Preparing Secrets for a Post-Quantum World—National Security Memorandum 10

INSIGHTi

Preparing Secrets for a Post-Quantum
World—National Security Memorandum 10
May 9, 2022
On May 4, 2022, President Biden signed National Security Memorandum 10 (NSM 10) on Promoting
United States Leadership in Quantum Computing While Mitigating Risks to Vulnerable Cryptographic
Systems. Along with an accompanying Executive Order (EO), the memorandum seeks to promote U.S.
leadership in quantum information science (QIS). NSM 10 also addresses potential threats that quantum
computers may pose to encrypted data and systems.
This Insight discusses the cybersecurity risks posed by quantum computing, details about the
memorandum, and potential issues for Congress.
Encryption
Encryption uses the art of cryptography to change information which can be read (plaintext) so that it
cannot be read (ciphertext). Cryptography is used to protect the confidentiality and integrity of sensitive
documents, data stores, and systems (e.g., critical infrastructure). Encryption is also used to secure
identities, create unique identifiers to authenticate data, and enable blockchain-based technologies.
Size and Security
Many federal and commercial information technology (IT) systems use the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES). AES keys are in lengths of 128, 192, and 258 bits (i.e., size). One may also express a
128-bit key as 2128 bits. If an attacker wanted to access data encrypted by an AES-128 key, they would
need to guess each possible combination of the key. They would, on average, discover the key after
running through half the options (i.e., 2127 tries). Using a single, modern computer, this attack would take
longer than the age of the universe to complete. Attackers tune their algorithms to reduce the possibilities
of passwords, thereby greatly increasing their likelihood of success. Knowing the conditions of a
password (e.g., complexity requirements) would further reduce the available options to try. For example,
short or numerical passwords may only take days to discover.
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
IN11921
CRS INSIGHT
Prepared for Members and
Committees of Congress

---

link to page 2 Congressional Research Service
2
Risks from Quantum Computing
Today’s classical computers process operations by manipulating binary bits (1 or 0). Quantum computers
take advantage of superposition and entanglement of bits to significantly speed up operations, which
would reduce the time necessary to discover an encryption key. Current quantum computers are in a
nascent state of development and are not known to be capable of conducting enough sustained operations
to pose a threat to AES keys. But ongoing research could lead to quantum computers that are capable of
such operations. If that happens, cryptanalysts with access to quantum computers will be able to discover
keys exponentially faster—for instance, 264 tries for an AES-128 key. A mathematician has already
developed the algorithm to break today’s encryption with quantum computers.
Given this potential, cybersecurity experts are concerned about steal-now and decrypt-later attacks
whereby nation-state actors download encrypted data from the U.S. government and critical infrastructure
operators today with the hopes of using quantum computers to decrypt that data at some point in the
future. Additionally, systems that continue to use current encryption standards in a future with
cryptanalytically relevant quantum computers will immediately risk having their security compromised.
Anticipating this shift, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has initiated a project
on quantum-resilient cryptographic (QRC) standards.
NSM 10
NSM 10 requires the federal government to partner with the private sector on developing and adopting
QRC standards, and develop plans to transition to them. To assist non-federal entities, the Cybersecurity
and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is to work with sector risk management agencies (SRMAs)
and engage with state and local governments, as well as the private sector, to educate them on the risks to
encryption from quantum computing.
Table 1 lists NSM 10 requirements for federal agency QRC adoption.
Table 1. NSM Requirements for Federal Agency IT
Action
Agencies
Deadline
Create public-private working group to advance and adopt QRC.
NIST
8/2/22
Create a dedicated project to work with the private sector to transition to
NIST
8/2/22
QRC.
Set requirements to inventory cryptosystems used by agencies.
OMB
10/31/22
Report on systems that remain vulnerable to attacks on encrypted data
All agencies to
5/4/23 and annually
from quantum computers.
CISA and NCD
thereafter
Issue guidance for QRC and National Security Systems.
NSA
5/4/23
Report to OMB on the status of agency QRC transitions and
NCD
10/18/23 and annually
recommendations on funding needed to facilitate transition.
thereafter
Propose a timeline for the deprecation of quantum-vulnerable
NIST
Within 90 days of the
cryptographic standards.
release of QRC standards
(expected 2024)
Set requirements to develop plans to transition quantum-vulnerable
OMB
A year after NIST
systems to QRC.
publishes standards
Source: CRS analysis of NSM 10.
Notes: Office of Management and Budget (OMB). National Cyber Director (NCD). National Security Agency (NSA).

---

Congressional Research Service
3

The NSA is to manage similar QRC transition efforts for national security systems, with deadlines similar
to those for civilian systems.
Issues for Congress
As entities continue to develop QRC and transition to those standards, Congress may choose to
engage in those developments—as it has recently done with the United States innovation and
competition legislation, which includes funding and authorities for QIS workforce and QRC
development.
NSM 10 creates a new requirement for federal agencies. Adding QRC transitions to existing EO 14028
cybersecurity requirements (e.g., migration to zero trust architecture, or ZTA) reflects a significant shift in
how agencies design, build, and operate their networks. Ensuring adequate plans, contracts, and
deployment of future IT systems will require resources not currently budgeted. The President’s FY2023
Budget has requests for ZTA transition, but only includes references to a QIS-ready workforce, not QRC
transition planning.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has found that while the federal government makes efforts
to share cybersecurity risk information with the private sector, it has not assessed the effectiveness of its
efforts. Given the scope and scale of present-day encryption deployment, CISA would likely need to
develop new communication strategies in order to reach and educate entities nationwide on this risk.
As activity around international QRC standards development increases, agencies will likely need to
refocus staff and resources to support those efforts. NIST is requesting a $15 million increase to support
QIS efforts, and the Department of State is requesting a $1.9 million increase to support the new Special
Envoy for Emerging and Critical Technology.

Author Information

Chris Jaikaran

Specialist in Cybersecurity Policy




Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff
to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of
Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of
information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.
CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United
States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However,
as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the
permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

IN11921 · VERSION 1 · NEW

---