capablll- fense system. This amounts to apty and the ability of the United States proximately $5 per capita and comto survive such a strike becomes of pares to our own expenditure of some ever-growing importance as a deter- 49 cents per capita, most of which is earmarked for administrative expendirent factor. To note now seriously the Soviets tures. Although estimates regarding the view civil defense, one has only to look a t their efforts in this regard. To com- capabilities of the U.S.S.R. civil deplement their offensive capabilities, fense system vary, it is clear that the the Soviet Union maintains a large Soviets are making a conscious effort strategic defense force supplemented to protect their population in the by what the Joint Chiefs of Staff refer event of nuclear war and have includto as "an extensive civil defense pro- ed all segments of their society in gram," both of which are far superior their defense planning. The irony of our present situation is to their US. counterparts. We must approach the Soviet level that the United States -could develop a of effort for passive defense. including reasonably effective civil defense procivil defense, if our strategic nuclear gram given a few well-thought-out force is to continue to provide a credi- plans and relatively modest expendible deterrence to potential Soviet nu- tures of time and money. AU that is clear aggression. Our "window of vul- lacking is a Federal commitment. Such a commitment is necessary to nerability" remains too wide open without such an improved civil defense an effective partnership in civil deposture. We must take into account fense between local governments and the civil defense'commitment of the 'the Pedenl Government to prepare Soviets and strengthen our own civil our communities and the Nation to defense program accordingly ,with the survive a war. If this; preparation is purpose of develo~ingplans to be im- made, these same communities are also prepared to survive the common plemented during times of crisis. The magnitude of Soviet civil de- natural occurrences of floods, tornafense efforts and capability, when cou- does, and hurricanes. In view of current international tenpled with high accuracy and more reliable missiles, could adversely affect sions, the civil defense partnership October 1, 1981 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD must be upheld and strengthened. Civil defense must once again become an integral component in our strategic debate.. - HOUSE Civil Defensethe New Debate The possibility of a newprogram for strengthening the U.S.civll defense against nuclear attack has been raised in Washington recently. Because the editors of Worldview believe a public debate on the program would be useful, we asked a number of people to respond to one or more of the following questions: 1. Do you understand it to be the policy of the Carter administration to give major priority to civil defense in the over-all defense posture of this country? 2. Would such a direction be a positive or negativefactor in t e r m of (a)American security and (b) reducing the chances of nuclear war? Why? 3. What is drfferent now from the debate over civil defense against nuclear attack that took place in the late Fifties and early Sixties? 4. What are the ethical considerations you believe are relevant to the above questions? New Situation, New Response Paul H. Nitze G eorge Kennan, in an interview published by the New York Times Magazine, affirmed the proposition that it is better to be "Red than dead." Since the end of World War I1 the United States has been engaged in a successful effort to demonstrate that the choice thus implied is wrong. We have demonstrated, at least to date, that it is not necessary to be either "Red or dead"; it has been possible both to remain free and to avoid a nuclear war. The essential task is to continue so to do. In the last half of the 1950's, at the time of Sputnik, serious doubts arose as to whether a time would shortly arise when that issue-"Red or dead"-could become serious. It had not been a serious choice during the period when we had a nuclear monopoly, or even when we had an overwhelming and stable nuclear deterrent. But with the Soviet development of ICBMs, the technological practicality of which was first demonstrated by Sputnik, it became possible, perhaps probable, that the "better Red than dead" issue would arise in all seriousness in a few years. The alternative solution originally given most attention was the initiation of a U.S.civil defense program. The Gaither Committee, a study group appointed by President Eisenhower, came to the conclusion that such a program could indeed be effective both in enhancing deterrence and greatly reducing casualties if deterrence were to fail. They also concluded, however, that higher priority should be given to immediate measures to improve the survivability of our strategic bomber crews so that a significant portion could be continuously on alert, and by assuring that the alert bombers could get off the ground in the time provided by the warning system. It was recommended that this be coordinated with a program to assure that as soon as possible we -- - - THE HONORABLE PAULH. N~TZE, who has held many high government positions, served until 1974 as the representative of the Secretary of Defense to the United States Delegation to SALT. He is Director of Policy Studies of the Committee on the Present Danger. deploy ICBMs in dispersed hardened silos and SLBMs in hard-to-find submarines at sea. An elaborate civil defense program was given second priority. The first priority recommendations of the Gaither Committee were put into effect. The executive branch concurrently initiated a modest civil defense program designed to provide warning, identify and mark already existing shelter spaces, and partially stock them with supplies. New shelter construction was left to individual initiative. By 1962 we had deployed sufficient ICBMs in dispersed and hardened silos and enough Polaris submarinsbased launchers to provide assured crisis stability and high-quality deterrence. After that time civil defense could be, and was viewed as, a low-priority requirement. To many it became, unjustifiably, a cause for derision. Today the situation has changed; the Soviet Union has for a decade or more been devoting far greater effort to its strategic offensive capabilities than have we. We cut back our program to a third, if measured in cQnstant dollars, of what it averaged during the six years from 1956 to 1962. The Soviet program has expanded to a point at which it is now estimated to be triple ours. There is now little doubt that our previous nuclear strategic superiority has been eliminated. Many, myself included, believe we are heading into a period of serious strategic inferiority and instability. Authorities in the executive branch take a less serious view than I, but they too are concerned. The "better Red than dead" or "better dead than Red" dilemma is again a serious concern. Under these circumstances the question arises whether we should again consider a more active civil defense program. The executive branch is putting priority on measures to assure the continuing survivability, endurance, and capability of our ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. I wish the executive branch were doing even more in that direction and had acted earlier. In addition the executive branch is reported to be considering doubling, or thereabouts, the current civil defense program of $90 million a year. In other words, they are considering adding to our civil defense program an SOURCE : Worldview v.22, ~ a n / ~ e 1979. b pp. 40-48" Reprinted by the Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, with permission of copyright claimant. December 1981. IA CIVIL DEFENSE / 41 amount approximating .O1 per cent of our overall defense budget. The purpose of this increased civil defense spending would be to give the United States in the event of a serious crisis the ability to evacuate most of our urban population to the countryside. The executive branch estimates that there are circumstances, were deterrence to fail, in which such measures would enable most of our population to survive. The main point, however, is that such a capability could add to deterrence and thus help us continue to avoid the "Red or dead" dilemma. It is suggested that the Carter administration is thereby giving major priority to civil defense and that this raises ethical questions. The first part of the suggestion is evident nonsense; how can an item constituting .O1 per cent of the defense budget be a major priority? A more pertinent question is whether it is enough to be effective. The second part of the question is, however, relevant. The second part suggests it is somehow immoral to think about nuclear war and, having thought, to take those considered steps designed