Conflict at the China-India Frontier
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INSIGHTi
Conflict at the China-India Frontier
June 17, 2020
Recent Developments at the China-India Frontier
Deadly conflict broke out on June 15 on the China-India border following weeks of minor military
confrontations along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) that separates the People’s Republic of China
(PRC or China) and the Indian regions of Ladakh and Sikkim. The lethal conflict occurred in the Galwan
Valley—one of the sites of tension in recent weeks—as the two sides were in the process of negotiating a
mutual “disengagement” of forces (see Figure 1). PRC and Indian sources offered conflicting accounts of
events, but officials on both sides confirmed casualties, including at least 20 Indian military personnel.
The last time the border conflict escalated to the point of casualties was in 1975.
The events leading up to the lethal clashes included fistfights between Chinese and Indian soldiers
stationed near Pangong Lake in India’s Ladakh state, territorial advances by Chinese forces in Hot
Springs and the Galwan Valley (also in Ladakh), and clashes between Chinese and Indian soldiers on the
border near India’s Sikkim state. Authoritative information is limited, but various accounts claim PRC
troops made territorial gains of 40-60 square kilometers. On May 27, President Trump tweeted that “the
United States is ready, willing and able to mediate or arbitrate [China and India’s] now raging border
dispute.”
Tensions had seemed to abate in early June as military officers and diplomats from both sides held talks to
try to manage the situation. According to India’s Army Chief, these talks led to an agreement to
“disengage[e] in a phased manner.” Following the June 15 clash, both sides pledged to continue to seek to
resolve the situation through dialogue and consultation; the status of these efforts is unclear.
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
IN11425
CRS INSIGHT
Prepared for Members and
Committees of Congress
Congressional Research Service
2
Figure 1.Western Sector of the China-India Frontier
Source: Adapted by CRS.
China-India Rivalry: Background
China-India relations have been fraught for decades, with signs of increasing acrimony in recent years. A
brief but bloody 1962 India-China War left in place one of the world’s longest disputed international
borders. At more than 2,500 miles, this border, known as the LAC, is poorly demarcated in places. China
has long been a major benefactor to India’s rival, Pakistan, and China’s increasing presence in the Indian
Ocean region could further constrain India’s regional influence. The China Pakistan Economic Corridor
(CPEC)—itself a major facet of China’s broader Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—entails tens of billions
of dollars’ worth of Chinese financing of Pakistan’s energy and transportation infrastructure. India objects
to CPEC in part because some projects run across territory claimed by India. Combined with ongoing
Chinese outreach to other South Asian littoral states, CPEC and BRI have New Delhi watchful for further
signs that Beijing seeks to “contain” India. Beijing also takes issue with the presence of the Dalai Lama,
the “Central Tibetan Administration,” and the “Tibetan Parliament in Exile” on Indian soil.
Despite these sources of bilateral friction, China has emerged among India’s largest trade partners in
recent years. In 2018, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping met in
Wuhan, China, for an “informal summit” and signaled their intention to pursue more amicable bilateral
relations, but the ensuing “Wuhan spirit” has since frayed.
The China-India Border Dispute
The China-India frontier is comprised of two major “sectors”: the western sector includes the vast but
mostly uninhabited Himalayan territory of Aksai Chin (part of the larger Kashmir dispute that also
Congressional Research Service
3
includes Pakistan); the eastern sector runs along the British-proposed McMahon Line that separated Tibet
and northeastern India in 1914. In a smaller middle sector, the Indian state of Sikkim abuts China between
Nepal and Bhutan. India and China both claim the entirety of Aksai Chin, and Beijing formally claims all
of India’s Arunachal Pradesh state, calling it “South Tibet.” (U.S. policy has long recognized the
McMahon Line and Arunachal Pradesh’s status as an Indian state.) In the 1990s, India and China signed
agreements to maintain peace and tranquility along the frontier (1993) while pursuing confidence-
building measures (1996), yet 22 rounds of subsequent Special Representative-level talks failed to settle
outstanding territorial claims. Prior to the latest clash, the last major confrontation was in 2017, when
military conflict nearly erupted over Chinese infrastructure projects near Doklam, Bhutan—projects that
New Delhi considers a security threat. A mutual troop withdrawal agreement ended the 73-day standoff,
but did not resolve larger tensions.
