International Discussions Concerning Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems
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Updated February 14, 2023
International Discussions Concerning Lethal Autonomous
Weapon Systems
Lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), or weapons
International Forum for LAWS Discussions
designed to independently select and engage targets without
The international community examines the implications of
the need for manual human control, could enable military
LAWS in discussions held primarily under the auspices of
operations in communications-degraded or -denied
the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional
environments where traditional systems may not be able to
Weapons (CCW), a multilateral arms control agreement to
operate. LAWS are not yet in widespread development.
which the United States became a party in 1982. The
However, as technology advances—particularly artificial
CCW’s purpose is to “ban or restrict the use of specific
intelligence (AI)—a larger number of countries may
types of weapons that are considered to cause unnecessary
consider developing and operating LAWS. This could hold
or unjustifiable suffering to combatants or to affect civilians
potential implications for congressional oversight, defense
indiscriminately.”
investments, military concepts of operations, treaty-making,
Since 2014, the CCW has convened annual meetings of
and the future of warfare.
States Parties, observers, and members of civil society to
Furthermore, incorporation of new technology into
discuss the legal, ethical, technological, and military facets
weapons systems could create a number of potential legal,
of LAWS. These meetings were elevated in 2017 from
ethical, strategic, and operational challenges. For this
informal Meetings of Experts to a formal Group of
reason, some members of the international community seek
Government Experts (GGE). After each session of the
through international discussions to constrain—if not ban—
GGE, the session’s chair produces a draft report that details
LAWS.
session proceedings and offers conclusions and
recommendations for future work. States Parties then adopt
What Are LAWS?
the final report by consensus.
Definitions. No single, universally accepted definition of
In 2019, States Parties additionally agreed to a set of
LAWS is used in international discussions. However,
“guiding principles” for LAWS. States Parties agreed that
Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, which
international humanitarian law (IHL) would apply to
establishes U.S. policy on autonomy in weapons systems,
defines LAWS as “weapon system[s] that, once activated,
LAWS, that humans must remain responsible for decisions
about the use of force, and that states must consider the
can select and engage targets without further intervention
risks of LAWS acquisition by, or proliferation to, terrorists.
by an operator.” This definition’s principal characteristic is
the role of the operator with regard to target selection and
Table 1. State Stances on Preemptive LAWS Ban
engagement decisions.
Support
Opposeb
Otherc
Other countries, however, have grounded their definition of
Algeria
Holy See
Australia
China
LAWS on different characteristics, in particular the
Argentina
Iraq
France
technological sophistication of the weapon system, such
Austria
Jordan
Germany
Bolivia
Mexico
India
that LAWS are considered to be weapon systems capable of
Brazil
Morocco
Israel
human-level cognition. Still others do not believe that a
Chile
Namibia
Russia
definition of LAWS is required—or desirable—for
Colombia
New Zealand
South Korea
international discussions. Despite these differences, most
Costa Rica
Nicaragua
Spain
parties to the LAWS discussions generally agree that the
Cuba
Pakistan
Turkey
defining features of LAWS include full autonomy (no
Djibouti
Panama
United
manual human control of the system) and the potential to
Ecuador
Peru
Kingdom
produce lethal effects.
Egypta
Uganda
United States
El Salvador
Venezuela
Status. Although the pursuit of LAWS is not yet
Ghanaa
Zimbabwea
widespread, some analysts have argued that Israel’s Harpy
Guatemala
loitering munition—which the weapon’s manufacturer, IAI,
Source: CRS consolidation of data from multiple sources.
describes as being fully autonomous—qualifies. Israel has
Notes: CCW discussions on LAWS exclude existing weapons
exported the Harpy to Chile, China, India, South Korea, and
systems. Therefore, States Parties consider any potential LAWS ban
Turkey. Similarly, former Secretary of Defense Mark Esper
to be preemptive.
has noted that Chinese manufacturer Ziyan has advertised a
a. State is not party to the CCW.
fully autonomous system, the Blowfish A3 helicopter
b. States that oppose a preemptive LAWS ban do not necessarily
drone, which it has reportedly exported to the Middle East.
share the same alternative approach to managing LAWS.
In addition, according to a report by the Defense Innovation
c. See section below on China.
