Pakistan’s 2024 National Election
INSIGHTi
Pakistan’s 2024 National Election
March 21, 2024
Overview
Congress has taken interest in Pakistan’s democratization, viewing progress as important to U.S. interests
including security cooperation and economic stability. In the 118th Congress, H.Res. 901—expressing
support for democracy and human rights in Pakistan—has garnered 101 bipartisan cosponsors to date.
Elections to seat Pakistan’s National Assembly (NA) and four provincial assemblies to five-year terms
took place on February 8, 2024, after nearly three months’ delay and two years of political turmoil.
Pakistanis’ discontent was on display in the run-up to the election, including in pre-election violence. A
record-high seven in ten told pollsters economic conditions were worsening, and the same number
expressed a lack of confidence in election credibility. Voter turnout was under 48% among the 128 million
registered voters, a decline from above 52% in the 2018 elections.
More than 5,100 NA candidates (94% of them male) and 167 registered political parties participated in
the February 2024 elections. The contest to fill 266 contested NA seats (70 are reserved for women and
minorities) pitted the Pakistan Muslim League faction of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (PML-N),
and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) under Bilawal Bhutto Zardari—son of former Prime Minister
Benazir Bhutto and former President Asif Ali Zardari—against independent candidates affiliated with the
Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI or Movement for Justice) party founded by former Prime Minister Imran
Khan. Khan, elected prime minister in 2018, was removed from office by an April 2022 NA no-
confidence vote and later jailed on corruption charges and barred from holding office. His still-popular
party was largely dismantled, leaving its candidates to run as “PTI-supported” independents.
PTI’s independents won at least 93 seats—a plurality—shocking observers, who called the outcome a
“political miracle” and a “bloody nose” for Pakistan’s “establishment” (a euphemism for the military and
intelligence services). Without allies, however, they could not form a government. The PML-N (75 seats)
and PPP (54 seats) cobbled together smaller parties (and some independents) to form a coalition
government under Shehbaz Sharif, Nawaz’s younger brother, who was sworn in as Pakistan’s prime
minister on March 3.
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Background
The PTI in late 2021 fell out of favor with the military, the institution that reportedly enabled the party’s
earlier electoral success. Khan’s government was replaced by a new coalition in April 2022 comprised
mainly of the PML-N and PPP; Shehbaz Sharif served as prime minister until August 2023, when a
caretaker government was formed to oversee elections.
Khan denounced his 2022 removal, blaming it (without providing evidence) on alleged machinations by
the U.S. government and/or Pakistan Army leadership. His public criticisms of the army were
unprecedented, leaving army leadership “aghast” and polarizing the electorate. The PML-N-led
government began cracking down on Khan and his party, including through media bans and criminal
charges against Khan himself.
In May 2023, Khan was arrested on corruption charges, sparking pro-PTI protests across Pakistan; some
of these were lethal and included attacks on military facilities. The government called in the army in to
restore order and analysts described the establishment as intent on crushing the Khan-PTI movement and
coopting the civilian government to consolidate a “hybrid regime” in which the army is above criticism.
In August, Khan was sentenced to three years in prison on graft charges and banned from politics for five
years. PTI’s electoral symbol, a cricket bat, was banned (two-fifths of Pakistanis are illiterate). In the
week before the election, the military reportedly intensified efforts to influence the outcome; Khan was
given multiple prison sentences in three separate cases. Government officials denied illicit interference of
any kind.
Critical Commentary
Observers have called the 2024 elections among the least credible in the country’s history. According to
the nongovernmental Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, the most serious victims of “political
engineering” were the country’s democracy, electoral politics, and the rule of law. Khan and his party
claimed they won as many as 180 seats. One senior official reportedly confessed to manipulating the
outcome.
One day after the election, the U.S. State Department joined “credible international and local election
observers in their assessment that these elections included undue restrictions on freedoms of expression,
association, and peaceful assembly,” and condemned “electoral violence, restrictions on the exercise of
human rights and fundamental freedoms.” The United Nations, European Union, and United Kingdom
expressed similar concerns.
In late February, 31 Representatives signed a letter to President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Antony
Blinken expressing concerns about alleged election rigging and urging the Administration to withhold
recognition of Pakistan’s new government until a credible investigation has been conducted.
Implications for U.S. Interests
Analysts say Pakistan’s new government is fragile and lacks legitimacy, and express concern its weakness
will make it more difficult to address political, economic, and security crises. The government’s standing
may depend on the perceived credibility of ongoing investigations into vote-rigging complaints.
The election outcome appeared to reflect public discontent with the establishment and the recent
performance of the civilian government. Public perceptions among Pakistanis of security institutions able
to shape political outcomes and impose stability, whether held favorably or not, are badly damaged. Imran
Khan and his supporters are likely to continue roiling the country’s politics in opposition. The military
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retains considerable influence; one expert predicts the coalition “will function as a junior partner to the
military.”
The Biden Administration declared that “democratic principles and respect for the rule of law are central
to the U.S.-Pakistan relationship and these values will continue to guide this partnership forward.” At the
same time, a State Department spokesperson suggested U.S. engagement with Islamabad (including
cooperation on counterterrorism and regional security, and support for economic reforms) may remain
unchanged.
Observers do not anticipate major changes in Pakistan’s foreign relations. Prime Minister Sharif, who a
Pakistani diplomat called an “old friend of China,” is likely to have better relations with Pakistan’s
military than Nawaz. China’s foreign ministry congratulated Pakistan for elections “held in a generally
steady and smooth manner.” Some analysts consider the Sharifs more amenable to dialogue with India
than other political leaders, but Islamabad’s domestic crises temper hopes for Pakistan-India
rapprochement.
Author Information
K. Alan Kronstadt
Specialist in South Asian Affairs
Disclaimer
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