Taiwan: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy Choices

Order Code IB98034
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Taiwan: Recent Developments
and U.S. Policy Choices
Updated June 8, 2006
Kerry Dumbaugh
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Taiwan’s Political Liberalization
Political Pluralization
Split Government, Competing Ideologies
Key Current Issues in Taiwan
Corruption Scandals
“Abolishing” Unification Council and Guidelines
PRC Anti-Secession Law
U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan and Taiwan Defense Budget
Opposition Party Visits to China
Taiwan-Mainland Relations
Cross-Strait Developments in the Chen Administration
Private-Sector Exchanges
Economic and Trade Issues
Taiwan’s World Trade Organization (WTO) Accession
Avian Flu, SARS, and WHO Observer Status
Policy Trends in the George W. Bush Administration
Initial Tilt Toward Taiwan
Toward a Taiwan/PRC Balance
Implications for U.S. Policy
LEGISLATION
CHRONOLOGY
FOR ADDITIONAL READING

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Taiwan: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy Choices
SUMMARY
Under the Bush Administration, U.S.-
election of March 20, 2004, to incumbent
China-Taiwan relations have undergone a
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate
number of changes. Initially, the new Admin-
Chen Shui-bian by a razor-thin margin. Chen
istration seemed to abandon the long-standing
has been able to seize the political initiative by
U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity” on Tai-
disavowing the concepts long embraced by his
wan in favor of “strategic clarity” that placed
KMT opponents: that there is “one China,”
more emphasis on Taiwan’s interests and less
that Taiwan is a part of it, and that Chinese
on PRC concerns. Among other things, Presi-
history and culture are Taiwan’s heritage.
dent Bush publicly stated that the United
Instead, Chen has emphasized a “new Taiwan
States would do “whatever it takes” to help
identity” and has said publicly that Taiwan
Taiwan’s defense — a position more support-
already “is an independent, sovereign country”
ive of Taiwan than had been articulated by
— a “status quo” that he promises to main-
previous U.S. presidents. In April 2001, the
tain. Legislative elections held on December
President also approved a substantial sale of
11, 2004, however, suggest that Taiwan’s
U.S. weapons to Taiwan, including Kidd-class
electorate appeared to reject the more strident
destroyers, anti-submarine P-3 “Orion” air-
aspects of the DPP’s election strategy, instead
craft, and diesel submarines. The White
returning a slim KMT majority to the legisla-
House also was more accommodating to visits
ture. As in Chen’s first term, it appears that
from Taiwan officials than previous U.S.
continued opposition control of the legislature
Administrations, and permitted visits from
could lead to policy gridlock, with the
Taiwan’s president in 2001 and 2003, and
legislature amending or blocking DPP policy
from Taiwan’s vice president and defense
initiatives.
minister in 2002.
Political trends in Taiwan have raised
The Administration’s initially assertive
anxieties about its future and the implications
posture was in keeping with growing congres-
for U.S. policy. Some are concerned that a
sional sentiment that greater U.S. support was
continued emphasis on “Taiwan identity” may
needed for Taiwan’s defense needs, particu-
lead to ethnic polarization and conflict.
larly given the PRC’s military build-up in
Others are concerned about the implications
southern China. Members undertook a num-
that these trends have for a possible
ber of bipartisan initiatives to focus more U.S.
declaration of Taiwan independence, which
attention on Taiwan and raise its international
Beijing has vowed to “pay any price” to
stature. These included House establishment
prevent. In recent months, political
of the Congressional Taiwan Caucus in 2002,
developments in Taiwan appear to be causing
and Senate establishment of the Senate Tai-
the Bush Administration to dial back its
wan Caucus in 2003.
earlier enthusiasm for supporting Taiwan.
U.S. officials now appear to be balancing
But President Bush’s first term has been
criticisms of the PRC military buildup
a time of increasing complexity and unpredict-
opposite Taiwan with periodic cautions and
ability in Taiwan’s political environment.
warnings to the effect that U.S. support for
Since 2000, the long-ruling Nationalist Party
Taiwan is not unconditional, but has limits.
(KMT) has been handed a series of stunning
This issue brief tracking the situation in Tai-
defeats, most recently losing the presidential
wan will be updated as events warrant.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
June 8, 2006 — The State Department issued a press release expressing U.S. pleasure
at President Chen’s “public reaffirmation” on June 8th of his pledges to maintain Taiwan’s
status quo.
June 7, 2006 — The chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), Raymond
Burghardt, arrived in Taiwan for meetings with top Taiwan officials over recent political
problems.
June 3, 2006 — Taiwan’s opposition parties threatened to initiate a legislative vote of
no confidence in President Chen over scandals involving the president’s family.
June 2, 2006 — Two key aides of President Chen, Ma Yung-cheng (Deputy Secretary-
General of the President’s office) and Lin chin-chang (a National Security Council advisory
member), tendered their resignations to “facilitate” government reform in the wake of recent
scandals.
June 1, 2006 — A Taiwan spokesman announced that President Chen had handed over
“day-to-day control” of the Taiwan government to Premier Su Tseng-chang in response to
recent scandals involving the president’s family.
May 24, 2006 — President Chen’s son-in-law, Chao Chien-min, was arrested on
charges of insider trading.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Once a U.S. World War II ally, the Republic of China (ROC) government on Taiwan
(an island also claimed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC)) remains a key U.S. foreign
policy issue. Official U.S. relations with Taiwan became a necessary casualty of the 1979
American decision to establish diplomatic relations with the communist PRC government
as the sole legitimate government of all China. Since then, absent diplomatic relations, the
United States still has maintained economic and security relations with Taiwan, including
the sale of defensive military weapons and services.1 But continuing political
transformations in both the PRC and Taiwan since 1979 mean that U.S. policymakers are
facing more difficult policy choices in U.S. relations with each government.
This report focuses on current developments in Taiwan, analyzing how those
developments are affecting choices the United States makes about its policy toward Taiwan
specifically and toward the PRC more broadly. Other CRS reports provide more details
about the myriad historical complexities of Taiwan’s current situation in U.S. policy, such
as: historical background about how the ROC on Taiwan went from a U.S. ally to a
government with no diplomatic U.S. relations, including the fundamentals governing U.S.
