U.S.-China Military-to-Military Relations
January 4, 2021
U.S.-China Military-to-Military Relations
Introduction
PLA to adhere to U.S.-championed norms and become
The United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC
more transparent about its activities and intentions. The
or China) established formal military-to-military (mil-mil)
United States also at times has showcased its own military
ties in 1979, a year after the two countries established
capabilities to the PLA for deterrence purposes. As the U.S.
diplomatic relations. Since then, mil-mil relations have
approach to China became more competitive during the
waxed and waned, with one side or the other periodically
Trump Administration, the U.S. Department of Defense
limiting ties in response to perceived transgressions. In
(DOD) remained committed to mil-mil relations but
recent years, military ties have encompassed regularly-
adopted a narrower set of priorities, with more focus on risk
scheduled dialogues and exchanges, a handful of military
reduction and less on cooperation. In general, Congress has
exercises, and ongoing confidence-building measures.
been increasingly cautious and skeptical about mil-mil
Congress has shaped U.S.-China mil-mil relations
relations with China and has passed legislation to limit and
significantly and could seek to maintain, repeal, create, or
enhance oversight of these ties. Most significantly, in the
modify legislation on this issue going forward.
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal
Year 2000 (P.L. 106-65), Congress restricted military
U.S. and PRC Approaches over Time
engagement with China to ensure the PLA would not gain
Washington and Beijing generally engaged in high levels of
combat-relevant skills or know-how from its interactions
military cooperation up until the PRC’s June 1989
with the United States (see below for more details).
Tiananmen Square crackdown. In response to the
crackdown, the United States suspended mil-mil ties and
U.S. policymakers and scholars debate the utility and
Congress prohibited U.S. arms sales to China. Although
purpose of military ties with China. Those who argue for
some ties resumed in 1993, they never regained their earlier
further limiting cooperation assess that the balance of
scope and depth. Even as strategic competition between the
benefits from mil-mil ties weighs heavily in China’s favor
two countries has accelerated and the overall bilateral
due to the aforementioned asymmetries in military strength
relationship has deteriorated in recent years, both sides
and transparency. These observers eschew “talking for the
continue to emphasize the importance of mil-mil relations
sake of talking,” citing instances in which China has
as a stabilizing force, and appear committed to sustained
refused to discuss certain topics or failed to uphold existing
dialogue amid tensions.
agreements. Instead, they argue that the U.S. approach
should be transactional, rewarding China’s cooperation
In the past, China frequently limited mil-mil ties to signal
with more cooperation and suspending initiatives that are
displeasure and attempt to pressure the United States to
not perceived to deliver sufficient benefits. Proponents of
change certain policies (usually related to arms sales to
more robust engagement argue the stabilizing effect of mil-
Taiwan), but it has done this less frequently in recent years.
mil ties is growing more important as the overall
China most recently limited mil-mil ties in 2018, following
relationship deteriorates, and that even sclerotic
a U.S. arms sale to Taiwan and the U.S. Treasury
negotiations and dialogues offer predictability in an
Department’s sanctioning of the PLA’s Equipment
otherwise tumultuous relationship.
Development Department for arms purchases from Russia
under the Countering America’s Adversaries through
Major Elements of Mil-Mil Relations
Sanctions Act (P.L. 115-44).
Many U.S.-China mil-mil activities occur on a regularly
scheduled basis, although some or all elements of the mil-
China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is eager to learn
mil relationship have been suspended or limited over the
from and about the relatively more transparent U.S. military
years. The number of mil-mil contacts (as reported by
(and, some observers argue, exploit this transparency), but
DOD, which began annually reporting them in 2010)
it is reluctant to reciprocate. PRC officials argue that the
declined in recent years: after peaking at 41 in 2014,
PLA is an inferior force, and that greater transparency could
reported contacts did not exceed 20 per year during the
provide the United States with insights that could
Trump Administration.
undermine the PLA’s already weaker position. Similarly,
China has resisted committing to military agreements on
Dialogues and exchanges: U.S.-China mil-mil dialogues
issues ranging from arms control to rules of engagement for
and exchanges include high-level visits of defense officials,
military forces, arguing that doing so would constrain its
longstanding dialogues, military academic exchanges, and
operational options or jeopardize its strategic position.
functional exchanges. Longstanding dialogues include the
Military Maritime Consultative Agreement talks (est.
The U.S. approach to mil-mil relations in recent decades
1998), a forum to discuss concerns about air and maritime
has aimed to reduce distrust and miscommunication,
operational safety, and the Defense Policy Coordination
cooperate on issues of mutual interest, and encourage the
Talks (est. 2006), which sets the annual agenda for military
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U.S.-China Military-to-Military Relations
exchanges. Bilateral dialogue mechanisms occasionally are
participating in future iterations of RIMPAC unless it meets
impacted by tensions; for example, when the Military
certain conditions, including establishing a “four-year track
Maritime Consultative Agreement dialogue planned for
record of taking actions toward stabilizing the region.”
