Morocco-Israel Normalization and U.S. Policy Change on Western Sahara
INSIGHTi
Morocco-Israel Normalization and U.S. Policy
Change on Western Sahara
December 15, 2020
On December 10, President Trump announced that Morocco would normalize relations with Israel, and
that the United States was recognizing Moroccan sovereignty over the disputed territory of Western
Sahara. Morocco affirmed that normalization will include “official contacts with counterparts and
diplomatic relations as soon as possible,” direct flights, and economic and technical cooperation. How
quickly these commitments might advance remains to be seen.
Morocco’s willingness to normalize relations with Israel follows similar moves by the United Arab
Emirates and Bahrain in September 2020, and comes after Sudan in October announced tentative plans to
do so. Arab government decisions formally to normalize relations with Israel have generally come after
years of discreet coordination to counter common concerns such as Iran and Islamist populist movements
(including the Muslim Brotherhood). These developments raise questions about the future of cooperation
and rivalry among key actors in the Middle East, U.S. arms sales to the region, Saudi Arabia’s willingness
to follow suit, and Arab state support for Palestinian national demands.
U.S. recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara—a preeminent Moroccan goal for
decades—has implications for U.S. relations with Morocco and regional rival Algeria, and possibly for
regional stability and the future of the U.N. peacekeeping operation in the territory, MINURSO. Congress
may consider the implications of making such a significant shift in longstanding U.S. policy, including
whether other countries may cite it as setting a precedent for other disputed or “non-self-administering”
territories. Over the years, many Members of Congress have expressed support for Morocco’s position,
while others have called for an independence referendum and/or expressed concern about human rights
conditions in Moroccan-administered areas.
Normalization with Israel
Morocco’s relationship with Israel dates to the 1960s, and has reportedly included security and
intelligence cooperation. The two countries established diplomatic liaison offices in the 1990s, but
Morocco decided to close them in 2000 during the second Palestinian intifada (uprising). Tourism has
nonetheless continued, partly because many Israeli Jews are originally from Morocco.
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
IN11555
CRS INSIGHT
Prepared for Members and
Committees of Congress
Congressional Research Service
2
Negotiations linking normalization and U.S. Western Sahara policy reportedly began in 2017. As recently
as August 2020, Moroccan Prime Minister Saad Eddine el Othmani declared that normalization was a
“red line.” El Othmani heads a moderate Islamist party with a plurality of seats in parliament, while King
Mohammed VI is the arbiter of national decision-making. Morocco has historically sought to support the
Israeli-Palestinian peace process in concert with other Arab states, and King Mohammed VI called
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Mahmoud Abbas on December 10 to express his
continued support for a two-state solution. As some analysts have noted, achieving its goals on Western
Sahara may help mute internal opposition to Morocco’s decision on normalization; in addition, Morocco
may have assessed that domestic reactions would be relatively mild in light of Arab responses to earlier
normalization deals with Israel.
Western Sahara Shift
Morocco controls roughly 85% of Western Sahara, west of a berm constructed during the 1975-1991 war
against the independence-seeking Polisario Front (Figure 1). The Polisario views areas east of the berm
as its “liberated territories.” The U.N. brokered a ceasefire in 1991 but did not achieve a peace settlement.
MINURSO was established to oversee a referendum on final status, but is currently tasked with observing
the ceasefire. For background, see CRS reports on Western Sahara and Morocco.
The United States did not previously recognize Morocco’s claim, despite warm relations. Previous
Administrations, and the Trump Administration prior to December 10, praised Morocco’s “autonomy”
proposal while calling on Morocco and the Polisario to negotiate a “mutually acceptable political
solution”—a goal the U.N. Security Council has endorsed since 2004 (most recently on October 30). The
United States also has not recognized the Polisario’s self-declared Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic
(SADR). The Polisario decried the President’s announcement.
How many other countries have recognized Moroccan sovereignty over the whole of the territory is
disputed. According to Morocco’s Foreign Ministry, eighteen countries have opened consulates in
Moroccan-administered areas, which may be viewed as recognition. Jordan and Bahrain recently pledged
to do the same. (President Trump committed to open a U.S. consulate in Moroccan-administered Dakhla.)
Dozens of countries maintain diplomatic relations with the SADR, which the African Union recognizes as
a member state.
Military tensions have recently escalated in the territory. In November, Morocco’s military cleared
Polisario protesters from blocking a road through the demilitarized buffer zone, and the Polisario declared
it would no longer respect the ceasefire and launched attacks on Moroccan positions. Algeria, which hosts
and backs the Polisario, criticized President Trump’s announcement as contrary to U.N. Security Council
resolutions and likely to “undermine” de-escalation efforts.
Congressional Research Service
3
Figure 1. U.N. Map of Western Sahara
Source: CRS graphic, adopted from U.N. Secretary-General reports to the U.N. Security Council.
Note: After President Trump’s announcement, the U.S. Embassy in Rabat unveiled a new U.S. government map that does
not demarcate the territory from Morocco.
Potential Issues for Congress
Oversight of U.S. Arms Sales and Investment Financing
News reports suggest that in tandem with the agreement on normalization and Western Sahara policy, the
Administration plans to sell MQ-9B drone aircraft to Morocco, and has pledged to facilitate some $3
billion in investments in Morocco via the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC).
Congress must be notified 30 days prior to such a military sale, and at least 15 days prior to a DFC
financial commitment over $10 million.
Congressional Research Service
4
Free Trade Agreement (FTA)
Neither the U.S.-Morocco FTA, nor implementing legislation enacted by Congress (P.L. 108-302),
explicitly refers to Western Sahara. However, P.L. 108-302 defines goods eligible for preferential
treatment under the agreement as those originating in the “territory of Morocco,” and H.Rept. 108-627
“notes that the FTA will cover trade with and investment in the territory of Morocco as recognized by the
United States, which does not currently include the Western Sahara.” Rules of origin are specific to
individual U.S. trade agreements.
Foreign Assistance
In an apparent sign of support for Morocco’s position, between 2013 and 2018, the House passed
appropriations legislation that would have compelled some bilateral aid funds provided for Morocco to be
implemented in Western Sahara. It has been the policy of successive Administrations not to do so, as this
could be interpreted as a tacit acknowledgement of Moroccan sovereignty. Final enacted aid
appropriations measures first substituted “should” for “shall” for FY2014 (P.L. 113-76, §7041[h]
of Division K), and later provided that funds appropriated for bilateral economic assistance worldwide,
without reference to Morocco, “shall be made available” for Western Sahara (P.L. 113-235, §7041[g]
of Division J). Subsequent enacted measures have contained substantially similar provisions, most
recently P.L. 116-94 (§7041[g] of Division G). The change in U.S. recognition policy arguably renders
this issue moot, and could open the way for increased development and/or security assistance
programming in support of Morocco’s objectives in the territory.
Author Information
Alexis Arieff
Brock R. Williams
Specialist in African Affairs
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
Jim Zanotti
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff
to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of
Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of
information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.
CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United
States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However,
as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the
permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
Congressional Research Service
5
IN11555 · VERSION 1 · NEW