1 U.S. weapons sales to Taiwan are governed by Section 2 and Section 3(b) of the Taiwan Relations
Act, P.L. 96-8: 22 U.S.C., Chapter 48, Sections 3301-3316.
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policy toward Taiwan today (CRS Report RS22388, Taiwan’s Political Status: Historical
Background and Ongoing Implications, by Kerry Dumbaugh); and the subtle and
complicated permutations of the “one-China” policy over three decades and its role in U.S.
policy (CRS Report RL30341, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy — Key
Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei).
Taiwan’s Political Liberalization
Ironically, one of the key challenges for U.S. Taiwan policy has become Taiwan’s own
political liberalization and democratization since 1979. Under the strongly authoritarian rule
(and martial law) of the long-ruling KMT, Taiwan’s political decisions from 1949 to 1979
were predictable, closely aligned with U.S. interests, and clearly dependent on U.S. support.
But several decades of political reform and democratic development have made Taiwan
politics today both more pluralistic and more unpredictable.
Political Pluralization. Taiwan’s political liberalization began in the mid-1980s,
when the KMT first permitted formation of opposition parties (1986), including the
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), a party whose platform advocated Taiwan
independence from China. The KMT government also ended martial law (in 1987), and for
the first time opened government positions to native “Taiwanese” — the 85% of the island’s
population who predated the influx of the two million “mainlanders” fleeing communist
forces. Members of Taiwan’s legislature in the 1980s, elected on mainland China over 40
years earlier, were asked to retire, and a new, streamlined legislature was elected in 1992.
In 1996, Taiwan held its first direct presidential election, which was won by KMT leader Lee
Teng-hui, himself a native Taiwanese. During his presidency, Lee increasingly distanced
himself from his party’s long-standing position that there was only “one China” and that
Taiwan was part of it. This posed complications for one of the fundamental tenets on which
U.S. relations with the PRC were based — the statement that “The United States
acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but
one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.”2
The uninterrupted KMT dynasty on Taiwan finally was broken on March 18, 2000,
when DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian won the presidency with only 39% of the popular vote.
The victory was a stunning defeat for the KMT and its unbroken 50-year tenure in power.
By the narrowest of margins, President Chen was elected to a second (and final) term in
March 2004, winning by only 29,518 votes out of a reported 13.25 million votes cast. The
KMT fall from its former political dominance was compounded in two subsequent legislative
elections in December 2001 and December 2004, when the struggling party saw its majority
of 115 seats in the 225-member Legislative Yuan (LY) cut drastically — to just 79 seats
today as a result of the December 2004 election.3
2 This particular quote is from the 1972 Shanghai Communique issued at the conclusion of President
Richard Nixon’s landmark trip to China. A somewhat vaguer formulation — “The [United States]
acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.” — was
part of the 1979 communique normalizing U.S. relations with the PRC.
3 Elections for Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan (LY) are held every three years. The next LY elections
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Split Government, Competing Ideologies. With Chen Shui-bian and the DPP’s
“Pan-Green” coalition in control of the presidency since 2000, the KMT nevertheless has
managed to retain the barest control of Taiwan’s legislature by cobbling together a working
“Pan-Blue” coalition of 113 from its own remnants: 79 KMT members and 34 members of
a new faction that broke from the main KMT party, the People First Party (PFP).4 Since the
two opposing coalitions have different political ideologies and roughly equal political
strength, this split government has created significant gridlock in Taiwan’s political arena
since 2000 and thus difficult political realities for U.S. policymakers.
The membership of the DPP-led “Pan-Green” coalition, to which incumbent president
Chen Shui-bian belongs, is largely native Taiwanese and is closely identified with advocating
Taiwan independence — an eventuality which Beijing has stated it will “bear any cost” to
prevent. Chen, himself a native Taiwanese, has had to perform a continuing balancing act
between the radical base of his party — avid independence advocates — and the more
cautious in the Taiwan electorate who may wish for independence but who believe that
antagonizing the PRC is not in Taiwan’s interests. Chen and his advisors have attempted to
finesse this contradiction by proclaiming a “new Taiwan identity” and emphasizing
maintenance of the “status quo” — which they define as Taiwan’s de-facto sovereignty and
statehood. While this strategy has met with certain success, these DPP political nuances
have created problems on several fronts. Strong pro-independence activists believe they do
not go far enough. Beijing claims they go too far and are close to an outright declaration of
independence, while Bush Administration officials are increasingly concerned over the
complications that the more assertive components of Chen’s strategy create for U.S. policy
toward China and Taiwan.5
On the other side of Taiwan’s political spectrum is the KMT’s opposition “Pan-Blue
Coalition.” The KMT historically is a party of mainlanders that fled to Taiwan from China
in 1949. It is politically conservative and strongly anti-communist. Although it is credited
with engineering Taiwan’s vibrant economic growth and transformation during its 50-year
rule on the island, the KMT’s inability to offer a clear and creative vision for Taiwan’s future
in the 21st century ultimately made it vulnerable to the DPP political challenge in the 2000
election.6 Since then, the KMT has portrayed itself as a more responsible steward than the
DPP for Taiwan’s future. It criticizes the DPP’s posture toward Beijing as unnecessarily
confrontational and promises to replace it with a policy of engagement. Many KMT
3 (...continued)
are scheduled for December 2007.
4 The “Pan-Green” is the popular name of the DPP’s political union with a like-minded minority
party, the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), which itself emerged from the December 2004 LY
elections with 12 seats. The two “color”coalitions were so named because of their respective party
colors.
5 In September 2005, for example, at the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council-Defense Industry
Conference 2005, Edward Ross, Director of the U.S. Defense Department’s Defense Security
Cooperation Agency, strongly criticized Taiwan’s politicization of security issues, saying it was
reasonable to question why the United States should invest in Taiwan’s self-defense if Taiwan itself
were not willing to invest in it.
6 The traditional KMT policy held that there was only one China, that Taiwan was part of China, and
that one day Taiwan would re-take the mainland and China would be reunified.
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members have criticized the DPP’s “new Taiwan identity” emphasis as an attempt to
question KMT political legitimacy and as a dangerous provocation to ethnic divisions. The
party also gets political mileage out of portraying Chen as insufficiently attentive to the needs
of Taiwan’s business community — as in the economic disadvantages Taiwan business
interests continue to face due to Taiwan’s restrictions on contacts with mainland China.
