The Army’s AimPoint and Army 2030 Force Structure Initiatives
Updated January 31, 2022
The Army’s AimPoint and Army 2030 Force Structure
Initiatives
Background
in Europe. As the name indicates, Air-Land Battle is
The 2018 National Military Strategy described how the
primarily based on operations in the air and land domains.
U.S. military was to defend the homeland and retain its
However, competitors now possess increasingly capable
competitive advantage to deter competitors and defeat
anti-access and area denial strategies, meant to separate the
adversaries, whether great power competitors like China
Joint Force physically and functionally and alliances
and Russia or from other security challenges. It was a
politically. Furthermore, near-peer competitors are capable
fundamental departure from other National Military
of securing strategic objectives by means other than armed
Strategies post-September 11, 2001, which focused on
conflict with the United States and its allies. More
counterinsurgency and defeating violent extremist
importantly, the Army can no longer guarantee dominance
organizations. In essence, the 2018 National Military
over a near-peer threat—an advantage that the United States
Strategy refocused the Army from fighting
has held for decades. Unlike Air-Land Battle, MDO
counterinsurgencies and violent extremist organizations to
addresses the notion that competition and conflict occur in
countering and possibly confronting Russian and Chinese
multiple domains (land, air, sea, cyber, and space). The
military forces. The Army’s 2020 AimPoint initiative was
Army intends to achieve a full MDO capability by 2035.
intended to be the means by which to build the force
structure needed to implement the 2018 National Military
Major Aspects of AimPoint Force
Strategy’s new focus.
Structure Initiative
The primary means by which the Army intended to build its
Previous Army Force
MDO capability was through what it called the AimPoint
Structure Construct
Force Structure Initiative. The AimPoint Force developed
During the Cold War, the U.S. Army was primarily a
by the Army Futures Command’s (AFC’s) Army Futures
division-centric force whereby divisions, consisting of a
and Concepts Center was to be a flexible force structure.
mix of specialized brigades, battalions, and companies,
While little change was expected at brigade level and
were the primary warfighting organization. Within the
below, the Army suggested major changes would occur at
division, the commander controlled a variety of assets such
higher echelons—division, corps, and theater command.
as artillery, engineers, and logistical units that could be
Under MDO, higher field headquarters would be required
assigned to subordinate infantry or armored brigades as the
to take the lead in coordinating large-scale campaigns
tactical situation required. Divisions were part of corps,
against well-armed nation-states such as Russia and China.
which also had their own organic units such as artillery and
Because of the geographic distinctions between the
engineers that the corps commander could allocate to
European and Indo-Pacific theaters, individual higher-
divisions to support operations.
echelon AimPoint formation force structure might differ by
theater as opposed to current one-size-fits-all units.
In the early 2000s, as the Army became committed to long-
term counterinsurgency combat operations in Iraq and
Major Proposed Force
Afghanistan, Army units would rotate in and out of these
Structure Initiatives
theaters on an annual basis. Based on observations of how
The following sections provide a description of some of
these rotations affected soldiers and units, Army leadership
AimPoint’s major proposed force structure changes.
determined that the division-centric force was not the best
structure to support a rotational force.
Division, Corps, and Theater Level
The Army notes that over the past 20 to 30 years, the
In September 2003, the U.S. Army began converting from
capacity to conduct campaigns at the division, corps, and
an organization centered on divisions (numbering from
theater level was “mortgaged” (i.e., assets and units at these
10,000 to 18,000 soldiers) to a force based upon brigade
levels were assigned to BCTs). Under AimPoint,
combat teams (BCTs) of around 4,000 soldiers. This new
headquarters at these levels would be developed and
brigade-centric force, known as the modular force, assigned
existing ones modified to build back a campaign capability
a number of division-level assets to the newly formed
(i.e., adding additional staff, specialists, capabilities, and
BCTs, thereby lessening the operational and tactical roles
units) to compete with near-peer adversaries and to employ
of the division.
information warfare and operate in the cyber and space
domains.
Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)
According to the Army, current conventional warfighting
As part of AimPoint, the Army announced on February 11,
doctrine is still largely based on the Air-Land Battle
2020, the activation of a fourth corps headquarters,
concept developed in 1981 to counter Warsaw Pact forces
designated Fifth Corps (V Corps) located at Fort Knox, KY.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
The Army’s AimPoint and Army 2030 Force Structure Initiatives
The V Corps Headquarters consists of approximately 635
Plan to Reorganize into Army 2030
soldiers, of which approximately 200 support a rotational
Arguably, the Army’s January 2022 plan to create five new
operational command post in Poland. The Army also
types of divisions is a significant organizational
planned under AimPoint to develop an unknown number of
undertaking, not unlike its 2003 decision to convert from a
new Theater Fires Commands intended to coordinate long-
division-based force to a brigade-based force. In essence,
range fires of Army missile and extended-range artillery
under Army 2030 the Army is returning to its original
systems and units presently under development.
division-based force structure apparently based on a
decision by Army leadership without much known public
Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTF)
examination or discussion.
To facilitate the conduct of MDO, under AimPoint, the
Army is currently creating five Multi-Domain Task Forces
Potential issues for policymakers include the following:
(MDTF). Based on a Field Artillery (FA) brigade and
How does Army 2030 support the anticipated 2022
augmented with an intelligence, information operations,
National Security Strategy?
cyber, electronic warfare and space (I2CEWS) detachment,
the first MDTF was established as a pilot program in 2017
What is the Army’s overall plan to achieve this force
and assigned to U.S. Army Pacific Command. The MDTF’s
redesign initiative?
mission is to penetrate an enemy environment, employing
assets that can counter enemy A2/AD capabilities and
What is the Army’s unit conversion timeline, and how
enemy network-focused targeting of U.S. units.
many units per year will be modified under the Army
2030 force construct?
Long-Range Artillery and Missiles
How will these changes affect existing units, and will
Under the auspices of AFC and AimPoint, the Army is
the Army activate new units?
developing long-range precision fires units and systems.
Systems under development include a new Precision Strike
How does Army 2030 affect the mission, organization,
Missile, or PrSM, which employs existing launchers and is
and force structure of the Army National Guard and
to be capable of achieving greater ranges than current
Army Reserve?
systems. The Army is also developing an Extended Range
How will Army 2030 affect basing, both in the United
Cannon Artillery (ERCA) system to provide division-level
States and overseas? Will bases be closed, downsized,
indirect fires. The Army plans to create a number of longer-
or expanded/modified?
range missile units, including Long Range Hypersonic
Weapon (LRHW) units as well as Mid-Range Missile units
How does Army 2030 affect overall Army
using, wherever possible, existing missiles modified for
modernization plans?
ground launch.
Will Army 2030 require additional Active and Reserve
Aim Point Becomes Army 2030
endstrength, or will endstrength be reduced?
In January 2022, Army officials reportedly redesignated the
Estimated Costs for Army 2030
Aim Point imitative (which had been re-named “Way Point
Army 2030 potentially represents a significant
2028” in 2021) to “Army 2030.” Under Army 2030, the
reorganization of Army combat forces and likely carries
Army envisions either redesignating existing divisions or
with it appreciable direct and indirect costs. What are the
creating new divisions into five new types of divisions:
estimated costs for Army 2030 annually and over relevant
Standard Light,
Future Years Defense Programs (FYDPs)? How does the
Army envision paying for these organizational changes and
Standard Heavy,
associated costs, given its current ambitious modernization
Penetration,
plan which consists of, among other things, a replacement
for the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle, as well as costly
Joint Force Entry Air Assault, and
requirements for new hypersonic weapons and other long-
Joint Force Entry Airborne.
range precision fires capabilities?
Standard light and heavy divisions are to be organized more
Additional References
flexibly than the joint forced entry and penetration divisions
by having different numbers and combinations of BCTs.
CRS Insight: CRS Insight IN11019, The U.S. Army and
Multi-Domain Operations, by Andrew Feickert.
The 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions could potentially
serve as the Army’s two joint force entry divisions. Most
Stryker BCTs would be incorporated into standard heavy
CRS In Focus IF11797, The Army’s Multi-Domain Task
Force (MDTF), by Andrew Feickert.
divisions, but Stryker BCTs could also augment standard
light divisions as well.
Potential Issues for Congress
Potential issues for Congress include but are not limited to
Andrew Feickert, Specialist in Military Ground Forces
the following:
IF11542
https://crsreports.congress.gov
The Army’s AimPoint and Army 2030 Force Structure Initiatives
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11542 · VERSION 2 · UPDATED