Russian Armed Forces: Capabilities
link to page 1 
June 30, 2020
Russian Armed Forces: Capabilities
Since 2008, Russia has sought to modernize its military and
increased, along with upgrading heavy artillery, missile
engaged in several armed interventions outside its borders.
artillery, and electronic warfare units. Additional priorities
The 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy prioritizes “long-
have included reconnaissance, communication, and the
term strategic competition” with Russia (and China). To
creation of permanently ready units at full staffing levels.
help guide policymaking in response to challenges posed by
Ground forces emphasize mobility and are increasingly
Russia, Members of Congress may have an interest in
capable of conducting short but complex, high-tempo
assessing the capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces.
operations. At the same time, Russian ground forces
This report briefly describes Russia’s current military
continue to rely on conscription, multiple types of similar
capabilities, including strengths and weaknesses.
equipment, and relatively limited personnel and units to
guard Russia’s expansive borders.
Defense Budget and State Armament
Plan
Russian ground forces are organized into 11 combined arms
Official figures suggest Russia’s military expenditures have
armies, one tank army, and four army corps. Russia’s most
ranged between $60 billion and $65 billion a year, or
advanced capabilities are in the Western Military District,
roughly 4% of its gross domestic product (GDP). However,
and the Southern Military District appears to have the most
the extent of defense spending may be greater if assessed on
competent units. Russian units exhibit a mixture of division
the basis of purchasing power parity rather than market
and brigade structures; brigades are utilized primarily in
exchange rates.
regions or areas where full divisions would be unwieldy.
Both generate ad hoc, task-specific Battalion Tactical
Russia’s long-term defense spending priorities are detailed
Groups, which have artillery and air defense units attached
in State Armament Plans (GPVs), which run in 10-year
and can be combined with other units as needed. Even with
increments. GPV 2020, which ran from 2011 to 2020,
a focus on permanent readiness, however, only a few
focused on increasing the military’s overall share of
subunits can be considered deployable.
modernized equipment to 70%. The newest plan, GPV
2027, calls for total spending of about $330 billion (in 2018
Recruiting professional soldiers has been a priority.
dollars) and 3%-4% of GDP from 2018 to 2027.
Conscription is unpopular and, at 12 months, considered too
short by the Russian military to effectively train new
Command and Control
conscripts. Most conscripts occupy secondary support roles,
Russian military reforms have emphasized the streamlining
although in most maneuver units conscripts comprise up to
of command and control structures. Russian forces are
one-third of personnel.
organized into five military districts (MDs) and
operational/joint strategic commands (OSK; see Figure 1).
The Russian military’s experiences in Ukraine and Syria
Russia also has created a Moscow-based central command
have reaffirmed for it the importance of massed artillery,
center, the National Defense Management Center.
rocket fire, and armored forces. However, ground forces
have been a relatively low funding priority in Russia’s
Figure 1. Russian Federation Military Districts
modernization; most of these efforts went into upgrading
existing platforms, which decreased standardization across
units and increased maintenance costs.
Aerospace Forces
The Aerospace Forces (VKS) combine Air Force, Air
Defense, Space Forces, and Army Aviation. Alongside the
Navy, Aerospace Forces received top priority during GPV
2020, allowing for the introduction of new and upgraded
legacy systems, including substantially improved missiles
and precision-guided munitions. Additionally, effort has
gone into expanding training and flight times for pilots and
Source: Russian Ministry of Defence.
air crews.
Notes: The Southern MD/OSK is responsible for Ukraine’s occupied
Crimea region.
Russia’s air forces feature numerous types of capable
fighters, fighter interceptors, and tactical bombers. Russia’s
Ground Forces
intervention in Syria has given the Aerospace Forces
Over the last decade, Russia has significantly changed its
significant operational experience and has been used as a
ground forces. Recruiting professional soldiers has
testing ground for new capabilities, including precision-
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Russian Armed Forces: Capabilities
strike and air-launched cruise missiles by both tactical and
Coastal Defense Troops
long-range assets.
The Navy is responsible for Coastal Defense Artillery units
and Marine Infantry. Coastal Defense Artillery units are
The development of fifth-generation fighters has run into
designed and equipped to protect Russia’s ports and
considerable production and design challenges, and Russia
coastlines. They are equipped with a variety of mobile and
lags significantly behind the U.S. in precision strike/bomb
stationary artillery, as well as advanced anti-ship missiles.
capabilities. Russia’s strategic bomber force (Long Range
Aviation) has continued to operate with heavily modernized
Each fleet commands at least one brigade of Naval Infantry
Soviet-era bombers. Additionally, Russia’s long-range
(around 10,000-12,500 troops total). These brigades are
transport capabilities remain limited, restricting the rapid
almost completely professionally manned, are considered
movement of ground or airborne forces.
an elite force, and form part of Russia’s rapid reaction and
intervention forces. Naval Infantry forces are similarly
Strategic air defenses are controlled by the Aerospace
equipped to and structured like other Russian ground force
Forces. VKS systems are responsible for defending critical
units, with reintroduced tank battalions, but few landing
infrastructure and strategic targets. They are separate from
ships mean they have a limited amphibious capability.