A Broader Pattern of PRC Territorial Assertiveness?
Prior to the events of June 15, PRC statements on recent developments had been restrained and offered
few clues as to the intentions behind Chinese troops’ recent movements. Some observers view PRC
activities along the LAC in May as part of a broader pattern of PRC territorial assertiveness, while others
suggest that at least some of the flare-ups were spontaneous, as the vast majority of border skirmishes
typically have been. Others posit that China’s latest moves may have been part of a response to previous
perceived Indian transgressions, namely, India’s 2019 decision to alter Ladakh’s administrative status. (In
October 2019, New Delhi redesignated Ladakh as a “Union Territory” after revoking the autonomy of
Jammu and Kashmir state. A PRC official said at the time that the move “undermine[d] China’s territorial
sovereignty.”) Still others suggest China had been responding to India’s construction of roads and other
infrastructure along its side of the LAC in Ladakh.
During earlier stages of the confrontation, some U.S. officials and Members of Congress
expressed concerns about China’s actions. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo referred to China’s
actions along the border as a “threat”; then-lead U.S. diplomat for South and Central Asia
Ambassador Alice Wells called them “provocations and disturbing behavior by China that [raise]
questions about how China seeks to use its growing power.” In early June, House Foreign Affairs
Committee Chairman Representative Eliot Engel expressed being “extremely concerned by the
ongoing Chinese aggression” along the LAC.
Author Information
Caitlin Campbell
K. Alan Kronstadt
Analyst in Asian Affairs
Specialist in South Asian Affairs
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff
to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of
Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of
information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.
Congressional Research Service
4
CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United
States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However,
as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the
permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
IN11425 · VERSION 1 · NEW
INSIGHTi
Conflict at the China-India Frontier
June 17, 2020
Recent Developments at the China-India Frontier
Deadly conflict broke out on June 15 on the China-India border following weeks of minor military
confrontations along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) that separates the People’s Republic of China
(PRC or China) and the Indian regions of Ladakh and Sikkim. The lethal conflict occurred in the Galwan
Valley—one of the sites of tension in recent weeks—as the two sides were in the process of negotiating a
mutual “disengagement” of forces (see Figure 1). PRC and Indian sources offered conflicting accounts of
events, but officials on both sides confirmed casualties, including at least 20 Indian military personnel.
The last time the border conflict escalated to the point of casualties was in 1975.
The events leading up to the lethal clashes included fistfights between Chinese and Indian soldiers
stationed near Pangong Lake in India’s Ladakh state, territorial advances by Chinese forces in Hot
Springs and the Galwan Valley (also in Ladakh), and clashes between Chinese and Indian soldiers on the
border near India’s Sikkim state. Authoritative information is limited, but various accounts claim PRC
troops made territorial gains of 40-60 square kilometers. On May 27, President Trump tweeted that “the
United States is ready, willing and able to mediate or arbitrate [China and India’s] now raging border
dispute.”
Tensions had seemed to abate in early June as military officers and diplomats from both sides held talks to
try to manage the situation. According to India’s Army Chief, these talks led to an agreement to
“disengage[e] in a phased manner.” Following the June 15 clash, both sides pledged to continue to seek to
resolve the situation through dialogue and consultation; the status of these efforts is unclear.
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
IN11425
CRS INSIGHT
Prepared for Members and
Committees of Congress
Congressional Research Service
2
Figure 1.Western Sector of the China-India Frontier
Source: Adapted by CRS.
