Election in The Gambia
INSIGHTi
Election in The Gambia
December 8, 2021
On December 4, 2021, voters in The Gambia (Gambia) reelected incumbent President Adama Barrow in
the country’s first presidential poll since 2016, when Gambia shocked observers by voting out longtime
autocrat Yahya Jammeh. Jammeh’s departure paved the way for widely lauded governance gains and a
marked improvement in U.S.-Gambia relations. Congress has expressed support for Gambia’s post-
Jammeh transition, including via legislation in the 117th Congress (S.Res. 456).
Some analysts considered the 2021 election a bel wether for Gambia’s democracy. The U.S. Embassy
assessed the polls as “free and fair,” notwithstanding “minor procedural irregularities, as wel as the need
for broader structural reforms to the electoral processes.” European Union observers described the process
as wel administered, while noting issues in the pre-election environment that contributed to an “unlevel
playing field” favoring Barrow. Some candidates have rejected the results and may chal enge them.
Looking ahead, Gambia faces chal enges related to institutionalizing reforms and managing transitional
justice. Prospects for U.S.-Gambia relations may partly depend on Barrow’s commitment to pursuing
accountability for abuses by ex-President Jammeh, a U.S. sanctions designee now living in exile.
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Figure 1. Gambia
Source: CRS. Boundaries from U.S. Department of State and GADM.
Background
In 2016, Gambians shocked observers by voting out President Jammeh, who had ruled the country since
taking power in a 1994 military coup. An erratic and authoritarian leader, Jammeh restricted civil liberties
and curtailed dissent; his regime brutal y targeted perceived opponents and sexual minorities.
With top opposition figures imprisoned ahead of the 2016 polls, the opposition coalesced behind Adama
Barrow, an officer in the United Democratic Party (UDP). Barrow’s victory surprised many who were not
expecting a fair process. A crisis over Jammeh’s refusal to step down was resolved in early 2017, when
regional military forces intervened under an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
mandate, to little resistance. Jammeh resigned and accepted exile in Equatorial Guinea. Many praised the
intervention by ECOWAS, which has arguably struggled to uphold democratic norms in other countries.
Governance conditions substantial y improved after Jammeh’s departure. Barrow released scores of
political prisoners, and private media burgeoned. The UDP and its al ies dominated National Assembly
elections in 2017, reinvigorating an institution that had previously served as a rubber stamp. In 2018,
Gambia recorded one of the largest-ever leaps in Freedom House’s annual “Freedom in the World” index.
By 2019, Barrow’s decision to renege on a promise to serve only three years split his political coalition.
Security forces used tear gas to disperse protests cal ing for his resignation, arresting dozens; authorities
shut down two radio stations in connection with the demonstrations. In 2020, the National Assembly
rejected a bil that would have enabled passage of a new constitution drafted with lengthy public input
and U.S. and other donor support. Pro-Barrow legislators al egedly objected to a provision that would
have counted Barrow’s first term toward a new two-term limit on the presidency. In 2021, Barrow
launched a new National People’s Party (NPP), drawing defections from the UDP and other parties.
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Outlook
Gambia’s political outlook may depend on several variables, including the extent to which President
Barrow moves to institutionalize governance reforms. Transitional justice is likely to be a prominent issue
during his second term. In 2018, Barrow launched a Truth, Reconciliation, and Reparations Commission
(TRRC) to uncover abuses by the Jammeh regime, grant reparations, and recommend cases for amnesty
or prosecution. TRRC hearings, which concluded in 2021, featured testimony that implicated Jammeh in
serious crimes, including murder and rape. The TRRC submitted its report to Barrow in November 2021;
it was not made public, but commentators speculate that Jammeh is among those it recommended for
prosecution. The government is to produce a white paper on the report by mid-2022. In its post-election
statement, the U.S. Embassy “urge[d] a reinvigoration in a second Barrow administration of the many
reform efforts promised in 2016 that remain unfinished [... including] constitutional and electoral reforms
as wel as accountability through implementation of the [TRRC’s] recommendations.”
Efforts to prosecute the former president could spark instability, including within the army, whose ranks
largely date from the Jammeh era. Moreover, President Barrow has signaled an intent to coopt, rather than
alienate, Jammeh’s base. In late 2021, Barrow and his NPP formed an al iance with Jammeh’s party, the
Al iance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction. Jammeh rejected the announcement from exile and
endorsed another presidential candidate, yet some observers speculated that the al iance could impede the
pursuit of justice for crimes by the Jammeh regime or herald Jammeh’s return to Gambia. Barrow may
weigh demands for justice against the expediency of reconciling with Jammeh and his former al ies.
U.S. Interests and Issues for Congress
Since Jammeh’s departure, U.S.-Gambia engagement has centered on encouraging Gambia’s democratic
transition. U.S. assistance has helped support the constitutional review process and other legal reforms,
build the capacity of the National Assembly, enhance fiscal transparency, educate voters, and strengthen
civil society. The International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute have worked to
strengthen governance. The Biden Administration requested $2.2 mil ion for Gambia for FY2022, mostly
for governance programs. Separately, in November 2021, the United States and Gambia agreed to a $25
mil ion Mil ennium Chal enge Corporation Threshold Program focused on the power sector.
In 2017, the Trump Administration imposed sanctions on ex-President Jammeh under Executive Order
13818 (“Global Magnitsky”), citing corruption and human rights abuses. In 2018, the State Department
imposed a visa ban on Jammeh under §7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs appropriations legislation. The Justice Department is seeking forfeiture of a U.S.
property belonging to Jammeh al egedly acquired with embezzled funds.
Looking ahead, Congress may consider governance trends in Gambia in the context of democratic retreat
in West Africa, a region that has recently witnessed a series of military seizures of power. The oversight of
U.S. anti-corruption assistance in Gambia, and of sanctions and asset recovery efforts targeting Jammeh,
also may be of interest as Congress considers the Biden Administration’s pledged efforts to expand anti-
corruption efforts global y.
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Author Information
Tomás F. Husted
Analyst in African Affairs
Disclaimer
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