This legislative-executive split in Taiwan’s government has created unique political
problems. U.S. policymakers generally have found these political processes difficult to
oppose because they are democratic but also, for the same reason, difficult to rely on for
support of U.S. interests. Domestically, the relatively even strength of the Taiwan two
coalitions has resulted in years of effective political gridlock. The KMT/PFP legislative
coalition since 2002 has been able to block or modify most of the DPP’s policy initiatives,
while President Chen has proven adept at counter-offensive in the public debate by offering
controversial initiatives affecting Taiwan’s political status. In the most recent of these re-
balancing acts, on December 3, 2005, the opposition KMT party won an impressive victory
in local city mayor and country magistrate elections, winning a total of 14 out of 23
constituencies while the ruling DPP won only six.7 These results were seen as a negative
mid-term referendum on the policies of Taiwan’s President Chen Shui-bian, whose
popularity in December 2005 was reported to have fallen to 21%.8 KMT supporters
interpreted this result as a “no-confidence” vote for the DPP and a boost to KMT fortunes
in coming presidential elections scheduled for 2008. President Chen appears to have
countered this momentum with controversial pronouncements since January 2006 about
abolishing or amending important symbols to the “one-China” policy and PRC-Taiwan
reunification, such as the National Unification Council, unification guidelines, and Taiwan’s
constitution.
Key Current Issues in Taiwan
Corruption Scandals
In recent months, the Chen administration has suffered grievous damage from
allegations of corruption by President Chen’s family members (including unproven
allegations against his wife, Wu Shu-chen) and by government officials close to the
president. The most damaging of these to date began in early May 2006, when the Taipei
district prosecutor’s office started investigating allegations that President Chen’s son-in-law,
Chao Chien-min, had profited in an insider trading scheme involving the Taiwan
Development Corporation. Chao was arrested on May 24, 2006. The following day, the
Vice Chairman of the National Science Council was taken into custody on suspicion of a
profiteering scandal involving the award of a contract to reduce vibrations from a new high-
speed railway line in Taiwan County. The scandals have helped worsen Chen’s abysmally
low approval rating, put at 16% in one survey on May 19, 2006.9 In an effort to save his
7 Five city mayor seats and 18 county magistrate seats were contested in the Dec. elections.
8 United Daily News, Dec. 4, 2005.
9 This result was obtained in a survey by Shih Hsin University. A separate poll conducted by
Taipei’s United Daily News put Chen’s approval ratings at 20%, the lowest its poll ratings have ever
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presidency, Chen on June 1, 2006, delegated authority for “day-to-day control” of the
government to Premier Su Tseng-chang and has accepted the resignations of a number of his
key advisors. Taiwan’s opposition parties, however, are calling for Chen’s resignation, and
on June 3, 2006, threatened to initiate a no-confidence vote in the Taiwan legislature.
“Abolishing” Unification Council and Guidelines
A new controversy has arisen in Taiwan as a result of President Chen’s announcement
of his decision on February 27, 2006, that Taiwan’s National Unification Council (NUC) will
“cease operations” and the Guidelines on National Reunification (GNR) will “cease to
apply.” The NUC and GNR are two initiatives strongly identified with the former KMT
government. President Chen first mentioned he was considering scrapping the NUC/GNR
on January 29, 2006. That statement appeared to surprise U.S. officials, who responded by
publicly reiterating the U.S. “one-China” policy, secretly sending a special envoy delegation
to Taiwan to express concerns, and reportedly privately criticizing the decision to Taiwan
officials.10 The softer formulation of the language in Chen’s February 27, 2006 decision is
regarded as a compromise to strong U.S. concern over the cross-strait implications of
“abolishing” both entities — a decision that at least one PRC scholar opined could result in
a “non-peaceful” response by Beijing.11
Long non-functional (the NUC last met in 1999), the NUC and GNR have political
significance largely as symbols of Taiwan’s commitment to eventual cross-strait unification.
One of four institutions under the direct authority of Taiwan’s president, the NUC was
established in 1990 under a KMT government by executive order of Taiwan President Lee
Teng-hui, then head of the KMT. On February 23, 1991, the NUC adopted a set of
Guidelines for National Unification which reaffirmed Taiwan’s status as part of China and
laid out the process by which unification with China should be achieved. Although prospects
for implementing the guidelines seemed remote (among other things, the initial phase
requires the PRC to implement “both democracy and the rule of law” before consultations
on unification can begin), the “unification” focus of the guidelines appealed to KMT
conservatives and reaffirmed the KMT’s long-standing “one-China” policy.12 When Chen
Shui-bian became the first pro-independence DPP party candidate elected as Taiwan’s
president in 2000, he pledged five things “as long as the CPP regime has no intention to use
9 (...continued)
showed for President Chen.
10 In a January 20, 2006 press briefing, Deputy State Department spokesman Adam Ereli responded
to a question on the statement with “we certainly weren’t expecting it, we weren’t consulted about
it, so I’d say it was a surprise.” On February 14, 2006, a White House National Security Council
official, Dennis Wilder, reportedly with State Department Taiwan official Clifford Hart, secretly
visited Taiwan to express U.S. concern and was reportedly told that the decision could not be
changed. Reuters, “Taiwan’s pro-independence Chen Snubs U.S.: Paper,” February 22, 2006.
11 Chang, S.C., “PRC scholar warns of ‘non-peaceful response’ to Chen’s NUC game,” Central News
Agency, February 23, 2006.
12 For the full text of the guidelines, see [http://cns.miis.edu/straittalk/Appendix%2059.htm]
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military force against Taiwan.” Among these was the pledge that the abolishment of the
National Reunification Council and Guidelines “will not be an issue.”13
President Chen’s NUC decision has sparked controversy and policy conflicts in Taiwan.
