May 15, 2015
U.S.-Singapore Relations
Overview
Though only about three times the size of Washington, DC,
and with a population of 5.3 million, the city-state of
Singapore exercises economic and diplomatic influence on
a par with much larger countries. Its stable government,
strong economic performance, educated citizenry, and
strategic position along key shipping lanes afford it
leverage and a role in regional and global affairs. As the
United States implements the Obama Administration’s
strategic “rebalance” to Asia, Singapore is a partner in both
trade and security cooperation.. At the same time,
Singapore’s leaders aim to strike a balance among the
region’s powers and also maintain close relations with
China.
The U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (FTA) went into
effect in January 2004—the United States’ first bilateral
FTA with an Asian country—and trade has burgeoned. In
2013, Singapore was the 17th largest U.S. trading partner,
with $50 billion in total two-way goods trade, and a
substantial destination for U.S. foreign direct investment. It
is one of 12 nations negotiating the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP), the Obama Administration’s signature
economic initiative in Asia. Mutual security interests also
strengthen ties between Singapore and the United States. A
formal strategic partnership agreement allows the United
States to access Singapore military facilities and provides
the basis for U.S.-Singapore cooperation in
counterterrorism, counter-proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, joint military exercises, policy dialogues, and
shared defense technology.
Singapore Politics
The People’s Action Party (PAP) has won every general
election since the end of the colonial era in 1959, aided by
its success in delivering consistent economic growth, as
well as Singapore’s fragmented opposition and electoral
procedures that strongly favor the ruling party. In recent
years, some observers have pointed to changes in the
political and social environment that may portend more
political pluralism, including generational changes and an
increasingly international outlook among Singaporeans. In
May 2011, opposition parties claimed their most successful
results in history, taking six of the unicameral Parliament’s
87 elected seats, and garnering about 40% of the popular
vote. Though this still left the PAP with an overwhelming
majority in Parliament, the ruling party described the
election as a watershed moment for Singapore and vowed
to reform the party to respond to the public’s concerns,
which appeared to focus mainly on the growing cost of
living and wealth disparities.
Perceptions of generational changes in Singapore were
highlighted further by the March 22, 2015, death of former
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew at age 91. Lee, Singapore’s
first prime minister, was widely heralded as the architect of
Singapore’s success as a nation and its rapid economic
development, although much of the country’s authoritarian
politics derived from Lee’s efforts to constrain political
opposition. Lee served as prime minister from Singapore’s
independence in 1959 until 1991, and Lee‘s eldest son is
current Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, who has been in
office since 2004.
Singapore’s leaders have acknowledged a “contract” with
the Singaporean people, under which individual rights are
curtailed in the interest of maintaining a stable, prosperous
society. Supporters praise Singapore’s pragmatism, noting
its sustained economic growth and high standards of living.
Others criticize the approach as stunting creativity and
entrepreneurship, and contributing to rising disparities of
income in Singapore’s expanding population.
Although it has been elected by a comfortable majority in
every election since Singapore’s founding, the PAP “has
used the government’s extensive powers to place
formidable obstacles in the path of political opponents.”
according to the U.S. State Department’s 2013 Country
Report on Human Rights Practices. According to Amnesty
International, defamation suits by PAP leaders to
discourage opposition are widespread. The political careers
of several opposition politicians are marked by
characteristic obstacles erected by the ruling party,
including being forced to declare bankruptcy for failing to
pay libel damages to prominent PAP members.
U.S.-Singapore Defense Cooperation
The 2005 “Strategic Framework Agreement” formalizes the
bilateral security and defense relationship between the
United States and Singapore. The agreement, the first of its
kind that the United States signed with a non-ally since the
Cold War, builds on the U.S. strategy of “places-not-bases”
in the region, a concept that allows the U.S. military access
to facilities on a rotational basis without bringing up
sensitive sovereignty issues. The agreement allows the
United States to operate resupply vessels from Singapore
and to use a naval base, a ship repair facility, and an airfield
on the island-state. The U.S. Navy also maintains a
logistical command unit—Commander, Logistics Group
Western Pacific—in Singapore that serves to coordinate
warship deployment and logistics in the region. Singapore’s
Changi Naval base is one of the few facilities in the world
that can accommodate a U.S. aircraft carrier.
www.crs.gov | 7-5700
U.S.-Singapore Relations
Starting in 2013, the U.S. Navy deployed a littoral combat
ship (LCS) to Singapore for a 10-month tour, and then
deployed a second beginning in 2014. By 2018, the Navy
plans to rotationally deploy four LCS ships from the
Seventh Fleet in Singapore. The stationing of the LCSs is
emblematic of the role that Singapore can play in the U.S.