to improve the quality of our nuclear deterrent. I am confused by this suggestion. Is it based on the hypothesis that it is wrong to take measures designed to avoid the "better Red than dead" dilemma? _Or on the hypotis t q late ~ ta make such measures effective andthat ac must now agree -- Red than with G o r g e Kennan that it is "bet--to-be dead,':' A corollary of that hypothesis would appcarto be that accommodation of the new-Soviet impxium is the best course available-to us, gveniEsuckcourse~ere_ to lead to the U.S. subjecting itself to the Kremlin's will. Perhaps the hypothesis is -tkat&e m w e dreadful we make the consequences of a nuclear w X o o u r s e l v ~the , more certairr we wiHwto wrdha-thepKudent has no real alternative in a crisis but to surrender. To do otherwise wouid be to3fii1g Gotterdammerung down %pn o u r a h a , even tnougliwell-designed military and defense -programs,-Guld suffer casuatties perhaps a tenth of ours: I await with interest the otheFai.fi-cres in this series. I trust they will contribute to clarifying the hypotheses upon which the ethical issues should be judged. _ I To Clarify the Issue Hans J. Morgenthau I t is impossible to state with assurance what the policy of the Carter administration is with regard to civil defense. As in so many other fields of policy, the policy of the Carter administration with regard to civil defense is contradictory in different respects. Successive statements of the same officials contradict each other. The statements of different officials contradict each .other. Official statements are contradicted by the actual policy pursued. The realities of the situation militate against the policy announced. For the purpose of clarifying the issue let us assume that the administration is committed to a greatly expanded civil defense effort over several years, meaning primarily the evacuation of the bulk of the civilian population from the cities. Such a policy is, according to the New York Times, "farcical" on several grounds. Fi&+wbereh the civif an population to be evacuated to? Let us s u p p s e the goal of the evacuation would be Upstate New York and Connecticut. Has anybody visualized the problems of logistics such a move would entail? Since a comprehensive shelter program appears to be excluded, where would these millions of people find shelter and nourishment, even if they were able to overcome the problems of chaotic mass traffic? Even if all these problems were overcome, the enemy need only change slightly the targets of a few of its multimegaton missiles in order to put the evacuated millions out of HANSJ. MORGENTHAU is Chairman of the Worldview Editorial Board and University Professor. Department of Political Science. at the New School for Social Research. commission. The only change the evacuation of the civilian population would bring about would be the place of demise. The city populations, instead of dying in their respective cities, would be annihilated in their respective places of evacuation. Die they must, if not at home, so at their place of refuge; if not through blast, then through fire and fallout. This argument supposes that evacuees arrive at their destination according to plan. But what if the evacuees of neighboring cities arrive at the same destination? If, for instance, the evacuees of Boston meet those of Hartford? Are we not going to be witness to a war of all against all, everybody trying to get to a place of safety before everybody else, and everybody fighting everybody tooth and nail, since allegedly sheer survival is at stake? However, we are only at the beginning of our troubles. So far we have dealt with what one might call the technical problems of evacuation, which appear'to be insurmountable. Now let us take a look at the military and political context. S a g military doctrine stresses the importance of surprise in military operations, espec ~ n u i : ~ d f w ~ ~ v a c u awould t i o nsignal to an enemy the likelihood of nuclear war, either perceived as an enemy move or intended by the evacuating government. Are the prospktive belligerents likely to wait until the evacuation -- - , - -is completed- or are they going to start the nuclear war as soon as the evacuation is started? Evacuation would be tantamount to an Act of War, forcing the hand of one or DiFother, or more likely of both of the pros-pi?cfiv<Giiigerents. Far from being a factor in - I . . _ -. - reventingjucleq war, evacuation would be a factor in ma ng it inevitable; for it would signal to all concerned that the evacuating government is ready for nuclear war. The argument against evacuation is similar to that made against shelters almost two decades ago. The idea of evacuation assumes that nuclear war is similar to conventional war, only more destructive than the latter. %-- In truth, nuclear war, by virtue of its unimaginable daiructiveness, is qualitatively different from conventional war. In conventional war you can rationally resort to evacuation and shelters. In nuclear war there is no place to hide. You have to prevent it in order to avoid destruction. Once deterrence has failed, only one question remains: How do you want to die-at home or elsewhere, in a shelter or above ground? Some Moral Reflections James T. Johnson T here can simply be no doubt that protection of noncombatants is a major priority of the Western tradition on warfare, generally called the "just war" fradition. Its general concerns are two: to define when the violence of war is allowable (the problem of justification) and to set limits to what may be done in even a just war (the problem of limitation). Paul Ramsey, for example, finds both these concerns in the thought of Augustine of Hippo and argues that for him and for Christian just war theory generally they should be regarded as requirements of divine love. A Christian, on this view, has a duty in love to protect innocent persons being unjustly threatened by violence or subjected to it, and he may utilize counterviolence, if necessary, to effect such a defense. At the same time, the use of such counterviolence is limited by a number of restraints also derived from love, foremost of which is a duty also toward the unjust assailant not to harm him any more than necessary to defend his victim. A similar pattern of reasoning emerges in Jewish tradition. Talmudic ethics allows use of violence against one who pursues with the intent of doing harm; yet the counterviolence that is permitted is limited by two constraints: First, one may do no worse to the pursuer than what he seeks to do, and, second, one may do no more than needed to make the pursuer leave off his evil intention. Secular contributions to Western just war tradition have provided analogous ideas: The medieval code of chivalry, for example, defined the knight as having a duty to protect noncombatants, while the concept of limited war originally defined and put into practice by such military theorists as Frederick the Great sought to ensure absolute protection of noncombatants outside a combat area and relative protection inside such an area. The requirements of defending noncombatants against the ravages of war is thus at the very core of Western thought on how war can be a moral enterprise. Still, there are numerous ways to defend against violence: running away or, more generally, putting the threatened out of reach of the threatener; interposing an JAMES T. JOHNSON, who heads the Department of Religion at Douglass College, Rutgers University. is author of Ideology. Reason and the Limirotion of War. impregnable shield between threatener and threatened; warding off the attack of an assailant with skillful parries; fighting back or striking pre-emptively in an attempt to disarm or disable the assailant; threatening to retaliate violently if the original threat is carried through. If all the above methods would be equally effective in a given situation, then the sequence of this list defines an order of moral priority among these methods: Those presented first are preferable to those presented later. The old civil defense program, which aimed at building shelters to protect city populations against nuclear blast and fallout, was a form of shield defense, while the new program recently announced by the Carter administration represents an attempt to defend by putting threatened noncombatants out of reach of the violence of nuclear attack. Similarly, ABMs constitute a defense oriented at fighting back with intent to disarm, while mutual assured destruction (MAD) strategy is a version of defense by the threat of retaliation. Prima facie, the Western just war tradition would seem to favor civil defense p;ograms over these last types of defense against countercity nuclear attack, since civil defense aims to maximize the restraints on use of violence in defense. But such a prima facie judgment would be, in this case, wrong. Just war