Lebanon’s 2022 Parliamentary Elections
INSIGHTi
Lebanon’s 2022 Parliamentary Elections
May 12, 2022
Lebanon plans to hold parliamentary elections on May 15, the first since the emergence in 2019 of a
protest movement calling for the removal of the country’s ruling political elite. Parties allied with the
March 14 political coalition—which seeks close ties with the United States, France, and Saudi Arabia—
hope to win a majority in parliament. The 2018 elections resulted in a parliamentary—and therefore
cabinet—majority for the March 8 political coalition of Hezbollah and its allies, which seeks close ties
with Syria and Iran (see Figure 1). As of 2022, forces opposed to Hezbollah remain splintered, and some
analysts question whether the election can overturn the current March 8 majority. The relative strength of
Hezbollah and its allies in the next government may impact congressional consideration of additional aid
to Lebanon, as the country struggles with an economic crisis the World Bank described as possibly among
the top three “most severe crises episodes globally since the mid-nineteenth century.”
Lebanon’s Confessional System Shapes Elections
Lebanese politics operate through a confessional system, which divides posts among the country’s
various religious groups in proportions designed to reflect each group’s share of the population as of the
1932 census. This system is the organizing principle for the parliamentary elections: Lebanon’s electoral
law assigns each seat in the country’s 15 electoral districts to a specific religious sect (see Table 1). This
ensures that Muslims and Christians are equally represented among the 128 Members of Parliament
(MPs), as required by the Taif Accords that ended the country’s 1975-1990 civil war.
Elections are administered via a system of proportional representation. Candidates run as part of an
electoral list, which must receive a certain percentage of votes (known as the electoral threshold) for its
members to win seats. Voters may cast a “preferential vote” to select a single candidate within their
chosen list. Some analysts see this mechanism as favoring established elites, making it difficult for less-
established candidates, including women, to win seats.
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Figure 1. Lebanon’s Political Coalitions
March 8 and March 14 seat distribution in Parliament as of 2021
Source: CRS calculations. Does not include the 10 MPs that have resigned or passed away since 2020.
Notes: March 8: Free Patriotic Movement, Hezbol ah, Amal, and smaller parties such as Marada and Tashnag. March 14:
Future Movement, Lebanese Forces, and Hiwar. Both coalitions also include MPs not formally affiliated with a specific
party, but aligned with a March 8 or March 14 political bloc in parliament. Kataeb MPs, formerly allied with March 14,
resigned from parliament fol owing the August 2020 Beirut port blast. Independent and Other: the Progressive Socialist
Party, Al Azm Movement, and MPs not formally aligned with either March 8 or March 14.
Table 1. Sectarian Allocations in Lebanon’s Parliament
per Lebanon’s 2017 electoral law
Muslims
Reserved Seats
Christians
Reserved Seats
Sunni
27
Maronite
34
Shi’a
27
Greek Orthodox
14
Druze
8
Greek Catholic
8
Alawi
2
Armenian Orthodox
5
Armenian Catholic
1
Protestant
1
Other
1
TOTAL
64
TOTAL
64
Source: Law No. 44 of 2017 (Annex 1), Constituencies and Seat Allocations for Parliamentary Elections.
Notes: Lebanon’s electoral law classifies Druze as Muslim, although Druze generally do not identify as such.
Hariri Boycott Splinters Sunni Groups; Creates Possible Opening for Hezbollah
In January 2022, Future Movement and March 14 leader Saad Hariri announced that he was suspending
his political career, and called on his party not to participate in the May elections—creating what analysts
describe as a political void in the Sunni community. (In 2018, nearly two-thirds of Sunnis elected to
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parliament were Future Movement members or part of its parliamentary bloc). Analysts attributed Hariri’s
decision in part to tensions with Saudi Arabia, which had criticized what Saudi leaders described as
Hezbollah’s dominance in the country. Some Future Movement members continued their electoral bid as
independents; others called on Sunnis to boycott the vote—raising concerns that a boycott could benefit
Hezbollah. Saudi re-engagement with Lebanon since early April, including the return of its ambassador
and outreach to Sunni candidates—may reflect such concerns.
A Sunni boycott would lower the electoral threshold in heavily Sunni districts, reducing the number of
votes that an electoral list would need in order to seat candidates. This could benefit “weaker” lists—
those comprised of newer parties (such as those affiliated with the October 2019 protest movement), or
those running outside of their traditional strongholds (such as Hezbollah or its allies in mixed or mostly
Sunni districts). Lebanon’s electoral law reserves 27 seats for Sunnis, irrespective of Sunni voter turnout
(see Table 1). In the case of low Sunni turnout, March 8 supporters could play a decisive role in
determining which Sunni candidates will enter parliament.
Hezbollah’s ability to capitalize on divisions within the Sunni community remains unclear. In addition to
concerns about renewed Saudi outreach to Sunni political leaders, Hezbollah also reportedly fears that
expected electoral losses among its Christian ally, the Free Patriotic Movement, could reduce its March 8
majority in parliament.
Opposition Groups Divided
The 2019 protest movement generated new civil society and opposition parties, but disunity among them
may constrain their ability to make electoral gains. With one exception, opposition figures in each district
are split among multiple electoral lists, reducing the likelihood that any single list will receive enough
votes to meet the electoral threshold. Divisions include internal power struggles and disagreements over
whether—for the purposes of meeting the electoral threshold—to join electoral lists with traditional
political elites that recently have rebranded as “opposition,” such as the Lebanese Forces and Kataeb
(formerly aligned with March 14).
Outlook and Issues for Congress
Lebanon’s parliamentary elections will shape the composition of Lebanese governments over the next
four years, as the cabinet traditionally reflects the balance of political forces in parliament. Lebanon’s
next government will need to implement wide-ranging reforms in order to receive urgently needed
economic assistance. In April, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced that it had reached a
“staff-level agreement” with Lebanon on a $3 billion economic package, but noted that the package
requires approval by the IMF management and Executive Board following Lebanon’s implementation of
a set of reforms, including the restructuring of the financial sector.
A further deterioration of economic conditions in Lebanon could generate requests for additional U.S.
funding. The United States has provided more than $5.5 billion in total foreign assistance to Lebanon
since 2006, including more than $2.5 billion in bilateral security assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces
(LAF). The Administration’s FY2023 request for Lebanon seeks $282 million in aid funding, including
$112.5 million in Economic Support Fund (ESF) and $150 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF).
Significant electoral gains by Hezbollah could challenge U.S. engagement with Lebanon. Hezbollah and
its allies need 65 seats to retain the simple majority that they have held in parliament since 2018; it seems
less likely that they would garner the two-thirds majority (86 out of 128 seats) needed to unilaterally push
through major initiatives. A renewed March 8 majority in parliament would leave the U.S. Administration
and Congress balancing the longstanding U.S. aim of isolating Hezbollah against the urgent economic and
humanitarian needs in Lebanon that risk undermining the country’s stability.
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Author Information
Carla E. Humud
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
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