“strategic rebalancing” to the region by providing a U.S.
Navy presence in Southeast and Northeast Asia. The USS
Freedom, the first LCS stationed in Singapore, performed
patrols in the South China Sea, participated in exercises
with other countries, and delivered relief supplies to the
Philippines in the wake of Typhoon Haiyan. The second
LCS, the USS Fort Worth, participated in search and rescue
operations for a commercial aircraft operated by Air Asia
that crashed in Indonesian waters in early 2015.
Law Enforcement Cooperation
The United States and Singapore engage in ongoing law
enforcement cooperation. Singapore is a transit point for a
wide range of individuals, including suspected terrorists
from neighboring countries, and its active port is a transshipment point. In the past, some U.S. officials have
expressed concerns about the strength of cooperation. The
State Department’s 2013 country report on terrorism,
however, said that cooperation has “benefited from
improved working level dialogue on many of the issues that
had previously impeded the development of more strategic
and productive agency-to-agency relationships.” Among
U.S. priorities are improvements in Singapore’s port
security, where the Department of Homeland Security
hopes to see Singapore make greater use of advance
manifests to screen containers through its busy port, and
improvements to the bilateral extradition treaty.
Singapore Economy and U.S. Trade
Relations
Singapore’s GDP per capita is $55,182 (2013 estimate), one
of the highest in the world. The city-state’s role as a
regional trading hub means its economy depends heavily on
trade. Annual trade volumes processed through the
Singapore port are around three times Singapore’s domestic
GDP. It relies on exports of consumer electronics,
information technology products, pharmaceuticals, and
financial services. China, Malaysia, and the United States
are Singapore’s largest trading partners. Cumulative U.S.
foreign direct investment (FDI) in Singapore exceeds $138
billion, making it the largest Southeast Asian destination for
U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI).
16-nation group of Asian nations that is negotiating a free
trade agreement at the same time some of its members are
working on the TPP. (RCEP’s members include ASEAN’s
10 nations, plus Australia, China, India, Japan, New
Zealand and South Korea. The nations that are involved in
both TPP and RCEP are Australia, Brunei, Japan, Malaysia,
New Zealand, and Vietnam.) Singapore does not face some
of the obstacles that other countries do in trade negotiations
because, in addition to having a mature, globalized
economy, it has virtually no agricultural sector and its
manufacturing is limited to specialized sectors such as highend electronic products and pharmaceuticals.
Singapore’s Regional Role
Singapore was a founding member of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the 10-member
regional forum that helps Southeast Asia’s mostly small
countries to influence regional diplomacy, particularly visà-vis China. (ASEAN’s members are Brunei, Burma
(Myanmar), Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.) Singapore
has praised the Administration’s “rebalancing” effort
toward Asia, yet has been careful to warn that anti-China
rhetoric or efforts to “contain” China’s rise will be
counterproductive. Singapore often portrays itself as a
useful balancer and intermediary between major powers in
the region. In ongoing territorial and sovereignty disputes in
the South China Sea, Singapore, a non-claimant, has
characterized its stance on the issue as neutral, yet
concerned because of the threat to maritime stability.
Singapore’s ties with Beijing are multifaceted and extend to
cultural, political, and educational exchanges as well.
Singapore adheres to a one-China policy, but has an
extensive relationship with Taiwan and has managed to
avoid jeopardizing its strong relations with Beijing.
Emma Chanlett-Avery, echanlettavery@crs.loc.gov,
7-7748
Ben Dolven, bdolven@crs.loc.gov, 7-7626
The TPP participants represent a third of the world’s trade.
Singapore’s record of championing rigorous trade pacts
raises its prominence as a negotiating partner in pushing for
a comprehensive agreement. However, trade observers say
that, in the TPP, Singapore faces sensitive issues in
negotiations over financial services and the imposition of
free-market disciplines on state-owned enterprises.
Singapore has concluded at least 18 free trade agreements
(FTAs) and is pursuing several more, including the
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a
www.crs.gov | 7-5700
IF10228