New U.S.-Mexico Security Strategy: Issues for Congressional Consideration
link to page 2 
INSIGHTi
New U.S.-Mexico Security Strategy: Issues for
Congressional Consideration
February 17, 2022
On January 31, 2022, the U.S. and Mexican governments published an action plan for implementing the
U.S.-Mexico Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Heath, and Safe Communities. Launched at the
October 2021 U.S.-Mexico High-Level Security Dialogue (HLSD), the framework is a replacement for
the Mérida Initiative, a long-standing security partnership featuring U.S. antidrug and rule-of-law
assistance to Mexico. Congress has appropriated more than $3.3 billion since FY2007 for the Mérida
Initiative, but there has been growing criticism within Congress of the inability of bilateral efforts to
reduce organized crime-related violence in Mexico and drug overdoses in the United States. The
Bicentennial Framework’s action plan has three broad pillars (see Figure 1) that Congress could
influence through legislation, appropriations, and oversight.
The Bicentennial Framework
Since taking office in 2018, Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has criticized the Mérida
Initiative and has reduced federal security cooperation with the United States, with the exception of
migration enforcement. Many observers praised the convening of the HLSD, the first since 2016, for
revitalizing bilateral security cooperation. Although some have criticized the Bicentennial Framework for
deemphasizing institutional reform in Mexico, others have acknowledged its prioritization of issues such
as arms trafficking and violence prevention. U.S. officials assert that the strategy’s pillars align with the
Biden Administration’s drug control priorities, including treating drug addiction through a public health
lens, preventing the diversion of precursor chemicals to illicit drug production, and combating illicit
financial networks.
Congressional Research Service
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IN11859
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Figure 1. From the Mérida Initiative to the Bicentennial Framework
Source: U.S. Department of State.
Issues for Congressional Consideration
Synthetic Opioids
A key oversight issue for Congress is the extent to which the Bicentennial Framework will address illicit
synthetic opioids concerns. In recent years, Mexican transnational criminal organizations (chiefly, Sinaloa
and the Jalisco New Generation Cartel, or CJNG) have established Mexico as the primary source and
transit point for illicit fentanyl into the United States. As U.S. synthetic opioid overdose deaths (including
fentanyl-related deaths) continue to mount, disrupting the illicit production and trafficking of U.S.-bound
synthetic opioids has emerged as a key U.S. priority in ensuring the framework’s success.
In its February 2022 final report, the Commission on Combating Synthetic Opioid Trafficking established
by Section 7221 of P.L. 116-92 encouraged international cooperation on reducing illicit synthetic opioids,
warning that the United States “cannot succeed alone.” It also emphasized that such cooperation has yet
to manifest in the U.S.-Mexico relationship, assessing that “overall cooperation with foreign law
enforcement officials in Mexico to eradicate the fentanyl threat has been insufficient to date.”
Some analysts question whether the U.S. and Mexican governments will prioritize this equally, given the
differing effects synthetic opioids are having in the two countries. Synthetic opioids are causing more
overdose deaths in the United States than in Mexico.
Rule of Law and the “Militarization” of Public Security
Congress has expressed ongoing concern about violence and human rights abuses perpetrated by criminal
groups and corrupt officials in Mexico. Since 2018, homicides in Mexico have exceeded 33,000 annually.
At least five journalists reportedly have been killed in 2022. Some 95,000 enforced disappearances have
been reported, most since 2006. Impunity for homicides stood at some 90% in 2019, higher for other
crimes. To deter such crimes and abuses, experts have urged Mexico to strengthen its criminal justice
system to increase the likelihood of prosecution.
Under the Mérida Initiative, the U.S. government provided more than $406 million to help train and equip
federal- and state-level justice operators (police, prosecutors, judges, and forensics personnel) to serve in
Mexico’s new accusatorial justice system, which took effect in 2016. While the nongovernmental
link to page 3
Congressional Research Service
3
organization World Justice Project praised the system’s potential for increasing transparency, efficiency,
and accountability, the López Obrador government has cut funding for its key law enforcement
institutions as part of austerity measures. It also dismantled the federal police and created a military-led
National Guard, a force with a controversial human rights record and no investigative authority.
