Burma’s Peace Process: Narrowing Opportunities in 2018
Updated February 14, 2018
Burma’s Peace Process: Narrowing Opportunities in 2018
Burma (Myanmar) has been riven by a low-grade civil war
Figure 1. Map of Burma (Myanmar)
between government forces and various ethnic armed
organizations (EAOs) since it became an independent
sovereign state in 1948. In 2016, State Councilor Aung San
Suu Kyi and her party, the National League for Democracy
(NLD), assumed power after a landslide victory in
parliamentary elections, and soon after identified ending the
long-standing conflict as one of their top priorities.
However, escalated fighting between the Burmese military,
or Tatmadaw, and several of the EAOs, and an alleged
“ethnic cleansing” in Rakhine State, have raised serious
doubts about the prospects for peace. Although two EAOs,
the Lahu Democratic Union and the New Mon State Army,
signed a ceasefire agreement with the NLD-led government
on February 13, 2018, several EAOs have lost trust in the
peace process advocated by Aung San Suu Kyi and are
preparing for intensified conflict in 2018. The 3rd session of
the 21st Century Panglong Conference—an effort to forge a
peace agreement between the government, the military, and
EAOs—which was tentatively scheduled for late January
2018, has been postponed at least until late February.
Historical Context for the Conflict
Burma has suffered a low-grade civil war since it became
an independent sovereign state on January 4, 1948. In 1962,
the Tatmadaw used the ongoing conflict—and the
perceived risk that some states could secede from the
federated government—to overthrow a democratically
elected civilian government. Over the next 50 years, the
Source: CRS.
Tatmadaw was unable either to negotiate peace or to win
victory on the battlefield.
The 1948 constitution was based in part on the provisions
of the 1947 Panglong Agreement negotiated between
In 2011, Burma’s military junta, the State Peace and
General Aung San (Aung San Suu Kyi’s father) and leaders
Development Council (SPDC), transferred power to a
of the Chin, Kachin, and Shan ethnic minority
mixed civilian/military government headed by President
communities. The Panglong Agreement accepted in
principle the “full autonomy in internal admini
Thein Sein, a retired general and ex-SPDC Prime Minister.
stration for
In October 2015, President Thein Sein signed a ceasefire
the Frontier Areas” in exchange for the ethnic minority
agreement with 8 of the more than 20 EAOs, but his
communities joining the Bamar majority, who generally
subsequent efforts to get more EAOs to sign were
live in central Burma, to form a federated nation.
unsuccessful. After the signing of the ceasefire agreement,
fighting between the Tatmadaw and several of the non-
In the view of most of the EAOs, Burma’s central
signatory EAOs intensified, resulting in both civilian and
government and the Tatmadaw have never lived up to the
military casualties.
agreement’s promises. These EAOs contend the Bamar
majority has used the central government and the
Causes of the Ongoing Conflict
Tatmadaw to dominate and oppress Burma’s ethnic
Burma is an ethnically diverse nation in which the ethnic
minorities. To the Tatmadaw and Burma’s past military
Bamar are a majority of the population, but several other
juntas, the EAOs are insurgents threatening the nation’s
ethnic minorities—including the Chin, Kachin, Karen,
territorial integrity. In September 2015, the Tatmadaw set
out its “six principles for peace,” which require the EAOs
Karenni, Mon, Rakhine, and Shan—are the majority
population in some regions. Burma’s 1948 constitution
to agree to remain part of Burma, accept the 2008
established the Union of Burma as a federated nation in
constitution, submit to “national sovereignty” (the
which the predominately ethnic minority states retained a
legitimacy of the current central government), and abide by
fair amount of autonomy and the right to secede from the
the laws of the central government.
Union after 10 years.
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Burma’s Peace Process: Narrowing Opportunities in 2018
Key Issues for Peace Process
Implications of the Rohingya Crisis
Most of the core disputes are between the Tatmadaw and
In August 2017, a relatively new EAO, the Arakan
the EAOs. In general, EAOs seek a more decentralized
Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), attacked 30 security
federated union, and the Tatmadaw prefers a stronger
outposts in northern Rakhine State. In response, the
central government with less state autonomy. The
Tatmadaw launched a “clearance operation” that resulted in
Tatmadaw insists that the 2008 constitution be maintained,
nearly 690,000 Rohingya relocating into Bangladesh and,
while some of the EAOs wish to write a new constitution.