Board, the United States developed LAWS during the
1980s but no longer has LAWS in its inventory.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
link to page 1 International Discussions Concerning Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems
Debate About Approaches to Managing LAWS
Alternative Approaches to Managing LAWS. Other
The CCW has considered proposals to ban LAWS, as well
states have proposed that the CCW instead focus on
as proposals to regulate or issue political declarations about
enhancing transparency in weapons development and
them. CCW States Parties have not reached a consensus on
sharing best practices for weapons review processes. France
which of these approaches, if any, they will adopt.
and Germany, for example, have proposed issuing a non-
legally binding political declaration that would affirm that
Arguments Supporting Preemptive LAWS Ban. In
international humanitarian law applies to LAWS and that
addition to the states listed in Table 1, approximately 165
“[States Parties] share the conviction that humans should
nongovernmental organizations have called for a
continue to be able to make ultimate decisions with regard
preemptive ban on LAWS due to ethical concerns. These
to the use of lethal force and should continue to exert
concerns include a perceived lack of accountability for use
sufficient control over lethal weapons systems they use.”
and a perceived inability to comply with the proportionality
Similarly, the United States has proposed a nonbinding
and distinction requirements of IHL. Some analysts have
Code of Conduct to “help States promote responsible
also raised concerns about LAWS’s potential operational
behavior and compliance with international law.” France
risks. For example, Center for a New American Security
and Germany have additionally proposed the establishment
analyst Paul Scharre has noted that risks could arise from
“hacking, enemy behavioral manipulation, unexpected
of a consultative committee of technical experts to advise
the CCW on relevant technological developments.
interactions with the environment, or simple malfunctions
or software errors” and could potentially result in civilian or
Positions of the United States, Russia, and China
noncombatant casualties. Although such risks could be
Although the CCW operates by consensus, the United
present in automated systems, they could be heightened in
States, Russia, and China—as leading military powers—are
autonomous systems, in which the human operator would
likely to be particularly influential in determining the
be unable to physically intervene to terminate
trajectory of international discussions of LAWS.
engagements—potentially resulting in wider-scale or more
numerous instances of fratricide, civilian casualties, or
United States. The U.S. delegation to the CCW has
other unintended consequences.
consistently opposed any preemptive ban on LAWS,
arguing that LAWS could potentially provide a
Those supporting a preemptive ban on LAWS have
humanitarian benefit and that existing IHL is sufficient to
additionally appealed to the Martens Clause, which appears
govern the development and use of LAWS.
in the 1899 Hague Convention preamble and states that
weapons use should conform to the “principles of humanity
Russia. The Russian delegation to the CCW has also
and the dictates of the public conscience.” These analysts
opposed a preemptive ban on LAWS, noting that LAWS
believe that LAWS contravene that requirement; however,
could “ensure the increased accuracy of weapon guidance
others have noted that the Martens Clause has not been used
on military targets, while contributing to lower rate of
previously to ban a weapons system and, furthermore, that
unintentional strikes against civilians and civilian targets.”
the legal status of the Martens Clause is questionable and
It has also argued there is no proper legal precedent for a
instead constitutes “merely a recognition of ‘customary
preemptive international ban on an entire class of weapons.
international law.’”
China. The Chinese delegation has stated that China
Arguments Opposing Preemptive LAWS Ban. A number
supports a ban on the use—but not development—of
of countries have voiced their opposition to a preemptive
LAWS, which it defines to be indiscriminate, lethal systems
ban on LAWS. These countries have noted the potential
that do not have any human oversight and cannot be
military utility of LAWS, which could operate in
terminated. China is the only country that defines LAWS in
communications-degraded or -denied environments where
this manner, and analysts note that such a weapon would be
traditional systems may not be able to operate. LAWS
unable to comply with IHL and therefore would be
could also potentially enable new concepts of operations,
inherently illegal. Some analysts have argued that China is
such as swarming, in which large formations of
maintaining “strategic ambiguity” about its position on
autonomous vehicles could be deployed to overwhelm
LAWS.
defensive systems. (Some proponents of a ban have argued
Potential Questions for Congress
that swarms of autonomous vehicles could alternatively
provide states or terrorist organizations with comparatively
Is the executive branch keeping Congress adequately
inexpensive weapons of mass destruction.)
informed about developments, both international and
domestic, concerning LAWS and their regulation?
Countries opposing a preemptive ban have additionally
What role should the United States play in UN CCW
noted the potential humanitarian benefits of LAWS, which
discussions of LAWS? Should the United States support
may be able to “strike military objectives more accurately
the status quo, propose a political declaration, or
and with less risk of collateral damage or civilian
advocate regulation of or a ban on LAWS?
casualties” than traditional systems. These countries
contend that human operators will remain accountable for
To what extent are potential U.S. adversaries developing
the deployment of the systems and for ensuring that the
LAWS? How, if at all, should this affect U.S. LAWS
systems’ use complies with IHL. Finally, some countries
and counter-LAWS research and development or the
United States’
are concerned that a preemptive ban on LAWS could
UN CCW position on LAWS?
inhibit research into technologies that may provide civilian
Kelley M. Sayler, Analyst in Advanced Technology and
benefits (e.g. elder care robots).