December 2020 did not occur as scheduled, each side
blamed the other. Successive U.S. administrations have
Real-world cooperation: While the PLA and U.S. military
sought to shape the direction of the mil-mil relationship by
do not conduct combined military operations, they have at
altering existing dialogues or establishing new ones.
times cooperated militarily in limited ways to address
nontraditional security threats. Since 2008, the two
Confidence-building measures: In 2014, DOD and the
militaries have coordinated their counterpiracy patrols in
PRC Ministry of National Defense signed two memoranda
the Gulf of Aden through a voluntary multinational
of understanding (MOUs) establishing voluntary
coordination and information-sharing mechanism. On at
confidence-building measures intended to manage risk,
least one occasion, U.S. Navy and PLA Navy ships
enhance mutual understanding, and avoid miscalculation
coordinated responses to an attempted pirating of a Chinese
between the two militaries.
cargo ship off the coast of Oman.
The Notification of Major Military Activities MOU
Future Prospects: Some policymakers and observers
promotes reciprocal notification of national security-
advocate for establishing or enhancing exchanges on issues
related information (including major announcements or
such as space, cyber, and artificial intelligence. The Trump
policy and strategy changes) and reciprocal observation
Administration has sought to include China in negotiations
of military exercises and activities. In 2015, the two
with Russia to limit nuclear weapons. Beijing has in the
sides negotiated an annex to “improve and normalize”
past participated in some arms control arrangements, but
the use of the Defense Telephone Link for crisis
has long declined to engage in formal negotiations to limit
communications. This link, established in 2008, aims to
nuclear weapons, and argues that Washington and Moscow
facilitate secure calls between the two militaries. Some
should take the first steps toward arms control given their
observers say China has been reluctant to use the link or
much larger arsenals and greater capabilities.
commit to protocols for communicating in a crisis.
Congressional Action
The Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime
Previous major Congressional action related to U.S.-China
Encounters MOU seeks to promote safe encounters
mil-mil relations includes:
between the two militaries at sea and in the air (an annex
on air encounters was added to the MOU in 2015). U.S.
Tiananmen sanctions and arms transfer restrictions:
and PRC stakeholders, including government officials,
Signed into law in 1990 (P.L. 101-246), the Foreign
have argued the MOU has been effective, although
Relations Authorization Act for FY1990-1991 prohibited a
DOD has publicized several unsafe air and maritime
range of U.S.-China mil-mil activities, including arms sales.
encounters with the PLA in the years since the MOU
Although some of these restrictions have been lifted,
was signed. These include at least nine incidents
remaining sanctions include prohibitions on the issuance of
between March and May 2020 involving U.S. and PLA
export licenses for U.S. Munitions List items and crime
aircraft operating over the South China Sea.
control equipment to China. Congress has prohibited the
export of dual-use items to China over the years as well.
Exercises: Since 2017, bilateral exercises have been limited
to the U.S.-China Disaster Management Exchange, an
Restrictions on U.S.-China mil-mil activities: In 1999,
annual exercise (since 2005) focused on humanitarian
the FY2000 NDAA prohibited the Secretary of Defense
assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR). Both countries have
from authorizing any military contact with the PLA that
in recent years participated in multilateral exercises held in
would “create a national security risk due to an
Australia, Mongolia, and Thailand. Neither side has hosted
inappropriate exposure” of the PLA to 12 operational areas
the other for a naval port visit since 2017.
of the U.S. military: force projection operations; nuclear
operations; advanced combined-arms and joint combat
In compliance with FY2000 NDAA restrictions, U.S.-China
operations; advanced logistical operations; chemical and
military exercises focus on non-combat scenarios and
biological defense and other capabilities related to weapons
capabilities such as HA/DR, search and rescue, and
of mass destruction; surveillance and reconnaissance
counterpiracy. The most high-profile exercise in which the
operations; joint warfighting experiments and other
United States and China both participated was the U.S.-led
activities related to transformations in warfare; military
multinational maritime exercise Rim of the Pacific
space operations; other advanced capabilities; arms sales or
(RIMPAC): in 2014 and 2016, the PLA participated in
military-related technology transfers; release of classified or
HA/DR drills. Some U.S. policymakers have cautioned that
restricted information; and access to a DOD laboratory.
even non-combat exercises with the PLA undermine U.S.
interests by providing opportunities for the PLA to hone
Reporting requirements: The FY2010 NDAA (P.L. 111-
warfighting capabilities, conferring know-how, experience,
84) required DOD to report on U.S.-China security
and prestige to the PLA. Then Secretary of Defense Jim
cooperation, mil-mil activities, and U.S. strategy for future
Mattis announced DOD had disinvited the PLA from the
mil-mil engagement in its congressionally-mandated (P.L.
2018 RIMPAC exercise, citing China’s “continued
106-65) annual report to Congress on China.
militarization of the South China Sea” as a primary reason.
The FY2018 NDAA (P.L. 115-232) prohibited China from
Caitlin Campbell, Analyst in Asian Affairs
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U.S.-China Military-to-Military Relations
IF11712
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