CRS Insights
Responding to Libya's Political and Security Crises: Policy Choices for the United States
Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs (
cblanchard@crs.loc.gov, 7-0428)
July 28, 2014 (IN10118)
Deepening conflict and political tension in Libya are threatening civilians and may drag the country off
the path of transition and toward civil war. (Read the CRS background report
here.) Intense clashes
near Tripoli between militias have closed the capital's international airport and further strained relations
among political factions. On July 26, the State Department
suspended operations at the U.S. Embassy
(located near the Tripoli airport) and evacuated personnel
under U.S. military escort. Fighting also
continues around Benghazi between armed Islamist groups and forces allied with an anti-Islamist
former military commander, Khalifa Haftar.
The fragmentation of political and military power in Libya since the end of the 2011 anti-Qadhafi
conflict and the absence of capable state institutions compound the difficulty of restoring order. In late
July 2014, Libya's acting cabinet issued a vague call for international assistance, but some Libyan
legislators responded by rejecting the prospect of any foreign military intervention. On July 23, acting
Interim Prime Minister Abdullah al Thinni
clarified his government's call for international support and
pleaded with combatants to pull back "before our country reaches a point of no-return and becomes
involved in an unjustifiable, full-blown war."
Some observers have warned that fighting among militias and mutual suspicions among political
factions could derail the work of the
recently-elected Council of Representatives (COR) and delay that
legislative body's selection of a new cabinet. Meanwhile, Members of Congress and Administration
officials may consider new options for encouraging Libyans to end the fighting and agree to security
and political arrangements to bring the transition period to a close.
U.S. Assistance and Diplomacy
The United States and other leading members of the international community are debating options for
reversing Libya's deteriorating security conditions and reenergizing Libyan efforts to build national
consensus. Although U.S. Embassy personnel have been evacuated, the State Department reports that
its officials will remain engaged in conflict resolution and transition support efforts. U.S. officials
have
called on Libyans to "immediately cease hostilities and begin negotiations to resolve their grievances,"
and "to respect the will of the people, including the authority of the recently-elected COR, and to reject
the use of violence to affect political processes."
David Satterfield continues to serve as a U.S. envoy to
Libyan leaders and concerned international parties.
The 113th Congress has approved and funded Administration proposals to provide
limited security
assistance to Libya's nascent border security and counterterrorism forces. However, the implementation
and scope of some programs have been delayed or altered for security and administrative reasons. In
June 2014, U.S. officials
told Congress that they would seek the yet-to-be-formed new Libyan cabinet's
endorsement for a planned larger-scale military training program. The evacuation of U.S. personnel
from Libya may hamper the preparation and implementation of U.S. security assistance programs for
the immediate future. Conditioning the delivery of future U.S. assistance on ceasefire or dialogue
commitments might underscore U.S. priorities but also might fail to influence those Libyans opposed to
the acceptance of U.S. assistance. It might also undermine U.S. relationships with emerging leaders
who desire U.S. support.
Executive Order 13566 and the national emergency declared in 2011
regarding Libya
remain in force and, if adapted, may offer options for placing financial or other
sanctions on individuals disrupting peace and security.
An Internationally Supported Security and Transition Plan?
Some observers have called for internationally supported security or dialogue agreements for Libya and
have looked to Yemen's post-2011 transition arrangements as potential models to consider
adapting to
Libya's current crises. In Yemen, a regionally negotiated and internationally backed transition plan
helped break a cycle of conflict that prevailed in 2011 and 2012, when fighting among Yemeni military
units, attacks on protestors, and a series of assassinations risked igniting civil war between supporters
and opponents of then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh. The United Nations (U.N.) Secretary General
named a Special Adviser and envoy for Yemen, and the U.N. Security Council adopted resolutions
(Resolution
2014, Resolution
2051, and Resolution
2140) demanding an end to political violence;
calling on leaders to agree to and implement a Gulf Cooperation Council-sponsored transition plan; and
authorizing financial and travel sanctions on individuals found to be "obstructing or undermining" the
transition and committing violent acts or human rights abuses. U.S.
Executive Order 13611 also
threatens individuals who undermine peace and security in Yemen with U.S. financial sanctions. Some
observers considered Yemen's National Dialogue Conference a success, although it concluded without
resolving some major issues. Several transition steps remain incomplete amid ongoing—but lower-level
—violence.
It remains to be seen whether such a framework
could be applied to the current situation in Libya.
Yemen's transition plan has sought to transfer power between leaders while reforming some ministries
and powerful national security forces. In comparison, Libya suffers from a national-level leadership
vacuum, hollow national bureaucracies, and weak national security forces. Foreign engagement in
Yemen in part reflects the concerns of powerful third parties such as Saudi Arabia and the United
States about transnational terrorism. Libya's neighbors, particularly Algeria and Egypt, have expressed
increasing concern about threats emanating from Libya, but have not formally offered to lead
mediation among Libyan factions alongside other countries' envoys. Libya's state oil wealth and the
funds available to militias also may limit outsiders' leverage.
U.N. Security Council Resolutions
1970 and 1973 defined the international response to Libya's 2011
conflict, but the Security Council has rescinded the public asset freeze, no-fly zone, and civilian
protection mandate provisions of those resolutions. Some of Resolution 1970's sanctions and arms
embargo provisions
remain operative, along with
International Criminal Court jurisdiction for certain
crimes. Resolution
2144 strengthened and expanded the mandate of the U.N. Support Mission in Libya
(UNSMIL, established by Resolution
2009), and
Tarek Mitri serves as the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General and Head of UNSMIL. Like their U.S. counterparts, U.N. personnel were recently
evacuated. It is conceivable that Security Council members could consider sanctions or embargo
provisions to support their
demands for an end to violence. However, a new U.N. mandate for military
intervention or peace enforcement in Libya does not appear to be forthcoming.