Ground Forces air defense units (PVO), which provide air
defense to maneuver units. Combined, these systems form
Spetsnaz and Special Operations
what many analysts consider to be a formidable integrated
Command
air defense system, although some contend that its
Spetsnaz are Russia’s elite light infantry force, responsible
purported capabilities are inflated.
for long-range battlefield reconnaissance and sabotage, as
well as overseeing local allied units in eastern Ukraine and
Navy
Syria. They are considered a strategic-level asset under the
The Russian Navy benefited from relatively high funding
Main Directorate of the General Staff, although they are
levels during GPV 2020, allowing it to introduce new s hips,
deployed under the command of local military districts.
submarines, and precision-strike capabilities after years of
Totaling around 17,000 troops, they are organized into
limited funding. Shipbuilding has prioritized smaller
seven regular Independent Special Designation Brigades.
warships with high levels of firepower, often with modular
Despite efforts to fully professionalize, Spetsnaz units are
or multipurpose designs, allowing for flexibility. In
still composed of some conscripts, although they, along
particular, the Russian Navy has focused on developing
with the Airborne and Air Assault Troops (VDV), have
long-range and precision-strike capabilities. Most of
their first pick of conscripts.
Russia’s larger surface ships are over 30 years old and
undergoing various retrofits to extend their service life as
The Russian military’s tier-one Special Forces unit is the
Russia’s shipbuilding industry struggles to produce ships
Special Operations Forces Command, built around the 346th
over 7,000 tons. As a result, Russia increasingly relies on
Independent Spetsnaz Brigade. This unit was modeled on
heavily armed frigates as its primary surface combatants.
Western Special Forces and represents Russia’s most
These ships are equipped with Vertical Launch Systems to
capable intervention force.
house an array of hypersonic anti-ship missiles, cruise
missiles, and antisubmarine missiles. However, this is not
Airborne and Air Assault Troops
without complications, as Russia has struggled to produce
Russia’s airborne and air assault troops represent some of
engines since its relationship with Ukrainian producers was
Russia’s most capable units. Considered a strategic asset
severed in 2014. Even with high levels of funding, Russia’s
under the command of the General Staff, they are well-
production of new surface ships has fallen far short of
equipped, have the highest state of readiness, and, like
initial plans. Russia’s submarine forces continue to make
Spetsnaz, receive priority for professionalization and the
advances in both manufacturing and capabilities, deploying
first pick of conscripts (the VDV is about 30% conscript
new nuclear-powered ballistic submarines, nuclear-powered
based). Consisting of around 45,000 troops, Russia’s
cruise missile submarines, and diesel-electric attack
airborne divisions are organized into two airborne divisions,
submarines.
two air assault divisions, four independent air assault
brigades, and an elite Spetsnaz reconnaissance regiment.
Organized into four fleets (Northern, Pacific, Black Sea,
However, Russia’s limited air transport capabilities mean
and Baltic) and one flotilla (Caspian), the Russian Navy’s
most units focus on air assault, with armored vehicles and
primary objectives are sea denial and protecting Russia’s
reintroduced tank battalions. Two divisions focus on
submarine-based nuclear deterrent. Recognizing resource
strategic-level parachute operations.
and shipbuilding constraints, Russia’s Navy focuses on
littoral defense, with limited expeditionary capabilities.
Additional Resources
Russian Military Capability in a Ten Year Perspective-
The Northern and Pacific fleets are home to Russia’s
2019, eds. Fredrik Westerlund and Susanne Oxenstierna
nuclear submarine force. The Northern Fleet is the most
(Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency FOI,
advanced, with responsibility for the Arctic and the
2019); Defense Intelligence Agency, Russia Military
Northern MD/OSK. Additionally, since Russia’s
Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power
occupation of Ukraine’s Crimea region, the Black Sea Fleet
Aspirations, 2017; Keith Crane, Olga Oliker, and Brian
has grown in size and capabilities and has contributed most
Nichiporuk, Trends in Russia’s Armed Forces: An
of the ships to the Navy’s Mediterranean task force.
