Iran’s President Dies in Helicopter Crash
INSIGHTi
Iran’s President Dies in Helicopter Crash
May 21, 2024
On May 19, 2024, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, and
several other officials were killed when their helicopter crashed amid bad weather in mountainous
northwestern Iran. Raisi’s death comes at a particularly tense moment for the Iranian government, which
last month launched its first-ever direct military attack on Israel and continues to face public discontent at
home. While Raisi’s death appears unlikely to substantively change Iranian foreign or domestic policies
in the near term, related developments may have implications for U.S. policy and Congress.
Ebrahim Raisi and His Presidency
Born in 1960, Raisi was reportedly a participant in the 1979 revolution that overthrew the Shah and
replaced his government with the Islamic Republic. After a period of religious education, Raisi was
appointed deputy prosecutor general of Tehran and served on the commission that ordered the execution
of thousands of political prisoners in 1988. He continued to advance through the hierarchy of the Islamic
Republic, including by winning election to the Assembly of Experts (the body responsible for choosing
Iran’s paramount decision-maker, the Supreme Leader) in 2006. He placed second in the 2017
presidential election behind incumbent Hassan Rouhani, after which Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei
appointed Raisi as the head of Iran’s judiciary. While Raise was in that position, the United States
sanctioned him pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13876.
In 2021, Raisi again ran for president, winning an “exceptionally uncompetitive” race in which the
government’s Guardian Council disqualified moderate candidates from running. Raisi’s accession to the
presidency further fueled longstanding speculation that he might succeed Khamenei as Supreme Leader
(see below). Less than half of eligible Iranians voted, the lowest turnout in the Islamic Republic’s history
up to that point.
Raisi’s presidency was dominated by continued tensions with the United States, including attacks by Iran-
backed groups on U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria; economic challenges; closer Iranian ties with Russia and
China; and the protest movement sparked by the death of Mahsa Amini. Protests appeared to recede in
2023 in the wake of a violent government crackdown that included alleged crimes against humanity (per a
United Nations fact-finding mission). Further declines in voter turnout in March 2024 parliamentary
elections and May 2024 run-offs, as well as the relatively muted public response to Raisi’s death, may
signal continued popular discontent.
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What Now?
Raisi’s death, while returning from a visit to neighboring Azerbaijan in a decades-old U.S.-origin
helicopter, leaves the presidency vacant for the second time in the history of the Islamic Republic. Per the
Iranian constitution, in the event of the president’s death, his deputy is to assume the “powers and
functions of the President,” and a council of three senior leaders is to arrange for the election of a new
president within 50 days.
With Supreme Leader Khamenei’s assent, First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber has assumed the
position of acting or interim president. The United States sanctioned Mokhber pursuant to E.O. 13876 in
January 2021 as then-head of the Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order (also known as Setad), a
Khamenei-linked “business juggernaut” with “a stake in nearly every sector of the Iranian economy.” It
remains unclear who the Guardian Council will permit to run for president in the election, reportedly
scheduled for June 28. Former lead nuclear negotiator Ali Bagheri Kani, a hardliner with family ties to
Khamenei, has succeeded Amir-Abdollahian as acting foreign minister.
Most speculation about Iranian leadership succession in the past year had focused not on Raisi but on
eighty-five-year-old Supreme Leader Khamenei, who suffered a bout of serious illness in 2022. Raisi was
widely seen as a top candidate to succeed him; Khamenei himself ascended to the Supreme Leader
position from the presidency in 1989. Raisi’s death leaves Khamenei’s son Mojtaba as the most widely
discussed possible successor, though some observers see him as an unlikely choice.
Future Implications
Given that Supreme Leader Khamenei remains the ultimate decisionmaker in Iran, it appears unlikely that
Raisi’s death will prompt immediate changes in Iranian government policy as Iranian leaders focus on
ensuring the election of an acceptable successor. Khamenei’s hardline posture at home (including an
unyielding stance on the mandatory headscarf for women) and abroad (including support for anti-U.S. and
anti-Israel groups across the region) is likely to continue unabated.
Raisi’s death adds uncertainty into what is already an unsettled situation in Iran and further complicates
the question of who might succeed Khamenei when his rule ends, a potentially vulnerable moment for the
regime. Some observers have speculated that the expected presidential election may see even lower
turnout, undermining the government’s legitimacy, and possibly renewed violence. Depending on various
factors, including public opinion in Iran, Khamenei’s successor could continue, double down on, or
deprioritize various aspects of his hardline rule. Any leader of the Islamic Republic, as currently
constituted, is unlikely to reverse Iran’s official longstanding rejection of U.S. influence in the Middle
East or move to end decades of U.S.-Iran enmity. A State Department press statement expressed official
condolences for Raisi’s death while affirming U.S. support for the Iranian people’s “struggle for human
rights and fundamental freedom;” some Members of Congress criticized this statement.
For now, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) appears to retain decisive influence over
Iranian foreign and domestic policy. Designated as a U.S. Foreign Terrorist Organization in 2019, the
IRGC is responsible for regime security, coordinates Iran’s support for regional armed groups and other
external operations, and plays a major unofficial role in Iran’s economy. Some observers assess that the
rise of the IRGC, which has been closely aligned with both Khamenei and Raisi, has coincided with the
decrease in influence of the clerical establishment, though others dispute that assessment and the notion
that the IRGC and the clergy are oppositional entities.
Raisi’s death may not directly alter relations with the United States, though changes to power dynamics in
Iran could have implications for U.S. interests. As Congress continues to review U.S. policy toward Iran,
Members may consider how U.S. policy choices (among many other factors) might influence, and in turn
be influenced by, developments in Iranian leadership personnel and policy.
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Author Information
Clayton Thomas
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
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