U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)
June 16, 2014
U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)
Congress has continued to examine the evolving role and
posture of the U.S. military in Africa since AFRICOM
For the foreseeable future, the most direct threat to
became fully operational as the newest U.S. geographic
America at home and abroad remains terrorism....
combatant command in 2008. The command is responsible
from decentralized al Qaeda affiliates and extremists,
for Department of Defense (DOD) operations, exercises,
many with agendas focused in countries where they
and security cooperation on the African continent, its island
operate. And this lessens the possibility of large-scale
nations, and its surrounding waters.
9/11-style attacks against the homeland, but it
heightens the danger of U.S. personnel overseas being
AFRICOM’s stated mission is to advance U.S. national
attacked, as we saw in Benghazi. It heightens the
interests and promote regional security, stability, and
danger to less defensible targets, as we saw in a
prosperity in Africa, in concert with interagency and
shopping mall in Nairobi. So we have to develop a
international partners, by building defense capabilities,
strategy that matches this diffuse threat—one that
responding to crises, and deterring and defeating
expands our reach without sending forces that stretch
transnational threats. AFRICOM Commander General
our military too thin, or stir up local resentments. We
David Rodriguez has stated that the command’s most
need partners to fight terrorists alongside us. President
important responsibility is to “detect, deter and prevent
Barack Obama at the U.S. Military Academy-West Point,
attacks against the United States, its territories, possessions,
May 28, 2014
and bases and to employ appropriate force to defend the
nation should deterrence fail.”
Before AFRICOM became a stand-alone command in
In Africa, the United States has taken a lower profile
October 2008, responsibility for U.S. military involvement
approach to countering terrorism that it has in Afghanistan,
in Africa was divided among European, Central, and Pacific
where the U.S. military deployed in large numbers to
Commands. Its area of responsibility (AOR) does not
pursue Al Qaeda, or in Pakistan or Yemen, where air strikes
include Egypt, which remains in Central Command’s AOR.
against terrorist targets have been more frequent.
Its FY2015 budget request (headquarters, operations,
AFRICOM works primarily indirectly, by training,
exercises and related programs) is $245 million.
equipping, and sustaining partner forces such as the African
Responding to Threats and Challenges
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to degrade extremist
capabilities. Direct U.S. military action has been limited;
AFRICOM’s establishment and its evolution reflect a
examples include Special Operations Forces missions in
change in policymakers' perceptions of U.S. strategic
Somalia and Libya in October 2013 to capture suspected
interests and security challenges in Africa. For some, the
terrorists; the January 2012 rescue of a U.S. hostage in
justification for a U.S. military command focused on the
Somalia; and, in a limited number of cases, targeted strikes
continent has never been more pronounced. The Obama
against members of Al Qaeda in Somalia.
Administration’s 2012 U.S. Strategy toward Sub-Saharan
Africa argues that “Africa is more important than ever to
AFRICOM’s largest military operation to date is Operation
the security and prosperity of the international community,
Odyssey Dawn, in which it had operational and tactical
and to the United States in particular.” While the military
command of U.S. forces supporting the multilateral effort to
prepares a strategic “rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific region,
enforce a no-fly zone and protect civilians in Libya in 2011.
in the near term, African conflicts and extremist threats
increasingly occupy military planners’ efforts. Despite
The Indirect Approach
positive political and economic trends in some countries,
armed conflict still plagues parts of the continent and poses
The Obama Administration’s 2010 National Security
threats to regional stability and other U.S. interests.
Strategy stresses the need to "embrace effective
partnerships" in Africa, highlighting U.S. strategic priorities
Terrorist threats appear to be increasing in North Africa; in
such as "access to open markets, conflict prevention, global
such West African countries as Nigeria and Mali; and
peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and the protection of vital
throughout East Africa, including in Somalia and Kenya.
carbon sinks." The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review
Violent extremist groups like Al Shabaab, Al Qaeda in the
asserts that “our ability to project forces to combat
Islamic Maghreb, Boko Haram, Ansar al Sharia and other
terrorism in places as far away as Yemen, Afghanistan, and
like-minded groups continue to attract recruits, and are
Mali—and to build capacity to help partners counter
reportedly increasingly sharing training, tactics, and
terrorism...reduces the likelihood that these threats could
weapons, including those from former Libyan stockpiles.
find their way to U.S. shores." It outlines DOD’s intent to
rebalance its counterterrorism efforts “toward greater
emphasis on building partnership capacity, especially in
https://crsreports.congress.gov
U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)
fragile states, while retaining robust capability for direct
After ruling out an initial plan to locate AFRICOM's
action, including intelligence, persistent surveillance,
headquarters in Africa, and countering proposals for a move
precision strike, and Special Operations Forces.”
to a U.S. location, DOD announced in early 2013 that the
command would remain based in Stuttgart, Germany, for
With partner capacity-building now a key component of
the foreseeable future. As noted in a 2013 Government
U.S. military strategy in Africa, AFRICOM has sought to
Accountability Office report (GAO-13-646), AFRICOM’s
focus greater effort on professionalizing African militaries.
commander had determined the command to be more
This work has been episodic in some countries and has been
operationally effective in its current location, given shared
largely reliant on the level and continuity of State
resources with European Command and the proximity to its
Department-administered security assistance that DOD
AOR, while acknowledging that Germany was a more
implements (some State Department security assistance
expensive option than moving to the United States. GAO
programs are conducted by contractors). Congress has
questioned DOD’s analysis of the operational and cost
authorized increasing DOD funding for capacity-building
benefits in making the location decision.
programs and DOD spending in Africa has increased, but
these programs are largely focused on counterterrorism.
