 
  
Updated September 12, 2023
U.S.-South Korea Alliance: Issues for Congress
Background 
uncertainty about U.S. security guarantees and heightened 
South Korea (officially the Republic of Korea, or ROK) is 
sense of vulnerability, some South Koreans have advocated 
one of the United States’ most important military and 
that the United State redeploy tactical nuclear weapons to 
economic partners in Asia. The U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense 
the country (the United States withdrew nuclear weapons 
Treaty, signed in 1953 at the end of the Korean War, 
from the Korean Peninsula in 1991). Some public opinion 
commits the United States to help South Korea defend 
polls suggest that a strong majority of South Koreans 
itself, particularly from North Korea (officially the 
support developing a domestic nuclear weapons capability.  
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK). The 
U.S. military has maintained a large troop presence in 
In an apparent bid to reassure South Koreans skeptical of 
South Korea since the end of the Korean War. Currently, 
U.S. extended deterrence (the ability and commitment to 
approximately 28,500 U.S. troops are based in the ROK, 
deter nuclear threats against allies, sometimes referred to as 
predominately U.S. Army personnel. Most U.S. troops in 
the “nuclear umbrella”), the two governments issued what 
the ROK are stationed at Camp Humphreys, which 
they called the “Washington Declaration” during Yoon’s 
underwent a major expansion in the 2010s and is the largest 
April 2023 State Visit. The declaration articulated a pledge 
U.S. overseas military base in the world. The tools 
to enhance bilateral planning, exercises, and other 
Congress uses to oversee and influence the U.S.-ROK 
consultations related to nuclear deterrence. It also 
include annual authorization and appropriations bills, 
established a Nuclear Consultative Group, which met for 
particularly the National Defense Authorization Act 
the first time in June 2023. The Nuclear Consultative Group 
(NDAA), and annual House and Senate Armed Service 
is intended to align and advance efforts to bolster 
Committee hearings involving the commander of U.S. 
deterrence against DPRK nuclear threats, with a particular 
Forces Korea. 
emphasis on joint planning for ROK conventional support 
to U.S. nuclear operations and on enhancing the visibility of 
Major Alliance Developments since 2022 
U.S. “strategic asset deployments” to the Peninsula. 
The Biden Administration has committed to reinvigorate 
Questions remain about the implementation and durability 
the alliance and has found a willing partner in South Korean 
of the Washington Declaration as South Koreans continue 
President Yoon Suk-yeol, elected in March 2022. The 
to debate the country’s future relationship to nuclear 
alliance had been strained during the Trump 
weapons. 
Administration: President Trump’s periodic references to 
withdrawing U.S. troops from the Peninsula, his criticism 
The Camp David Trilateral Summit and the Future 
of the value of alliances more broadly, and the expiration of 
of the U.S.-South Korea-Japan Relationship 
a burden-sharing deal in 2019 raised questions in South 
In August 2023, Biden hosted Yoon and Japanese Prime 
Korea about U.S. security commitments. Shortly after 
Minister Fumio Kishida at Camp David for the first-ever 
Biden took office, the two sides concluded a new cost-
standalone summit meeting between the leaders of the 
sharing arrangement. 
United States, Japan, and South Korea. At the meeting, the 
three leaders announced several initiatives for a “new era of 
The Biden and Yoon administrations have advanced several 
trilateral partnership.” They agreed to: institutionalize 
initiatives to strengthen the alliance and commemorate its 
trilateral meetings at high levels, including an annual 
70th anniversary in 2023. Whereas the alliance traditionally 
leaders’ meeting to coordinate Indo-Pacific strategy; 
has been focused on deterring North Korea and preparing 
establish a three-way hotline for crisis response; and expand 
for a potential attack from the North, the alliance has 
trilateral military exercises. Biden praised Yoon and 
widened its scope to cooperate on other regional and global 
Kishida’s “courageous leadership in transforming relations 
issues. In April 2023, Biden hosted Yoon for a State Visit, 
between Japan and the ROK,” which have been perennially 
and Yoon addressed a joint meeting of Congress. Since 
fraught because of a territorial dispute and sensitive 
2022, the alliance also has re-started and expanded large-
historical issues stemming from Japan’s colonization of the 
scale bilateral military exercises. South Korea has joined 
Korean Peninsula from 1910 to 1945. Some observers 
the international campaign to pressure Russia through 
question whether this unprecedented arrangement, which 
sanctions and support for Ukraine, and has worked 
the main ROK opposition party opposes, will survive 
vigorously to improve frayed ties with Japan.   
beyond the administrations of the current leaders. 
The Washington Declaration and the Future of 
Military Exercises and the DPRK 
Extended Deterrence 
The threat from North Korea has framed the alliance since 
Since 2013, multiple North Korean nuclear weapon tests 
its formation. (For more on the DPRK, see CRS In Focus 
and missile tests have sharpened the DPRK’s threat to 
IF10472, 
North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile 
South Korea. In a sign of South Koreans’ increased 
Programs, and CRS In Focus IF10246, 
U.S.-North Korea 
https://crsreports.congress.gov 