tradition permits violence if it is necessary to an effectual defense, and such violence is allowed up to and including the level of violence employed by the "unjust" or "pursuing" attacker. It is clear that in this moral tradition one may kill if necessary to prevent an innocent person from being killed. The permission to resort to such a response in kind includes permission to threaten to do so. Thus we are all well off the scent if we take the concern of just war tradition to defend noncombatants to rule out the threat of retaliation, or if we take it to imply that programs of civil defense, which are inherently nonviolent, are ipso facto to be preferred over means of defense that threaten violence against the attacker. This tradition is concerned with the protection of nonc jmbatants, and that requires an effective defense. This in turn requires that moral analysis take into account the relative effectiveness of various possible modes of defense as well as their abstract moral preferability in terms of the level of violence each entails. CIVIL DEFENSE / The only thing that can be said in favor of mutual assured destruction as a defensive strategy is that for quite some time now it has worked to help prevent a nuclear war. But that is a great deal to say for it. And given the proposed scale of the Carter civil defense program, this program will not replace such a strategy of retaliation but can only supplement it. Were this new program the leading edge of an effort to substitute civil defense entirely for MAD, we would have to weigh the 43 impligtlons of such a substitution. But as a supplement to existing strategic defense policy, it presumably aims at maintaining a balance between the superpowers as to what level of destruction could be sustained by their societies in the event of a nuclear interchange. Thus it is an effort to bolster the stalemate. A full moral analysis of this new civil defense program therefore would have to weigh it within this larger context of a continuing reliance on defense by retaliatory threat. Reasons in Opposition John C. Bennett B form of civil d&mcasik+q&rati~n to evacuate cities efore our government embarks on the would do to our own people. .&ain, this would necessiproposed forms of civil defense I hope tate taking such authoritarian m&~s7C+aTE€iis11so that the following reasons for not doing so will be taken unaccustomed to them as to make a great impression on very seriously. the American people, leading them to become accusPreparations for the evacuation of cities in a s o c i a a s tomed to nuclear war as more than urnate gos_sibility. free u ours would iavslvve such drastic actions that they Official explanations, which in such matters always would be more of a signal than,we would intend of our seem too optimistic, might create the sense that nuclear readiness for nuclear war. Combined with any build-up q ~ i ~ n _ u _ c ~ ~ ~ ~ - s u ag fint-strike g e s t t dwar could be survived, not only by a large majority of our people, but also by our free institutions and other capability t_othe other side, they x~u1-prevocaspects of our life that we believe most worth defending. to ---whon?_ihe~ would seem a w t s appears to us,-,Such an outcome is highly doubtful. The secondary innocent aniK88ensive. TPhls reminds me of the account effects of nuclear explosions would be played down, and by Thucjldides 0r'tKe"great pains the Athenians took to conceal from the Spartans the fact that they were the more remote genetic effects on futufe generations would not be considered. It might be better to die rebuilding their walls after the Persian wars. What could instantly in Manhattan than slowly in New Jersey. We be more innocent and defensive than a wall! cannot trust the Pentagon's weighing of the intangible Greater account must be taken of the fears of the effects of nuclear war. Sov~etUnion. In the long run they may fear China more than the U S . We are their powerful adversary, who for deca Jes expressed, more unofficially than officially, hostility to the Soviet Union. How much of a residue better to die instantly in Manhattan than there is in the USSR of a dogmatic belief in the inevitaslowly in New Jersey. " bility of war between the two systems, I do not know. A tuo-front war is in their minds, and they even speak of China as an eastern member of NATO. They know that the countries of Eastern Europe that are s u p p e d to be in their samp are not reliable allies. They even fear the Also, m m q a h m b y A u q m p 1 ~ ~ isuch n preparations U.S may come to have a powerful presence in Iran. might w_eg_ncrn_crease our own fear of the Russians and our There is in the background something the Russians IOS'TiIify toward them. We have long had a tendency to remember and exaggerate and we have forgotten: the 6e i i b T e G ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ I G of n aanticommunism tbn and American military presence in Siberia in 1917-20. It is anti-Szmi-~&@~Abut in recent years we have in large --also not forgotten that the U.S. is the only nation ever to measure moved away from it. Eartheamerican people use atomic bombs, that most of the victims were civilonce more to be c~ntrolkd> this obsession would ians, and that the US. since World War I1 has dropped QUL&~ and i m t i e $ - a c t h e other dmore bombs on other nations than have the rest of the -side. I fear thatprepatinns f8~evacuatbnof c i t i e 4 w t nations combined. We do not see ourselves in this light me--thorough -*.. enpugh to-be w t would -the at all. Indeed, what others see is quite out of line with end of detenre and of a n y ~ i s e - & ~ h e ~ , m s our own present intentions as a nation. But fears and raCe;TlilTw~liT~~~eeeVen if wt: l-d~hat Russia's provocations depend on what others see. more authoritarian government had & k e to ~ The second reason for not going ahead is what such a .. _- --- JOHN C. BENNETT.a member of the Graduate Theological Union at Berkeley, is former President of Union Theological Seminary in New York. recognize the grounds I have mentioned for Russian fears and its history of invasion by others. can possibly hope to protect its civilian population to the extent that nuclear confrontation could be thought safe. Nuclear war would be the greatest possible mistake for both sides. irresponsible lead the AmeriIt would bem&y ----- to---can people to believe that safety from a nuclear attack ~onveYseTy;'we cou?irTe -fOund~tTiiTu@-eVaCui3~I nyone who believes that the Soviet Union, must not give t h e Soviet Union the impressionthat we beGse of .its civil defense program, is believe they have an advantage or a ckancs: of sIl;nriyal better able to survive a nuclear war than the United because of their evacuation program. They do not; and, States is totally misguided. And anyone willing to-a~cept furthermore, anv useca. . destabilizing. accelerating t o duation such a foolish argume-ntis3hi ta three basicfacts. would_becnsls am-7-First, the inassive urban evacuation program would fllct. In the event of a crisis situation-say, Soviet interhave Hmiit$leff~tjveness in r d u G n g the disastrous effefs of a nuclear attack on the general papulation, even supposing that sucb a scheme could be effectively The Misguided Concept Thomas J. Downey A ---- gic ylanners are conte-mplating a first-strike scenario againsf the United States (as many American ha-wks state in their arguments for an American civil defense evih5uation scheme), they would be unahle to employ taeir_urban evacuation plan, because to do so would obvjausly destroy the element of surprise needed for any first strike to succeed. .What would Soviet urban evacuation on a massive scale-if it could actually be accomplished with Russia's very limited transportation system-actually accomplish? Millions of city dwellers fleeingto the countryside would prgscnt trmendaus logistical problems even under the best of conditions, and the Russian climate and terrain are iiot n ~ t e dfor mildness and hosp@ality. An American nuclear counterstrike would be designed to destroy the Russian industrial base for waging war and the entire economic structure of the enemy for recovery. It is presently_estimated that two-thirds of the Soviet industrial b a s e d d -be-destroyed within hours. W a i a s h a t k r d - g\o.crni~ base, a crippled transportation system, and the '!means of production" in ashes, Soviet evacuees would be left with only stockpiled food, medicine, and heating oil. There would be no hope of replenishing these essedak. Furth~rmore, fight- to clouds of nuclerural arsjs-n-oLefens_eag_ainserifting ar r a i t i o n ; and radiation, not blast effect, is the primary cause of death in the civilian poplation, whether u ~ i orr rural. ~ Also, if? coun@ntrike occurred before evacuation were complete, the civilian evacuees would be much more vulnerable on the road than they- would have been at home. It should