Department of Energy’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (OICI)
June 7, 2024
Department of Energy’s Office of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence (OICI)
Background
DOE’s foreign intelligence and counterintelligence
The Department of Energy’s Office of Intelligence and
activities, complementing both DOE internal and
Counterintelligence (OICI) can trace its origins to the
congressional oversight.
Second World War, when the U.S. government sought to
collect intelligence on German efforts to develop a nuclear
Presidential Decision Directive-61
weapon while safeguarding the secrecy of its own
In February 1998, President Clinton, concerned that China
Manhattan Project. OICI’s antecedents had both foreign
had penetrated U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories, and
intelligence collection and counterintelligence
acting on recommendations of the National
responsibilities, which OICI retains.
Counterintelligence Policy Board (NACIPB), issued
Presidential Decision Directive-61 (PDD-61). Among other
In 1946, Congress, in P.L. 79-585, established the Atomic
things, PDD-61 reorganized the foreign intelligence and
Energy Commission (AEC), the forerunner of the
counterintelligence component of DOE into two separate
Department of Energy (DOE). The AEC, in turn,
offices—the Office of Counterintelligence and the Office of
established the Office of Security and Intelligence for
Intelligence—which would each report directly to the
liaison with the congressional Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy Secretary. PDD-61 also mandated the Office of
Energy, and elements of the intelligence community,
Counterintelligence be headed by a senior FBI official,
including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and
who, in addition to the Energy Secretary, would have direct
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The office was also
access to the DCI and the Director of the FBI.
responsible for providing physical security as well as the
establishment of security standards, policies, and
National Defense Authorization Act for
procedures.
Fiscal Year 2000
Congress codified PDD-61 reforms in the National Defense
In 1974, Congress enacted the Energy Reorganization Act
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2000 (P.L. 106-
(P.L. 93-438). The Act dissolved the AEC, splitting its
65), including provisions that required DOE to maintain an
functions between two new entities, the Nuclear Regulatory
Office of Counterintelligence—under the directorship of a
Commission (NRC, responsible for regulating the nuclear
senior official detailed from the FBI—as well as a separate
power industry), and the Energy Research and
Office of Intelligence.
Development Administration (ERDA, responsible for
managing U.S. nuclear research and development, nuclear
The legislation further established within the department
weapons, and nuclear reactors). The ERDA inherited the
the semi-autonomous National Nuclear Security
AEC’s foreign intelligence and counterintelligence
Administration (NNSA), headed by an Administrator and
responsibilities under an Assistant Administrator for
responsible for U.S. military nuclear programs, including
National Security.
nuclear weapons and reactor safety, reliability, security, and
research and development. Other provisions in the NDAA
Intelligence and Counterintelligence
for FY2000 created a second, parallel, counterintelligence
within the New Department of Energy
structure within NNSA. This office, called the Office of
In 1977, Congress enacted the Department of Energy
Defense Nuclear Counterintelligence, was responsible for
Organization Act (P.L. 95-91), which established the DOE
implementing, at NNSA facilities, policy developed by the
by bringing together 40 existing government organizations
DOE Office of Counterintelligence. Arguably, these
into a single department that would oversee and support
changes created more complex lines of authority and
U.S. energy programs, research and development, and
accountability for counterintelligence policy
infrastructure. These included the NRC, ERDA, national
implementation within the department: one entity, the
laboratories, and other facilities. DOE’s bureaucracy posed
Office of Counterintelligence, reported directly to the
challenges in managing physical security, protecting
Energy Secretary, and the other, the NNSA’s Office of
classified information, screening personnel, and monitoring
Defense Nuclear Counterintelligence, to the NNSA
foreign visitors.
Administrator. The Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence in 2002 noted the two offices shared
In 1992, through a provision of the Intelligence
Authorization Act (IAA) for Fiscal Year 1993 (P.L. 102-
the same program staff at DOE headquarters and
496), Congress amended the statutory definition of the
manage their field programs at sites delineated
“intelligence community” to include the DOE’s intelligence
along lines of the NNSA/DOE organization.
and counterintelligence organization. This gave the Director
However, although the sites are characterized as
of Central Intelligence (DCI) oversight authority over
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Department of Energy’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (OICI)
either DOE or NNSA, the program activities are not
Information Officers of both DOE and the NNSA. OICI
as easily separated since many NNSA program
also manages a 24/7 Intelligence Operations Center
activities are supported by DOE sites. The
enabling communications with all DOE component
Committee is concerned that this bifurcation has
organizations, other elements of the intelligence
created administrative inefficiencies that affect day-
community, and the White House up to and including
to-day operations, has an adverse impact on
information at the TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
counterintelligence investigations management,
COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION (TS/SCI)
and diminishes the lines of program responsibility
classification level.
as well as overall accountability.