A senior Taiwan official in charge of cross-strait policy initially sought to soften the edges
of Chen’s January 2006 statement by saying that any decision was still a long way off.14 But
President Chen toughened his rhetoric in ensuing weeks, reportedly telling a visiting U.S.
congressman that the NUC and its guidelines were “an absurd product of an absurd era” that
should be abolished, and his party’s Central Standing Committee voted on February 22,
2006, to endorse the NUC’s abolishment..15 Chen reportedly made his final decision at a
special meeting of Taiwan’s National Security Council on February 27, 2006.16 Critics
maintain that the decision is a dangerous and unnecessary provocation to Beijing, that it
violates President Chen’s 2000 inaugural pledge of not seeking to abolish the NUC, and that
it unilaterally changes the “status quo” in the Taiwan Strait. Supporters of the President’s
statement assert that Beijing’s increasing missile deployments opposite Taiwan and its
adoption of an “Anti-Secession Law” (see below) violate the “no use of force” condition
under which Chen’s original pledge was made. These PRC moves, Chen’s supporters say,
have already changed the status quo in the Strait.
PRC Anti-Secession Law
President Chen and his supporters have linked the decision to abolish the NUC/NGU
to the PRC’s adoption, on March 14, 2005, of a ten-article “anti-secession law” aimed at
reining in Taiwan independence advocates.17 While much of the new PRC law speaks of
conciliatory measures — such as encouraging cross-strait economic and cultural exchanges
and resumption of direct trade, air, and mail links — Article 8 of the anti-secession law
specifically authorizes the use of “non-peaceful means” to reunify Taiwan with China.
According to Article 8:
In the event that the “Taiwan independence” secessionist forces should act under any
name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China, or that major
incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for
a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-
peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and
territorial integrity.
13 President Chen Shui-bian’s Inaugural Speech (2000), May 20, 2000. For the full text, see
[http://cns.miis.edu/straittalk/Appendix%20119.htm]
14 Joseph Wu, Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council, at a February 2, 2006 news conference.
Magnier, Mark and Tsai Ting-I, “Taiwan official seeks to recast Chen’s stance,” LA Times, February
3, 2006.
15 Dickie, Mure and Hille, Kathrin, Taiwan’s president labels unification body ‘absurd’,” Financial
Times, Asia, February 23, 2006, p. 2.
16 Chang, S.C. “President decides to cease NUC’s operation,” Central News Agency, February 27,
2006.
17 The measure was adopted by the PRC’s National People’s Congress.
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American observers and U.S. officials termed the PRC anti-secession law
counterproductive, particularly given improvements in a range of Taiwan-China contacts
since December 2004. Many saw the anti-secession law as a clear signal of China’s potential
rising military threat to Taiwan and feared it could significantly raise tensions across the
Taiwan strait. Critics also feared the law could be used to harass independence advocates
in Taiwan by, for example, labeling them “criminals” and demanding their extradition from
third party countries. For their part, Taiwan authorities denounced the enactment of the law
and temporarily suspended further talks with Beijing on holding direct-charter cargo and
holiday passenger flights between the two sides. On March 16, 2005, President Chen made
his first public statement about the law, saying it would have a “severe impact” on cross-
strait relations. Chen’s 2006 decision to abolish the NUC and its guidelines appears to be
the first policy decision he has specifically linked to the 2005 PRC anti-secession law.
U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan and Taiwan Defense Budget
Taiwan’s inability so far to take full advantage of a substantial U.S. military support
package approved for sale in 2001 has become an increasing irritant in Taiwan-U.S.
relations. To date, political infighting has blocked legislative consideration of the arms
procurement budget for purchasing much of the U.S. arms package.18 In particular, members
of the opposition coalition (the KMT/PFP “Pan-Blue”) in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan (LY)
have lodged objections over: the multi-billion (U.S.) dollar cost of the package (which the
Taiwan government has pared back on several occasions in an effort to win support);
whether the types of weapons in the package meet Taiwan’s defense needs; the compatibility
of the proposed purchases with Taiwan’s military; and whether Taiwan companies can
benefit or participate. In addition, some members in the “Pan-Blue” opposition object to
Taipei’s decision to keep submitting the procurement budget as a free-standing “special
defense” budget rather than as part of Taiwan’s overall annual defense budget. Commenting
on the stalemate on October 20, 2005, Taiwan’s President Chen Shui-bian said that the LY’s
continued boycott of the special defense budget was jeopardizing Taiwan’s future.
Multiplying problems over arms sales have the potential to impose longer-term damage
to the unique character of unofficial U.S.-Taiwan relations. In 2002, U.S. officials began
voicing concerns over what they described as weaknesses in Taiwan’s self-defense and a
lagging pace to Taiwan’s arms purchases. According to a DOD report, Taiwan’s self-defense
deficiencies include an “opaque military policymaking system; a ground force-centric
orientation; and a conservative military leadership culture.”19 As the defense budget
stalemate in Taiwan has continued, some U.S. officials have begun to question Taiwan’s
level of commitment to its own defense, implying that perhaps U.S. policy should be
reassessed accordingly.20 Criticism also has come from the Taiwan side, as Taiwan officials
18 In 2003, Taiwan’s legislature did approve $800 million for the purchase of the four Kidd-class
destroyers. On December 8, 2005, the first two of these (now designated Keelung class) arrived at
the Suao naval base in northeastern Taiwan after having been refurbished in South Carolina,
reportedly by a Taiwanese work crew. The two destroyers were commissioned in a December 17,
2005 ceremony in Keelung. Taipei Times, December 19, 2005, p. 3.
19 The text of the 2003 DOD report is at [http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/20030730chinaex.pdf].