be remembered too that food-producing areas are also imprtant strategic targets, and this further limits the imagined safety of flight to the countryside. Though nuclear-targeting doctrine in the Seventies does not have the aim of slaughtering the civilian population, a very high proportion of the population in any country receiving a nuclear attack would be killed, in the attack and from its aftereffects, whether they fled the urban areas or not. Neither Russia nor the United States -C THOMAS J. DOWNEY (D-New York) s e ~ on u thc Committtc on Armed Services of the House of Representativu. Civil W e n s e the Last Time Around Basement Concrete-Block Fallout Shelter (Otfrce of Civil and Defense Mobilization diagram). A pair of slippers l i a in readiness for the shelter's one (!?) inhabitant. ference with the supply of oil to the West from the Persian G u l f - t h e U n l t e d n dantly clear to the_Ssviet_s_ that an implementation of their urban evacuation program would be seen as a prelude to a strike against us and that our nuciear focces would be put on alert accordingly- If the U S . had-an evag-qJi~sckane and p u t i t i n t o s f f e a the Russians would-xd.oub gaon alest, and the -movement toward nuclear confrontation would be similarly uelerated. Not on& iuhiL_d.d.ms evacuation ineffectke- in protecting the general. population and u s x s s in plannmg a surpris~firststake,$ could actually incregse the wed by planning to maintain calm and American cities in a crisis, whether of war or natural disaster. In the event CML DEFENSE /. 45 leader of the U.S. or the USSR would choose nuclear The Illusion of Protection ewar m o conceivable national interest on m e r side U d iustifv the Richard J. Barnet T believed to be nuclear war w d e c l s i o n to pre-ep ble f u t u j a t m e e m lausible. The drill for death thilti.&rns so pathological when one on a small scale, as at Jonestown, brings us closer to war because it conditions us to accept the inevitability of war. The most +- he policy of the Carter administration is to increase substantially civil defense expenditures. In terms of money it is not a "majority priority," since the administration plans to lock us into overall military expenditures on the order of $1.8 trillion in 1977 dollars by 1988. The justification for the increased civil defense expenditure is that it is a "modest" increase in response to demands for a much bigger program and a helping brainwash a_generasbaaiatcz.aax&q+U -:We% iio'B?"e&tive t o ~ q & g h u u a h i d e . counter to the Soviet program. There is a strong pork f -rememkr a fi-pul"d%cabout Nazi Germany barrel element in the program too. Just as civil defense called Education for Death. It was one of the most was the justification for building the nation's highway telling critiques of the moral bankruptcy of a regime system, it is now being quietly presented to local offithat preached the inevitability of war and drilled the cials as a way to get some money into local communities whole society into accepting that belief. Anything that in a time of austerity. It is also a way to buy off opposilegitimizes nuclear war by perpetuating the illusion that tion to a SALT treaty, or so it is thought. it is simply an extension of old-fashioned war and not an All such justifications for the program are utterly historic watershed betrays an arrogant disregard for the irresponsible. To spend billions on civil defense when future of the planet. We are only beginning to undercrucial programs essential to the strength of the nation s~~tt~~Jogica1effects-of f i ~ u ~ _ t & m are being slashed is pathological. Appeasing critics of are c u c h more serCous th~iprgisusl&~euse the SALT treaty by throwing them a "harmless" bone is the life-suj@mt- syi&&s7-r,sei& -etc=are self-defeating, for the program lends credibility to their i n i v e x v e no idea of the real extent or duraview of reality, not that of the treaty advocates, and creates a climate in which it is easier to defeat the treaty. y irragatingvaqti?%iof €he tTon of the & - The idea that we should "match" the Soviets, or even, phmsei-aiXh a u n . i m d . ~ to future e n q a h s . All we can be reasonably sure of is within very broad limits, be influenced by what they do t at the effects will be worse than we plan for. To foster in civil defense, is puerile. If they were developing a the belief that nuclear war is "manageable" or "winnaprogram that suggested an ability or an intent to elimible" or justified for any political purpose is a way of nate virtually all civilian casualties, that would be cause avoiding the real ethical issue-that this generation is not for concern. It would suggest an effort to create what we used to call a "credible first-strike posture." But that is the owner of the earth, only a steward or a trustee. To assert the right to destroy it is the ultimate blasphemy. not the case. The Soviet program becomes threatening only if we assume that the leaders are prepared to sacrifice a substantial portion of their population, or more. For-the&- program, as the CZA .Bas ts-qerted,_ca.qn,ot pcr?_e_.c=M -10. a a u d y Sovjettwmof the Natio_nalS3tyritx Chu.n&Jhe fer moie than a hunrred-million =stig.in_a-nr?gclx war. m e S ~ i e tspena s moneymany ways the U.S. would be foolish to imitate. Civil &3e=ee~s a % i m s ; - A civil defense program is a waste of money not only because it cannot protect the society from the effects of a nuclear war,it is harmful because it o-in hile the Carter administration is clearly that Americaps can be "pr-." J t causes the paying more attention to civil defense government to make outrageous&m~su~hb as lht:-on_e and will undoubtedly request more funding for crisisthis does not yet constitute giving t ~ _ a _ t _ t T . ~ K ~ , ~ ~ . k s a ~ ~ 4 y 4 y e . v arelocation c u a t i planning, ng the cities (anyone who has ever tried to leave a ciiy in a ebbws normal holiday weekerf&;-ttn-af6fieeanucTearalert, how - ~ y _ t h g - s )It. rein Many of the questions related to the desirability or t a m of ~oauslir-;cl dynamic pushing us toward the ultimate catastrophcJf undesirability of more stress on civil defense are essen? un tially unanswerable. We simply cannot know with assurstart ~t believe that it cannot be avoided. Only an insane ance how it will affect U.S. security or the chances of p- Some Possible Problems David T.Johnson W RICHARDJ. BARNET is a Senior Fellow of the Institute for Policy Studies. Washington. D.C. T. JOHNSON is Director of Research at the Center for DAVID Defense Information, Washington, D.C. 48 1 WORLDVIEW I JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1979 nuclear war. P & h k p a m k a & e made on both sides, but it is mostly speculation. Nobody who feels strongly oixewagoi the other is likely to have his views changed. The debate will be predictably inconclusive. What masquerades as rational decisionmaking on most issues of nuclear weapons and nuclear war is really a strikingly subjective process in which no one should have much confidence. Decisions are reached, such as the decision to expand civil defense preparations, on the basis of a hodgepodge of relevant and irrelevant considerations. Different people and groups will oppose or support the decision for their own reasons. Shifting tides of prejudice and habit will play a determining part. It is certain the debate over civil defense in 1979 will be primarily presented as an issue of whether the U.S. should be strong vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. More intellectual types will be appealed to on the basis of the presumed moderate, prudent, humanitarian character of the Carter civil defense insurance policy. In the existing climate there will be less than adequate attention paid to some possible problems arising out of the new civil defense thrust. The Soviet threat. Regardless of whatever plausiblesounding arguments are made for the Carter civil defense program, an unavoidable consequence of selling the program to the American people and the Congress will be an increase in their fear and suspicion of the Soviet Union. Of course this is the whole point of the exercise for some people. Others, perhaps even President Carter and Defense Secretary Harold Brown, may be less pleased with this side effect. It may complicate, rather than help, the SALT ratification process. U.S. military weakness. Both President Carter and Secretary Brown have on numerous occasions downplayed the effectiveness of Soviet civil defense activities in shielding the Soviet Union from the effects of an American nuclear strike. They have expressed firm confidence in the American deterrent irrespective of Soviet civil defense. However, the effort to promote the new U.S. civil defense program will undoubtedly stimulate widespread concern in the U.S. about the possible potency of Soviet civil defense. It will inspire unnecessary anxieties