Global Security
https://crsreports.congress.gov
International Discussions Concerning Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems
IF11294
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11294 · VERSION 6 · UPDATED
Updated February 14, 2023
International Discussions Concerning Lethal Autonomous
Weapon Systems
Lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), or weapons
International Forum for LAWS Discussions
designed to independently select and engage targets without
The international community examines the implications of
the need for manual human control, could enable military
LAWS in discussions held primarily under the auspices of
operations in communications-degraded or -denied
the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional
environments where traditional systems may not be able to
Weapons (CCW), a multilateral arms control agreement to
operate. LAWS are not yet in widespread development.
which the United States became a party in 1982. The
However, as technology advances—particularly artificial
CCW’s purpose is to “ban or restrict the use of specific
intelligence (AI)—a larger number of countries may
types of weapons that are considered to cause unnecessary
consider developing and operating LAWS. This could hold
or unjustifiable suffering to combatants or to affect civilians
potential implications for congressional oversight, defense
indiscriminately.”
investments, military concepts of operations, treaty-making,
Since 2014, the CCW has convened annual meetings of
and the future of warfare.
States Parties, observers, and members of civil society to
Furthermore, incorporation of new technology into
discuss the legal, ethical, technological, and military facets
weapons systems could create a number of potential legal,
of LAWS. These meetings were elevated in 2017 from
ethical, strategic, and operational challenges. For this
informal Meetings of Experts to a formal Group of
reason, some members of the international community seek
Government Experts (GGE). After each session of the
through international discussions to constrain—if not ban—
GGE, the session’s chair produces a draft report that details
LAWS.
session proceedings and offers conclusions and
recommendations for future work. States Parties then adopt
What Are LAWS?
the final report by consensus.
Definitions. No single, universally accepted definition of
In 2019, States Parties additionally agreed to a set of
LAWS is used in international discussions. However,
“guiding principles” for LAWS. States Parties agreed that
Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, which
international humanitarian law (IHL) would apply to
establishes U.S. policy on autonomy in weapons systems,
defines LAWS as “weapon system[s] that, once activated,
LAWS, that humans must remain responsible for decisions
about the use of force, and that states must consider the
can select and engage targets without further intervention
risks of LAWS acquisition by, or proliferation to, terrorists.
by an operator.” This definition’s principal characteristic is
the role of the operator with regard to target selection and
Table 1. State Stances on Preemptive LAWS Ban
engagement decisions.
Support
Opposeb
Otherc
Other countries, however, have grounded their definition of
Algeria
Holy See
Australia
China
LAWS on different characteristics, in particular the
Argentina
Iraq
France
technological sophistication of the weapon system, such
Austria
Jordan
Germany
Bolivia
Mexico
India
that LAWS are considered to be weapon systems capable of
Brazil
Morocco
Israel
human-level cognition. Still others do not believe that a
Chile
Namibia
Russia
definition of LAWS is required—or desirable—for
Colombia
New Zealand
South Korea
international discussions. Despite these differences, most
Costa Rica
Nicaragua
Spain
parties to the LAWS discussions generally agree that the
Cuba
Pakistan
Turkey
defining features of LAWS include full autonomy (no
Djibouti
Panama
United
manual human control of the system) and the potential to
Ecuador
Peru
Kingdom
produce lethal effects.
Egypta
Uganda
United States
El Salvador
Venezuela
Status. Although the pursuit of LAWS is not yet
Ghanaa
Zimbabwea
widespread, some analysts have argued that Israel’s Harpy
Guatemala
loitering munition—which the weapon’s manufacturer, IAI,
Source: CRS consolidation of data from multiple sources.
describes as being fully autonomous—qualifies. Israel has
Notes: CCW discussions on LAWS exclude existing weapons
exported the Harpy to Chile, China, India, South Korea, and
systems. Therefore, States Parties consider any potential LAWS ban
Turkey. Similarly, former Secretary of Defense Mark Esper
to be preemptive.
has noted that Chinese manufacturer Ziyan has advertised a
a. State is not party to the CCW.
fully autonomous system, the Blowfish A3 helicopter
b. States that oppose a preemptive LAWS ban do not necessarily
drone, which it has reportedly exported to the Middle East.
share the same alternative approach to managing LAWS.
In addition, according to a report by the Defense Innovation
c. See section below on China.
