INSIGHTi
The Change Healthcare Cyberattack and
Response Considerations for Policymakers
Updated April 24, 2024
On February 21, 2024, UnitedHealth Group Incorporat
ed disclosed that one of its companies’ units—
Change Healthcare—was experiencing a cyberattack.
The BlackCat/ALPHV ransomware group—a
Russia-linked cybercrime organization—claimed responsibility. Repercussions from this cyberattack are
reportedly affecting some individuals’ ability to access health care services nationwide.
Attack Background
In December 2023, the Department of Justice
(DOJ) announced that it
disrupted the operations of the
BlackCat/ALPHV/Noberus ransomware group. The government developed a tool to help victims decrypt
and regain control of their systems—saving them from paying an estimated $68 million in ransom
payments. The Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) also disrupted BlackCat’s infrastructure by
infiltrating its systems and seizing websites. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
(CISA) worked with other federal agencies to update a ransomware
advisory with technical indicators of
compromise as well as mitigation strategies. Following the FBI’s campaign, BlackCat declared that it
would retaliate against the United State
s by targeting health care providers with ransomware.
In the subsequent two months, BlackCat was able to reconstitute its infrastructure and compromise
Change Healthcare. Change Healthcare facilitates transactions in the health care system (e.g., ensuring
pharmacies receive payment from insurers for medications). BlackCat
allegedly used stolen credentials to
gain access to Change Healthcare’s systems and deploy ransomware while also exfiltrating data. Upon
discovery, Change Healthcare disconnected the affected system and took other systems offline to stem the
ransomware’s spread. The disruption of these networks has led to a cascade of real-world consequences
across the nation, with individuals unable to leverage their insurance coverage for prescriptions and cash
flow issues for pharmacies as payments wer
e frozen.
This ransomware attack bears similarities to the 2021 attack against
Colonial Pipeline. Both attacks began
with ransomware, led the victim to disconnect systems thereby causing operational disruptions, which
resulted in physical consequences.
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Attack Response
As the effects of the attack have transpired, concerns over the federal response and the attack’s resolution
have grown.
Change Healthcare reverted to manual processes and other workarounds to continue business operations
while restoring digital system. UnitedHealth has retained cybersecurity firms to investigate the attack, and
has shared information with the U.S. government. They als
o paid roughly $22 million in bitcoin (350
bitcoins) in ransom. For some organizations, paying a ransom is cheaper than addressing response and
recovery costs. But the ransom payment did not alleviate total costs related to response, system
reconstitution, or business losses. UnitedHealth estimates that this breach could cost the company in
excess of
$1.5 billion.
The health sector has generally bee
n critical of the federal response
, calling for the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Service
s (HHS) to take action, especially with regards to the impact on the
pharmaceutical supply chain.
On March 5, 2024
, HHS said it would help Medicaid and Medicare program participants switch
clearinghouses for claims, encourage relaxing policies related to prior authorization, and allow
accelerated payments. On March 13, HH
S opened an investigation related to compliance with th
e HIPAA
Privacy, Security, and Breach Notification Rules.
Policy Considerations
Arguably, the incident itself is not remarkable as ransomware attacks are common. The entity that was
targeted, and its effect on the broader ecosystem, however, is notable. This incident highlights the health
care system’s interconnected nature and nationwide reach, and the broader impact of the disruption on
economic activity.
Congress and th
e National Cybersecurity Strategy created a unique response structure for cyber incidents
because traditional response structures were not inclusive enough to account for the complexities of a
cyber incident. Unlike physical disasters, cyber incidents do not start with an apparent, singular event.
They occur and develop over time, and downstream effects (which may include physical consequences)
may be more severe. The Government Accountability Office highlighted that thes
e challenges complicate
a unified federal response.
In terms of federal activity, an almost decade-ol
d domestic cyber response policy dictates a two-pronged
approach with t
he FBI investigating the malicious actor
and DHS assisting the victim. The policy also
established the concept of a Cyber Unified Coordination Group (UCG) which would bring interagency
resources together in response to a specific event. This is further elaborated in the
National Cyber
Incident Response Plan (NCIRP), which is now over seven years old. The National Security Council
(NSC)
reportedly has convened meetings of agency deputy heads to discuss responses to the Change
Healthcare cyberattack, but it is unclear whether a UCG has been established, as would be expected under
the policy.
The
2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy directs CISA to update the NCIRP, which the agenc
y claims is
in progress—a responsibility that
Congress also requires. It is unclear if the NCIRP is being used in its
current state or if it is being used with some new conditions to test potential changes.
The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act
(IIJA) authorized the Secretary of Homeland Security to
declare a
significant incident related to cybersecurity (which accounts for harm to public confidence and
safety). A declaration allows t
he National Cyber Director to coordinate interagency activities to respond
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to the incident. Such declarations need to be published in the
Federal Register within 72 hours. To date,
none have been.
The IIJA also authorized
a cyber response and recovery fund to help finance technical responses to
significant incidents, but funding does not extend to addressing real-world consequences of the incident.
Information Parity
This incident raises potential matters concerning information parity.
•
Coordination of offensive and defensive actions. The FBI conducted an offensive
campaign against a known bad actor. Policymakers may want consider to what extent
CISA and other
sector risk management agencies (SRMAs) knew about the operation, the
capabilities of the actor, the probability of retaliatory actions, and the capabilities the
government could bring to impede a subsequent attack. If an SRMA does not have
protective capabilities, policymakers may want to consider whether the SRMA can
partner with another agency, or the private sector, to respond.
•
Knowledge of conditions in decisionmaking. CISA may not have access to the requisite
information needed to declare an incident “significant.” The responsibility for such
declaration does not lie with the NSC, where current deliberations are occurring. If CISA
does not have access to requisite information, Congress may choose to consider whether
future reporting, industry partnerships, or interagency collaboration be needed to ensure a
complete picture of the incident and response
•
Information Sharing Reach. CISA and the FBI have both released information on
ransomware and its threat to hospitals, but the health care sector includes many other
players (e.g., physicians and pharmacies). HHS is the SRMA for the
Healthcare and
Public Health sector and arguably better positioned to ensur
e cyber threat information can
reach all sector actors. However
, awareness and distribution of information to the right
parties is an ongoi
ng challenge.
Author Information
Chris Jaikaran
Specialist in Cybersecurity Policy
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