China-India Rivalry: Background
China-India relations have been fraught for decades, with signs of increasing acrimony in recent years. A
brief but bloody 1962 India-China War left in place one of the world’s longest disputed international
borders. At more than 2,500 miles, this border, known as the LAC, is poorly demarcated in places. China
has long been a major benefactor to India’s rival, Pakistan, and China’s increasing presence in the Indian
Ocean region could further constrain India’s regional influence. The China Pakistan Economic Corridor
(CPEC)—itself a major facet of China’s broader Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—entails tens of billions
of dollars’ worth of Chinese financing of Pakistan’s energy and transportation infrastructure. India objects
to CPEC in part because some projects run across territory claimed by India. Combined with ongoing
Chinese outreach to other South Asian littoral states, CPEC and BRI have New Delhi watchful for further
signs that Beijing seeks to “contain” India. Beijing also takes issue with the presence of the Dalai Lama,
the “Central Tibetan Administration,” and the “Tibetan Parliament in Exile” on Indian soil.
Despite these sources of bilateral friction, China has emerged among India’s largest trade partners in
recent years. In 2018, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping met in
Wuhan, China, for an “informal summit” and signaled their intention to pursue more amicable bilateral
relations, but the ensuing “Wuhan spirit” has since frayed.
The China-India Border Dispute
The China-India frontier is comprised of two major “sectors”: the western sector includes the vast but
mostly uninhabited Himalayan territory of Aksai Chin (part of the larger Kashmir dispute that also
Congressional Research Service
3
includes Pakistan); the eastern sector runs along the British-proposed McMahon Line that separated Tibet
and northeastern India in 1914. In a smaller middle sector, the Indian state of Sikkim abuts China between
Nepal and Bhutan. India and China both claim the entirety of Aksai Chin, and Beijing formally claims all
of India’s Arunachal Pradesh state, calling it “South Tibet.” (U.S. policy has long recognized the
McMahon Line and Arunachal Pradesh’s status as an Indian state.) In the 1990s, India and China signed
agreements to maintain peace and tranquility along the frontier (1993) while pursuing confidence-
building measures (1996), yet 22 rounds of subsequent Special Representative-level talks failed to settle
outstanding territorial claims. Prior to the latest clash, the last major confrontation was in 2017, when
military conflict nearly erupted over Chinese infrastructure projects near Doklam, Bhutan—projects that
New Delhi considers a security threat. A mutual troop withdrawal agreement ended the 73-day standoff,
but did not resolve larger tensions.
A Broader Pattern of PRC Territorial Assertiveness?
Prior to the events of June 15, PRC statements on recent developments had been restrained and offered
few clues as to the intentions behind Chinese troops’ recent movements. Some observers view PRC
activities along the LAC in May as part of a broader pattern of PRC territorial assertiveness, while others
suggest that at least some of the flare-ups were spontaneous, as the vast majority of border skirmishes
typically have been. Others posit that China’s latest moves may have been part of a response to previous
perceived Indian transgressions, namely, India’s 2019 decision to alter Ladakh’s administrative status. (In
October 2019, New Delhi redesignated Ladakh as a “Union Territory” after revoking the autonomy of
Jammu and Kashmir state. A PRC official said at the time that the move “undermine[d] China’s territorial
sovereignty.”) Still others suggest China had been responding to India’s construction of roads and other
infrastructure along its side of the LAC in Ladakh.
During earlier stages of the confrontation, some U.S. officials and Members of Congress
expressed concerns about China’s actions. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo referred to China’s
actions along the border as a “threat”; then-lead U.S. diplomat for South and Central Asia
Ambassador Alice Wells called them “provocations and disturbing behavior by China that [raise]
questions about how China seeks to use its growing power.” In early June, House Foreign Affairs
Committee Chairman Representative Eliot Engel expressed being “extremely concerned by the
ongoing Chinese aggression” along the LAC.
Author Information
Caitlin Campbell
K. Alan Kronstadt
Analyst in Asian Affairs
Specialist in South Asian Affairs
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff
to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of
Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of
information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.
Congressional Research Service
4
CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United
States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However,
as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the
permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
IN11425 · VERSION 1 · NEW