The Allied Democratic Forces, an Islamic State Affiliate in the Democratic Republic of Congo
September 1, 2022
The Allied Democratic Forces, an Islamic State Affiliate in the
Democratic Republic of Congo
The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) is an armed group
reportedly comprise between 2% and 5% of DRC’s total
primarily active in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo
population.) Rival, less capable factions reportedly endure.
(DRC). ADF combatants primarily are from Uganda and
DRC, with some reportedly from other countries in East
Figure 1. Approximate Areas of ADF Activity
Africa. The Islamic State (IS, aka ISIL/ISIS) recognized a
pledge of allegiance by ADF leadership in 2019, and the
State Department designated the group as an IS affiliate and
Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in 2021. The ADF
has drawn interest from Congress due to its IS affiliation
and for the threat it poses to long-running U.S. efforts to
help stabilize DRC, where overlapping conflicts have
caused one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises.
The ADF has reportedly expanded its areas of operation,
capacity, and lethality since 2021, despite Congolese and
Ugandan military operations. DRC’s government declared
martial law in ADF-affected areas in May 2021, and in late
2021, Uganda deployed troops to counter the ADF inside
DRC after a string of attacks within Uganda. Since mid-
Source: CRS graphic based on Kivu Security Tracker data.
2022, a surge in activity by another DRC-based armed
Attempted attacks were also reported in Rwanda.
group, the March 23 Movement (M23), has led some DRC
troops and U.N. peacekeeping forces to withdraw from
Impact. The ADF has reportedly killed thousands of
ADF-affected areas, deepening a security vacuum.
civilians and hundreds of soldiers in DRC since 2014, and
the conflict has displaced tens to hundreds of thousands of
Researchers debate the nature and significance of the
ADF’s
people. (Overall, about 6 million people were internally
IS ties, amid ambiguity about the ADF’s size,
displaced in DRC as of late 2021, one of the world’s largest
structure, and aims. The U.S.-based Congo Research Group
tolls; about a million more Congolese were refugees or
and U.N. sanctions investigators for DRC have reported
asylum-seekers in nearby countries.) According to a tally
that other armed groups or members of DRC’s military may
by the U.N. peacekeeping operation in DRC (MONUSCO),
be responsible for some attacks attributed to the ADF or
claimed by IS global media on the ADF’s behalf
the ADF killed over 1,300 civilians in 2021, nearly 50%
.
more than in 2020. U.N. officials have attributed possible
Origins. The ADF-National Army for the Liberation of
crimes against humanity and war crimes to the ADF,
Uganda (ADF-NALU) was formed in 1995 as a merger of
including civilian killings, abductions, and use of child
two Ugandan rebel movements that had fled to DRC (then
soldiers. The ADF also has been implicated in a string of
Zaire) under Ugandan military pressure. The governments
prison breaks. Security threats, among other factors,
of Zaire and Sudan, then at odds with Uganda, reportedly
impeded efforts to contain a large Ebola outbreak in North
provided backing. Under leader Jamil Mukulu, a member of
Kivu and Ituri in 2018-2020. State security forces have
Tablighi Jamaat (a global Sunni Muslim revivalist
allegedly committed abuses, including extrajudicial killings
movement), the ADF-NALU rebranded itself as Islamist
and sexual violence, during counter-ADF operations.
and recruited among Ugandan Muslims. The group also
After seeming to be weakened and divided by military
began to recruit in DRC (at times forcibly), and forged ties
operations in the mid-2010s, the ADF appeared to rebound
with local civilians, soldiers, and rebels via marriage, trade,
around 2017. An ADF assault on a MONUSCO outpost in
and alliances. The NALU component eventually disbanded.
2017 was one of the deadliest attacks ever on U.N.
The ADF grew more active in DRC in the early 2010s, and
peacekeepers, killing 15 Tanzanian soldiers and wounding
was implicated in large civilian massacres starting in 2014.
dozens. Since 2019, when DRC launched a new military
Leadership. In 2014, joint U.N.-DRC military operations
offensive, the ADF has expanded north into Ituri from its
splintered the ADF. Leader Mukulu was arrested in
longtime strongholds in North Kivu (Figure 1), and has
Tanzania in 2015 and extradited to Uganda. His successor,
increasingly used improvised explosive devices (IEDs). In
Seka Musa Baluku, likewise a Ugandan national, has
April 2022, DRC officials stated that they suspected the
pursued IS affiliation, advocated Islamic rule in DRC, and
ADF in a suicide bombing outside Goma, a large city and
overseen an apparent growth in ADF capacity. (Muslims
hub for peacekeeping and aid operations; if confirmed, this
would be the group’s first attack in the Goma area.
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The Allied Democratic Forces, an Islamic State Affiliate in the Democratic Republic of Congo
After years of not operating openly within Uganda, the
have continued to grow. U.N.-backed operations against the
ADF reportedly carried out a string of attacks in the country
ADF appeared to weaken the group in the mid-2010s, but
in late 2021, including simultaneous suicide bombings in
the group soon rebounded and its new leader forged IS ties.
Kampala that killed several people and wounded dozens.
