 
 
 
Updated March 24, 2022
U.S. Export Controls and China
Since 2018, Congress and the executive branch have 
specific destinations, end use, and end user controls. On the 
revised—through legislation, regulation, and licensing 
CCL, national security (NS) controlled items are on the 
practices—the U.S. export control system that regulates 
Wassenaar Arrangement’s multilateral control list. The 
dual-use exports (goods and technology that may have both 
EAR presumes denial for license applications of NS items 
civilian and military uses). Much of the legislative reform 
that would make a direct and significant contribution to 
has focused on controlling emerging and foundational 
China’s military. Separate statutes and regulations control 
technologies, strengthening other technology controls and 
nuclear materials and technology and defense articles and 
licensing practices, engaging multilaterally to ensure U.S. 
services. U.S. law has prohibited arms sales to China since 
controls are effective, and considering the impact of 
1989. Congress has also mandated a policy of denial for 
controls on the U.S. economy, including the foreign 
exports of satellite and space equipment to China.  
availability of U.S. products subject to control. Many of 
these changes were efforts to address concerns about the 
Figure 1. 2020 U.S. Exports to China and BIS Actions 
People’s Republic of China’s (PRC or China) pursuit of 
civilian and military leadership in advanced technologies 
through U.S. commercial ties. Congress plays a key role in 
overseeing the reforms it enacted and shaping the U.S. 
export control regime to address U.S. national security and 
foreign policy concerns, including those posed by China.  
China’s Industrial Policies 
China’s 
 
state-led industrial policies, such as 
Made in China 
Source: CRS with reporting data from
 BIS. 
2025 (
MIC 2025), seek to create competitive advantages for 
Note: EAR99 items are subject to the EAR, but are not control ed. 
China in strategic industries, in part by obtaining 
Percentages are based on the value of U.S. exports. 
technology from U.S. and foreign firms. 
MIC 2025 aims to 
establish China’s leadership in emerging technologies 
 
critical to future commercial, government, and military 
U.S. Licensing Approach 
capabilities. Priority areas include advanced manufacturing, 
The U.S. government only controls or restricts a small 
aerospace, artificial intelligence, information technology, 
percentage of U.S. technology exports to China in practice. 
new materials, robotics, and semiconductors. China’s 
BIS has removed from the CCL or waived licensing 
military-civil fusion (MCF) program also seeks to leverage 
requirements for much of U.S. technology trade to China 
MIC 2025 technological advancements for military 
since the 1990s as certain technologies have become more 
development. Some experts say that China’s approach blurs 
widely available globally and in response to U.S. business 
commercial and military distinctions and may challenge the 
interests in the China market. Before new rules in May 
U.S. export control regime’s ability to distinguish between 
2020, BIS waived license requirements for NS items 
military and civilian end use and end users. China’s policies 
destined for civilian end use in China in sectors such as 
in strategic sectors often require a PRC partner, frequently 
aerospace, computing, and semiconductors. An estimated 
state-tied, to own or otherwise control U.S. technology that 
18.1% of $124.6 billion in U.S. exports to China in 2020 
is transferred to China, potentially increasing risks that U.S. 
($22.6 billion) involved dual-use technologies on the CCL 
technology could support China’s military.  
and subject to controls. BIS required licenses for 2.1%, or 
$478 million of these CCL technology exports. Most CCL 
U.S. Dual-Use Export Controls 
technology exports—97.9% or $22.1 billion—went to 
The Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA) (P.L. 115-
China without a license. (
Figure 1).  
232) reestablished nonemergency authority for the 
President to control dual-use exports for national security 
Separately, BIS reported that it reviewed $112 billion in 
and foreign policy reasons and to coordinate with 
licenses for U.S. software and technology exports to China 
multilateral export control regimes, and provided policy 
in 2020 and denied 2.2% ($471 million). The $112 billion 
requirements for setting controls. The Bureau of Industry 
in licenses in 2020 increased from $6.9 billion in 2019; the 
and Security (BIS) of the Department of Commerce 
increase might reflect licenses, including for EAR 99 items, 
administers dual-use export controls and chairs an 
required for PRC firms added to the EL since 2019. EAR 
interagency process that includes the Departments of 
99 includes nonsensitive products and potentially sensitive 
Defense (DOD), State, and Energy. BIS administers these 
technologies in light of China’s dual-use programs. ECRA 
controls through the Export Administration Regulations 
called for a review of the CCL and EAR99 to determine 
(EAR, 15 C.F.R. 730 
et seq.), which includes the 
whether some EAR99 technologies should be added to the 
Commerce Control List (CCL) of dual-use technologies 
CCL. In 2020, BIS denied three of 482 licenses to release 
subject to controls. The EAR sets licensing policy for 
U.S.-controlled technology and knowhow to PRC nationals. 
https://crsreports.congress.gov 
U.S. Export Controls and China 
BIS Entity List 
  Clarifying that existing U.S. controls apply to re-
Since 2018, the U.S. government has increased use of the 
exports, regardless of the structure of the underlying 
BIS Entity List (EL) to restrict some dual-use trade with 
transaction, including identifying and considering any 
China by placing certain PRC firms of concern on the list. 
foreign party to a license with a significant ownership 
The EL identifies persons involved, or with the potential to 
interest. This requires more detail on ultimate end users 
be involved, in activities contrary to U.S. national security 
and scrutiny of joint ventures. Additionally, after the 
or foreign policy interests. BIS typically requires a license 
U.S. government decision in June 2020 to no longer 
for any U.S. export of EAR items to those listed. EL listings 
treat Hong Kong separately from China, BIS imposed 
often presume an export denial, but licensing guidance—
new licensing conditions for U.S. exports to Hong Kong 
such as narrow or low technology thresholds, partial listing 
and re-exports from Hong Kong to mainland China. 
of firms, and case-by-case approval—appears to facilitate 
  Requiring the President to create an interagency process 
the export of some U.S. technology and CCL items to PRC 
to create controls on “emerging and foundational 
firms on the EL. A lack of restrictions on 4G, 6G, cloud, 
technologies” of concern—including through a review 
and, until recently, undersea cable technologies has allowed 
of the CCL—and regulate their release to foreign 
Huawei to purchase U.S. technology. In 2020, Huawei sold 
persons by, at a minimum, requiring an export license. 
its Honor 5G mobile business to the PRC government. BIS 
has not added Honor to the EL to extend Huawei 
  Reviewing the interagency dispute resolution process 
restrictions to the firm. EL restrictions for China’s foundry, 
and requiring BIS to work with DOD on commodity 
Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation 
classifications to determine when a license is required.  
(SMIC), apply to technology below 10 nanometers (nm), 
  Adding a role for the Director of National Intelligence 
allowing trade at and above 14 nm to continue. In October 
and considering the U.S. industrial base in setting 
2021, the House Foreign Affairs Committee released BIS 
controls and in licensing decisions.  
licensing data for Huawei and SMIC from November 2020 
to April 2021. Much of it involved semiconductor 
  Defining dual-use to include law-enforcement 
technology: BIS approved 113 licenses for Huawei ($61.4 
applications. Relatedly, crime control equipment exports 
billion); and returned 48 ($29.8 billion) without action. BIS 
to China require a license. Concerns about China’s 
approved 188 licenses for SMIC ($41.9 billion), and 
human rights abuses and surveillance activities have led 
returned 17 ($1.2 billion) without action.  
to tighter scrutiny of these exports to China.  
 