The Bicentennial Framework mentions increasing institutional capacity to respond to homicides and
reduce impunity, but it is unclear how much U.S. training and technical assistance the government will
accept. Should Mexico continue to rely on its military to perform public security tasks and accept less
U.S. foreign assistance, Congress may lose some influence on rule-of-law reform in Mexico through
conditions on appropriations, vetting, and human rights training.
Anti-corruption and Law Enforcement Cooperation
Congressional attention may focus on the status of progress in combating corruption (a global strategic
priority for the Biden Administration) and strengthening bilateral law enforcement cooperation through
the framework. The action plan envisions a joint objective of building on past cooperation to investigate
and prosecute corrupt actors in the context of disrupting criminal financial networks, as well as increasing
cooperation in extradition matters (see Figure 2). However, bilateral law enforcement cooperation on all
criminal matters, especially those pertaining to corruption cases, remains a source of friction between the
countries. President López Obrador also has criticized civil society groups that have received U.S.
funding for reporting on corruption in his government.
Figure 2. Extraditions from Mexico to the United States
(1999-2021)
Source: U.S. Department of Justice.
In recent years, investigations in both the United States and Mexico have targeted high-level alleged
criminal kingpins and corrupt actors, including Genaro García Luna, a former Mexican Secretary of
Public Security, and Emilio Lozoya, the former chief executive of Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex).
However, the late 2020 U.S. law enforcement arrest of former Mexican Defense Secretary General
Salvador Cienfuegos on drug- and corruption-related charges led to an unraveling of law enforcement
cooperation. In the aftermath of Cienfuegos’s arrest (and subsequent release), the Mexican Congress
enacted legislation to limit U.S. law enforcement operations and U.S.-Mexican intelligence sharing and
the López Obrador government paused the issuance of visas for U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration
agents. Compounded by the pandemic, extraditions from Mexico to the United States hit a 15-year low in
Congressional Research Service
4
2021. These and other factors raise questions about the extent to which the Bicentennial Framework
might achieve the levels of cooperation seen during the Mérida Initiative.
Author Information
Clare Ribando Seelke
Liana W. Rosen
Acting Section Research Manager
Specialist in International Crime and Narcotics
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff
to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of
Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of
information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.
CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United
States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However,
as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the
permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
IN11859 · VERSION 1 · NEW
INSIGHTi
New U.S.-Mexico Security Strategy: Issues for
Congressional Consideration
February 17, 2022
On January 31, 2022, the U.S. and Mexican governments published an action plan for implementing the
U.S.-Mexico Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Heath, and Safe Communities. Launched at the
October 2021 U.S.-Mexico High-Level Security Dialogue (HLSD), the framework is a replacement for
the Mérida Initiative, a long-standing security partnership featuring U.S. antidrug and rule-of-law
assistance to Mexico. Congress has appropriated more than $3.3 billion since FY2007 for the Mérida
Initiative, but there has been growing criticism within Congress of the inability of bilateral efforts to
reduce organized crime-related violence in Mexico and drug overdoses in the United States. The
Bicentennial Framework’s action plan has three broad pillars (see Figure 1) that Congress could
influence through legislation, appropriations, and oversight.
The Bicentennial Framework
Since taking office in 2018, Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has criticized the Mérida
Initiative and has reduced federal security cooperation with the United States, with the exception of
migration enforcement. Many observers praised the convening of the HLSD, the first since 2016, for
revitalizing bilateral security cooperation. Although some have criticized the Bicentennial Framework for
deemphasizing institutional reform in Mexico, others have acknowledged its prioritization of issues such
as arms trafficking and violence prevention. U.S. officials assert that the strategy’s pillars align with the
Biden Administration’s drug control priorities, including treating drug addiction through a public health
lens, preventing the diversion of precursor chemicals to illicit drug production, and combating illicit
financial networks.
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
IN11859
CRS INSIGHT
Prepared for Members and
Committees of Congress
Congressional Research Service
2
Figure 1. From the Mérida Initiative to the Bicentennial Framework
Source: U.S. Department of State.
Issues for Congressional Consideration
Synthetic Opioids
A key oversight issue for Congress is the extent to which the Bicentennial Framework will address illicit
synthetic opioids concerns. In recent years, Mexican transnational criminal organizations (chiefly, Sinaloa
and the Jalisco New Generation Cartel, or CJNG) have established Mexico as the primary source and
transit point for illicit fentanyl into the United States. As U.S. synthetic opioid overdose deaths (including
fentanyl-related deaths) continue to mount, disrupting the illicit production and trafficking of U.S.-bound
synthetic opioids has emerged as a key U.S. priority in ensuring the framework’s success.