20 In a 2005 speech to the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council-Defense Industry Conference 2005, Ed
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periodically have accused the U.S. Navy of deliberately trying to subvert progress on the
2001 diesel-electric submarine sale by over-inflation of estimated construction costs and
onerous funding requirements.21
Opposition Party Visits to China
In addition to the anti-secession law, PRC officials also have sought to increase pressure
on the Chen government by inviting Taiwan opposition leaders to visit China and meet with
PRC President Hu Jintao in Beijing. Both Taiwan’s Nationalist Party (KMT) chairman Lien
Chan and People First Party (PFP) chairman James Soong accepted these invitations, making
eight-day visits to China in April and May 2005. While some view the visits as a positive
development for Taiwan-PRC relations, others see them as Beijing’s effort to exploit
Taiwan’s internal political divisions and further isolate President Chen.22 Some critics —
in Taiwan and elsewhere — accused Lien and Soong of helping the PRC to more
successfully “sell” to the world its claim that the intentions of its March 2005 anti-secession
law are peaceful.23 At least half a dozen more Taiwan political groups have undertaken
unofficial visits to China since the Lien-Soong visits, and on August 16, 2005, KMT
Chairman Lien Chan further announced the formal start of grass-roots exchanges between
KMT and CCP officials from six different locations on each side, with Taiwan party officials
from Keelong, Hsinchu, Taichung, Changhua, Tainan, and Kaohsiung; and CCP party
officials from Shenzhen, Xiamen, Suzhou, Qingdao, Ningbo, and Fuzhou. U.S. officials
have warned Beijing against using the party-to-party visits to drive a wedge between
Taiwan’s political parties, and have stressed that Beijing should be talking to President Chen
and the elected Taiwan government.
Taiwan-Mainland Relations
Despite new cross-strait tensions in 2006, succeeding Taiwan governments since 1987
incrementally have eased long-standing restrictions on travel to and contacts with the PRC.
In Taiwan, cross-strait policies are under the purview of the Mainland Affairs Council
(MAC), a government body, while cross-strait talks are handled by the Straits Exchange
20 (...continued)
Ross, Director of DOD’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency, strongly criticized Taiwan’s foot-
dragging on passage of the defense budget, saying it was reasonable in such a situation to question
the level of U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s self-defense.
21 Minnick, Wendell, “Taiwan claims U.S. Navy is sabotaging SSK plans,” in Jane’s Defence
Weekly, February 15, 2005.
22 “It’s classic divide-and-conquer strategy: Assemble the most allies possible and isolate your
enemy.” Jean-Philippe Beja, senior fellow at the Center for International Studies and Research in
Paris. Cited in Magnier, Mark and Tsai Ting-I, “China Tries New Tactic with Taiwan,” Los Angeles
Times, Apr. 29, 2005, p. A-3.
23 According to Shen Dingli, a PRC foreign policy expert at Shanghai’s Fudan University, “These
invitations for Taiwanese to visit help China regain the international high ground in cross-strait
matters. And it deflects international focus from the anti-secession law.” Ibid., Los Angeles Times,
Apr. 29, 2005.
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Foundation (SEF), a private organization authorized by the government to handle these
exchanges. Corresponding bodies in the PRC are the government’s Taiwan Affairs Office,
while cross-strait talks are handled by the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait
(ARATS). Despite substantial and growing economic ties, the two sides have not held
official talks since October 14-19, 1998, in Shanghai and Beijing. Further progress stalled
in 1999, when then-President Lee Teng-hui declared that such talks should be conducted on
an equal, “state to state” basis, which Beijing took as a statement of Taiwan sovereignty.
Cross-Strait Developments in the Chen Administration. Although Beijing has
adamantly opposed the DPP and its pro-independence statements, early in Chen’s first term
both the PRC and Taiwan governments made selected overtures and statements that some
interpreted as positive signs in PRC-Taiwan relations. In January 2001, Taiwan launched
what it called the “three mini-links” — for the first time permitting direct transport,
commerce, and postal exchanges between two outlying Taiwan islands and the south of
China. In October 2001, Taiwan officials announced they would simplify visa application
procedures for professionals from the PRC, making it easier for them to reside and work in
Taiwan. In November 2001, President Chen gave a speech in Taiwan urging the PRC
government to drop its opposition to negotiating with his administration. In May 2002,
President Chen announced he would send a DPP delegation to Beijing to establish contacts
between the DPP and the Chinese Communist Party.
The PRC also appeared to soften its position. On January 24, 2002, PRC Vice-Premier
Qian Qichen described pro-independence advocates in the DPP as only an “extremely small
number” in the Party, and he invited DPP members to visit the mainland under a “suitable
status” — a change in the PRC’s policy of not meeting with DPP members. More
interestingly, in an interview with Russia’s ITAR-TASS news agency on March 14, 2002,
the deputy director of the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office, Zhou Mingwei, suggested that the
PRC may be willing to accept the simultaneous representation of both Beijing and Taipei in
the United Nations, provided that Taiwan acknowledges the “one-China” principle. Even
so, the PRC continued to increase its missile build-up along the south China coast opposite
Taiwan, now deploying close to 500 missiles.
In the lead-up to and aftermath of the March 2004 Taiwan presidential elections, cross-
strait tensions increased. On September 1, 2003, for instance, Taiwan authorities added the
words “Issued in Taiwan” to Taiwan passports, reportedly to avoid confusion between the
PRC and Taiwan. A seemingly innocuous change, the decision appealed to Taiwan
nationalists and irritated Beijing, which responded by saying that the move demonstrated
Taiwan was “inching toward independence.” In December 2003, as the Taiwan referendum
debate heated up, PRC officials publicly warned Taiwan that further moves toward
independence could result in a PRC military response. But as has happened in the past,
tensions appear to have eased in the election’s aftermath. On January 29, 2005, for instance,
Taiwan and the PRC launched the first non-stop direct charter flights flown in 55 years
between the two adversaries. While temporary (the flights were scheduled only to reunite
families and friends during the weeks surrounding the Lunar New Year holiday on February
9, 2005), the direct-flight breakthrough suggests that further momentum might be possible.
With the PRC’s enactment of the anti-secession law, Taiwan officials put a temporary hold
on further direct-flight talks. The suspension was later lifted, and on November 18, 2005,
Taiwan and the PRC reached agreement to offer cross-strait flights for the Lunar New Year
from January 20-February 13, 2006.
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Private-Sector Exchanges. Meanwhile, unofficial Taiwan-PRC contacts and
economic ties have grown increasingly robust in the past decade. Over 13 million visits have
taken place from Taiwan to the mainland. Over 250,000 mainland Chinese experts,
entrepreneurs, and others have traveled to Taiwan for consultations and exchanges.
Exchanges of PRC-Taiwan scholars and experts for consultations on cross-strait and other
issues provide, in the view of some Taiwanese officials, an active “second track” for
PRC-Taiwan dialogue. Other events in cross-strait relations have included the decision by
oil companies in the PRC and Taiwan to explore jointly offshore areas for oil; the start of
flights from Taiwan to the mainland with only a short stopover in Macao or Hong Kong; and
Taiwan’s opening to third-country ships, and selected mainland and Taiwanese ships, to
carry cargo to and from designated ports in Taiwan and on the mainland.