In August 2020, BIS amended the foreign-direct product 
Issues for Congress 
rule to restrict Huawei’s ability to acquire chips from any 
Some Members have expressed concerns about a slow pace 
source using U.S.-controlled equipment or software, such as 
of implementing some of the reforms required by statute. 
TSMC in Taiwan; other PRC firms are not restricted. In 
For example, while BIS has initiated a rulemaking process 
April 2021, BIS added PRC firm Pythium to the EL for the 
for emerging technologies and proposed an approach for 
firm’s role in China’s hypersonic weapons program—BIS 
foundational technologies, it has established few new 
does not appear to restrict Pythium’s and other PRC firms’ 
controls. This, some argue, could impede congressional 
use of U.S. open source technology platforms and U.S. 
reforms that expanded the authority of the Committee on 
software tools to design and test advanced chips for China’s 
Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to review 
strategic advanced computing programs. In December 
PRC and other foreign investments in critical and emerging 
2021, BIS added China’s Academy of Military Medical 
technologies below thresholds of foreign control. Issues for 
Sciences and eleven of its institutes to the EL; these 
possible oversight or legislative action include: 
controls may not pertain to U.S. research ties with China. 
  The status of ECRA implementation and whether the pace and 
scope of actions are sufficient without greater oversight or 
Military-Tied Firms 
changes to the export control regime. 
In late 2020, BIS extended licensing requirements for PRC 
  The impact of the pace and scope of ECRA’s implementation 
firms identified as military-end users; it presumed denial for 
on other congressional reforms like CFIUS. 
certain, but not all, CCL exports to these firms. Many PRC 
  The global context of export controls and practices to ascertain 
military firms do not appear to be on the BIS military-end 
whether to pursue more multilateral controls and reforms. 
users list or the EL. The BIS lists include a subset of the 
  The status of controlling emerging and existing technologies, 
PRC military firms that Congress requires DOD to identify 
and reforming the process for classification determinations and 
in accordance with Section 1260H of the National Defense 
licensing decisions, including for escalated cases. 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (P.L. 116-283). In 
  The operating committee’s current voting structure and BIS’s 
some cases, BIS lists only parts of these firms. 
role as chair in determining licensing decision outcomes. 
  The level of congressional scrutiny of licensing decisions, 
ECRA Reforms 
justifications, waivers, and exceptions, and whether to pursue 
ECRA has provisions—which impact U.S. dual-use exports 
more frequent and regularized reporting to Congress to 
to China—to reform or augment export control decision- 
strengthen its oversight of export controls in practice. 
making, licensing, and technology controls, including: 
Karen M. Sutter, Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance   
  Determining foreign availability by considering 
Christopher A. Casey, Analyst in International Trade and 
comparable quality in ascertaining whether a global 
Finance   
alternative is comparable to a U.S. technology. Foreign 
availability determinations can affect decisions on 
IF11627
whether to apply specific or general controls.  
https://crsreports.congress.gov 
U.S. Export Controls and China 
 
 
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11627 · VERSION 5 · UPDATED