In its February 2022 final report, the Commission on Combating Synthetic Opioid Trafficking established
by Section 7221 of P.L. 116-92 encouraged international cooperation on reducing illicit synthetic opioids,
warning that the United States “cannot succeed alone.” It also emphasized that such cooperation has yet
to manifest in the U.S.-Mexico relationship, assessing that “overall cooperation with foreign law
enforcement officials in Mexico to eradicate the fentanyl threat has been insufficient to date.”
Some analysts question whether the U.S. and Mexican governments will prioritize this equally, given the
differing effects synthetic opioids are having in the two countries. Synthetic opioids are causing more
overdose deaths in the United States than in Mexico.
Rule of Law and the “Militarization” of Public Security
Congress has expressed ongoing concern about violence and human rights abuses perpetrated by criminal
groups and corrupt officials in Mexico. Since 2018, homicides in Mexico have exceeded 33,000 annually.
At least five journalists reportedly have been killed in 2022. Some 95,000 enforced disappearances have
been reported, most since 2006. Impunity for homicides stood at some 90% in 2019, higher for other
crimes. To deter such crimes and abuses, experts have urged Mexico to strengthen its criminal justice
system to increase the likelihood of prosecution.
Under the Mérida Initiative, the U.S. government provided more than $406 million to help train and equip
federal- and state-level justice operators (police, prosecutors, judges, and forensics personnel) to serve in
Mexico’s new accusatorial justice system, which took effect in 2016. While the nongovernmental
link to page 3
Congressional Research Service
3
organization World Justice Project praised the system’s potential for increasing transparency, efficiency,
and accountability, the López Obrador government has cut funding for its key law enforcement
institutions as part of austerity measures. It also dismantled the federal police and created a military-led
National Guard, a force with a controversial human rights record and no investigative authority.
The Bicentennial Framework mentions increasing institutional capacity to respond to homicides and
reduce impunity, but it is unclear how much U.S. training and technical assistance the government will
accept. Should Mexico continue to rely on its military to perform public security tasks and accept less
U.S. foreign assistance, Congress may lose some influence on rule-of-law reform in Mexico through
conditions on appropriations, vetting, and human rights training.
Anti-corruption and Law Enforcement Cooperation
Congressional attention may focus on the status of progress in combating corruption (a global strategic
priority for the Biden Administration) and strengthening bilateral law enforcement cooperation through
the framework. The action plan envisions a joint objective of building on past cooperation to investigate
and prosecute corrupt actors in the context of disrupting criminal financial networks, as well as increasing
cooperation in extradition matters (see Figure 2). However, bilateral law enforcement cooperation on all
criminal matters, especially those pertaining to corruption cases, remains a source of friction between the
countries. President López Obrador also has criticized civil society groups that have received U.S.
funding for reporting on corruption in his government.
Figure 2. Extraditions from Mexico to the United States
(1999-2021)
Source: U.S. Department of Justice.
In recent years, investigations in both the United States and Mexico have targeted high-level alleged
criminal kingpins and corrupt actors, including Genaro García Luna, a former Mexican Secretary of
Public Security, and Emilio Lozoya, the former chief executive of Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex).
However, the late 2020 U.S. law enforcement arrest of former Mexican Defense Secretary General
Salvador Cienfuegos on drug- and corruption-related charges led to an unraveling of law enforcement
cooperation. In the aftermath of Cienfuegos’s arrest (and subsequent release), the Mexican Congress
enacted legislation to limit U.S. law enforcement operations and U.S.-Mexican intelligence sharing and
the López Obrador government paused the issuance of visas for U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration
agents. Compounded by the pandemic, extraditions from Mexico to the United States hit a 15-year low in
Congressional Research Service
4
2021. These and other factors raise questions about the extent to which the Bicentennial Framework
might achieve the levels of cooperation seen during the Mérida Initiative.
Author Information
Clare Ribando Seelke
Liana W. Rosen
Acting Section Research Manager
Specialist in International Crime and Narcotics
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff
to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of
Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of
information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.
CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United
States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However,
as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the
permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
IN11859 · VERSION 1 · NEW