about U.S. nuclear strength. Perceptio~.I n ~ r ~ ~ $ g lAmerican y, militarx_&!ro: -rams are being argued fp_t0 ~ ~ ~what~other6 countries might think of the U.S., their "perceptions" of U.S. power or weakness. Officials seem-willing to advocate programs that are needed just to improve "perceptmns," even if their strictly military justification is!ess than compelling. The Carter administration's-civil aefense program has just this character. In April, 1978, the New York Times quoted from a secret' ten-pge memorandum from Secretary Brown to tharesident: -- , An expansion of U.S. civil defense justified primarily on the basis of "international perceptions" (perceptions that Secretary Brown appears to find in error) seems somewhat dubious. It may encourage equally questionable decisionmaking on other defense issues. Camel's narc- Mare civil defense preparations may be the camel's nose under the tent. Once the American people are convinced of the efficacy of some "limitedfi , ' civil defense measures, they will be appealed to e n the same grounds for additional means of protection. Expansion-of U S . air defense capability and stepped-up ABM research and potential deployment of new ABM systems are likely follow-ons. If a little protection is good, why not more? Fear of nuclear war. Another apparently unavoidable-if unintended-consequence of the new stress on civil defense will be that it will serve as a signal of the g~er-j%%ii6iTTtYoffnucTear war. It is more likely that f~ this ipcreas-d_ fear willkmahilized in thedirection of military build-up and "tough" foreign policy actions than in the direction of reducing nuclear arsenals. The heart of the danger in the civil defense issue today was reflected in the words of Clyde Mitchell, director of Oklahoma City's civil defense program: "We don't want to lay down and die in Oklahoma City. Folks around here say, yes, eventually we are going to come to a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union. It's sort of inevitable." *- The Background Music Paul Ramsey T he trial balloons recently sent up about protecting our population in the event of nuclear war focus on the staged evacuation of citiesnot, as in the early Sixties, on bomb shelters. The aim today is more on countering nuclear threats, less on protecting people or defending the nation. A capability to ~ maneuver n ~ people ~ (like f troops) is ~ ~ ~ ~ & e - t f j e p r e s i d e n ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t ~ ~ f o f o f i e j @ _blackmail. n~@t_o~a;~ This is what is called crisis management, and it has a "logic" of its own. For example, the US, would have to be-able to move people out of cities, or protect them t h e s i n vastly greater n u m k r s than- Russia needs to do simply lo make fhings even. We. have far more of our poptxatioeinh-mare and far rnose-populotlsmetropolitan areas than has Russia* The president,jf_he is__sensible, is more Wrely^ts*eld tcL P~JNS-movm u ~ d e r w v e r Xs you know, the Soviets have shown great interest and o ~ Qyats -than is Russia. ~ He~ must blink k t . considerable activity in this field. While I do not believe Under such conditions, who now has the more ~ r d i b l e ,' that the effort significantly enhances the prospects for Soviet society as a whole following any full-scale nuclear ' deters&.? i The main question to be raised about civil defense in a 1 exchange, it has obviously hat. an effect on international 1 j perceptions, particularly in contrast to our small and static j nuclear age never was whether this is feasible or not. 1 civil defense program. For that reason alone I believe at I i 1 I c a s _ t m ~ ~ s o u l d h a v e - T m p h a s i s added]. otf, PAULRAMSEYis Harrington Spear Paine Professor of Christian Ethics at Princeton University. CIVIL DEFENSE I (The plans-long in existence-for the staged evacuation of Oklahoma City are reported to be practical [New York Times, December 1 , 19781. Oklahoma City is a good-size Russian city!) Listen to the background music in some of these responses in Worldview and the forthcaming national debate over this proposal (if there is one). It will be evident that the morality and feasibilityof massive deterrence is the issue. Yesterday, today, and forever in a nuclear age this will be the issue, not one component part of such a strategy. Those who accept the desirability or the irreformability of mutual assured destruction (the MAD policy) will argue that civil defense is infeasible. The background music, however, is that such defense Is undesirable because MAD is the only sound or moral strategic policy. By this we get peace, with-it will also be supposed-fewer bucks and no bangs. I myself doubt there will again be serious discussion of the morality or immorality of the Deterrent Siate such as there was in the early Sixties. For what can be better khan peace, even if the means are immorally aimed at civilian hostages? Peace with butter-and a national health plan. In the early Sixties I was one of two theologians who dared address the matter of "shelter morality." L.C. McHugh and I* probed mainly the micro-problem of what one should do in the event of a breakdown of all government and human beings were returned to a '%ate of nature" or, at least, to that stage of society in which the paterfamilias or limited local chieftains served also as the highest known political authorities, before the emergence of the differentiation of "government" in larger societies. To such a primitive political situation, I argued, we would be returned by nuclear destruction of modern organized states; and that then the remaining "magistrates" should do what they must to save life when all lives cannot be saved-protecting by whatever means the capacity of a bomb shelter to save life, perhaps against desperate human beings banging at the door, whom to admit would mean all would be lost. The Princeton faculty planned, in those days, to designate the underground levels of Firestone Library as a place of refuge for ourselves and the students, for whom we had first responsibility, then as a community shelter to the extent the facilities allowed. This was proper planning, but only if the larger context was proper. Father McHugh may have been told to write no more; and it would have saved personal energy if I also had been so told-since few then or now in the church or in American political society seem able to be convinced that the chief thing wrong with fallout shelters or city evacuations is not their infeasibility but, rather, their participation in the gross immorality of our MAD deterrence policy. The articulate elites in our nation and in the churches seem to believe that they can accept the Deterrent State while still braying against civil defense *LC. McHugh, w.. "Ethics at the Shelter Doorway,"America (September 30, 1961); Paul Ramsey, "Shelter Morality," Presbyterian Life (November 15, 1961); with correspondence. January 1, 1962. Father McHugh concentrated more exclusively on the micro-problem than I-if anyone wants to know. 47 and even against vats of Pentagon poison. Thus the neutron bomb was opposed, even though it is a more discriminate weapon. It kills people was the vocal reason. The real reason was: We ought to do nothing to weaken or alter our single-minded intention to destroy entire populations on the condition that we are attacked-to prevent that attack, of course! Looking back, I should have introduced this further micro-point. I should have made the case for a just revolution against the Deterrent State that meam to make no defense of its people. In a thrice the theory of justifiable revolution can be directed against a government such as ours that means to maneuver its citizens (whether to protect them or not) as if we all are soldiers, and that also treats the entire citizenry of an adversary as if they were combatants, pawns in the power struggle between nations. "How explain [the churches']acceptance of the systematic political intention o f the U.S. to do evil that good may come?" I should have argued that every head of household, or local councilman, is in principle already a chief magistrate who may be called upon to overthrow the magistrates in power who have abandoned the intention to wage only just war. That, in short, MAD has placed us before such deterrence fails in a situation like the one when deterrence fails. I should have argued with John Calvin that "if there be, in the present day, any magistrates appointed for the protection of the people and the moderation of the power of kings . . . I am so far from prohibiting them in the discharge of their duty, to oppose the violence and cruelty of kings, that I affirm that if they connive in their oppression of their people, such forebearance involves the most nefarious perfidy, because they fraudulently betray the [lives and] liberty of the people, of which they know that they have been appointed protectors by the ordinance of God." Such connivance now takes the stark form of taking hostages and giving the people of one's own nation over to be hostages to deter a nuclear enemy. Any "forebearance" to raise democratic opposition to massive deterrence or, that failing. to bring about radical reform in military policy, to raise a revolution against such government, is indeed a nefarious perfidy. The greatest betrayal, however, has been that of the churches. How explain our acceptance of the systematic political intention of the U.S. to do evil that good may come? Especially, how can this be excused on the part of spokesmen of churches whose stance is cooperation with p o l i t i d institutions when just and necessary; disagreemast, opposition, and efforts to reform when they are not? HOWexcuse the exertions of political participatory religious influence that seizes so many occasions to fasten the hold of an unaltered MAD policy upon us. instead of undertaking the difficult intellectual and / WORLDVIEW I JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1979 practical task of finding and supporting those military policies and weapons decisions that can transform this system?