The poor human rights record of DRC’s military and other
The Islamic State claimed the suicide attacks and several
regional military forces, along with distrust among regional
smaller bombings that preceded them. Also in 2021,
leaders, may further limit the effectiveness of counter-ADF
authorities in Rwanda announced that they had disrupted an
operations and produce undesired outcomes. DRC’s
ADF plot to carry out urban IED attacks there.
imposition of martial law in ADF-affected areas since 2021
Potential Issues for Congress
has reportedly led to the suppression of civil liberties. DRC
Nature and Implications of IS Affiliation. Members of
military forces have long been accused of abusing civilians
Congress continue to weigh the significance of, and
during operations. DRC military commanders reportedly
possible responses to, IS cultivation of local affiliates in
collaborate with armed groups at times: a DRC general was
Africa and beyond, in the context of congressional
sanctioned by the United States and U.N. Security Council
authorization, funding, and oversight of U.S. counter-
in 2018 for allegedly recruiting and equipping combatants
terrorism and regional stabilization efforts. The Islamic
to “participate” in ADF massacres of civilians.
State has recognized the ADF as an affiliate and claimed
Uganda’s military deployment against the ADF also
many of the attacks attributed to the group. In 2021, U.N.
appears to have fueled frictions in an already tense sub-
global terrorism monitors relayed reports that IS
“operatives” in DRC had benefitted from “
region. The Congo Research Group reported in mid-2022
trainers, tactical
that Uganda’s DRC deployment was partly motivated by
strategists and financial support remitted from the ISIL core
economic interests, some possibly illicit. While Kinshasa
through ISIL networks and enablers in Somalia and other
East African countries.”
agreed to the deployment, the Ugandan troop presence is
The U.S. Treasury Department has
politically sensitive given Uganda’s history of unilateral
sanctioned persons in South Africa and Kenya who
military interventions and proxy warfare in DRC. Some
allegedly facilitated IS financial support for the ADF.
regional analysts posit that Uganda’s entry may have fueled
U.N. sanctions investigators focused on DRC, however,
tensions with neighboring Rwanda, further stymying
asserted as of mid-2022 that they had been unable to
regional conflict resolution efforts. DRC officials have
confirm “direct” IS support or “command and control” over
accused Rwanda and Uganda of backing the M23 in 2022.
the ADF, although they described growing
The East African Community, a regional bloc that DRC
communications. Researchers with George Washington
University’s Program on Extremism
joined in 2022, announced plans in early 2022 to deploy a
assessed in 2021 that
regional force against foreign-origin armed groups in
although command and control was unlikely, ADF
eastern DRC (including the ADF), as part of a two-track
propaganda reflected growing IS “influence”; the
approach that also envisions talks with Congolese-led
researchers asserted that the ADF had benefited from
groups. Many details on the initiative, known as the
transnational funding, recruitment, and logistics. DRC-
“Nairobi Process,” remain unclear. The Biden
focused researchers emphasize the ADF’s historically local
Administration has expressed support for the Nairobi
and regional aims, and the extent to which the particular
Process, without specifically pledging to finance or
context of eastern DRC has shaped the group. Field
otherwise facilitate the regional military intervention.
researchers also emphasize ongoing ambiguity over the
authorship of some attacks attributed to the ADF.
The United States has expanded some U.S. military
assistance for DRC since President Félix Tshisekedi’s
Global IS propaganda initially claimed ADF attacks under
the banner of a “Central Africa Province” covering
inauguration in 2019, but has not provided significant
DRC
counterterrorism aid or equipment. Several DRC military
and Mozambique, but local affiliates appear to be
commanders remain under U.S. sanctions due to alleged
operationally distinct, as reflected in separate State
human rights abuses and/or anti-democratic actions under
Department FTO designations in 2021. In May 2022, IS
propaganda announced a separate “province” in
Tshisekedi’s predecessor, Joseph Kabila. U.S. military aid
to DRC is further subject to certain restrictions pursuant to
Mozambique, effectively acknowledging the distinction.
DRC’s designation under the Child Soldiers Prevention Act
Support for Regional Military Operations. Congress
(Title IV of P.L. 110-457).
authorizes, appropriates, and oversees U.S. security
Sanctions. Congress may examine the impact of U.S.
assistance for DRC, Uganda, and other countries in the
sanctions, which seek to isolate and deter support for the
region. Congress also funds and oversees U.S. support for
ADF. In addition to the 2021 FTO designation, U.S.
MONUSCO, which is mandated to support DRC-led
sanctions have been imposed on the ADF, its leaders, and
military operations. Members of Congress may consider
alleged financiers under executive orders pertaining to
several issues when weighing possible U.S. support for
global terrorism (E.O. 13224), global human rights (E.O.
counter-ADF operations, including whether and how to
13818), and the situation in DRC (E.O. 13413). The United
mitigate possible unintended consequences. The ADF has
States first designated the ADF under the DRC-specific
repeatedly withstood military pressure, which in some cases
E.O. 13413 in 2014, in tandem with the group’s designation
appears to have led the group to escalate attacks on
under the U.N. DRC sanctions program.
civilians. While Ugandan and DRC military commanders
claim to have killed hundreds of ADF combatants and
Anne Foley contributed research and analysis to this
destroyed the group’s safe-havens since 2021, U.N. reports
product.
indicate that the ADF’s area of operations and lethality
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The Allied Democratic Forces, an Islamic State Affiliate in the Democratic Republic of Congo
IF12206
Alexis Arieff, Specialist in African Affairs
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF12206 · VERSION 1 · NEW