Russia’s War in Ukraine: Status Update
INSIGHTi
Russia’s War in Ukraine: Status Update
May 14, 2024
Overview
As Russia’s war in Ukraine enters its third year, both Ukraine and Russia continue to battle for territory
along the 600-mile front line. At various points in the conflict, the advantage has shifted between Ukraine
and Russia, but since the beginning of 2024 Russian forces have made territorial gains, prompting some
analysts to argue that current conditions may favor Russia. As Director of National Intelligence Avril
Haines testified before Congress on May 2, 2024, “Russia is making incremental progress on the
battlefield with the potential for tactical breakthroughs along the front lines in areas such as Donetsk and
Kharkiv.” For both Russia and Ukraine, having sufficient military reserves could be a key factor in
determining success on the battlefield.
The Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) continue to experience shortages of personnel and equipment,
especially artillery and air defense ammunition. In April 2024, Congress passed the Ukraine Security
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2024 (Division B of P.L. 118-50), committing more than $60 billion to
support Ukraine and other countries affected by Russia’s war. P.L. 118-50 provides security and economic
assistance, as observers continue to debate the ability of either side to obtain a decisive advantage through
2024.
Battlefield Situation
After blunting Ukraine’s summer 2023 counteroffensive, Russian forces resumed offensive operations
and seized several Ukrainian towns and cities (such as Bakhmut and Avdiivka). Russia continues to
leverage its advantages in personnel and equipment to achieve territorial gains and conduct operations
across multiple sectors of the front line. Russia continues to conduct long-range precision strikes against
Ukrainian infrastructure and has increasingly used glide bombs (large unguided warheads upgraded with
simple guidance systems) against UAF positions.
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
IN12360
CRS INSIGHT
Prepared for Members and
Committees of Congress
Congressional Research Service
2
Figure 1. Front Line in the Russia-Ukraine War
Source: Institute for the Study of War, May 13, 2024.
Russia appears to be prioritizing exploiting its success at two points in Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk
regions: (1) to capture the strategically important city of Chasiv Yar outside of Bakhmut and (2) to exploit
Congressional Research Service
3
a lack of UAF fortifications and defensive positions outside of the town of Avdiivka in the southern
Donetsk region.
On May 10, the UAF reported that Russia had launched an offensive in the Kharkiv region, although it is
unclear if Russia has sufficient forces to breach Ukrainian lines. Risks to the UAF include drawing forces
away from other positions, potentially allowing a Russian breakthrough elsewhere.
Russia continues to conduct casualty-prone operations. The British government estimated in May that
Russia is currently suffering an average of 899 casualties a day.
UAF forces suffer from a lack of personnel—both to replace losses and to rotate exhausted units from the
front line—as well as an acute shortage of artillery ammunition and other supplies (including armored
vehicles and air defense systems). Some observers argue the UAF was late in building fortifications and
defensive lines, potentially compromising its positions. UAF strategy appears to focus on slowing
Russian advances and imposing casualties on Russian forces. Despite these limitations, the UAF has
prevented large-scale Russian breakthroughs, although UAF officials candidly admit further Russian
gains are likely.
Outlook
The situation for the UAF has “worsened” due in part to Russia’s “numerical advantage in personnel,
weapons, and equipment,” according to Ukrainian Commander in Chief Colonel General Oleksandr
Syrsky. Even with new security assistance, the UAF will likely continue to experience shortages
(including artillery ammunition and air defense munitions) as logistical and production constraints slow
the delivery of aid.
Ukraine recently adopted new laws in an effort to recruit more personnel. It remains unclear how the
Ukrainian government will implement these measures and how effective they will be. The UAF maintains
it will be able to conduct basic training in Ukraine, while the United States and other partners continue to
offer “comprehensive” unit-level and officer training should the UAF recruit more personnel.
Russian military recruitment is resilient, with financial incentives apparently remaining attractive to new
recruits and, currently, mitigating the need for further mobilization. The Russian military continues to
refurbish equipment from stockpiles, and its operations could reflect the Kremlin’s assessment that the
defense industry can continue to provide sufficient equipment for the immediate future. Some observers
debate the long-term sustainability of its production given capacity and input constraints.
Issues for Congress
In addition to providing assistance to Ukraine, Congress has passed legislation to conduct oversight of
U.S. policy regarding the war. Both P.L. 118-47 (7046(d)(1) of Division F) and P.L. 118-50 (Title V,
§504) require the Biden Administration to provide a strategy regarding the war. P.L. 118-50, for example,
calls for a strategy that will be “multi-year, establish specific and achievable objectives, define and
prioritize United States national security interests, and include the metrics to be used to measure progress
in achieving such objectives.”
As Congress considers U.S. support for the UAF—including possible provision of additional security
assistance—and conducts oversight of U.S. policy in Ukraine, Members could examine numerous
questions, including the following:
• What are the impacts of recent Russian battlefield gains on U.S. and allied policy toward
the conflict? What is the potential of Ukraine regaining the advantage in 2024?
Congressional Research Service
4
• How effective have U.S. efforts to train and advise the UAF been? Do the United States
and its allies have the capacity to train more personnel and units?
• Has U.S. and allied and partner support improved the UAF’s ability to maintain and
repair equipment? What else could be done to improve the UAF’s ability to maintain and
sustain provided security assistance?
• Should the United States and its allies and partners consider additional efforts to support
the development of Ukraine’s domestic defense industry? Are there other policies, in
addition to those such as hosting the U.S.-Ukraine Defense Industrial Base Conference,
that could be considered?
Author Information
Andrew S. Bowen
Analyst in Russian and European Affairs
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff
to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of
Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of
information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.
CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United
States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However,
as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the
permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
IN12360 · VERSION 1 · NEW