* A nonpacifist Christian should experience an enduring moral sorrow over the exclusive attention of the church to other concerns in recent years, and over it$ misattention to this one. Even Christians who stand within the tradition of involvement in the constraining realities of politics know, or should know, that the state can become a beast or a drunken "harlot sitting on the seven hills." This is a moment of mortal peril for our nation, all the more because it is unrecognized. By mortal peril 1 do not so much mean survival as our place in the future mohl and political history of mankind. Symbolically, but only symbolically, the critical moment was Martin Luther King, Jr.'s, Riverside Church address linking the plight of the poor and the blacks to the Vietnam war (April 4, 1967). Then liberals supposed there would be a "peace dividend" resulting from extrication from that war. King only tapped beliefs already deeply imbedded in the mentality of the articulate liberal blite, especially in the churches. There was no such "peace dividend" in sight of any realistic analysis at that time. It is not surprising, then, --- - *It is rather late, if not too late, to cite in support of options to our confirmed MAD policy the following experts who are no way contaminated by theological politid reasoning: Arthur Lee Burns ( Adelphi Paper, No. 69, "Ethics and Deterrence: A Nuclear Balance Without Hostage Cities?" [London: Institute for Strategic Studies, July, 19701); Donald G. Brennan of the Hudson Institute, who first coined the MAD acronym (New York Times, Op.Ed. page [May 24 and 25, 19711); and Bruce M. R w t t ("Short of Nuclear Madness," Worldview [April. 19721). In this and other articles Russett advocated a countercombatant deterrent. The Russians are adequately deterred by a credible threat that the U.S.can and will wipe out their army on the Chinese border; there is no nted to aim at their civilian population. For the record I may add that in earlier writings on the morality of warfare and of deterrence my expression "counterforce" took its meaning from its o p p site, "counterpeople." I never meant to say the U.S. should develop the overwhelming power to destroy Russia's missile forces with impunity. Russett's expression "countercombata d ' exactly expresses my meaning-including their military forces, of coursc. that those already addicted to such expectations have since continued to befuddle U.S. foreign policy by the same hopes. This leads such people to place greater and greater reliance on "minimum" deterrence, meantime blinding themselves to sound discussion of any such policy by rhetorical persuasions that we already had too much. So I seriously suggest that any sensible person-for his own serenity, if for no other reason, whether possessed of the apostle John's ultimate faith or notrefuse to discuss or get agitated about any single item or all the separate items together that are on our present military agenda unless he or she has some expectation of opening again the discussion of the basic immorality and the final irrationality of the present shape of mutual deterrence. This would be a sound political resolution whether the specific issue is bomb shelters or staged city evacuation or the neutron bomb or the Trident submarine or SALT 11, or whether we already have overkilled and can safely cut the defense budget, or our commitment to NATO to increase the budget by 3 per cent, beyond inflation, or whether we can abandon altogether our contimtt&ged missiles and depend on the other two parts of the tkipod (submarine and air-based citydestroying missiles), or should learn to move the Minuteman missiles around or instead increase their throw-weight or multiple accuracy. These are only some of the options in contention. Discussion of them is "sound and fury signifying nothing," unless and until we relate them each and every one to the radical transformation of mutual massive nuclear deterrence. As long as any of t h w options is only a subordi?ate aspect of MAD, it too is equally M-A-D, however feasible or infeasible when considered alone. If a sound discussion of military strategy could be launched, it would not have as a basic premise "more bang for the buck." But neither can the premise be-to which the religious are inclined-the notions that we can have enough immorally intended but planned-notto-be-used bangs with fewer bucks, or that what was once called "minimum deterrence" is a good idea because it promises that we can turn our attention to the priority of domestic claims on the Federal budget, or that distributing more butter could possibly justify the peacekeeping means our nati~nnow relies on. f COXMITTEE P E I N T { No. 2 WASHINGTON .I881 U 8 OOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE - Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Servims of the House of Representatives FEBRUART 1981 Reprinted by t h e Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, December 1981. 269a10 THE HOUSE O F R E P R E S E X T A T R E S OF COMMITTEE ON AHJLEI) SERT'ICES PREPARED FOR T H E U 6 E OF THE As Amended Through February 1, 1981 T H E FEDERAL C I V I L D E F E S S E ACT O F 1950 V7th let Congress CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAhl f 2' The Atonlir Ener Y Act of I'M6 was conlpleCcly revised hy the Act of August 30, I!+%. and was rrdrsignated as the Atomic 8ne y Act of 1W. That Act is classified principally to chapter W (section 2011 c t snq.) of title 42. United States ?ode.' E 7 (1) a civil defense progrtlni roviding for the relocation of the population of risk arens, inc uding the larger United States cit~es,during a period of strategic warning resulting from nn internntiond crisis mny be effective in protecting the popult~tion; (2) the present civil defense progrnm should be im roved; and (3) a n improved civil defense proprnrn cnn be deveyoped which could enhnnce the civil defense ctiptlbility of the United States. (b) It is further the sense of Congress that an improved civil defense program should be implemented which(1) enhances the survivability of the Americm people m d its leadership in the event of nucletlr war and thereby im roves the busis for eventual recovery and reduces the Nation's vu ner~~bility to a major attnck; (2) enhances deterrence, contributes to perceptions of the United States-Soviet strtltegic balt~ncetlntl crisis st~~bility, ~ n d reduces the ossibility thtit the Unitetl Stt~tesmight be susceptible to coercion y nn enemy in times of increased tension; SEC.501.