INSIGHTi
South Africa’s May 2024 Elections
June 7, 2024
South Africa held national and provincial elections on May 29, 2024. After a two-decade
decline in voter
support, the African National Congress (ANC)
lost its National Assembly (NA) majority and, as the NA
elects the president, its unitary control over the executive branch. The ANC had held that majority since
the first racially inclusive post-apartheid elections in 1994. Talks ar
e underway between the ANC and
other parties to form a governing coalition—with implications for South African policy orientations,
including foreign policy stances about which multiple Members of Congress have expressed concern. The
election outcome poses a major challenge to President and ANC leader Cyril Ramaphosa, in office since
2018.
Vote: Outcome and Process
The ANC won 40% of the
2024 national vote and 159 out of 400 NA seats, sharply down from elections
in 2019—when it won 58% of the vote and 230 seats—while the oppositi
on Democratic Alliance (DA)
remained the second-largest party, winning 22% of votes and 87 seats, slightly up from 2019. Top
runners-up included two ANC splinter parties
—uMkhonto weSizwe (MK), a new party led by former
President Jacob Zuma (15%, 58 seats) and t
he Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), led by ex-ANC youth
wing leader-turned-ANC critic Julius Malema (10%, 39 seats). Fifth was t
he Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP;
4%, 17 seats), a longtime NA seat-holder.
The MK was among seven parties that won seats for the first time in the 2024 polls, which featured a
historically low 59% voter
turnout rate
and 52 participating parties. Voters selected parties to fill half of
NA seats at the national level, and at the provincial level elected parties or independents for remaining
seats, allocated to the country’s nine provinces based on population size. Voters also chose parties or
independents for seats in provincial legislatures, which are each to select 10 of 90 National Council of
Provinces (upper house) members in proportion to party ratios within their ranks
.
Election Issues
The election came ami
d concern expressed by some Members of Congress over South Africa’s clos
e ties
with Russia, the People’s Republic of
China, and Iran; and the ANC government’s international
legal
interventions regarding t
he Israel-Hamas conflict. The makeup of South Africa’s new governing coalition
could affect its position on these issues. While the DA has criticized the ANC’s approach to the Israel-
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Hamas conflict and to Russi
a, some observers have predicted that an ANC-MK-EFF alliance might bring
South Africa closer to these U.S. adversaries or geostrategic competitors—though the MK and EFF
election manifestos’ foreign policy statements are limited.
While foreign policy likely was important to some voters, domestic issues reportedly were most
prominent. Respondents in a pre-pol
l Afrobarometer survey cited the
32.9% unemployment rate as the top
issue (71% of respondents), followed by electricity cuts, corruption, living costs, poverty, economic
management, crime/security, water access, education, and housing. Also at issue were pre-election ANC
pledges to permanently extend COVID-19-er
a income grants and enact
a national health insurance
system; widesprea
d anti-immigrant attitudes; land redistribution, potentially of expropriated private land;
and ANC
patronage appointments.
ANC and MK Challenger
The ideologically leftist ANC has in practice melded support for private sector-led growth with state-centric economic
planning and a large social welfare system. Its post-1994 electoral support has been rooted in its leadin
g anti-apartheid
struggle role and efforts to overcome apartheid’s stark, enduring racial and socioeconomic inequality legacies. ANC voter
support has waned over time, amid reported public service inadequacies and endemic corruption, notably
“state capture,” a
form of systematized graft that emerged under ex-presiden
t Jacob Zuma. Zuma
resigned under pressure and was replaced
by President Cyril Ramaphosa in 2018.
The rise of the MK presented a serious electoral challenge to the ANC, which suspended Zuma in late 2023 and
unsuccessful y sued to halt the new party’s use of the MK name and logo, which are those of the ANC’s anti-apartheid-era
armed wing. Zuma, who h
as criticized Ramaphosa’s own
non-reporting of income, was disqualified as a 2024 MK NA
candidate over hi
s conviction for refusing to testify to
a judicial commission on state capture. Zuma, a populist, has vowed
retribution against the Ramaphosa-led ANC and engaged in bitter
spoiler rhetoric. The MK’s 15% of the vo
te exceeded
some predictions and helped prevent an ANC majority.
Coalition Prospects
The time available for inter-party coalition negotiations is limited. Per th
e constitution, members of the
NA, South Africa’s lower house, must choose the president from among their own ranks withi
n two
weeks of th
e results announcement, and the winner must be sworn-in withi
n five days thereafter—barring
possible litigation delays.
Some in the ANC and some
investors reportedly favor a centrist coaliti
on with the DA and IFP. While
left-leaning ANC members reportedly prefer a coalition with the radical EFF and/or MK over the DA—
which is ideologically centrist but
criticized by some as a predominantly White party—the ANC
reportedly has
rejected an MK demand that President Ramaphosa resign prior to any negotiations. ANC
leaders are reportedly now considering a possible
national unity government inclusive of multiple parties.
Congress: Potential Implications
Some in Congress may closely monitor South Africa’s coalition talks, given their potential implications
for South Africa’s foreign policy and bilateral relations. An ANC-DA coalition could seek to foster greater
U.S-South Africa’s foreign policy alignment, whereas an ANC-EFF-and/or MK coalition could signal a
closer alignment with the forementioned U.S. adversaries and foster strains in bilateral ties.
Regardless of the outcome, some in Congress
have proposed a mandatory comprehensive review of U.S.-
South Africa relations and a determination of whether South Africa’s foreign policy has undermined U.S.
national security or foreign policy interests, as som
e Members have contended. A positive finding could
affect South Africa’s eligibility for U.S. trade benefits under t
he African Growth and Opportunity Act
(AGOA), as could an out-of-cycle AGOA eligibility review called for under
S. 4110, an AGOA
reauthorization bill. The Biden Administration has called South Afric
a “an anchor” for global peace and
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prosperity. South Africa receives substantial
U.S. assistance, notably t
o counter HIV/AIDS, and is a top
U.S. regional trade and investment partner.
Author Information
Nicolas Cook
Specialist in African Affairs
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