according to Doctors Without Borders, at least 6,700
The EAOs want the ethnic states to have greater control
civilian deaths. The State Department has officially
over lucrative ruby and jade mines, but many of those
described the Tatmadaw’s “clearance operation” as ethnic
mines are owned by the Tatmadaw. So far, the Tatmadaw
cleansing, and a senior U.N. official has suggested that
has insisted that the EAOs disarm, demobilize, and
Aung San Suu Kyi and Min Aung Hlaing may face charges
reintegrate (DDR), while most of the EAOs have called for
of genocide. For more about the situation in Rakhine State,
security sector reform (SSR). Finally, the EAOs generally
see CRS Report R45016, The Rohingya Crises in
agree that the peace talks should include all the EAOs, but
Bangladesh and Burma.
the Tatmadaw has rejected the participation of several of
the EAOs with whom it is currently fighting.
The alleged ARSA attacks and the Tatmadaw’s violent
“clearance operation” have had an indirect impact on the
NLD’s Approach
prospects for peace. The reported ferocity and intensity of
In April 2016, Aung San Suu Kyi announced her intention
the Tatmadaw’s response to the ARSA attacks have
to hold a “21st Century Panglong Conference” to negotiate a
fostered greater distrust of the Burmese military among
path to peace. Aung San Suu Kyi also renamed the
some of the EAOs, especially those already facing alleged
Myanmar Peace Center (MPC) as the National
Tatmadaw assaults elsewhere in Burma. In addition, the
Reconciliation and Peace Center (NRPC), and transformed
NLD-led government, the Tatmadaw, and the EAOs must
it into an agency reporting to the State Counselor.
determine if ARSA will have a role in the peace process.
The first session of the 21st Century Panglong Conference
Issues for U.S. Policy
was held in Naypyitaw in August–September 2016. While
Identifying a path to peace, and what constructive role, if
Aung San Suu Kyi was able to secure the participation of
any, the United States can play in helping to end Burma’s
many of the EAOs, progress appeared to be hampered by
civil war, raises a number of policy options, including:
the Tatmadaw’s objection to inviting the Arakan Army
(AA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army
1. Providing assistance to the NRPC and/or the peace
(MNDAA), and the Ta-ang National Liberation Army
negotiations. Donors to the MPC, which included the
(TNLA). Statements presented by Commander-in-Chief
United States, found that such assistance was seen by some
Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and several EAOs
EAOs as support for President Thein Sein and the
revealed different visions of a democratic federated state of
Tatmadaw, undermining the donors’ desire to serve as
Burma and the path to creating that state.
neutral parties to the peace process. This is likely to
continue to be true for donations to the NRPC.
The second Panglong Peace Conference was held in May
2017, with mixed results. In part due to China’s
2. Encouraging or otherwise applying pressure on the key
intervention, the AA, the Kachin Independence Army
groups in the peace process to negotiate in good faith and
(KIA), MNDAA, TNLA, and the United Wa State Army
compromise. Certain forms of assistance or support for the
(UWSA) met with Aung San Suu Kyi during the
NLD-led government, the Tatmadaw, or the EAOs could be
conference. Other EAOs that had attended the first
made contingent on progress in the peace process.
conference, however, chose not to attend the second.
3. Withholding selected forms of engagement or aid from
Escalated Fighting Since 2016
parties in Burma’s peace process who are viewed as
Fighting between the Tatmadaw and some of the EAOs
uncooperative by the United States.
increased after the NLD took power in 2016, and has
further intensified since the 1st and 2nd Panglong Peace
Role of China
Conferences. The fighting has been particularly intense in
Whatever action the United States may or may not choose
Kachin State and northern Shan State, with some clashes
to take, Congress and the Administration also may consider
reported in Chin State and Rakhine State. Some of the
the role China may continue to play in Burma’s search for
EAOs view the Tatmadaw’s increased offensives as an
peace. China reportedly seeks a stable and friendly
indication that the Burmese military is seeking a possible
neighbor on its southwestern border and has long-standing
military solution to the nation’s long-standing conflict.
relations with some of the EAOs. In addition, China has
close ties to the Tatmadaw and is one of its major arms
Periodic clashes were reported throughout 2017 in Kachin
suppliers. China also allegedly provides arms to several of
State and Shan State, most frequently among the Tatmadaw
the EAOs, particularly the UWSA.
and the four main EAOs, but occasionally including the
Shan State Army–North and the Shan State Army–South. In
Michael F. Martin, Specialist in Asian Affairs
late 2017, fighting occurred in parts of Chin State, Kayin
(Karen) State, and Rakhine State.
IF10808
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Burma’s Peace Process: Narrowing Opportunities in 2018
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