Instability in Africa’s Great Lakes Region: Current Issues
May 25, 2016
Instability in Africa’s Great Lakes Region: Current Issues
Overview
led to protests, brutal repression of activists by the security
U.S. policy toward Central Africa’s Great Lakes region has
forces, and high-profile defections from the ruling party.
long sought a number of objectives, including: (1) to
Tensions seemed to edge higher in May 2016, when the
prevent large-scale regional conflict in the wake of the
government issued an arrest warrant for a top opposition
“Second Congo War” (1998-2003), (2) to preclude ethnic
politician, former Katanga governor Moise Katumbi,
massacres such as the 1994 Rwandan genocide, (3) to
accusing him of hiring mercenaries. A U.S. citizen who was
support multilateral efforts to demobilize non-state armed
advising Katumbi has also been detained.
groups, (4) to respond to humanitarian needs, (5) to
advance economic development, and (6) to promote fair
U.S. Policy: Current Focus
and nonviolent business practices in the minerals sector.
Diplomatic Outreach. The Administration has engaged in
The Obama Administration has emphasized the prevention
high-level regional diplomacy aimed at convincing Kabila
of mass atrocities and the encouragement of peaceful
to step down at the end of his current term. U.S. diplomacy
political transitions amid attempts by the region’s
also aims to convince DRC’s neighbors to adhere to a U.N.-
incumbent leaders to extend their time in office. Now, a
backed 2013 “framework accord,” in which countries
budding electoral crisis in the Democratic Republic of
committed to refrain from backing rebel movements in each
Congo (DRC) and a violent political impasse in Burundi
others’ territories. U.S. diplomats have also focused on
threaten the limited, but real, security gains the region has
urging DRC leaders to issue exit permits for adopted
achieved over the past decade.
children. The issuance of these permits, which was largely
suspended in 2013, resumed to a limited extent in 2016.
Figure 1. Map
Sanctions. The U.N. Security Council maintains an arms
embargo on non-state groups in DRC and a related
sanctions regime. The Obama Administration has regularly
extended Executive Order 13413 (2006) and expanded it
through Executive Order 13671 (2014), authorizing
targeted financial sanctions on those who foment conflict,
impede democracy, or commit gross human rights abuses in
DRC. DRC opposition leaders have called for sanctioning
members of Kabila’s inner circle in connection with
electoral process missteps and the abuse of protesters—
which could potentially mean, for the first time, designating
government officials. U.S. policymakers have debated the
justification, timing, and potential unintended consequences
of such an action.
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
MONUSCO Mandate. As a permanent member of the
Since the mid-1990s, cyclical conflict in eastern DRC has
U.N. Security Council, the United States has helped shape
destabilized the Great Lakes region and inhibited
the mandate and size of the U.N. peacekeeping operation in
development, consuming substantial domestic and donor
DRC. The DRC government has pushed for a reduction in
resources. A particularly formidable, Rwandan-backed
MONUSCO’s force in the lead-up to the 2016 elections,
rebel movement known as the M23 was defeated in 2013 in
and operational coordination between U.N. and DRC troops
U.N.-backed military operations, but a range of other armed
has largely ceased since 2015 due to U.N. criticism of
groups (both Congolese- and foreign-led) remain active.
Concern about armed groups’ invo
political tensions and the poor human rights record of
lvement in illicit mineral
specific Congolese commanders. The Security Council has
exports led Congress to pass “conflict minerals” legislation
endorsed a slight troop drawdown but has not lowered the
in 2010, and Members have expressed serious concern with
authorized troop ceiling (22,016 uniformed personnel),
the scale of conflict-related human rights abuses in DRC.
leaving room for a plus-up if security conditions
DRC is also affected by wildlife poaching, which Congress
deteriorate. MONUSCO’s mandate prioritizes protecting
and the Administration have sought to counter.
civilians but includes a number of other tasks, including,
DRC’s 2016 election cycle
under certain conditions, electoral support. Observers
has also become a potential
debate whether MONUSCO—most of whose troops are in
flashpoint for instability. President Joseph Kabila, in office
the east—is prepared to respond to political violence in
since 2001, is constitutionally prohibited from reelection
areas such as the capital, Kinshasa (in the west), and
when his term expires in December 2016, but most
Katanga (in the southeast).
observers expect him to try to stay in office by postponing
the vote. Over the past year, skepticism about his intent has
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Instability in Africa’s Great Lakes Region: Current Issues
Burundi
Sanctions and Aid Restrictions. Executive Order 13712
Burundi’s current political crisis stems from President
(2015) authorizes financial sanctions against persons
Pierre Nkurunziza’s reelection to a third term in July 2015.
