Fethullah Gulen, Turkey, and the United States: A Reference
Updated April 10, 2017
Fethullah Gulen, Turkey, and the United States: A Reference
This In Focus product provides background information on
movement for the coup attempt. The post-plot environment
this subject. For analysis of the subject within the overall
in Turkey features competing narratives amid a major
context of U.S.-Turkey relations, see CRS Report R41368,
government effort to purge Gulen’s influence from Turkish
Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and
institutions. The effort widely affects Turkish society.
Clayton Thomas.
Public opinion in Turkey is largely suspicious of the Gulen
movement and is divided regarding the scope of the
Following the July 2016 failed coup in Turkey, the status of
government crackdown. Although many analysts have
Muhammed Fethullah Gülen (hereinafter Fethullah Gulen),
acknowledged the possibility of some Gulen movement
and the civil society movement that bears his name have
involvement in the coup attempt, some U.S. and European
become more significant for U.S.-Turkey relations. Gulen,
officials have stated that existing evidence does not appear
born in Turkey between 1938 and 1941, is a former Turkish
to prove Gulen’s direct involvement.
state-employed imam and now a permanent U.S. resident.
The Turkish government has increased calls for Gulen’s
Gulen strenuously denies any role in the plot, and insists
extradition in light of allegations that individuals with
that it went against all that he and his movement stand for,
connections to him participated in the coup plot.
though he has acknowledged that he “could not rule out”
involvement by some of his followers.
Fethullah Gulen
Turkish officials—with widespread popular support—have
called for the United States to extradite Gulen under the
applicable U.S.-Turkey treaty (in force since 1981).
Multiple arrest warrants had been issued for Gulen before
the coup attempt, and Turkish media reported days before
the attempt that the Turkish government was about to
request extradition formally. Following the failed coup,
some Turkish officials have sought to portray Gulen’s
extradition as critical for positive U.S.-Turkey relations,
and speculation continues about the possibility of Gulen
fleeing to a third country. The treaty allows for the
possibility of provisional arrest.
U.S. officials have stated their intention to respond,
pursuant to the treaty, to documents that Turkey has
submitted after the coup attempt. These documents
Source: CBS News
reportedly refer to actions related to the coup attempt as
Gulen lives in seclusion with a few of his adherents at a
well as to other matters. Deciding whether to honor an
Poconos Mountain retreat in Saylorsburg, Pennsylvania.
extradition request involves initial determinations by the
The Gulen movement or community (commonly known by
Justice and State Departments. If a decision is made to go
supporters as Hizmet, or “service” in Turkish) is an array of
forward, a hearing would take place before a federal
individuals, educational institutions, and other
magistrate to assess whether the request is proper under the
organizations in Turkey, the United States, and countries
treaty and whether there is sufficient evidence to believe an
around the world with a connection to Gulen or his
extraditable offense was committed. Even if the magistrate
teachings. These teachings come from a distinctly Turkish
certifies the extradition as permissible, the Secretary of
brand of Islam inspired by the influential Turkish-Kurdish
State has final authority to determine whether the
spiritual leader Said Nursi (1877-1960) and various Sufi
extradition shall occur. For more on the U.S. extradition
traditions. Gulen’s interpretation of Islam condemns
process in general, see CRS Report RS22702, An Abridged
terrorism and promotes interfaith and cross-cultural
Sketch of Extradition To and From the United States, by
understanding, and in the sociopolitical sphere he publicly
supports “values of democracy, universal human rig
Charles Doyle.
hts and
freedoms.”
The Gulen Movement: An Overview
July 2016 Failed Coup and Turkey’s Calls
The Gulen movement gained influence across Turkey in the
for Extradition
1970s and 1980s. Initially, Gulen’s ideas attracted support
for various youth educational initiatives. Over time, Gulen-
On July 15-16, 2016, elements within the Turkish military
inspired schools, businesses, media and publishing
attempted but failed to overthrow Turkish President Recep
enterprises, charitable organizations, business
Tayyip Erdoğan (Erdogan) and the government. Turkish
officials blamed individuals with connections to the Gulen
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Fethullah Gulen, Turkey, and the United States: A Reference
confederations, and civil society groups have come to
Some of these charter schools have reputations for
exercise considerable influence in Turkey and elsewhere.
successful student achievement, but in recent years some
have reportedly lost their charters or faced public criticism
For decades, many observers have speculated that Gulen
and government regulatory action or investigation. Issues of
movement adherents and sympathizers occupy influential
concern range from student performance to specific
positions within Turkey’s official institutions. Gulen and
financial, hiring, or other business practices. Some
his close supporters insist that he has not hierarchically
individuals voice the possibility that anti-Muslim bias
controlled Turkish state employees or any others who either
affects discourse regarding the charter schools. Lawyers
publicly or privately align themselves with him and his
representing Turkey’s government have brought recent
teachings, though this point is actively debated.
legal action within U.S. jurisdictions against Gulen and
some charter schools.