U.S.-South Korea Alliance: Issues for Congress 
Relations.) Since the 1950s, the U.S. and ROK militaries 
U.S. and ROK civilian authorities; neither side would 
have conducted regular bilateral exercises to enhance their 
relinquish command authority over their own troops. 
capability as a joint force. The exercises facilitate readiness 
and operational cohesion, but can also contribute to 
The OPCON transfer, announced in 2006, twice delayed, 
tensions on the Peninsula. Pyongyang has responded 
and now on an indefinite “conditions-based” timeline, 
angrily to drills, calling them “preparation for war.” When 
would reflect the ROK’s advances in military strength since 
the United States and South Korea have pursued diplomacy 
the Korean War and is seen by many South Koreans as an 
with Pyongyang, the alliance sometimes has scaled back 
important tenet of ROK sovereignty. Yoon’s predecessor  
military activities. For example, following the 2018 summit 
Moon Jae-in had prioritized the transfer; Yoon reportedly 
with North Korean Leader Kim Jong-un, then-President 
has not pressed as forcefully to accelerate the transfer. In 
Trump cancelled large-scale military exercises. In 2022, the 
general, more progressive leaders (such as Moon) have 
U.S. and ROK resumed large-scale in-person exercises.  
favored greater autonomy for South Korea, and the ROK 
military, within the alliance; conservative leaders have 
Figure 1. U.S. Military Bases in South Korea  
tended to be more comfortable with the status quo. 
ROK Defense and Military Issues 
In 2022, South Korea was the world’s 9th-largest defense 
spender; spending about 2.7% of its GDP on defense. In 
August 2023, the ROK Ministry of National Defense 
announced a proposed 2024 defense budget of around $45 
billion. If approved, this would represent a year-on-year 
increase of 4.5%, marking a slight slowdown in growth 
compared to general trends over the past decade. The ROK 
is among the top purchasers of U.S. Foreign Military Sales 
(FMS). From FY2018 to FY2022, FMS to South Korea 
totaled $7.67 billion, making it the ninth-largest purchaser 
during those years according to DOD’s historical sales data. 
 
Source: Amber Wilhelm (CRS).  
South Korea has a mature defense industry itself, funded in 
part by massive increases in the value of defense exports 
Cost-Sharing Negotiations  
since the mid-2000s. From 2018 to 2022, South Korea was 
Since 1991, South Korea has provided financial support to 
the world’s 9th-largest exporter of major arms. The ROK 
the alliance through periodically re-negotiated Special 
government prohibits lethal weapons transfers to countries 
Measures Agreements (SMAs) to offset the cost of 
at war, but faces growing U.S. pressure to send arms to 
stationing U.S. forces in Korea. SMA negotiations became 
Ukraine. In 2023, Seoul reportedly began transferring 
particularly contentious during the Trump Administration, 
500,000 artillery rounds to the United States, which planned 
which requested steep increases in ROK contributions. 
to send them to Ukraine. The previous year, South Korea 
Amid the impasse, the previous SMA expired in December 
struck its largest-ever arms deal, selling tanks, aircraft, and 
2019, leading to the furlough of about 4,500 Koreans who 
other items reportedly valued at $13.7 billion to Poland; 
worked on U.S. bases. After Biden’s 2021 inauguration, the 
some of the equipment replaces weapons Poland had 
two sides concluded a new five-year SMA, removing an 
transferred to Ukraine from its own stocks. 
irritant to the relationship. Under the agreement, South 
Korea is to pay about $1 billion annually, representing an 
Congress’s Role in the Alliance 
increase of about 13.9% over previous SMAs. 
Support for the alliance has been bipartisan, and Congress 
has acted to restrain the executive branch’s ability to make 
In the past, South Korea generally paid for 40%-50% (over 
major changes to force structure on the Peninsula. For 
$800 million annually) of the total non-personnel costs of 
example, the NDAAs for FYs 2020 and 2021 (P.L. 116-92 
maintaining the U.S. troop presence in South Korea. ROK 
and P.L. 116-283) prohibited the use of funds to reduce 
payments—a combination of in-kind and cash 
U.S. forces deployed to South Korea below 28,500 until 90 
contributions—fall into three categories: labor (salaries for 
days after the Secretary of Defense certifies to Congress (1) 
the Koreans who work on U.S. bases); logistics; and 
that such a reduction is in the U.S. national interest and will 
construction (by ROK firms for U.S. facilities). The ROK 
not significantly undermine the security the U.S. allies in 
government spent $9.7 billion, or about 90% of the total 
the region and (2) that regional U.S. allies have been 
cost, of the expansion of Camp Humphreys.  
“appropriately consulted” on the proposed reduction. The 
Senate-amended version of an FY2024 NDAA 
Wartime Operational Control (OPCON)  (incorporating S. 2226 into H.R. 2670) would require a 
The alliance plans to transfer wartime operational control of 
report on the conditions under which wartime OPCON 
the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC) to an 
would be transferred to the ROK and an assessment of the 
ROK commander, with a U.S. deputy. Under the current 
ROK’s progress toward meeting those conditions. 
decades-long arrangement, designated ROK military units 
would be under a U.S. commander—and a South Korean 
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Specialist in Asian Affairs   
deputy commander—in the event of war on the Peninsula. 
Caitlin Campbell, Analyst in Asian Affairs  
If wartime OPCON is transferred, a South Korean 
commander would become CFC head, answering to both 
https://crsreports.congress.gov 
U.S.-South Korea Alliance: Issues for Congress 
 
IF11388
Christina L. Arabia, Analyst in Security Assistance, 
Security Cooperation and the Global Arms Trade    
 
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11388 · VERSION 5 · UPDATED