[50 U.S.C. App. 2301) (a) I t is the sense of Congress thnt- SENSE OF CONGRESS TITLE V-IMPROVED as P. L. 96-342. Civil Defense Program effective September 8, 1980 Of particular interest i s T i t l e V - Improved r 5-' SEC.502. [50 U.S.C. App. 23021 (a) I n order to carry out the sense of Congress expressed in section 501, the President shnll, to the extent practicable, develop and implement tin improved civil defense program which includes(1) r p-opmm structure for the resources to be used for uttackreltlted civi defense; (2) a pro rrtm structure for the resources to be used for disasterrelated civif defense; and (3) criteria nnd procedures under which those resources isasterfor attack-related civil defense nnd those planned for {Ianned related civil defense can be used interchangeably. (b) In developing t~ program structure for attack-related civil defense pursuant to subsection (ti), the President shall give consideration to including in such program structure the following elements: (1) Nuclear civil protect~onplanning for more rapid population relocation during times of international crisis. (2) Nuclear civil protection planning for improved inplace population protection during times of international crisis in the event circumstances preclude population relocation. (3) A survey of the shelters ~nherentin existin6 facilities. (4) Planning for the development during times of crisis of adtlitional shelter. (5) Development of c~yabilitiesfor shelter management. (6) Marking and stocking of shelters. (7) Development and procurement of ventilation kits for shelters. (8) The development of emergency evacuation plans for areas in which nuclear powerplnnt,~are located. (9) The improvement of civil defense wtirning systems. (10) The improvement of systems and cripabilities for direction find control of emergency o p m t i o n s by civil governments a t a11 levels, including further development of a network of emergency operating centers. (11) The improvement of radiological defense ~apabilities. (12) The improvement of emergency public lnformt~tionand trnining progrtuns rind cnpabilities. (I:<) The tlevelopment of plms for postattack economic recovery t ~ n d t,he c(eve1opment of plans for postt1i:aster econornk recovery to the extent t h t ~ tpl~mningfor posttlistwter econonllc recovery planning does not detrixt from plr~mingfor post,attjack ecor.omic recovery. (14) The improvement of antl training in self-help nuclear w w survival skills. ELEhlENTS O F A N IMPROVED CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM (3) does not suggest m y change in the United States policy of relying on strategic nuclear forces as the preponderant factor in mnintt~iningdeterrence; (4) inclutles plnnning for the relocr~tionof certain segments of the po~)ultttion(luring times of international crisis; antl (5) is atlaptnble to help deal with nr~turaldisasters and other peacetime emergencies. SEC.503. [50 U.S.C. App. 23031 The powers contr~inetlin titles I1 nnd IV of this Act shnll be used in developing m c l implementing the program required by section 502. ADBIINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS (15) Civil defense-related resenrch rind development. (16) The development of other rtppropriete systems tint1 capnbilities to incretise the lifesriving potential of the civil defense progrrm. C c I Congressional Research Service The Library of Congress - a CIVIL DEFENSE BUDGET I n r e s p o n s e t o r e q u e s t s f o r i n f o r m a t i o n o n t h e f i s c a l y e a r 1982 and 1983 b u d g e t o u t l o o k f o r c i v i l d e f e n s e , we h a v e g a t h e r e d t h e f o l l o w i n g The FY 1982 a p p r o p r i a t i o n f i g u r e s f o r t h e F e d e r a l Emergency information. Management Agency (FEMA), which h a s t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r c i v i l d e f e n s e a c t i v i t i e s , a r e from t h e H o u s i n g and Urban Development and I n d e p e n d e n t A g e n c i e s A p p r o p r i a t i o n s Act o f 1982 (P.L. 9 7 - 1 0 1 ) , a s v e r i f i e d b y FEMA. The f i g u r e s f o r t h e FY 1983 b u d g e t r e q u e s t w e r e p r o v i d e d b y FEMA. The budget i n f o r m a t i o n i s provided i n t h r e e m a j o r c a t e g o r i e s . CIVIL DEFENSE PORTION OF FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY BUDGET i n thousands o f d o l l a r s unadjusted f o r i n f l a t i o n FY82 ( a c t u a l ) FY83 ( r e q u e s t ) I. 11. 111. S t a t e and L o c a l A s s i s t a n c e A. S t a t e and L o c a l A s s i s t a n c e 3. Radiological Assistance C. Nuclear Attack--Civil D. Emergency O p e r a t i n g C e n t e r s E. Communications and Warning Preparedness Emergency p l a n n i n g and A s s i s t a n c e A. Research B. T r a i n i n g and E d u c a t i o n C. T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s and Warning 1. T e l e c o m a u n i c a t i o n s and Warning 2. Communications and Warning S a l a r y and E x p e n s e s Total Source : FEMA Budget O f f i c e , F e b r u a r y 1 0 , 1982 Congressional Reference Division New Civil-Defense Aim: deadly radioactive particles carried by the winds. The new approach is predicated on the conviction of civil-defense planners that the US. would get several days' notice of an impending Soviet nuclear attack during a period of gro\+.ingtension, as occurred in the Cuban missile Will Reagan's plan to evacuate era1 chaos would result if officials tried crisis of 1962. Aside from being tipped empty America's largest cities. Still off by an exchange of demands and target areas improve chances to other opponents contended that mon- threats, officials count on the detection for peace--or risk nuclear ey could be better spent in other ways by intelligence sources of other signs of war? Views are split over a big to increase the nation's defenses. danger such as movement of ships and The new civil-defense scheme differs troops and a higher alert status for Russwitch in U.S. strategy. significantly from those put forward in sian nuclear forces. Ruled out: Surprise. Administration Amid rising controversy over Presi- the 1950s and 1960s, largely because of dent Reagan's nuclear-arms policy, a the enormous rise in the number of experts consider a bolt-from-the-blue White House plan for a vast new civil- nuclear weapons now aimed at the US. surprise attack very unlikely, because Once it was assumed that an atomic this would bar evacuation of Soviet citdefense program has ignited a political attack would destroy some cities but ies and leave the Russian population firestorm. The plan spelled out in late March leave many others intact. Kow the as- defenseless against a return blow from calls, in case of a nuclear showdown sumption is that 400 targets-all the the United States. "Even if we ha\,e as with the Soviet Union, for evacuating to U.S. cities of more than 50,000 popula- little as 3 hours' warning, our progrbm the countryside the 145 million Arneri- tion, the bomber and nuclear-subma- will save lives," says Giuffrida of FEMA. cans living in 400 high-risk areas in big rine bases, the missile silos and other "If we have a week's warning, our promilitary and industrial sites-might be gram will be of significant benefit." cities and near vital military bases. In contrast to earlier civil-defense Key to the proposal is the assump- hit almost simultaneously. The number of Americans living or programs that called for widespread CItion that risk of a nuclear war would be working in those high-risk areas totals vilian preparation in the form of fallout obvious days before it actually begannot a surprise attack of the sort that 145 million, and for them there would shelters and stocking of emergency supplies, the new plan requires \.irtualformed the basis of the last civil-de- be no place to hide. The new plan is to move them out ly no involvement by most Americans fense program, which called for sendinto the countryside to host areas until a nuclear war appears imminent. ing people to nearby shelters. Experts predict that an all-out nucle- where they would be relatively safe If that happens, this is how the plan is ar attack today probably would kill from blast, heat and the initial burst of supposed to unfold: rn Each target city would have its some 139 million of the nation's popu- nuclear radiation. They would require own-~evaciation~ I a nwith . a corm of for weeks-from lation of 231 million. Proponents claim protection-perhaps civildefense workers tramed to the new ~ l a would n cut the death ,, , , , , . . , u ;,,,,, ,,,,, direct the exodus Evacuation toll to abbut 46 million. maps, along with instructions on "Our goal is to double the numwhere to go and what to do. \rould ber of Americans that would surbe printed in telephone books vive from a major Soviet attack on rn When people from the clties the U.S.," said Louis 0 . Giuffrida, reached the countrys~de,man\ director of the Federal Emergenwould be put to work Some would cy Management Agency. operate kitchens for mass feedmg Strategic aim. The plan also has Others would be handed shovels a strategic purpose: To prevent a and told to stack dirt around shelsituation from developing during ters for protection agamst radiaan eyeball-to-eyeball confrontafildn fr6m nuclear fallout tion in which the Soviets could XEGCTii&%<umbk housed in empty their cities but the U.S. schools, churches aild other pubcould not. thus perhaps encouraglic buildings, not in private ing the Russians to believe they homes. Englneering students could strike first and win. hlred dpring the summers alread) Critics, some of them already at have checked out 975,000 of the odds with the administration over -1bn shelters needed the issue of a nuclear-weapons Each person would be._a_lllotted freeze, retorted that the new civan area-of 40 squEee'feet-about il-defense program is part of an 61/3 feet on a side. If a cloud of effort by the Reagan administranuclear fallout were expected, tion to convince Americans that it evacuees would move into much is possible to fight-and win-a more crowded fallout shelters nuclear