U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)

June 16, 2014 IF00029



June 16, 2014
U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)
Congress has continued to examine the evolving role and
“For the foreseeable future, the most direct threat to
posture of the U.S. military in Africa since AFRICOM
America at home and abroad remains terrorism. . from
became fully operational as the newest U.S. geographic
decentralized al Qaeda affiliates and extremists, many with
combatant command in 2008. The command is responsible
agendas focused in countries where they operate. And this
for Department of Defense (DOD) operations, exercises,
lessens the possibility of large-scale 9/11-style attacks against
and security cooperation on the African continent, its island
the homeland, but it heightens the danger of U.S. personnel
nations, and its surrounding waters.
overseas being attacked, as we saw in Benghazi. It heightens
the danger to less defensible targets, as we saw in a
AFRICOM’s stated mission is to advance U.S. national
shopping mal in Nairobi. So we have to develop a strategy
interests and promote regional security, stability, and
that matches this diffuse threat—one that expands our
prosperity in Africa, in concert with interagency and
reach without sending forces that stretch our military too
international partners, by building defense capabilities,
thin, or stir up local resentments. We need partners to fight
responding to crises, and deterring and defeating
terrorists alongside us.” President Barack Obama at the U.S.
transnational threats. AFRICOM Commander General
Military Academy-West Point, May 28, 2014
David Rodriguez has stated that the command’s most
important responsibility is to “detect, deter and prevent
attacks against the United States, its territories, possessions,
In Africa, the United States has taken a lower profile
and bases and to employ appropriate force to defend the
approach to countering terrorism that it has in Afghanistan,
nation should deterrence fail.”
where the U.S. military deployed in large numbers to
pursue Al Qaeda, or in Pakistan or Yemen, where air strikes
Before AFRICOM became a stand-alone command in
against terrorist targets have been more frequent.
October 2008, responsibility for U.S. military involvement
AFRICOM works primarily indirectly, by training,
in Africa was divided among European, Central, and Pacific
equipping, and sustaining partner forces such as the African
Commands. Its area of responsibility (AOR) does not
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to degrade extremist
include Egypt, which remains in Central Command’s AOR.
capabilities. Direct U.S. military action has been limited;
Its FY2015 budget request (headquarters, operations,
examples include Special Operations Forces missions in
exercises and related programs) is $245 million.
Somalia and Libya in October 2013 to capture suspected
terrorists; the January 2012 rescue of a U.S. hostage in
Responding to Threats and Challenges
Somalia; and, in a limited number of cases, targeted strikes
against members of Al Qaeda in Somalia.
AFRICOM’s establishment and its evolution reflect a
change in policymakers' perceptions of U.S. strategic
AFRICOM’s largest military operation to date is Operation
interests and security challenges in Africa. For some, the
Odyssey Dawn, in which it had operational and tactical
justification for a U.S. military command focused on the
command of U.S. forces supporting the multilateral effort to
continent has never been more pronounced. The Obama
enforce a no-fly zone and protect civilians in Libya in 2011.
Administration’s 2012 U.S. Strategy toward Sub-Saharan
Africa argues that “Africa is more important than ever to
The Indirect Approach
the security and prosperity of the international community,
and to the United States in particular.” While the military
The Obama Administration’s 2010 National Security
prepares a strategic “rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific region,
Strategy stresses the need to "embrace effective
in the near term, African conflicts and extremist threats
partnerships" in Africa, highlighting U.S. strategic priorities
increasingly occupy military planners’ efforts. Despite
such as "access to open markets, conflict prevention, global
positive political and economic trends in some countries,
peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and the protection of vital
armed conflict still plagues parts of the continent and poses
carbon sinks." The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review
threats to regional stability and other U.S. interests.
asserts that “our ability to project forces to combat
terrorism in places as far away as Yemen, Afghanistan, and
Terrorist threats appear to be increasing in North Africa; in
Mali—and to build capacity to help partners counter
such West African countries as Nigeria and Mali; and
terrorism...reduces the likelihood that these threats could
throughout East Africa, including in Somalia and Kenya.
find their way to U.S. shores." It outlines DOD’s intent to
Violent extremist groups like Al Shabaab, Al Qaeda in the
rebalance its counterterrorism efforts “toward greater
Islamic Maghreb, Boko Haram, Ansar al Sharia and other
emphasis on building partnership capacity, especially in
like-minded groups continue to attract recruits, and are
fragile states, while retaining robust capability for direct
reportedly increasingly sharing training, tactics, and
action, including intelligence, persistent surveillance,
weapons, including those from former Libyan stockpiles.
precision strike, and Special Operations Forces.”
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U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)
With partner capacity-building now a key component of
command would remain based in Stuttgart, Germany, for
U.S. military strategy in Africa, AFRICOM has sought to
the foreseeable future. As noted in a 2013 Government
focus greater effort on professionalizing African militaries.