threatening peace and security or abusing human rights in
Opponents view his reelection as unconstitutional and a
Burundi. Eight individuals have been designated to date,
violation of the landmark Arusha Accords, which were
from both the government and opposition. The
signed in 2000 and are credited with ending a decade-long
Administration has suspended in-country security
ethnic conflict. The current standoff has caused growing
assistance programs, but Burundian troops deployed in
ethnic polarization, although opposition to Nkurunziza also
U.S.-supported regional military operations in Somalia
spans the ethnic divide. Like neighboring Rwanda, Burundi
continue to receive U.S. equipment and support. The
is majority ethnic Hutu, with minority Tutsi and Twa
European Union also has imposed sanctions and has
communities. During the 1990s conflict, Nkurunziza, a
suspended all non-humanitarian aid; the AU announced its
Hutu, led a predominantly Hutu rebel movement known as
intention to impose sanctions in 2015 but has yet to do so.
the CNDD-FDD, which has been the ruling party since he
was first elected in 2005. Previously, the government and
Rwanda
military elite were dominated by Tutsis, but the Arusha
Rwanda has achieved political stability and substantial
Accords mandated the ethnic integration of both.
economic progress under the authoritarian leadership of
Over the past year, Burundi has seen large urban protests; a
President Paul Kagame. Political opposition and
failed coup attempt by senior military officers (including
independent civil society activities are extremely limited,
former comrades-in-arms of Nkurunziza); a violent
however, and some analysts question whether stability is
government crackdown on the opposition, media, and civil
sustainable in the absence of peaceful avenues for
society; hundreds of extrajudicial killings, including high-
opposition. In January 2016, Kagame stated he would seek
profile assassinations; and the flight of at least 260,000
a third term in 2017—following a constitutional referendum
refugees into neighboring countries. Opponents of
in December 2015 that altered term limits. Concerns about
Rwanda’s r
Nkurunziza—including several former members of the
egional activities have heightened in recent
president’s inner circle and the army—have organized
years due to Rwandan support for the M23 in DRC in 2012-
outside the country, and some have announced their
2013 (prior to the group’s defeat), reports that its security
intention to oust the president by force.
services have targeted exiled dissidents for assassination,
and recent reports of Burundian rebel recruitment from
The political impasse could lead to renewed war and/or
refugee camps in Rwanda.
large-scale ethnic reprisals, possibly dragging in
neighboring DRC and Rwanda. So far, a full-scale armed
U.S. Policy: Current Focus
conflict has not emerged, but international efforts to forge a
Domestic Political Conditions. The Administration has
peace process have been halting, including an attempted
expressed growing concern with political conditions in
mediation by the East African Community, an inter-
Rwanda since Kagame’s reelection in 2010. U.S. officials
governmental body. The government and the main exiled
criticized the conditions under which the 2015 referendum
opposition coalition, known as the CNARED, have placed
took place, expressed “disappointment” with Kagame’s
mutually-exclusive conditions on their participation in
subsequent decision to seek a third term in office, and have
peace talks. The government also accuses Rwanda’s Tutsi-
urged Kagame to transfer power to “the next generation.”
led government—which criticized Nkurunziza’s third-
term—of backing rebels.
Role in Regional Instability. U.S. officials strongly
criticized Rwanda’s support for the M23 rebellion in
U.S. Policy: Current Focus
eastern DRC. Between FY2012 and FY2014, the
Support for Peace Talks. U.S. officials condemned
Administration suspended some bilateral security
Nkurunziza’s third term bid as a violation of the Arusha
assistance, consistent with laws enacted by Congress
Accords. The Administration has called for talks among
restricting aid to Rwanda if it were found to be supporting
“all Burundian stakeholders” and “without preconditions.”
DRC-based rebel groups, and restricting aid to any country
U.S. officials welcomed the latest attempt to start talks in
supporting the use of child soldiers (citing the M23’s use of
Tanzania on May 21, despite protests from the CNARED
child soldiers). After the M23’s defeat, these restrictions
and civil society groups that they were not included.
were lifted. In Senate testimony in February 2016, U.S.
Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Tom Periello expressed
Multilateral Contingency Planning. In 2015, the
concern regarding reports that Rwanda is “engaging in
Administration expressed support for African Union (AU)
destabilizing behavior” in Burundi.
plans for a military intervention to protect civilians. The
Burundian government objected to the idea, and the AU
Further CRS Reading
tacitly abandoned the concept in early 2016. The
CRS Report R43166, Democratic Republic of Congo:
Administration has since urged the AU to deploy more
Background and U.S. Relations; CRS Report R44018,
human rights monitors (several dozen are on the ground,
Burundi’s Political Crisis; and CRS Report R44402,
with plans for more, but their activities are reportedly
Rwanda: In Brief.
constrained by Burundian government restrictions) and to
engage in “contingency planning to counter potential mass
Alexis Arieff, Specialist in African Affairs
atrocities.” In the U.N. Security Council, U.S. diplomats
have supported consideration of a U.N. police deployment.
IF10413
Some observers have called for MONUSCO to play a role
in responding to Burundi’s crisis.
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Instability in Africa’s Great Lakes Region: Current Issues
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