Wagner Group Mutiny in Russia
INSIGHTi
Wagner Group Mutiny in Russia
June 28, 2023
On Friday, June 23, 2023, Russia’s Wagner Group and its leader Yevgeny Prigozhin launched the most
serious threat yet to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s rule. The mutiny followed worsening tensions
between Prigozhin and the Ministry of Defense (MoD), specifically Russian Defense Minister Sergei
Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov. Prigozhin accused the military leadership in a
video of fabricating the pretext for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and killing troops unnecessarily—
including attacking Wagner units. Some observers speculate Prigozhin’s video and the subsequent
escalation was initially an attempt to preempt the demand that all “volunteer” formations sign contracts
with the Russian MoD, effectively ending the Wagner Group’s autonomy. Russian authorities issued an
arrest warrant for “incitement to armed rebellion” for Prigozhin shortly after midnight on Saturday, June
24, 2023.
The Wagner Group
The Wagner Group is a quasi-private company that had been under Russian government oversight and played a key role in
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The U.S. Departments of State and the Treasury have designated the Wagner Group for
sanctions under multiple executive orders. In January 2023, the Biden Administration designated Wagner a Transnational
Criminal Organization (TCO). See also CRS In Focus IF12344, Russia’s Wagner Private Military Company (PMC), by Andrew S.
Bowen, and CRS In Focus IF12389, Russia’s Wagner Group in Africa: Issues for Congress, coordinated by Alexis Arieff.
By early morning on Saturday, June 24, Prigozhin and his forces had seized control of the headquarters of
Russia’s Southern Military District in Rostov-on-Don and soon pushed toward Moscow, reportedly
making it to several hundred miles outside the capital. Prigozhin claimed his actions were against not
President Putin but the “corrupt” military leadership. President Putin released an address to the nation on
Saturday promising to crush those responsible, but Russian military and security forces appeared
unwilling or unable to coordinate an effective response on the ground. Wagner forces shot down attacking
Russian Aerospace Forces fighters and helicopters. On Saturday evening, Prigozhin and the Kremlin
announced what they called a “deal” in which the column of advancing Wagner troops stood down in
return for amnesty, with Prigozhin and Wagner fighters reportedly being allowed to go to Belarus.
Russian Intelligence and Security Service Response
It is unclear whether Russian intelligence, specifically the Federal Security Service (FSB),
detected the plot or failed to accurately assess and brief policymakers on the danger. It is possible
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
IN12186
CRS INSIGHT
Prepared for Members and
Committees of Congress
Congressional Research Service
2
the FSB uncovered the plans and conveyed the situation to Putin, and that he declined to act or
did not act for other unknown reasons. This uncertainty notwithstanding, the FSB did not appear
prepared for events as they unfolded.
The Russian government’s large, well-staffed security forces appeared surprised by the speed of Wagner’s
mutiny. Lack of coordination by or orders from the Russian political leadership may have contributed to
confusion within security forces. It is also possible the security forces received orders but were debating
whether or not to fulfill them, which could indicate only passive support for the regime. It is also possible
Prigozhin assessed that the support he anticipated from the lower-level Russian military and security
forces did not materialize, prompting him to agree to the “deal.”
Potential Issues Facing Congress
Members of Congress now may assess how these latest events alter issues facing Congress including, for
example, on matters concerning sanctions, security assistance to Ukraine, stability in Russia, and
developments in Belarus. As Members evaluate implications for U.S. interests, they may seek
clarification on the following questions:
What Does the Mutiny Mean for Russian Military Forces’ Ability to Counter
Ukraine’s Counteroffensive?
By the end of May 2023, Wagner forces had been rotated off the frontlines in Ukraine and replaced by
Russian military forces. The speed of the Wagner takeover in Rostov may have been attributable, in part,
to the Wagner forces’ location in the immediate vicinity after being taken off the frontlines, while most
Russian forces were deployed on the frontlines. This allowed Wagner forces to seize key objectives before
the military could react. It is unclear, however, how the mutiny may affect the morale, cohesion, and
overall command and control of Russian forces. Wagner forces were likely acting as a mobile reserve in
Ukraine. Russian forces may be less able to respond to a potential Ukrainian breakthrough without the
Wagner Group as a cohesive force.
Did the “Deal” Between Prigozhin and the Kremlin Actually End the Mutiny?
On Saturday, Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov announced a “deal” ending the mutiny. While the
deal ended any immediate conflict, it is unclear whether the underlying issues have been resolved.
Reports indicate Prigozhin has fled, or was allowed to flee, to Belarus, while both Defense Minister
Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov appear to remain in office. The status of Wagner’s
fighters also remains unclear, with some reports indicating fighters are still roaming several Russian
cities. The deal called for Wagner fighters who did not participate in the mutiny to have the opportunity to
sign contracts to serve with the MoD, while those who did participate would not be prosecuted. The
Russian military is unlikely to tolerate an autonomous Wagner, and questions remain over whether the
Wagner fighters would submit to Russian military oversight—either through signing contracts with the
MoD or other “private” military companies under the control of the MoD.
What Does the Mutiny Mean for Putin’s Rule and Stability?
While the long-term implications remain unclear, the mutiny has likely weakened the image of the regime
and Putin’s leadership. Some analysts assess that the Russian political and security elite are frustrated
with Putin for not dealing with Prigozhin earlier and for allowing the tension between the Wagner Group
and the MoD to grow. The disconnect between the aggressive tone of Putin’s national speech and the
apparent blanket amnesty could further contribute to these views. Some observers point out that the deal
was better than other possible outcomes, arguing that increased fighting between the security forces and
Congressional Research Service
3
Wagner would heighten portrayals of regime weakness. At this time, Putin appears to remain the only
politically feasible leadership option for most of the Russian political and security elite, based on
Prigozhin’s apparent failure to garner sufficient support.
Author Information
Andrew S. Bowen
Analyst in Russian and European Affairs
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff
to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of
Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of
information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.
CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United
States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However,
as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the
permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
IN12186 · VERSION 1 · NEW