Accountability Office report (GAO-13-646), AFRICOM’s
This work has been episodic in some countries and has been
commander had determined the command to be more
largely reliant on the level and continuity of State
operationally effective in its current location, given shared
Department-administered security assistance that DOD
resources with European Command and the proximity to its
implements (some State Department security assistance
AOR, while acknowledging that Germany was a more
programs are conducted by contractors). Congress has
expensive option than moving to the United States. GAO
authorized increasing DOD funding for capacity-building
questioned DOD’s analysis of the operational and cost
programs and DOD spending in Africa has increased, but
benefits in making the location decision.
these programs are largely focused on counterterrorism.
DOD has repeatedly stressed that there are no plans to have
AFRICOM has sought more persistent engagement with
a “significant” troop presence in Africa. Camp Lemonnier
partner militaries, in line with the 2011 National Military
in Djibouti hosts the U.S. military's only enduring
Strategy, which states that "military-to-military
infrastructure in Africa. The facility also provides support
relationships must be reliable to be effective, and persevere
for U.S. military operations in the Gulf of Aden area and
through political upheavals or even disruption." Debate
supports DOD objectives in Yemen. AFRICOM has access
continues within the U.S. government as to whether
to several foreign air and naval bases and ports in Africa,
military relationships should be sustained in situations such
including several sites from which to conduct aerial
as the 2012 military coup in Mali, when a combination of
surveillance for counterterrorism and counterpiracy efforts,
legal and policy restrictions led to a cessation of military
and to support missions such as the regional effort to
training and contacts despite an ongoing conflict involving
address the threat posed by the Lord’s Resistance Army
transnational terrorist groups. Some observers express
(LRA), a small, vicious armed group in Central Africa.
concern that growing DOD engagement risks feeding the
perception of an increasingly militarized American foreign
AFRICOM’s troop footprint on the continent varies from
policy toward the region.
month to month, based on training, exercises, and other
operational requirements, but is estimated at 5,000-6,500 at
DOD officials stress training programs aim in part to
any given time. Approximately 100 U.S. military personnel
encourage respect for civilian authority and human rights,
serve as advisors to the counter-LRA effort. U.S. military
key shortcomings for some African forces. Provisions in
personnel have also been deployed to support counter-
DOD appropriations measures prohibit DOD assistance to
terrorism efforts in East Africa and North-West Africa, and,
foreign security force units implicated in gross human
more recently, Nigeria. AFRICOM also draws support from
rights abuses, a restriction that S. 2410, the draft National
a Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SP-
Defense Authorization Act for FY2015, seeks to codify.
MAGTF) for engagements and crisis response capability.
Since 2013, AFRICOM has served as a test case for the
AFRICOM's proactive approach of seeking to strengthen
Army’s new Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) concept.
partner capacities to shape the regional security
Troops from a Kansas-based brigade of the 1st Infantry
environment for the longer term reflects an evolution in
Division have deployed for a range of partner capacity
DOD strategy, but it remains a difficult effort to
building missions in Africa that have been traditionally
operationalize. Congress and the executive branch continue
performed by Special Operations Forces.
to deliberate on the appropriate balance between DOD and
the State Department in addressing stabilization priorities.
The New Normal: Protecting U.S.
Debates about funding and authorities are ongoing, with
Personnel and Facilities
Administration officials arguing for greater flexibility and
resources to respond to emerging threats and opportunities.
In early 2014, 15 U.S. diplomatic missions in Africa were
classified as high threat, high risk posts, and the continent’s
A Light Footprint
size and limited infrastructure pose serious challenges for
crisis response. Planning for the rapid deployment of
DOD engagement in Africa has grown since AFRICOM’s
response forces, particularly in the aftermath of the 2012
establishment. That growth may be attributed to a range of
attacks on U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya, has become an
factors—policymakers’ changing perceptions of U.S.
increasing focus for AFRICOM. Several crisis response
national security interests in Africa; Congress’s enactment
units have been assigned to AFRICOM since October 2012,
of increasing authorities and appropriations for DOD
including a Commander’s In-Extremis Force; a Fleet Anti-
programs there (and for DOD partner capacity building
Terrorism Support Team; an SP-MAGTF Crisis Response
efforts globally); and, more recently, an increase in U.S.
unit; and the Army’s East Africa Response Force (EARF),
military units aligned with or assigned to AFRICOM from
which operates from Djibouti; along with other Special
which the command can draw for engagements. (In its early
Operations Forces units. Efforts to secure the U.S. embassy
years AFRICOM had no assigned forces and had to use the
and evacuate U.S. citizens from South Sudan in December
Global Force Management and Request for Forces system.)
2013, amidst an unfolding civil war, was an early test for
AFRICOM’s new crisis response capabilities.
After ruling out an initial plan to locate AFRICOM's
headquarters in Africa, and countering proposals for a move
Lauren Ploch Blanchard, lploch@crs.loc.gov, 7-7640
to a U.S. location, DOD announced in early 2013 that the
IF00029
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