OICI maintains a liaison relationship with the NNSA. In
Establishment of OICI
addition, OICI has nearly 30 intelligence and
Congress subsequently abolished the NNSA’s Office of
counterintelligence offices throughout the United States, as
Defense Nuclear Counterintelligence through a provision of
well as representation on two FBI-managed inter-agency
the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for
coordination entities—the Joint Terrorism Task Force and
Fiscal Year 2007 (P.L. 109-364). The office’s personnel
the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force—and
and functions were transferred to the DOE Office of
two coordination entities within the Office of the DNI —the
Counterintelligence. This legislation thereby eliminated the
National Counterterrorism Center and the Climate and
dual structure of counterintelligence within DOE. DOE
Security Advisory Council.
further consolidated its offices of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence to create a unified approach to related
Relevant Statutes
challenges and requirements in the Department under the
present-day OICI. In 2020, Congress codified OICI’s chain
Title 42 U.S.C. §7144b
of authority, leadership, and responsibilities in Subtitle C of
Title 50 U.S.C. §§2401, 2408(b)(4), 3003(4)(H), 3041(b)(2)(E)
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2020 (P.L. 116-92). P.L. 116-92OICI Leadership and
CRS Products
Responsibilities
CRS In Focus IF10527, U.S. Intelligence Community Establishment
Provisions, by Michael E. DeVine
The Secretary of Energy appoints the Director of OICI with
the concurrence of the Director of National Intelligence
(DNI). The OICI Director, who reports directly to the DOE
Other Resources
Secretary, is required by statute to have “substantial
Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities
expertise in matters relating to the intelligence community,
Atomic Heritage Foundation, “Alsos Mission,” June 6, 2014
including foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.” The
Secretary of Energy is required to consult with the DNI
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Members of
prior to making a decision to remove the Director of OICI
the IC: Department of Energy”
(Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, “Letter from the Chairman
Activities, para. 1.3(e)(2)). OICI is funded under the
and Members of the United States Atomic Energy
National Intelligence Program (NIP) (42 U.S.C. §7144(b)).
Commission,” 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., Doc. No. 118, February 2,
Its budget is classified. According to information published
1948
by the Office of the DNI, the mission of OICI is
U.S. Congress, House of Representatives Committee on
Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and
to protect, enable, and represent the vast scientific
Investigations, Statement of Stanley L. Borgia, Deputy Director for
brain trust resident in DOE’s laboratories and
Counterintelligence at the Office of Intelligence and
plants. The office protects vital national security
Counterintelligence, U.S. Department of Energy, 110th Cong., 2nd
information
and
technologies,
representing
Sess., September 25, 2008
intellectual property of incalculable value, and
U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
provides unmatched scientific and technical
report to accompany S. 2506, Intelligence Authorization Act for
expertise to the U.S. government to respond to
Fiscal Year 2003, 107th Cong., 2nd Sess., S.Rept. 107-149
foreign intelligence, terrorist and cyber threats, to
“Science at its Best, Security at its Worst: A Report on
solve the hardest problems associate with U.S.
Security Problems at the U.S. Department of Energy,”
energy security, and to address a wide range of
President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, June 1999
other national security issues.
U.S. Department of Energy, Transition 2016 Organization
OICI’s intelligence component produces and disseminates
Overviews, Book Three
intelligence unique to DOE and is a consumer of actionable
intelligence disseminated from other elements of the
intelligence community. OICI’s counterintelligence
component provides support for DOE’s 17 national
Michael E. DeVine, Analyst in Intelligence and National
laboratories and offices; this includes investigations and
Security
DOE’s insider-threat program. OICI conducts cyber
functions, including analysis of foreign-origin cyber
IF12684
incidents that require coordination with the Chief
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Department of Energy’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (OICI)
Disclaimer
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF12684 · VERSION 1 · NEW