Economic and Trade Issues
Taiwan’s economy grew rapidly (around 10% a year) in the 1970s and 1980s. Growth
declined to around 5-6% a year in the 1990s as the economy matured. During the first years
of the 21st century, however, the Taiwan economy experienced a serious slowdown. GDP
growth for 2001 contracted by 2.2% — Taiwan’s first economic contraction in 26 years.
Exports were down 13.6% in the first seven months of 2001, while the unemployment rate
hovered at around 5%. Experts blamed these economic difficulties on the global economic
downturn, reduced U.S. demand for Taiwan’s information technology exports, and the
sizeable transfer of the island’s manufacturing base to the PRC.
Even with the official restrictions that Taiwan continues to maintain on investment and
trade with mainland China, Taiwan businesses are increasingly invested across the strait,
although the exact figures remain unclear. Taiwan-China trade has also increased
dramatically over the past decade, so that China (along with Hong Kong) now has surpassed
the United States as Taiwan’s most important trading partner. According to one report,
statistics show Taiwan’s total bilateral trade with the PRC rose to $61.64 billion in 2004 —
a 33.1% increase over 2003.24
This increasing economic interconnectedness with the PRC has put special pressure on
Taiwan’s DPP government to further accommodate the Taiwan business community by
easing restrictions on direct travel and investment to the PRC. But such accommodations are
worrisome to the DPP’s pro-independence political base in Taiwan, who believe that further
economic ties to the mainland will erode Taiwan’s autonomy and lead to a “hollowing out”
of Taiwan’s industrial base.25 Thus, each Taiwan decision on economic links with the PRC
represents an uneasy political compromise.
Taiwan’s World Trade Organization (WTO) Accession. After a 12-year
application process, Taiwan joined the WTO on January 1, 2002, as “the Separate Customs
Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu” or, less formally, “Chinese Taipei.” In
24 According to the Foreign Board of Trade, cited by Agence-France Presse in Taiwan News online,
March 3, 2005, [http://www.etaiwannews.com]. See also CRS Report RL31749, Foreign Direct
Investment in China, by Dick Nanto and Radha Sinha.
25 For instance, there are reportedly 300,000 Taiwan citizens now living and working in Shanghai.
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keeping with the PRC’s wishes, Taiwan was not admitted to the organization until after the
PRC’s accession on December 12, 2001, following a 15-year application process. As a result
of its WTO membership, Taiwan will have to reduce tariffs and open a number of market
sectors to foreign investment, thus setting the stage for new opportunities for U.S.
businesses. In addition, mutual membership in the WTO is likely to have a significant
impact on PRC-Taiwan economic and trade relations. To be in compliance with their WTO
obligations, both Beijing and Taipei will have to reduce long-standing bilateral trade
restrictions, setting the stage for direct trade links between the two governments.
Avian Flu, SARS, and WHO Observer Status
Taiwan did not escape the outbreak of new viruses that swept Asia since 2002. By late
May 2003, Taiwan had reported 585 probable cases of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome,
or SARS — which first surfaced in southern China in November 2002 — placing it behind
China and Hong Kong for the greatest number of cases. Taiwan also has been affected by
avian flu outbreaks in poultry since 2004, although apparently with a less virulent strain than
that ravaging bird populations and causing some human fatalities throughout other parts of
Asia.
Because Taiwan is not a member of WHO (the World Health Organization), the avian
flu outbreaks had broader political ramifications for Taiwan’s international position and for
China-Taiwan relations. The PRC objects strenuously to any WHO representation by
Taiwan, claiming that as Taiwan is part of China, it can access WHO’s services through the
PRC government. Even as the SARS crisis was underway, PRC leaders continued
vigorously to block any international effort to give Taiwan unofficial “observer” status in the
WHO,26 although PRC authorities did consent to a WHO team visit to Taiwan to investigate
early in May 2003. Taiwan authorities, in a view supported by many Members of the U.S.
Congress, have used the SARS and avian flu crises to press their argument that the rapid
spread and consequences of emerging communicable diseases demonstrate why WHO
observer status is essential for Taiwan. But Taiwan again failed to gain observer status when
33 countries objected to considering the issue on May 16, 2005, at the annual meeting of the
World Health Assembly (WHA), WHO’s decision-making body.
Policy Trends in the George W. Bush Administration
When it first assumed office, the Bush Administration articulated policies in Asia that
were more supportive of Taiwan and less solicitous of engagement with China than those of
previous U.S. Administrations. But since then, although U.S.-PRC relations have remained
remarkably smooth, other factors — the PRC’s anti-secession law, Taiwan’s internal political
divisions, and what is viewed as President Chen’s more assertive and divisive push for
separate Taiwan status — have posed growing problems for this U.S. policy approach. In
26 On May 14, 2003, WHO began a ten-day meeting of its General Assembly in Geneva, at which
the United States was prepared to support Taiwan’s bid — its seventh such attempt — to gain WHO
observer status. Because of PRC opposition, WHO member countries elected not to place the matter
of Taiwan’s participation on the meeting’s agenda.
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the face of these complications, Bush Administration officials at times are thought to be
trying to rein in Chen and seem to be placing more public caveats on U.S. support for
Taiwan.
Initial Tilt Toward Taiwan. Many observers concluded in 2001 that the newly
elected George W. Bush had abandoned the long-standing U.S. policy of “strategic
ambiguity” in favor of “strategic clarity” that placed a clearer emphasis on Taiwan’s interests
and showed less concern for PRC views. In addition to approving a major arms sales
package for Taiwan, in an ABC television interview on April 25, 2001, President Bush
responded to a question about what Washington would do if Taiwan were attacked by saying
that the United States would do “Whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself.” Since
Section 3 of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) addresses only arms sales and not the use of
American military forces in the island’s defense, the President’s answer caused considerable
controversy over whether the United States had changed its policy toward Taiwan’s security
or was preparing to change its position on Taiwan independence. Although State
Department and White House officials, including President Bush, later insisted that the
President’s statement was consistent with U.S. commitments in the TRA and that there had
been no change in U.S. policy, subsequent statements and actions by Bush Administration
officials in the following months continued to appear more supportive of Taiwan than those
of previous U.S. Administrations.