Overview of Budgets and Capabilities, RAND, Santa
Monica, CA, 2019.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Russian Armed Forces: Capabilities
Andrew S. Bowen, Analyst in Russian and European
Affairs
IF11589
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permissio n of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11589 · VERSION 1 · NEW
June 30, 2020
Russian Armed Forces: Capabilities
Since 2008, Russia has sought to modernize its military and
increased, along with upgrading heavy artillery, missile
engaged in several armed interventions outside its borders.
artillery, and electronic warfare units. Additional priorities
The 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy prioritizes “long-
have included reconnaissance, communication, and the
term strategic competition” with Russia (and China). To
creation of permanently ready units at full staffing levels.
help guide policymaking in response to challenges posed by
Ground forces emphasize mobility and are increasingly
Russia, Members of Congress may have an interest in
capable of conducting short but complex, high-tempo
assessing the capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces.
operations. At the same time, Russian ground forces
This report briefly describes Russia’s current military
continue to rely on conscription, multiple types of similar
capabilities, including strengths and weaknesses.
equipment, and relatively limited personnel and units to
guard Russia’s expansive borders.
Defense Budget and State Armament
Plan
Russian ground forces are organized into 11 combined arms
Official figures suggest Russia’s military expenditures have
armies, one tank army, and four army corps. Russia’s most
ranged between $60 billion and $65 billion a year, or
advanced capabilities are in the Western Military District,
roughly 4% of its gross domestic product (GDP). However,
and the Southern Military District appears to have the most
the extent of defense spending may be greater if assessed on
competent units. Russian units exhibit a mixture of division
the basis of purchasing power parity rather than market
and brigade structures; brigades are utilized primarily in
exchange rates.
regions or areas where full divisions would be unwieldy.
Both generate ad hoc, task-specific Battalion Tactical
Russia’s long-term defense spending priorities are detailed
Groups, which have artillery and air defense units attached
in State Armament Plans (GPVs), which run in 10-year
and can be combined with other units as needed. Even with
increments. GPV 2020, which ran from 2011 to 2020,
a focus on permanent readiness, however, only a few
focused on increasing the military’s overall share of
subunits can be considered deployable.
modernized equipment to 70%. The newest plan, GPV
2027, calls for total spending of about $330 billion (in 2018
Recruiting professional soldiers has been a priority.
dollars) and 3%-4% of GDP from 2018 to 2027.
Conscription is unpopular and, at 12 months, considered too
short by the Russian military to effectively train new
Command and Control
conscripts. Most conscripts occupy secondary support roles,
Russian military reforms have emphasized the streamlining
although in most maneuver units conscripts comprise up to
of command and control structures. Russian forces are
one-third of personnel.
organized into five military districts (MDs) and
operational/joint strategic commands (OSK; see Figure 1).
The Russian military’s experiences in Ukraine and Syria
Russia also has created a Moscow-based central command
have reaffirmed for it the importance of massed artillery,
center, the National Defense Management Center.
rocket fire, and armored forces. However, ground forces
have been a relatively low funding priority in Russia’s
Figure 1. Russian Federation Military Districts
modernization; most of these efforts went into upgrading
existing platforms, which decreased standardization across
units and increased maintenance costs.
Aerospace Forces
The Aerospace Forces (VKS) combine Air Force, Air
Defense, Space Forces, and Army Aviation. Alongside the
Navy, Aerospace Forces received top priority during GPV
2020, allowing for the introduction of new and upgraded
legacy systems, including substantially improved missiles
and precision-guided munitions. Additionally, effort has
gone into expanding training and flight times for pilots and
Source: Russian Ministry of Defence.
air crews.
Notes: The Southern MD/OSK is responsible for Ukraine’s occupied
Crimea region.
Russia’s air forces feature numerous types of capable
fighters, fighter interceptors, and tactical bombers. Russia’s
Ground Forces
intervention in Syria has given the Aerospace Forces
Over the last decade, Russia has significantly changed its
significant operational experience and has been used as a
ground forces. Recruiting professional soldiers has
testing ground for new capabilities, including precision-
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Russian Armed Forces: Capabilities
strike and air-launched cruise missiles by both tactical and
Coastal Defense Troops
long-range assets.
The Navy is responsible for Coastal Defense Artillery units
and Marine Infantry. Coastal Defense Artillery units are
The development of fifth-generation fighters has run into
designed and equipped to protect Russia’s ports and
considerable production and design challenges, and Russia
coastlines. They are equipped with a variety of mobile and
lags significantly behind the U.S. in precision strike/bomb
stationary artillery, as well as advanced anti-ship missiles.
capabilities. Russia’s strategic bomber force (Long Range
Aviation) has continued to operate with heavily modernized
Each fleet commands at least one brigade of Naval Infantry
Soviet-era bombers. Additionally, Russia’s long-range
(around 10,000-12,500 troops total). These brigades are
transport capabilities remain limited, restricting the rapid
almost completely professionally manned, are considered
movement of ground or airborne forces.
an elite force, and form part of Russia’s rapid reaction and
intervention forces. Naval Infantry forces are similarly
Strategic air defenses are controlled by the Aerospace
equipped to and structured like other Russian ground force
Forces. VKS systems are responsible for defending critical
units, with reintroduced tank battalions, but few landing
infrastructure and strategic targets. They are separate from
ships mean they have a limited amphibious capability.
