Mexican Drug Trafficking and Cartel Operations amid COVID-19




INSIGHTi

Mexican Drug Trafficking and Cartel
Operations amid COVID-19

Updated October 14, 2021
Mexico is a primary producer and transit country for illicit drugs destined for the United States.
Policymakers, including many in Congress, have closely watched how the Coronavirus Disease 2019
(COVID-19) pandemic is affecting illicit drug flow patterns out of Mexico, including the flow of potent
opioids. Any changes could affect the extent to which Mexico-based transnational criminal organizations
(TCOs), popularly described as cartels, pose a law enforcement and national security threat to the United
States. Despite early supply chain disruptions, U.S.-bound illicit drug supplies appear to have returned to
pre-pandemic levels; illicit fentanyl flows in particular appear to be thriving.
Illicit Drug Flows
According to various press, think-tank, U.S. government, and United Nations reports, the pandemic’s
effect on Mexico-based drug production and trafficking has been mixed. Early COVID-19-related
lockdowns and slowdowns in container trade and port activity, particularly in China and India, appear to
have caused temporary shortages in precursor chemicals used to synthesize methamphetamine and
fentanyl, short-term product shortages, and price increases. Some reports indicated Mexican traffickers
stockpiled resources, including cash, uncertain of how COVID-19 would affect law enforcement attention
on the illicit drug trade. Several high-profile seizures in 2020 suggested potential trafficker
miscalculations, as cartels adapted to the COVID-19 operating environment. Such seizures, however, also
indicated that illicit drugs and money continued to flow along U.S.-Mexico trafficking corridors.
Additionally, although Mexico registered declines in opium poppy cultivation and potential heroin
production in 2020 for the third consecutive year, a 2020 study showed that Mexican heroin production
was largely unaffected by the pandemic. Some analysts warned that pandemic conditions may motivate
Mexico-based drug producers to find alternative precursor sources and further develop domestic
production capabilities. In March 2021, the State Department reported that “there is some law
enforcement evidence that Mexican drug cartels are consolidating their involvement in fentanyl
production and trafficking, using alternative production methods involving ‘pre-precursor’ chemicals.”
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Cartel Operations
The pandemic does not appear to have diminished the extensive criminal and political power of Mexico’s
criminal organizations. An October 2020 U.S. Department of Homeland Security report named Mexican
cartels a key threat to the U.S. homeland because of the cartels’ ability to control territory and trafficking
routes along the U.S. southwest border and to co-opt officials at various levels of government. Mexico’s
cartels control the movement of most foreign illicit drugs trafficked into the United States, including
heroin, fentanyl, cocaine, methamphetamine, and marijuana. According to a U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration report published in early 2021, the Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco New Generation Cartel
(CJNG) have shown “signs of expansion in Mexico” and have increased their production and pill
pressing.
Neither the risk of infection nor government-mandated mobility restrictions during the pandemic appear
to have significantly deterred cartel activity. Since the pandemic’s onset, the range of criminality by
smaller cartels has broadened. Current conditions seem to have intensified inter-cartel competition,
favoring larger Mexican cartels’ territorial ambitions to dominate certain transportation corridors. As a
result, crimes of assault and homicide have remained elevated during Mexico’s pandemic response, even
as crimes of opportunity, such as robbery, appear to have declined.
Mexico’s homicide rate remains “stuck” at historically high levels, with roughly 27 murders per 100,000
and more than 34,000 killings in 2020; with the highest number of homicides recorded in the central state
of Guanajuato and the border state of Baja California. Rival groups have jockeyed for drug routes,
extortion rackets, and control of other illicit markets. Organized crime-related violence also has
encroached into the Mexican capital; there was a sharp increase in murders of public office holders and
candidates for Mexico’s midterm elections held in June 2021. Although Mexican President Andrés López
Obrador retains high approval levels (above 60% in mid-2021), his handling of the Mexican crime groups
and his failure to reduce violence are frequently criticized.
Angling for the Pandemic Advantage
Early in the pandemic, cartels exploited the pandemic for profit and territorial gain. Press interviews with
cartel-aligned traffickers described directives to increase drug prices. Some observers speculated that
cartels used the pandemic as pretext to collude and set prices. Mexican crime groups reportedly
distributed aid packages to the local populace, branded with cartel insignia, and enforced COVID-19-
related lockdown measures. Such activities, amplified on social media, seemingly were intended to win
community support for cartels’ criminal enterprises and attract recruits. The aid packages reinforced the
perception of a weak Mexican government, unable to exert territorial control, amid an estimated
economic contraction of more than 8% in 2020. Some observers also posit the pandemic has motivated
cartels to diversify and expand their use of submersible craft, drones, ultralights, tunnels, and
cryptocurrencies. Weaponized drones have been used against police in the Mexican states of Jalisco,
Guanajuato, and Michoacán, an emerging security issue being investigated by the Mexican military.
U.S. Policy Outlook
As Congress considers the pandemic’s effect on Mexican drug flows and cartel activity, the future of
U.S.-Mexico collaboration and resourcing of counternarcotics priorities remains to be seen. A key
question is how the Biden Administration and the López Obrador government may modify the Mérida
Initiative, a
joint security and governance partnership supported by U.S. foreign aid to Mexico, to better
target transnational crime. Observers also are watching broader U.S.-Mexico anti-drug cooperation,
which was severely buffeted in late 2020 by the surprise U.S. arrest (and subsequent release) of former
Mexican Secretary of Defense Salvador Cienfuegos on drug and money-laundering charges and by the


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Mexican Congress’s imposition of restrictions on U.S.-Mexico law enforcement cooperation. The fifth
North American Drug Dialogue, originally scheduled for late 2020 in Mexico, has not been rescheduled.
Meanwhile, a March 2021 State Department report assessed that, despite some progress, “the volume of
dangerous drugs from Mexico and violent crime within Mexico … remain alarmingly and unacceptably
high.” In the 117th Congress, the Security First Act (H.R. 812) would, among its provisions, require the
U.S. Secretary of State to report to certain congressional committees on whether six Mexican cartels meet
the criteria for designation as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs).


Author Information

June S. Beittel
Liana W. Rosen
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
Specialist in International Crime and Narcotics





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