war. Merely putting the D During p ~ a c e t i m e ,20,000 plan into effect, opponents shelter-management instructors warned, would edge closer the would be trained. In a crisis, they possibility of an atomic holocaust. would conduct crash courses to Others attacked the program teach a miibrrpthers on a pragmatic basis, arguing that mn-&Hion radiation_-dePicnic monumental traffic jams and gen- Empty Major Cities U.S.NEWS & WORLD REPORT, April 12, 1982 2'7 High-Risk Areas In a Heavy Nuclear Attack f;\ Civil DefenseSoviet Style MOSCOW The Soviet Union has spent billions to create what may be the world's most extensive civil-defense system, but to the average Muscovite there is little to show for the effort. Some of the subway stations have heavy blast doors, and civildefense instructions are posted in some workplaces. Every factory or institution of any size has a full-time civil-defense warden who is responsible for being prepared for an emergency. Grammar-school children are taught how to crouch under desks and to shield their eyes from a nuclevices wo-u& be available to tell survi- ever put into effect: "Evon ar blast. vors when they could leave the shel- w.osld There is no evidence, howev- s .. . ' d ters and where they could safely travel. w o d d & d e d ~ a c w er, that the So\iets have ever m News and instruct~onswould come tion would be a c c o m ~ l J b ~ r h a , d tested on a large scale the evacudca'st sta- fgar-J-t&?&&e41~,. , from some of th_e 7 ation of a major city-the one tions that w dmd- b fallOthers were far more critical. S-enatactic that experts in the United out and the-bruptiag effects-of r a a - tor Alan Cranston (U-~allf.) described States say could save as many as -ti%-@yen off b l a nuclear explo'sYon 100 million Russian lives. *g%%??2 U ~ ~ U S " Critics of the $GiTeiz&on-a com- and - a hoax on Yet, behind the scenes, the Soment by T. K. Jones, a longtime c i d - :-eht viets have done far more than defense advocate and now a deputy Retired Vice Adm. Noel Gayler, the U.S. to protect their leaderunder secretary of defense, in an inter- whose naval career included a stint as ship, their essential work force view with the Los Angeles Trmes. deputy head of the staff that selects and their population. erybody's goingt-e it i;f there are strategic targets in the Soviet Union, Blast shelters capable of housenough _shov& to go around," ]&es said the plan "generates a mind-set toing 110,000 key officials and said. "Dig a hole, cover it with a couple ward nuclear war." workers have been built around of doors and then throw 3 feet of d ~ r t It is impossible to hide from a nucleMoscow, near factories and in on top It's the dirt that does it." ar attack, Gayler said, adding: "I've other parts of the country. Under angry questioning by mem- done the targeting. If you want to Top leaders also have standby bers of the Senate Fore~gnRelat~ons evacuate your cities, 1'11 target the mobile command posts in planes, hs- evacuation areas." Committee on March 31, Jones& ships and railroad cars. d d not mean to imply t h z nuclear Several communities-among them Head tor farm areas. In a criwar is "winnable." But h e i m i s t d that Cambridge, Mass.; Sacramento Counsis, the Russian people would be the Soviet Union, using s~mpleearthen ty, Calif.; Brattleboro, Vt., and Boulder ordered to leave the citiesshelters tp~pro-t ~ ~ s _ c l t i z ~ i c m u cCounty, h Cola.--already have refused to many of them on foot-and to b e ' f G q u i p p e d to surmve an atom~c take part in evacuation plans. assemble in rural collective-farm exchange than the US. On April 1, the Senate Armed Serareas. Soviet booklets contain deBudget boost. The Reagan civil-de- vices Committee dealt the plan a blow tailed descriptions of how ci\dfense plan is estimated to cost 4.2 bd- when it refused to provide the funds ians would be expected to prelion dollars over seven years, not needed to get started on the program. pare their own makeshift fallout countiilg inflation As a first step, ConTwice before-in the early 1950s afshelters. gress u bemg asked this year for 252 ter the Soviets developed their own While some US. experts worr? milhon dollars, nearly double the civd- nuclear weapons, and again in the earthat the Soviet chii-defense prodefense spending in the 1982 budget ly 1960s when the Berlin and Cuban gram might embolden the KremSome administration spokesmen crises brought the threat of war-the lin to take chances in a crisis. one were more restrained than FEMA offi- U.S. set civil-defense plans in motion. Moscow resident sums up the cials in describmg the new program. In both cases, the drives faded out after feeling of the man in the street: Assistant Defense Secretary Richard the crises had passed. "Of course we have to take some Perle told members of Congr_ess that In today's climate of rising worry civil-defense precautions. But we tKe prG is '%tt~e-,m~o'_e-~th~ insur- over a nuclear conflict and concern don't kid ourselves that it would an~e-~in.su_rance that in -mumstances over sharply increased budget deficits, save us in nuclear war. The major short of a central strategic e x c b g e , Reagan's new attempt to overhaul U.S. thing is to prevent nuclear war some lives 3 g h t be wed-@ would civil-defense policy faces the toughest from happening." otherwise be lost.'' test yet. 0 ave a gloomy picture of @ NICHOWS DAErILOFF W s tne pian were By ORR KELL I' '=- * e U.S.NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Aprtl 12. 1982 a.5 THE NEW YORK TIME$ THURSDAY, APRIL 8 , ; ~ v.420 Civil Defense Agency: 'Tryingto Do Something! -. ~ . *: c ~ l d r staf~a ~ a tht "Cdor rb.t you n e d ln helms.? todsidbeit No mars. CrtdainNttb.ttbcpro(gunL,~ rama Idd22o'-p Li rroemfRcfams malor dam nuclear attack loomed. But Mr. ~ ~ . b o u t - ~ ~ I n t a r r a i n tte agQcy and tbs a-Pw47 m.tmversp. He smiled. For an .gaocy t h t ru backmtsr, ae'N matiMslotof~lewrYaervolg Reprinted by the Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, with permission of copyright claimant, August 1982. THE N E W YORK TIMES, TUESDAY,A U G U S T 17, 1982 Reagan N m e Gas Request Deleted in Military Bill1 gads request foe $54 million to begin making d binary nerve gas munitions. Ibc committee met for more than two weeks in dosed seaaim to reconcile slightly differing versions of legislation that would set spanding targets for pruauiag defweapam and equip ment, for research and development and tor operating and maintaining the cumed services. Todav it anreed to au- werthe 1982 spending figure. The United States suspended pmdw tion of lethal gases in the early 1970%. B i i munitions contain two m t o x i c chemicals that mix and become nerve gas while the gas shell is in flight. The Senatevotedtoapprwe the President's $54 millim request to begin nerve gaa pmductim, but the House p w e d an m e n d m a t striltinn the bfnarv m a DW ary, Tbe MministrPhon's, request for W3.4 bill1011reprssented ari increase in mIlitaIyspendiasofalma6t33percent *---- statement today that the confereeshad " d e f e d without prejudice the request forfunds for production of b i chemi d m m i because ~ of U* stiarp divisions on this issuewhich exist in tbe ----+ minMtation request to begin produo mated cost of the helicapter M tion of nine MX intercontinental ballis- aroused criticism earlnt this year. tic missiles, with b d h g of 51.14 billian qA vote to cancel immediately L. LWlir~lyarla~plrpor. Y . ductm of the *-LO tigtms b o m c However, Sehator Tower said the corn- which the Air Force had inmuled to Congress.'* mttee had voted to provide $889 mlllioo pbase out in the 1984 budget year. This mtmnt, one Congressional staff to procure just five MX missiles. qA vote, reported earlier, to beglo member said, that "Congress is not givprocurement of 50 Loddseed C5 air W*tlcn *1.ntaMXMaUc6 ing the White House money for the gas planes, as well as three ~ mrbutismakingmval~judsment ' b m m m i t t e e ~ w l l d t o~reightaircrattthatwereaddedasa Pnd is leaving open the powbility of a that a $7l5 million autborizatim for m sort of "consolation price" for memsearch oa how and where to base the bua of Congreplr who bad fought for a new propam next year." MX missiles and t158 million for ma- pmposal to sub6titute 74Ts lor tbe CS'u terials for MX basing not be spent until Senator Tower pr+ixd tbq work d President Reagan has submitted a writ- the committee. tenplaa on how to base the missilea. But Senator Gary LIarl, Danoart d Other significant actions gy the aa- Cotorado, said the cmfercdlca zep~fl temaecommittee included; was "largely a charade"in which a ma~AdecisiontospendS25mlllimto forltyofmnfe1#5hadban"ta,qpr proam the Amy's attack hell- to yield whenever its bill dllfsrsd from coptsr. Sharp inatpsar In the atl- thawishustottbp~t.goa*~ _, Reproduced by Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress with Permission of Copyright Claimant -