INSIGHTi
Kyrgyz Republic Set to Hold Snap
Presidential Election and Constitutional
Referendum after Parliamentary Elections
Annulled
Updated December 14, 2020
The
Kyrgyz Republic (commonly known as Kyrgyzstan) faces political upheaval following the annulment
of disputed parliamentary elections that heavily favored pro-government parties. Opposition parties
alleged widespre
ad irregularities in the October 4, 2020, vote, including vote-buying and voter
intimidation; these assertions were deem
ed credible by international election observers. While no date has
been set for new parliamentary elections, a snap presidential election and a controversial constitutional
referendum, both scheduled for January 10, 2021, are raising
concerns among some
observers about
democracy and rule of law in the country.
As a parliamentary republic that holds contested elections, Kyrgyzstan has long been considered the most
democratic country in Central Asia, with a vibrant
civil society and a higher degree of
press freedom than
found elsewhere in the region. Promoting a more inclusive and accountable democracy is a stat
ed goal of
U.S. foreign policy in Kyrgyzstan, and Kyrgyzstan is one of 21 countries worldwide that participate in the
House Democracy Partnership. Many Members of Congress and other U.S. policymakers have long
voiced support for consolidating Kyrgyzstan’s gains as Central Asia’s only parliamentary democracy.
Corruption is pervasive, however, and political institutions remain weak. In light of recent developments,
U.S. officials hav
e expressed concerns about t
he influence of organized crime in Kyrgyz politics.
Under the laws in force at the time of the October 4 vote, a party had to receive at least 7% of the overall
vote to secure seats in parliament—one of the highest electoral thresholds in the world. Because the
country’s two largest parliamentary groupings ha
d fractured in recent years, there were no clear front-
runners in the October elections. Of th
e 16 parties that fielded candidates, 5 are new and 3 currently hold
parliamentary seats. Nevertheless, the candidates included many veteran politicians reshuffled into new
groupings. Although Kyrgyzstan enjoys a greater degree of political pluralism than its Central Asian
neighbors, in t
he assessment of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, “political
parties are built around personalities, rather than around platforms, and tend to rely on funding from
businesses, thus often reflecting private interests.” According to preliminary results issued by th
e Central
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Election Commission (CEC) on October 4, four parties cleared the 7% electoral threshold, accounting for
about 65% of all votes cast (se
e Figure 1). Birimdik (24.9%) had close ties to then-President Sooronbai
Jeenbekov, while Mekenim Kyrgyzstan (24.3%) was reportedly financed by Raimbek Matraimov, a
former customs official
implicated in a large-scale corruption and money-laundering scheme.
Figure 1. Preliminary Results as of October 4
Source: Graphic created by CRS. Data from Kloop.kg.
Mass protests broke out in the capital, Bishkek, on October 5. Hundreds, including multiple parliamentary
candidates, wer
e injured i
n clashes with police; one protestor was killed. On October 6, the CEC
announced that the October 4 results had been annulled, resulting in
a power vacuum as t
he prime
minister, t
he parliamentary speaker, and other officials announced their
resignations. In the early hours of
October 6, protestors freed several prominent jailed politicians, including
Sadyr Japarov, a former
Member of Parliament known for his nationalist views who had been serving an 11.5-year sentence for
kidnapping. Although most were returned to prison, Japarov, w
ho maintains that the charges against him
were politically motivated, quickly emerged as a
leading contender for the post of interim prime minister.
President Jeenbekov
announced his resignation on October 15, one day after Japarov was
ultimately
confirmed as prime minister. Although by law the presidency should have passed to the new
parliamentary speaker, he declined the office, leaving
Japarov as both prime minister and acting president.
Kyrgyzstan’s CEC initially set
December 20 as the date for new parliamentary elections, with a
presidential election set to follow i
n January, but Japarov called for the parliamentary vote to be delayed.
On October 22, parliament voted to extend its current mandate into 2021 and to lower the electoral
threshold to 3%. Because Kyrgyzstan’s constitution bars the acting president from participating in a
presidential election, Japarov resigned on November 16. He is considered the front-runner in a field of 18
candidates.
After Kyrgyzstan experienced revolutions i
n 2005 and i
n 2010 that ousted authoritarian-leaning
presidents, a new constitution adopted in 2010 converted the country to a semi-parliamentary system in
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3
which the prime minister shares executive power with the president, who is limited to one six-year term.
After taking power, Japarov and his allies began to push for a constitutional referendum in order to return
the country to a presidential form of government. Initially, lawmakers moved to present voters with a new
draft constitution, dubbed by
critics a
“khanstitution” because it would significantly expand presidential
power. Ultimately, parliament
approved a referendum on whether the country should have a parliamentary
or presidential system, to be held on the same day as the presidential election.
Amid these political changes, broader discontent within Kyrgyzstan remains largely unaddressed. The
ongoing Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has strained the country’s under-resourced
healthcare system and exerted a
significant negative impact on Kyrgyzstan’s economy, which depends
heavily on remittances from Russia. An August
poll conducted by the International Republican Institute
showed widespread dissatisfaction among the Kyrgyz public, with 53% of respondents stating that the
country was heading in the wrong direction; unemployment, COVID, and corruption were named as the
three top problems facing Kyrgyzstan.
As he moved to consolidate power, Japar
ov announced his intention t
o combat crime and corruption.
Nevertheless, some analysts
speculate that he ha
s backing from organized crime leaders and that the
October 22-24 arrests of
Matraimov and Kamchybek Kolbayev, who i
s designated by the U.S. Treasury
Department as a key member of a transnational criminal organization, were
for show. On December 9,
Treasury
added Matraimov to the Specially Designated Nationals List under Executive Order 13818,
which implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Title XII, Subtitle F of
P.L.
114-328), due to his involvement in corruption. The State Department additionally
announced visa
sanctions against Matraimov and his spouse on December 10. Kyrgyz authorities have sinc
e expressed
willingness to cooperate with the United States on combatting corruption.
Author Information
Maria A. Blackwood
Analyst in Asian Policy
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