The U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) is an independent federal agency that is charged with helping election officials to improve the administration of elections and voters to participate in the electoral process. It was established by the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) as part of Congress's response to problems with the administration of the 2000 elections.
The EAC—and the legislation that created it—marked something of a shift in the federal approach to election administration. Previous federal election laws had set requirements for the administration of federal elections, but HAVA was the first to back its requirements with substantial support. The act authorized grant programs for election administration and an assistance-oriented elections agency, the EAC.
This In Focus provides an introduction to the EAC. It describes the agency's duties and structure and briefly reviews some of its history and related legislative activity.
The highest-profile problems with the administration of the 2000 elections were in Florida—where disputes about the vote count delayed resolution of the presidential race for weeks—but post-election investigations revealed widespread problems with states' conduct of elections. Those investigations also prompted suggestions about how to avoid similar problems in the future, including proposals to increase federal involvement in election administration.
Exactly what that involvement should look like was a matter of debate. The disagreements played out in at least two discussions relevant to the EAC: (1) whether any new federal responsibilities should be assigned to existing entities like the Federal Election Commission's (FEC's) Office of Election Administration (OEA) or to an entirely new agency, and (2) whether the new responsibilities should focus solely on supporting states and localities or also include authority to compel them to act.
Congress struck a compromise in HAVA by creating a new agency, the EAC, but positioning it as a support agency. That focus on assistance—in combination with other objectives, such as providing for a range of expert input into agency activities and guarding against partisanship—informed the duties and structure of the agency.
In keeping with its positioning as an assistance agency, the EAC's rulemaking authority is limited. HAVA explicitly restricts the agency's authority to issue rules, regulations, and other requirements for states or localities to regulations about two duties it transferred to the EAC from the FEC: (1) reporting to Congress on the impact of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), and (2) maintaining the federal mail voter registration form required by the NVRA.
That limitation on rulemaking does not mean that the EAC has no ability to influence state or local action. However, the agency's duties are primarily oriented toward facilitating or incentivizing elections activities rather than compelling them. Those duties, most of which are designed to involve opportunities for input from a range of elections stakeholders, include
The EAC includes an appointed commission, a professional staff led by an executive director and general counsel, an Office of Inspector General (OIG), three statutory advisory bodies, and one agency-created advisory body.
The commission is designed to have four members, each of whom is required to have elections experience or expertise and no more than two of whom may be affiliated with the same political party. Candidates for the commission are recommended by the majority or minority leadership of the House or Senate and appointed by the President subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. Action on activities the commission is authorized by HAVA to conduct, such as updating the VVSG and appointing an executive director and general counsel, requires approval by a three-vote quorum of the commissioners.
The EAC's executive director and general counsel are appointed by the commission, with input in the case of the executive director from two of the agency's advisory bodies. HAVA authorizes the executive director to hire other professional staff. The size of the EAC's staff has varied, from the four commissioners and handful of transfers from OEA in FY2004 to 50 full-time equivalent positions (FTEs) in FY2010, about 20 to 30 FTEs between FY2013 and FY2019, and 83 FTEs in FY2024.
One of the EAC OIG's primary responsibilities is auditing recipients of grant funds administered by the EAC. The OIG also conducts internal audits and investigations of the agency itself, including audits of its finances, reports on management challenges, and investigations of complaints about fraud, waste, mismanagement, and abuse. For example, the OIG conducted a 2008 investigation of alleged political bias in the preparation of an EAC report about voter fraud and intimidation and a 2010 investigation of complaints about the agency's work environment.
HAVA provided for three advisory bodies for the EAC: the Board of Advisors, the Standards Board, and the Technical Guidelines Development Committee. In 2021, the EAC used its own authority to add a fourth advisory body, the Local Leadership Council.
The structure of the EAC, like its duties, reflects its emphasis on assistance. The agency's advisory bodies are central to its functioning, with opportunities for input into its guidance, planning, and staffing. Voters are represented on one of the advisory bodies, and state officials, local officials, or their representatives make up some or all of the membership of all four.
The EAC was also set up to provide for a range of expert input into agency activities and to help guard against partisanship. In addition to voters and state and local officials, the agency's advisory bodies include experts in various other fields relevant to election administration. The commission's quorum requirement and the membership and selection processes for the commission and some of the advisory bodies are also designed for partisan balance.
One question Congress considered when developing the EAC was whether it should exist as a separate agency at all. That question was also a subject of particular congressional interest for a period starting with the 112th Congress. As of the beginning of that Congress, the EAC had distributed most of the grant funding it was authorized by HAVA to administer and completed much of the research the act directed it to conduct. The authorization of operational funding for the agency had expired, and the National Association of Secretaries of State had recently renewed a resolution that called for disbanding the agency.
Those developments were taken by some as evidence that the agency had outlived its usefulness. Members introduced legislation to terminate the EAC in each of the 112th through 115th Congresses, and the House Committee on Appropriations recommended cutting or eliminating the agency's funding each year between FY2012 and FY2018.
At least as of the 119th Congress, however, debate about whether there is a role for the EAC seems to have receded in prominence. Recent election cycles have seen a number of high-profile developments, including foreign efforts to interfere in the 2016 elections, the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in the 2020 election cycle, and an increase in reports of threats to election workers during and after 2020.
The EAC has played a role in the federal response to each of those developments. For example, it has provided election officials with resources to help address physical and cybersecurity threats and administered grant funding Congress has appropriated to help states address elections effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and foreign efforts to interfere in elections. Following the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's designation of election systems as critical infrastructure in January 2017, the EAC also helped set up and has participated in the department's Election Infrastructure Subsector.
Supporters of an ongoing role for the EAC have cited its participation in the federal response to recent developments as new grounds to extend or expand it. More generally, the primary focus of legislative activity on the agency seems to have shifted in recent Congresses from whether there is a role for the EAC to what its role should be, including
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (P.L. 119-60) includes a provision requiring the EAC to provide for the conduct of penetration testing as part of its voting system testing and certification program. Congress has also made some adjustments to the EAC's operations in appropriations acts, such as by increasing its funding.