Shinzo Abe’s Assassination and the Impact on U.S.-Japan Relations
July 20, 2022
Shinzo Abe’s Assassination and the Impact on U.S.-Japan
Relations
On July 8, 2022, a gunman assassinated former Japanese
decisive role in salvaging the deal with the remaining 11
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, arguably Japan’s most
members. The resulting Comprehensive and Progressive
powerful politician, jolting Japan just days before
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)
parliamentary elections. Abe, the longest serving prime
demonstrated Abe’s determination to support a regional
minister in postwar Japan, was campaigning in the central
rules-based order in the face of challenges from China. Abe
Japanese city of Nara when he was shot with a home-made
forged new security and trade initiatives with Europe,
gun; he died shortly thereafter. The assassin, a 41-year old
Southeast Asia, Russia, and India. He was also one of the
man, reportedly targeted Abe because of the former leader’s
principal promoters of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
support of a religious group that he claimed bankrupted his
(“the Quad”) among Australia, India, Japan, and the United
mother. The shooting stunned Japan, where gun violence is
States.
rare and restrictions on gun ownership are among the
strictest in the world. From 2017 to 2021, Japan recorded
One of Abe’s overriding goals was for Japan to better
60 shootings and 14 total shooting deaths.
compete economically, diplomatically, and militarily with
China. Yet he also sought to engage Chinese leaders to
Abe, 67, was poised to play a lasting role in Japanese
manage bilateral tensions. Abe courted Russian President
politics as an elder statesman. As premier from 2012
Vladimir Putin in part to try to prevent Moscow and Beijing
through 2020 (in addition to a year-long term in 2006-
from developing a closer relationship. Conversely, under his
2007), he accelerated Japan’s trend toward developing a
leadership Japan’s relations with South Korea plummeted to
more capable and flexible military force, passing major
near all-time lows, complicating U.S. policy in the region.
security legislation advancing these goals and centralizing
Japan’s national security bureaucracy. Abe also prioritized
U.S.-Japan Relations Under Abe
several domestic economic reforms and pursued generally
Abe was a stalwart supporter of the U.S.-Japan alliance who
expansionary economic policies as well as closer trade and
worked closely with Presidents Obama and Trump to
economic ties with the United States. After resigning in
strengthen the operational capabilities of the two militaries
2020, he remained politically active, pushing for Japan to
and align U.S. and Japanese strategies toward the Indo-
increase its defense spending, acquire more advanced
Pacific. Obama and Abe together made historic visits to
military capabilities, and take a more assertive stance
Hiroshima and Pearl Harbor, and in 2015 Abe became the
toward China, especially its threats to Taiwan—all moves
first Japanese prime minister to address a joint meeting of
widely supported by the U.S. government.
Congress. Abe developed a close rapport with Trump that
sustained the relationship despite the U.S. withdrawal from
Japan is one of the United States’ key Indo-Pacific partners,
the TPP, U.S. imposition of tariffs on Japanese steel and
and Abe’s assassination raises several questions that could
aluminum on national security grounds, and Trump’s
affect congressional consideration of U.S. policy in the
skepticism of alliances. In 2019, Trump and Abe completed
region. Will Abe’s sudden death spur his party—the ruling
two limited trade deals covering some goods and digital trade
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which Abe dominated for
that did not require U.S. congressional approval.
a decade—to deepen its support for his legacy and policy
positions? Will more extreme forces take up the mantle of
Abe’s nationalist views on Japan’s history of colonialism and
the LDP’s hawkish wing, potentially including those who
invasion during the first half of the 20th century at times
fear U.S. abandonment and seek greater autonomy in
generated controversy in Japan and abroad. Abe was
developing their own military capabilities? Or will Abe’s
associated with groups and promoted individuals to important
passing diminish the influence of these groups? Given his
posts who rejected the narrative of Japanese aggression and
influence, does Abe’s death remove a ballast of stability for
victimization of other Asians. Early in his premiership, some
the U.S.-Japan partnership?
observers voiced concern that his leadership could harm U.S.
interests in the region by inflaming historical tensions.
Abe’s Foreign Policy Legacies
Examples include a 2013 visit to a controversial shrine that
International leaders responded to the news with sorrow and
honored Japan’s wartime dead—including several Class A
praise for Abe’s role in leading Japan to a more assertive role war criminals—and his suggestion that women forced to
on the global stage. Abe was known as a key architect of the
provide sex to Imperial Japanese soldiers were not coerced
“Free and Open Indo-Pacific” concept—much of which the
into the military’s extensive brothel system. However, Abe
United States subsequently adopted as its own policy—and a
generally tended to avoid making major inflammatory
champion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade
statements and drew widespread praise for his pragmatic
agreement. After President Donald Trump withdrew the
foreign policy. Japan’s regional standing and relationships
United States from the proposed TPP in 2017, Abe played a
generally improved during his tenure, aside from China and
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Shinzo Abe’s Assassination and the Impact on U.S.-Japan Relations
South Korea. During visits to the United States and Australia, between Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and PRC threats
Abe made speeches expressing regret for World War II.
against Taiwan, a sentiment that bolstered Kishida’s support
for Ukraine.