The Bush Administration’s support for Taiwan was in keeping with growing sentiment
in Congress in the late 1990s that the TRA was outdated and that Taiwan’s self-defense
capabilities had eroded while the PRC had grown militarily more capable and more hostile
to its smaller neighbor. These conclusions were supported by a congressionally mandated
annual report, first issued by the Pentagon in February 1999, assessing the military balance
in the Taiwan Strait. The 1999 report concluded that in light of improvements in offensive
military capabilities, by the year 2005 China will have acquired the ability “to attack Taiwan
with air and missile strikes which would degrade key military facilities and damage the
island’s economic infrastructure.”
In addition to differences over security issues, the Administration also differed from its
predecessors in how it handled requests for U.S. visits by senior Taiwan officials. Whereas
earlier U.S. Administrations were either unwilling or forced by congressional pressure to
allow Taiwan officials to come to the United States, the Bush Administration was more
accommodating. The White House approved a transit stop for new Taiwan President Chen
Shui-bian in 2001 during which he visited both New York (previously off-limits) and
Houston, attended public functions and meetings, and met with nearly two-dozen Members
of Congress. Similar U.S. visits were approved for Taiwan’s Vice-President, Annette Lu,
(in early January 2002), and for Taiwan’s Defense Minister, Tang Yao-ming (March 2002),
who attended a defense conference in Florida and while there met with U.S. Deputy
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly. In
late October 2003, the Bush Administration accommodated President Chen with a higher-
profile transit visit to New York City — a visit that received wide press coverage in Taiwan.
Toward a Taiwan/PRC Balance. Since assuming office, however, the Bush
Administration has been reshaping its own policy articulations concerning both Taiwan and
the PRC. Administration officials now see smooth U.S.-PRC relations as an important tool
in cooperating against terrorism and maintaining stability on the Korean peninsula. As
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articulated by Vice President Cheney during his visit to Shanghai in April 2004, the White
House judges that “the areas of agreement [between the United States and the PRC] are far
greater than those areas where we disagree...”27 By the same token, during Taiwan’s
presidential and legislative campaigns in 2004, the Administration continued to balance
criticisms of the PRC military buildup opposite Taiwan with periodic cautions and warnings
to the Taiwan government, indicating that U.S. support for Taiwan is not unconditional.28
Implications for U.S. Policy
For much of the past 25 years, Taiwan and PRC officials generally maintained that the
United States should remain uninvolved in issues concerning Taiwan’s political status. That
appears to be changing, and U.S. officials have been under subtle but increasing pressure
from both governments to become directly involved in some aspects of cross-strait ties. PRC
officials late in 2003 began quietly urging the United States to pressure Chen Shui-bian into
shelving plans for an island-wide referendum. In 2004, they pressed U.S. officials to avoid
sending the “wrong signals” to Taiwan — defined as those encouraging independence
aspirations. Members of the Taiwan government have begun suggesting to U.S. officials that
the Taiwan Relations Act needs to be strengthened or re-evaluated and have sought U.S.
support for Chen’s constitutional reform plans. In the month between Chen Shui-bian’s
January 2006 statement that he would consider “abolishing” the National Unification Council
and his February 2006 announcement that the NUC would “cease” its operations, several
rounds of meetings and talks between U.S. and Taiwan officials were credited with the subtle
but politically important rhetorical change.
Taiwan’s supporters within the U.S. Congress continue to press for more favorable U.S.
treatment of Taiwan and for Taiwan’s inclusion in some capacity in international
organizations like the World Health Organization. Congressional policy initiatives have
included the formation of the Congressional Taiwan Caucus on April 9, 2002, and the
formation of the Senate Taiwan Caucus on September 17, 2003. Both of these bodies have
strongly bipartisan memberships. Congress also continues to consider legislative measures
seeking to reinforce or expand on U.S.-Taiwan ties. (See Legislation below.)
Faced with these competing pressures and with continuing transformations in both the
PRC and Taiwan systems, U.S. officials may be facing new and more difficult policy choices
concerning Taiwan in the next few years. In addition to raising the risks of political and
economic instability, growing political polarization in Taiwan could erode the quality of
U.S.-Taiwan contacts and create fractures and divisiveness within the sizeable U.S. Chinese-
American community. Pressure from multiple sources could continue to build for U.S.
officials to take any number of actions: to reassess all the fundamentals of U.S.
China/Taiwan policy in light of changing circumstances; to reinforce American democratic
values by providing greater support for Taiwan and possibly support for Taiwan
27 From the Q & A session with Vice President Cheney following his speech at Fudan University in
Shanghai, broadcast by Beijing CCTV in English, found in FBIS, Apr. 15, 2004.
28 “There are limitations with respect to what the United States will support as Taiwan considers
possible changes to its constitution.” Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly
before the House International Relations Committee, Apr. 21, 2004.
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independence; or to abandon Taiwan in favor of the geopolitical demands and benefits of
close U.S.-China relations. U.S. officials are likely to face mounting pressure to adopt a
more pro-active mediating role in the cross-strait relationship. Finally, any policy
developments that affect Taiwan have direct consequences for U.S.-China relations and
could involve crucial decisions among U.S. officials about the extent of U.S. support for
Taiwan’s security. In the coming two years, it appears that actors from across the political
spectrum — including governments, interest groups, political parties, and individuals — will
continue efforts to push the United States into greater commitments and clarity on various
questions involving Taiwan.
LEGISLATION
P.L. 109-102 (H.R. 3057). Appropriations for Foreign Operations, Export Financing,
and related programs for FY2006. The House version provided presidential authority for
NATO allies, major non-NATO allies, and Taiwan to waive the prohibition of Economic
Support Funds for signatories to the International Criminal Court who do not have exempting
agreements with the United States. Introduced in House June 24, 2005 (H.Rept. 109-152).
