INSIGHTi
South Koreans Elect a New President
March 15, 2022
On March 9, 2022, South Koreans narrowly elected former chief prosecutor Yoon Suk-youl as their next
president. The victory by Yoon, who represents the conservative People Power Party (PPP), will change
party control of South Korea’
s Blue House, as the president’s office and residence compound is known.
His win also likely signals greater alignment with the United States on a number of issues followed
closely by many Members of Congress, including policy toward North Korea, China, Japan, and the Indo-
Pacific. In May, Yoon will replace current president Moon Jae-in, from the progressive Minjoo
(Democratic) Party. The constitution of South Korea (officially the Republic of Korea, or ROK) limits
presidents to one five-year term.
Key Features of the Election
The 2022 election was the closest in South Korea’s history. Yoon garnered 48.6% of the vote, about 0.7%
more than the Minjoo Party’s Lee Jae-myung, a former Gyeonggi province governor. Turnout was
a near-
record high of just over 77%, notwithstanding widespread voter sentiment that this election was a choice
between two
“unlikeable” candidates. Yoon’s lack of a clear mandate, combined with the Minjoo Party’s
control of the National Assembly, likely will challenge his administration. Exit polls indicated domestic
issues such as anemic job growth and soaring real estate price
s dominated voters’ choices. The election
revealed a stark
gender divide among younger voters, with around 60% of men in their 20s supporting
Yoon, who appealed t
o “anti-feminist” elements, and a comparable percentage of 20-something women
supporting Lee.
Yoon’s Background
A political newcomer, Yoon had a nearly three-decade career as a prosecutor who developed a reputation
for independence by investigating a number of high-profile South Korean executives and politicians. In
2016, he helped lead the investigation into
a corruption scandal that led to then-President Park Geun-
hye’s impeachment and removal from office. Moon later appointed Yoon as Prosecutor General of South
Korea, only to clash with him after Yo
on launched investigations into major figures in Moon’s
government. Yoon resigned in March 2021 and announced his candidacy for the Presidency in July 2021.
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Implications for U.S. Policy
Yoon’s statements over the course of the campaign and
a foreign policy document his transition team
issued after his victory indicate he endorses the expansive agenda for U.S.-ROK cooperation President
Moon and President Joseph Bided outlined in their May 2021 joint statement. In a number of areas,
however, Yoon’s statements also suggest he may pursue policies more in line with Washington’s than his
predecessor.
North Korea
During the campaign, Yoon criticized the Moon government for being insufficiently committed to North
Korea’s denuclearization and reacting in a
“subservient” manner to Pyongyang’s bellicose actions.
Instead, he said he would expand the ROK’s
defense and deterrence capabilities in conjunction with the
U.S. alliance, including offensive strike capabilities and enhanced missile defense. In past ROK-DPRK
military clashes, the United States often pressured South Korea to rein in its military response, which
could conflict with some of Yoon’s pledges. In remarks widely interpreted as a dismissal of Moon’s
efforts to preemptively offer a U.S.-ROK peace declaration to North Korea, the incoming president said
he will only pursue a
peace treaty “when and if North Korea makes active efforts in complete and
verifiable denuclearization.”
Y
oon proposed making economic aid to North Korea and inter-Korean economic cooperation conditional
upon North Korea’s progress in denuclearizing. He also argued that humanitarian aid to ordinary North
Koreans be provided unconditionally, and pledged to set up a permanent North-South-U.S. liaison office
in the truce village of Panmunjom inside the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating the two Koreas. Yoon
further vow
ed to normalize U.S.-ROK military exercises. Large-scale exercises have been curtailed since
2018, due to the COVID-19 pandemic and to former President Donald Trump and Moon’s cancelation of
drills t
o promote dialogue with North Korea.
China
In recent years, ROK officials generally have appeared reluctant to raise objections to Chinese behavior,
most likely due to China’s status as South Korea’s top trade partner and its perceived importance to ROK
diplomacy with North Korea. Yoon has criticized Moon’s
“strategic ambiguity” on U.S.-China
competition, saying it had created an impression that Seoul is tilting toward Beijing. He accused Moon of
being
“overly accommodating” to China in 2017, when Beijing imposed harsh penalties against ROK
companies in response to South Korea’s agreement to deploy a U.S. terminal high altitude area defense
(THAAD) unit in the ROK to protect against North Korean missiles. Following a series of North Korean
missile launches in 2022, Yoon pledged t
o deploy additional THAAD units, which would reverse one of
Moon’s promises to Beijing. Yoon’s more assertive stance toward China resonates with increasingly
negative attitudes towards China among South Koreans, particularly among those in their
20s and 30s.
Yoon has expressed eagerness t
o increase South Korea’s participation in elements of the Biden
Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. Following the election, Yoon’s transition team said he eventually
would seek
formal membership in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad) among the United
States, India, Japan, and Australia. In the meantime, he will have South Korea participate in the Quad’s
vaccine, climate change, and emerging technology working groups.
Japan
ROK-Japan relations are perennially fraught because of a territorial dispute and sensitive historical issues
from Japan’s colonization of the Korean Peninsula from 1910 to 1945. Since 2018, a series of actions and
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retaliatory countermeasures by both governments involving trade, security, and history-related
controversies have caused South Korea-Japan relations to plummet, eroding U.S.-ROK-Japan policy
coordination. ROK and Japanese leaders have not held a bilateral summit since 2019. Calling attention to
Japan’s
“strategic importance” to South Korea, Yoon has proposed resuming
shuttle summitry and
establishing high-level comprehensive talks about issues of cooperation and friction. He says Japanese
Prime Minister Kishida Yoshio will
be the second foreign leader he meets, after President Biden. Key
areas to watch are whether Yoon reverses Moon’s reluctance to participate in military exercises with the
United States and Japan, and whether Japan welcomes South Korea’s expected spring 2022 application to
join the 11-member Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).
Author Information
Mark E. Manyin
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Disclaimer
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