INSIGHTi
President Biden Nominates OIRA
Administrator
September 22, 2022
On September 2, 2022, President Bid
en announced his intention to nomin
ate Richard Revesz as
administrator of th
e Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB). OIRA is best known for its role in reviewing federal regulations. Since 1981, OIRA
has reviewed most agencies’ regulations before they have been issued. OIRA also plays an important role
in implementing federal regulatory policy.
This Insight provides a brief history of OIRA and describes its current role in federal regulatory policy. It
then provides information on Senate consideration of past nominations to the position of administrator.
In addition to its regulatory activities, OIRA oversees matters related to information policy, statistical
policy, and privacy. For more information about those functions, see CRS Report RS2166
5, Office of
Management and Budget (OMB): An Overview, coordinated by Taylor N. Riccard.
Overview of OIRA
Congress established OIRA (pronounced “oh-eye-ruh”) within OMB in the
Paperwork Reduction Act
(PRA) of 1980. The PRA established OIRA to oversee and enforce government-wide efforts to reduce the
federal paperwork burden. To achieve that goal, th
e PRA tasked OMB and OIRA with reviewing and
approving federal agencies’ collections of information—for example, government surveys, tax forms, and
regulatory reporting requirements.
Congress created an administrator, who was originally to be appointed by the OMB director, to head
OIRA. In 1986, however, following som
e disagreements over regulatory policy between the Reagan
Administration and Congress, Congress
made the position subject to Senate advice and consent. The
position was filled by a Senate-confirmed appointee for the first time
in 1988.
OIRA’s History and Role in Reviewing Regulations
OIRA’s responsibilities were greatly increased in early 1981 when President Reagan issued
Executive
Order (E.O.) 12291, which required most federal agencies—other than
“independent regulatory
agencies,” such as the Securities and Exchange Commission—to submit their regulations to OIRA for
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review and approval before issuing them. It also required agencies to condu
ct cost-benefit analysis for
“major” rules (rules expected to have at least $100 million of economic impact) and stated that the
benefits of each regulation must outweigh the cost. While presidential review of regulations has largely
come to be seen as the norm since 1981, at the time, establishing centralized OIRA review of regulations
was a somew
hat controversial exercise of presidential power.
In 1993, President Clinton issued
E.O. 12866, which limited OIRA review to “significant” rules.
“Significant” rules, as defined by the order, include those that have economic significance, may affect the
federal budget, or “raise novel legal or policy issues.” E.O. 12866 remains in effect today.
OIRA review has three main components. First, the office reviews the content of each rule to ensure that
it is consistent with the President’s policy preferences. Second, if a rule is “economically significant”—
generally, having an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more—the agency must conduct
a
cost-benefit analysis. OIRA reviews the analysis for compliance with OMB’s principal guidance
document on regulatory analysis,
Circular A-4. Third, OIRA then coordinates
an interagency review
process with other interested agencies, including other entities within the Executive Office of the
President such as the White House counsel.
OIRA can exert considerable influence over regulations, ensuring that federal agencies’ actions are
consistent with the President’s policy preferences. Information about regulations previously or currently
under review at OIRA can be foun
d on OIRA’s website.
OIRA’s Role in Implementing Regulatory Policy
OIRA is also responsible for carrying out the regulatory policy goals of the Administration. For example,
OIRA issued
guidance in 2017 implementing former President Donald Trump’s
regulatory one-in, two-
out policy (which President Biden
later revoked). OIRA has not issued publicly available guidance
implementing President Biden’s regulatory agenda, which he announced on his first day in office in a
presidential memorandum.
Timing of Senate Consideration of Past Nominations
Table 1 below lists confirmed and recess-appointed OIRA administrators who served after 1986, when
Congress
amended the PRA to require presidential appointment with Senate advice and consent. It does
not include administrators who served on a temporary, acting basis.
Table 1. Timing of Senate Consideration of Nominations to the Position of
Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)
Date Nomination
Date Ordered
Date of Senate
Administrator
Received in Senate
Date of Hearing
Reported
Confirmation
Richard L. Revesz
09/12/2022
09/29/2022
—
—
(scheduled)
Paul J. Ray
10/15/2019
12/04/2019
12/17/2019
01/09/2020
Neomi Rao
05/18/2017
06/07/2017
06/21/2017
07/10/2017
Howard A. Shelanski
04/25/2013
06/12/2013
06/24/2013
06/27/2013
Congressional Research Service
3
Cass R. Sunstein
04/20/2009
05/12/2009
05/20/2009
09/10/2009
Susan Dudley (recess
08/01/2006
11/13/2006
—
04/04/2007 (date of
appointed)
recess appointment;
nomination was not
confirmed by the
Senate)
John D. Graham
03/28/2001
05/17/2001
05/23/2001
07/19/2001
John T. Spotila
01/07/1999
04/29/1999
05/20/1999
07/01/1999
Sally Katzen
04/21/1993
05/19/1993
05/26/1993
05/28/1993
S. Jay Plager
04/19/1988
06/14/1988
06/27/1988
07/12/1988
Source: Congress.gov nominations database.
Notes: This table does not include acting administrators.
As the table shows, President Biden’s first nomination for OIRA administrator, in September of the
second year of his Administration, was submitted later than has been typical for a new President. The four
other nominations in the table that were a President’s first OIRA administrator were nominated within a
few months of inauguration and confirmed soon thereafter. Former OIRA administrators and others have
suggested that this timing might negatively impact the President’s regulatory agenda.
Author Information
Maeve P. Carey
Kathleen E. Marchsteiner
Specialist in Government Organization and Management Senior Research Librarian
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff
to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of
Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of
information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.
CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United
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