Board, the United States developed LAWS during the
1980s but no longer has LAWS in its inventory.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
link to page 1 International Discussions Concerning Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems
Debate About Approaches to Managing LAWS
Alternative Approaches to Managing LAWS. Other
The CCW has considered proposals to ban LAWS, as well
states have proposed that the CCW instead focus on
as proposals to regulate or issue political declarations about
enhancing transparency in weapons development and
them. CCW States Parties have not reached a consensus on
sharing best practices for weapons review processes. France
which of these approaches, if any, they will adopt.
and Germany, for example, have proposed issuing a non-
legally binding political declaration that would affirm that
Arguments Supporting Preemptive LAWS Ban. In
international humanitarian law applies to LAWS and that
addition to the states listed in Table 1, approximately 165
“[States Parties] share the conviction that humans should
nongovernmental organizations have called for a
continue to be able to make ultimate decisions with regard
preemptive ban on LAWS due to ethical concerns. These
to the use of lethal force and should continue to exert
concerns include a perceived lack of accountability for use
sufficient control over lethal weapons systems they use.”
and a perceived inability to comply with the proportionality
Similarly, the United States has proposed a nonbinding
and distinction requirements of IHL. Some analysts have
Code of Conduct to “help States promote responsible
also raised concerns about LAWS’s potential operational
behavior and compliance with international law.” France
risks. For example, Center for a New American Security
and Germany have additionally proposed the establishment
analyst Paul Scharre has noted that risks could arise from
“hacking, enemy behavioral manipulation, unexpected
of a consultative committee of technical experts to advise
the CCW on relevant technological developments.
interactions with the environment, or simple malfunctions
or software errors” and could potentially result in civilian or
Positions of the United States, Russia, and China
noncombatant casualties. Although such risks could be
Although the CCW operates by consensus, the United
present in automated systems, they could be heightened in
States, Russia, and China—as leading military powers—are
autonomous systems, in which the human operator would
likely to be particularly influential in determining the
be unable to physically intervene to terminate
trajectory of international discussions of LAWS.
engagements—potentially resulting in wider-scale or more
numerous instances of fratricide, civilian casualties, or
United States. The U.S. delegation to the CCW has
other unintended consequences.
consistently opposed any preemptive ban on LAWS,
arguing that LAWS could potentially provide a
Those supporting a preemptive ban on LAWS have
humanitarian benefit and that existing IHL is sufficient to
additionally appealed to the Martens Clause, which appears
govern the development and use of LAWS.
in the 1899 Hague Convention preamble and states that
weapons use should conform to the “principles of humanity
Russia. The Russian delegation to the CCW has also
and the dictates of the public conscience.” These analysts
opposed a preemptive ban on LAWS, noting that LAWS
believe that LAWS contravene that requirement; however,
could “ensure the increased accuracy of weapon guidance
others have noted that the Martens Clause has not been used
on military targets, while contributing to lower rate of
previously to ban a weapons system and, furthermore, that
unintentional strikes against civilians and civilian targets.”
the legal status of the Martens Clause is questionable and
It has also argued there is no proper legal precedent for a
instead constitutes “merely a recognition of ‘customary
preemptive international ban on an entire class of weapons.
international law.’”
China. The Chinese delegation has stated that China
Arguments Opposing Preemptive LAWS Ban. A number
supports a ban on the use—but not development—of
of countries have voiced their opposition to a preemptive
LAWS, which it defines to be indiscriminate, lethal systems
ban on LAWS. These countries have noted the potential
that do not have any human oversight and cannot be
military utility of LAWS, which could operate in
terminated. China is the only country that defines LAWS in
communications-degraded or -denied environments where
this manner, and analysts note that such a weapon would be
traditional systems may not be able to operate. LAWS
unable to comply with IHL and therefore would be
could also potentially enable new concepts of operations,
inherently illegal. Some analysts have argued that China is
such as swarming, in which large formations of
maintaining “strategic ambiguity” about its position on
autonomous vehicles could be deployed to overwhelm
LAWS.
defensive systems. (Some proponents of a ban have argued
Potential Questions for Congress
that swarms of autonomous vehicles could alternatively
provide states or terrorist organizations with comparatively
Is the executive branch keeping Congress adequately
inexpensive weapons of mass destruction.)
informed about developments, both international and
domestic, concerning LAWS and their regulation?
Countries opposing a preemptive ban have additionally
What role should the United States play in UN CCW
noted the potential humanitarian benefits of LAWS, which
discussions of LAWS? Should the United States support
may be able to “strike military objectives more accurately
the status quo, propose a political declaration, or
and with less risk of collateral damage or civilian
advocate regulation of or a ban on LAWS?
casualties” than traditional systems. These countries
contend that human operators will remain accountable for
To what extent are potential U.S. adversaries developing
the deployment of the systems and for ensuring that the
LAWS? How, if at all, should this affect U.S. LAWS
systems’ use complies with IHL. Finally, some countries
and counter-LAWS research and development or the
United States’
are concerned that a preemptive ban on LAWS could
UN CCW position on LAWS?
inhibit research into technologies that may provide civilian
Kelley M. Sayler, Analyst in Advanced Technology and
benefits (e.g. elder care robots).
Global Security
https://crsreports.congress.gov
International Discussions Concerning Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems
IF11294
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11294 · VERSION 6 · UPDATED