The Gulen movement does not have its own political party.
Many observers claim that the movement aligned itself with
Organizations with stated or reported connections to the
Erdogan and the Justice and Development Party (AKP)
Gulen movement (such as the Alliance for Shared Values
during Erdogan’s first decade in power (2003-2012), using
and Turkic American Alliance umbrella organizations)
its social connectedness, international reach, and media
conduct various public relations activities throughout the
clout to bolster AKP rule at home and abroad. Both the
United States. These include outreach to governments and
Gulen movement and the AKP sought to curb the military’s
lawmakers at local, state, and federal levels, sponsored trips
longstanding secularist control over civilian politics. Many
abroad, cultural events, and interfaith dialogue.
of the movement’s adherents and sympathizers were among
the strongest supporters of the Ergenekon and
Timeline of Key Events
Sledgehammer (Balyoz) prosecutions and convictions,
1971
Gulen imprisoned in Turkey shortly after
which dealt with alleged military-centered networks aimed
military coup under a law criminalizing
at overthrowing or undermining the AKP government.
activities that undermine Turkish secularism;
Some analysts assert that these cases, along with changes in
released six months later in general amnesty.
military vetting practices under AKP rule, may have given
officers with Gulen movement sympathies greater
1980s
Gulen movement allowed to operate more
opportunity for promotion.
freely in Turkey following 1980 military coup.
1999
Gulen relocates to United States, citing
In December 2013, when the AKP-Gulen movement
health reasons.
alliance was reportedly already troubled, the relationship
Video recording of disputed authenticity airs
became outright adversarial when prosecutors brought
on Turkish television depicting Gulen calling
corruption charges against some close associates of (then-
on supporters to gain power inconspicuously
Prime Minister) Erdogan, and audio recordings implicating
within Turkey’s constitutional system.
Erdogan and his son Bilal in possible improprieties were
anonymously leaked. Erdogan accused Gulen and his
2000
Gulen indicted by Turkish authorities in
loyalists of an illegal effort to oust elected officials via a
absentia on conspiracy charges.
“parallel structure” within key state institutions.
2003-2014
Erdogan serves as prime minister.
The Turkish government has taken a number of steps
2006
Gulen acquitted of conspiracy charges.
ostensibly targeting the Gulen movement’s societal
influence that widely affect others in Turkish society. These
2008
Gulen obtains U.S. permanent residency after
measures intensified after the coup attempt, and include (1)
an initially adverse ruling is reversed by a
dismissing or reassigning thousands of government security
federal court. Various individuals write in
personnel and civil servants; (2) repressing or taking over
support of his application, including some
independent media and educational outlets; and (3)
former U.S. government officials.
detaining and prosecuting journalists and civil society
2007-2015
Investigations and legal proceedings in
activists under anti-terrorism laws. Also, with Erdogan’s
Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases.
support, Turkish courts dismissed or reversed the military-
related Ergenekon and Sledgehammer charges and
2013
AKP-Gulen movement controversy begins
convictions. The Turkish government has also petitioned
regarding corruption charges.
other countries to close institutions suspected of affiliation
2014
Erdogan elected president.
with the Gulen movement, with varying levels of success.
2016-2017
Turkish government designates the Gulen
The Movement’s U.S. Activities: Charter
movement a terrorist organization.
Schools and Otherwise
July 2016 coup attempt and aftermath.
A number of Gulen-inspired organizations have U.S.
locations or presences. Reportedly, some of these
organizations operate schools. Taken together, this may
include more than 150 publicly funded charter schools
Jim Zanotti, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
across 26 states and the District of Columbia.
Clayton Thomas, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
IF10444
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Fethullah Gulen, Turkey, and the United States: A Reference
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