July 10 Upper House Elections
After Abe’s assassination, Japanese leaders moved ahead
Shortly before resigning for health reasons in 2020, Abe
with planned national parliamentary elections two days later.
called for Japan to develop the ability to launch offensive
In the vote, the LDP and its coalition partner, Komeito,
missile attacks against adversary bases. Although the LDP
increased their majority in the Upper House of Japan’s Diet
had been considering this step for years, Abe’s endorsement
(parliament) from 57% of the seats to 60%, despite economic advanced the debate. The release of national security
difficulties such as accelerating inflation. Abe’s death did not documents this year could establish a policy on pursuing this
appear to alter the results significantly. The victory of current capability, a notion that many would have considered taboo a
Prime Minister Fumio Kishida was roughly in line with many decade ago. Questions remain about how Japan would
pre-assassination polls. The LDP and Komeito control over
acquire this capability, including the extent to which it would
60% of the Diet’s Lower House, giving the coalition a
be developed in cooperation with the United States.
commanding majority in both legislative chambers. Diet
elections do not need to be held until 2025, giving Kishida a
Analysts observe Abe achieved mixed success in his program
likely three-year window to promote his policies.
to revitalize Japan’s economy through expansionary
monetary policy, fiscal stimulus, and structural reforms, but
One of Kishida’s biggest obstacles is likely to come from
many credit Abe with bringing a sense of urgency to debates
within the LDP, which is comprised of a number of factions
over Japan’s economic challenges. Kishida is promoting a
that often battle and horse-trade fiercely with one another for
“new form of capitalism,” a thus-far vague platform that
power and influence. Abe, as the leader of the largest and
continues many of Abe’s initiatives but also seeks to be more
hawkish faction, was able to overcome many of the intra-
productive, equitable, and sustainable. One concrete element
party battles that had hobbled previous premiers, and to unify has been Kishida’s creation of a new economic security
the party in support of his policy goals. It is unclear whether
ministerial post. Japan has joined the Biden Administration’s
Kishida, who leads a much smaller faction, will possess this
Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF).
type of political heft. A mark of Abe’s influence was that
Kishida, who historically has been associated with a more
Constitutional Revision Prospects
dovish foreign policy, campaigned on Abe’s hawkish stances. Kishida has said he would like to explore the process of
Abe’s faction has no clear successor, which could allow
amending Japan’s constitution, a chief Abe goal. The
Kishida to adopt a more moderate stance on foreign policy.
document has not been revised since U.S. officials drafted it
during the 1945-1952 occupation of Japan. The LDP supports
The Future of Abe’s Policy Priorities
amending the language of Article 9, which says, “the
With the LDP’s firm control of the Diet, Kishida could
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of
potentially cement elements of Abe’s policy agenda, many of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling
which could strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance. After leaving international disputes ... land, sea, and air forces ... will never
office, Abe advocated for Japan to raise its defense spending
be maintained.” In practice, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces
to 2% of its GDP, in line with NATO countries. Kishida has
(SDF) are among the world’s ten best-funded militaries. In
supported this move. Japan for decades has limited defense
2014, the Abe government reinterpreted Article 9 to allow
spending to 1% of GDP, although this is custom rather than
the SDF to act in support of an ally that is under attack, a
law. Although many analysts doubt that Japan will
right known as “collective self-defense.” Abe and other
precipitously double its defense budget, the LDP has
conservatives have argued that Article 9 explicitly should
indicated it intends to raise it substantially. New iterations of
reflect these changes.
three major documents—the National Security Strategy, the
National Defense Program Guidelines, and the Mid-Term
Despite Abe’s longevity in office and his political strength,
Defense Program—are due to be published by the end of
amending Article 9 proved elusive for him. Revising the
2022, and could reflect Abe’s vision of how Japan should
constitution is a rigorous process, requiring the approval of
distribute its resources. The U.S. government has long
two-thirds of legislators from both houses of the Diet and
supported Japan investing more in its defense and has a keen
then approval by a majority in a national referendum. Polls
interest in the content of these documents.
indicate the public is divided on whether amendments are
needed, and widespread disagreement exists on what
Somewhat uniquely among regional leaders, Abe was a
amendments should be made. Komeito, a party with pacifist
forceful supporter of Taiwan, and helped move Japan toward
roots, may not support amending Article 9 in the direction the
a more muscular framing of the urgency of defending Taiwan LDP prefers; its position likely will be decisive because of its
from potential Chinese aggression. After leaving office, he
electoral importance to the coalition. Official U.S. statements
argued “A Taiwan emergency is a Japanese emergency, and
have usually said that adjusting the constitution is up to the
therefore an emergency for the Japan-U.S. alliance.” These
Japanese people, but some observers argue that Japan
sentiments were echoed by his successors, as well as Japan’s abandoning some or all of Article 9 could benefit U.S.
Defense Minister, Abe’s brother. Just months before his
security interests.
death, Abe weighed in publicly on the controversial questions
of whether the United States should abandon its longstanding Emma Chanlett-Avery, Specialist in Asian Affairs
cross-Strait policy and commit to defending Taiwan “against
Mark E. Manyin, Specialist in Asian Affairs
any attempted Chinese invasion.” Abe often drew parallels
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Shinzo Abe’s Assassination and the Impact on U.S.-Japan Relations
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