Ground Forces air defense units (PVO), which provide air
defense to maneuver units. Combined, these systems form
Spetsnaz and Special Operations
what many analysts consider to be a formidable integrated
Command
air defense system, although some contend that its
Spetsnaz are Russia’s elite light infantry force, responsible
purported capabilities are inflated.
for long-range battlefield reconnaissance and sabotage, as
well as overseeing local allied units in eastern Ukraine and
Navy
Syria. They are considered a strategic-level asset under the
The Russian Navy benefited from relatively high funding
Main Directorate of the General Staff, although they are
levels during GPV 2020, allowing it to introduce new s hips,
deployed under the command of local military districts.
submarines, and precision-strike capabilities after years of
Totaling around 17,000 troops, they are organized into
limited funding. Shipbuilding has prioritized smaller
seven regular Independent Special Designation Brigades.
warships with high levels of firepower, often with modular
Despite efforts to fully professionalize, Spetsnaz units are
or multipurpose designs, allowing for flexibility. In
still composed of some conscripts, although they, along
particular, the Russian Navy has focused on developing
with the Airborne and Air Assault Troops (VDV), have
long-range and precision-strike capabilities. Most of
their first pick of conscripts.
Russia’s larger surface ships are over 30 years old and
undergoing various retrofits to extend their service life as
The Russian military’s tier-one Special Forces unit is the
Russia’s shipbuilding industry struggles to produce ships
Special Operations Forces Command, built around the 346th
over 7,000 tons. As a result, Russia increasingly relies on
Independent Spetsnaz Brigade. This unit was modeled on
heavily armed frigates as its primary surface combatants.
Western Special Forces and represents Russia’s most
These ships are equipped with Vertical Launch Systems to
capable intervention force.
house an array of hypersonic anti-ship missiles, cruise
missiles, and antisubmarine missiles. However, this is not
Airborne and Air Assault Troops
without complications, as Russia has struggled to produce
Russia’s airborne and air assault troops represent some of
engines since its relationship with Ukrainian producers was
Russia’s most capable units. Considered a strategic asset
severed in 2014. Even with high levels of funding, Russia’s
under the command of the General Staff, they are well-
production of new surface ships has fallen far short of
equipped, have the highest state of readiness, and, like
initial plans. Russia’s submarine forces continue to make
Spetsnaz, receive priority for professionalization and the
advances in both manufacturing and capabilities, deploying
first pick of conscripts (the VDV is about 30% conscript
new nuclear-powered ballistic submarines, nuclear-powered
based). Consisting of around 45,000 troops, Russia’s
cruise missile submarines, and diesel-electric attack
airborne divisions are organized into two airborne divisions,
submarines.
two air assault divisions, four independent air assault
brigades, and an elite Spetsnaz reconnaissance regiment.
Organized into four fleets (Northern, Pacific, Black Sea,
However, Russia’s limited air transport capabilities mean
and Baltic) and one flotilla (Caspian), the Russian Navy’s
most units focus on air assault, with armored vehicles and
primary objectives are sea denial and protecting Russia’s
reintroduced tank battalions. Two divisions focus on
submarine-based nuclear deterrent. Recognizing resource
strategic-level parachute operations.
and shipbuilding constraints, Russia’s Navy focuses on
littoral defense, with limited expeditionary capabilities.
Additional Resources
Russian Military Capability in a Ten Year Perspective-
The Northern and Pacific fleets are home to Russia’s
2019, eds. Fredrik Westerlund and Susanne Oxenstierna
nuclear submarine force. The Northern Fleet is the most
(Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency FOI,
advanced, with responsibility for the Arctic and the
2019); Defense Intelligence Agency, Russia Military
Northern MD/OSK. Additionally, since Russia’s
Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power
occupation of Ukraine’s Crimea region, the Black Sea Fleet
Aspirations, 2017; Keith Crane, Olga Oliker, and Brian
has grown in size and capabilities and has contributed most
Nichiporuk, Trends in Russia’s Armed Forces: An
of the ships to the Navy’s Mediterranean task force.
Overview of Budgets and Capabilities, RAND, Santa
Monica, CA, 2019.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Russian Armed Forces: Capabilities
Andrew S. Bowen, Analyst in Russian and European
Affairs
IF11589
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permissio n of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11589 · VERSION 1 · NEW