DOD has repeatedly stressed that there are no plans to have
a “significant” troop presence in Africa. Camp Lemonnier
AFRICOM has sought more persistent engagement with
in Djibouti hosts the U.S. military's only enduring
partner militaries, in line with the 2011 National Military
infrastructure in Africa. The facility also provides support
Strategy, which states that "military-to-military
for U.S. military operations in the Gulf of Aden area and
relationships must be reliable to be effective, and persevere
supports DOD objectives in Yemen. AFRICOM has access
through political upheavals or even disruption." Debate
to several foreign air and naval bases and ports in Africa,
continues within the U.S. government as to whether
including several sites from which to conduct aerial
military relationships should be sustained in situations such
surveillance for counterterrorism and counterpiracy efforts,
as the 2012 military coup in Mali, when a combination of
and to support missions such as the regional effort to
legal and policy restrictions led to a cessation of military
address the threat posed by the Lord’s Resistance Army
training and contacts despite an ongoing conflict involving
(LRA), a small, vicious armed group in Central Africa.
transnational terrorist groups. Some observers express
concern that growing DOD engagement risks feeding the
AFRICOM’s troop footprint on the continent varies from
perception of an increasingly militarized American foreign
month to month, based on training, exercises, and other
policy toward the region.
operational requirements, but is estimated at 5,000-6,500 at
any given time. Approximately 100 U.S. military personnel
DOD officials stress training programs aim in part to
serve as advisors to the counter-LRA effort. U.S. military
encourage respect for civilian authority and human rights,
personnel have also been deployed to support counter-
key shortcomings for some African forces. Provisions in
terrorism efforts in East Africa and North-West Africa, and,
DOD appropriations measures prohibit DOD assistance to
more recently, Nigeria. AFRICOM also draws support from
foreign security force units implicated in gross human
a Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SP-
rights abuses, a restriction that S. 2410, the draft National
MAGTF) for engagements and crisis response capability.
Defense Authorization Act for FY2015, seeks to codify.
Since 2013, AFRICOM has served as a test case for the
Army’s new Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) concept.
AFRICOM's proactive approach of seeking to strengthen
Troops from a Kansas-based brigade of the 1st Infantry
partner capacities to shape the regional security
Division have deployed for a range of partner capacity
environment for the longer term reflects an evolution in
building missions in Africa that have been traditionally
DOD strategy, but it remains a difficult effort to
performed by Special Operations Forces.
operationalize. Congress and the executive branch continue
to deliberate on the appropriate balance between DOD and
The New Normal: Protecting U.S.
the State Department in addressing stabilization priorities.
Personnel and Facilities
Debates about funding and authorities are ongoing, with
In early 2014, 15 U.S. diplomatic missions in Africa were
Administration officials arguing for greater flexibility and
classified as high threat, high risk posts, and the continent’s
resources to respond to emerging threats and opportunities.
size and limited infrastructure pose serious challenges for
crisis response. Planning for the rapid deployment of
A Light Footprint
response forces, particularly in the aftermath of the 2012
DOD engagement in Africa has grown since AFRICOM’s
attacks on U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya, has become an
establishment. That growth may be attributed to a range of
increasing focus for AFRICOM. Several crisis response
factors—policymakers’ changing perceptions of U.S.
units have been assigned to AFRICOM since October 2012,
national security interests in Africa; Congress’s enactment
including a Commander’s In-Extremis Force; a Fleet Anti-
of increasing authorities and appropriations for DOD
Terrorism Support Team; an SP-MAGTF Crisis Response
programs there (and for DOD partner capacity building
unit; and the Army’s East Africa Response Force (EARF),
efforts globally); and, more recently, an increase in U.S.
which operates from Djibouti; along with other Special
military units aligned with or assigned to AFRICOM from
Operations Forces units. Efforts to secure the U.S. embassy
which the command can draw for engagements. (In its early
and evacuate U.S. citizens from South Sudan in December
years AFRICOM had no assigned forces and had to use the
2013, amidst an unfolding civil war, was an early test for
Global Force Management and Request for Forces system.)
AFRICOM’s new crisis response capabilities.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)
Lauren Ploch Blanchard, Specialist in African Affairs
IF10180
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10180 · VERSION 2 · NEW