House passed the bill, amended, by a vote of 393-32 on June 28, 2005. Referred to the
Senate Committee on Appropriations on June 29, 2005 and ordered reported, amended, on
June 30, 2005 (S.Rept. 109-96). The Senate passed the bill, amended, on July 20, 2005 (98-
1), and asked for a conference. Conference Report H.Rept. 109-265 was filed on November
2, 2005, including the Taiwan provisions above. The House adopted it on November 4, 2005
(358-39) and the Senate on November 10, 2005 (91-0). The bill became Public Law 109-102
on November 14, 2005.
H.Con.Res. 76 (Miller). Expressing the sense of Congress that the United States
should strongly oppose China’s anti-secession law with respect to Taiwan. Introduced on
February 17, 2005, and referred to the House Committee on International Relations.
H.Con.Res. 98 (Hyde). Expressing the “grave concern” of Congress about China’s
passage of an anti-secession law aimed at Taiwan. Introduced March 15, 2005. The measure
passed on March 16, 2005, by a vote of 424-4.
H.Con.Res. 219 (Andrews, R.). Expressing Congress’s grave concern over China’s
continued deployment of ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan. The bill also expresses
Congress’s sense that the President should: seek from China a renunciation of the use of
force against Taiwan; abolish all restrictions on high-level military visits to Taiwan;
authorize the sale of the Aegis system to Taiwan. The bill was introduced on July 27, 2005,
and referred to the House International Relations Committee.
H.R. 1815 (Hunter) (P.L. 109-163)
Authorizing appropriations for the Department of Defense for FY2006. Introduced
April 26, 2005. H.Rept. 109-89. The final Act was the result of a conference. Sec. 535
provides incentives to cadets and midshipmen to study key languages, including Chinese;
Sec. 1211 prohibits the Secretary of Defense from procuring any goods or services from a
“Communist Chinese military company,” except on a waiver for national security reasons;
Sec.1234 states the sense of Congress that the White House should “quickly” present to
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Congress a comprehensive strategy to deal with China’s economic, diplomatic, and military
rise, including specific mention of what areas such a strategy should address. In conference,
the House receded on several key measures in its bill: on a measure to mandate “at least” one
class field study trip annually to both Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) by
military education classes of the National Defense University; on a measure to require
regular senior U.S. military exchanges with Taiwan military officials; and on a measure to
prohibit the Secretary of Defense from procuring goods or services from any foreign person
who knowingly sells to the PRC items on the U.S. munitions list. House action: After
Committee and Subcommittee mark-ups, reported (amended) by the House Armed Services
Committee on May 20, 2005. Referred to the House on May 25, 2005, and passed by a vote
of 390-39. Referred to the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 6, 2005. Senate
action: On November 15, 2005, the Committee was discharged, the Senate considered the
bill under unanimous consent, and the Senate passed the bill after incorporating the language
of S. 1042. Conference action: Conferees filed a conference report on December 12, 2005
(H.Rept. 109-360), and the House passed it on December 19, 2005 (374-41). The Senate
agreed to the Report by voice vote on December 21, 2005, and the President signed the bill
into law on January 1, 2006, with a clarifying statement ([http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2006/01/20060106-12.html]).
CHRONOLOGY
06/08/06 —
The State Department issued a press statement expressing U.S. pleasure at
President Chen Shui-bian’s “public reaffirmation” on June 8 of his promises
to the United States to make no changes in the status quo and to exclude any
sovereignty measures in a revision of Taiwan’s constitution. The statement
said the United States “attaches profound importance” to the pledges.
06/07/06 —
Raymond Burghardt, chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT),
arrived in Taiwan for discussions concerning Taiwan’s political situation.
03/22/06 —
In a 10-day U.S. visit, KMT chairman and Mayor of Taipei City Ma Ying-
jeou visited Washington, unveiling his “five do’s” proposal for improving
cross-strait ties.
03/02/06 —
State Department spokesman Adam Ereli issued a written statement saying
that the United States expected the Taiwan authorities to unambiguously and
publicly clarify that the NUC had not been abolished, the status quo had been
maintained, and that Chen Shui-bian’s assurances were still in force.
02/27/06 — Chen Shui-bian announced his decision that the NUC would “cease
operations” and the NGU would “cease to apply.”
01/01/06 —
In his New Year’s Day address, Taiwan president Chen Shui-bian announced
that strengthening the island’s separate identity would be his top priority for
the remainder of his term, along with devising a new constitution for Taiwan.
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12/08/05 —
The first two (out of four) U.S. Kidd-class destroyers sold to Taiwan arrived
at Suao Naval base in northeast Taiwan. The destroyers were delivered to the
Taiwan navy on October 29th from a Charleston, South Carolina, shipyard.
12/03/05 —
The DPP was soundly defeated in Taiwan’s local elections for city mayors
and county magistrates, retaining only 6 out of 23 constituencies, while the
opposition KMT won 14.
10/20/05 — Speaking in Washington DC during a two-week U.S. trip, former Taiwan
President Lee Teng-hui called on the international community to recognize
Taiwan as an independent country.
09/25/05 — Thousands of Taiwan citizens marched through Taipei to protest the
legislature’s delay in passing the “special arms budget” to purchase American
weapons. Estimates of participants ranged from 15,000-50,000.
09/20/05 —
Edward Ross, a senior Pentagon official, said it was reasonable to question
whether the United States should continue to provide for Taiwan’s self-
defense “if Taiwan is not willing to properly invest in its own self-defense.”
08/18/05 —
China and Russia began an eight-day joint military exercise off the Shandong
Peninsula — their largest joint military exercise in modern history, involving
nearly 10,000 troops.
08/17/05 — Taiwan’s army and navy conducted joint military exercises designed to
counter a PRC amphibious invasion and blockade.
08/16/05 — KMT Chairman Lien Chan announced the formal start of grass-roots
exchanges between the KMT and the CCP.

06/07/05 — By a vote of 248-23, Taiwan’s antiquated National Assembly approved
constitutional changes, including a change calling for future constitutional
amendments to be decided by an island-wide referendum.

03/14/05 — The National People’s Congress (NPC) enacted an anti-secession law
authorizing “non-peaceful” means to resolve the Taiwan question.
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
CRS Report RS22388, Taiwan’s Political Status: Historical Background and Ongoing
Implications, by Kerry Dumbaugh.
CRS Report RL30957, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990, by Shirley Kan.
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