The Strategic Defense Initiative: Issues for Phase 1 Deployment

Order Code IB88033 T H E S T R A T E G I C DEFEYSE INITIATIVE: I S S U E S FOR P H A S E 1 D E P L O Y M E Y T Updated n a r c h 7, 1988 by Steven A. Hildreth F o r e i g n Affairs and National D e f e n s e D i v i s i o n Congressional Research S e r v i c e GENERAL LIBRARI~S ncnncwnpv SUMMARY ISSUE DEFINITION BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS Administration Decisions regarding Phased Deployment The Elements of Phase 1 The Administration's Case for Phase 1 Deployment Criticism of Phase 1 Survivability Issues Military Effectiveness Issues Feasibility of Phase 1 Technologies Key Policy Issues for Congress Strategic Policy and Phase 1 Deployment Competing Perspectives of Phase 1 Deployment ABM Treaty and Phase 1 Development and Deployment Budgetary Issues and Phase 1 Deployment Options for Congress Support the Phase 1 Concept Modify the Phase 1 Concept Stop or Slow Development of the Phase 1 Concept LEG1 SLATION Related CRS Products include: CRS Issue Brief 85170, The Strategic Defense Initiative: Issues for Congress CRS Report 86-8 SPR, The Strategic Description and Major Issues Defense Initiative: Program CRS Issue Brief 86073, Arms Control: Negotiations to Limit Defense and Space Weapons THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE: ISSUES FOR PHASE 1 DEPLOYMENT From i t s i n c e p t i o n i n 1984, t h e S t r a t e g i c Defense I n i t i a t i v e ( S D I ) was d e s c r i b e d o f f i c i a l l y a s a long-term t e c h n o l o g y r e s e a r c h program t o d e t e r m i n e t h e f e a s i b i l i t y o f d e v e l o p i n g d e f e n s e s a g a i n s t t h e t h r e a t of ballistic missile attack. While SDI was s t r u c t u r e d t o make p o s s i b l e a deployment d e c i s i o n i n t h e e a r l y - t o mid-1990s, s p e c i f i c deployment g o a l s were u n d e f i n e d . T h i s a m b i g u i t y h a s been s u b s t a n t i a l l y r e d u c e d now t h a t t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n h a s d e f i n e d , and i s p u r s u i n g , a f i r s t p h a s e SDI c o n c e p t ( P h a s e 1 ) c o n s i s t i n g o f v a r i o u s weapons, s e n s o r s , and b a t t l e management e l e m e n t s , w i t h deployment d e c i s i o n s i n t h e e a r l y 1990s and p o s s i b l e deployment i n t h e mid- t o l a t e - 1 9 9 0 s . While n o d e c i s i o n h a s been made t o d e p l o y s u c h a s y s t e m , t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s new e f f o r t s a r e b r i n g i n g i m p o r t a n t c h a n g e s t o t h e SDI program and r a i s i n g v a r i o u s p o l i c y i s s u e s . A s u b s t a n t i a l p a r t of t h e program w i l l now f o c u s on b r i n g i n g v a r i o u s s y s t e m e l e m e n t s t o a s t a g e where a d e c i s i o n c a n be made whether t o d e p l o y o r n o t . C o s t e s t i m a t e s of p u r s u i n g P h a s e 1 d e m o n s t r a t i o n and v a l i d a t i o n o v e r t h e n e x t 4 t o 5 y e a r s Changes i n program d i r e c t i o n and r a n g e from $10 b i l l i o n t o $25 b i l l i o n . p u r p o s e a r e e v i d e n t i n t h e FY89 d e f e n s e budget r e q u e s t t o C o n g r e s s . The s t a t e d p u r p o s e o f t h e Phase 1 SDI s y s t e m would b e t o s t r e n g t h e n U.S. d e t e r r e n c e by moving toward a s t a b l e b a l a n c e between o f f e n s i v e and d e f e n s i v e E o r c e s . A Phase 1 SDI s y s t e m would a l s o p r o v i d e some p o p u l a t i o n defense, according t o the Administration. T h e i r r a t i o n a l e f o r Phase 1 i s multifaceted. I t would p e r f o r m a s p e c i f i c m i l i t a r y m i s s i o n t o d e n y t h e S o v i e t s t h e i r w a r t i m e o b j e c t i v e s and p r o v i d e some p o p u l a t i o n d e f e n s e , compel S o v i e t o p e r a t i o n a l and d o c t r i n a l changes i n t h e i r b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e f o r c e s , and l a y t h e f o u n d a t i o n f o r more e f f e c t i v e follow-on SDI deployment p h a s e s . The d e c i s i o n t o p u r s u e an i n i t i a l deployment c o n c e p t i s h i g h l y controversial. C r i t i c s c h a r g e t h a t t h e e v e n t u a l s y s t e m w i l l n o t be s u r v i v a b l e a g a i n s t S o v i e t a t t a c k n o r be e f f e c t i v e a g a i n s t r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e S o v i e t countermeasures. C r i t i c s s t i l l question the f e a s i b i l i t y of d e v e l o p i n g and d e p l o y i n g s u c h a c o s t l y system. S e v e r a l key p o l i c y i s s u e s a r e r a i s e d by Administration a c t i o n s t h u s far. For example, on t h e m a t t e r o f whether a l i m i t e d SDI s y s t e m s h o u l d be p u r s u e d and d e p l o y e d a s an e l e m e n t o f U.S. s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y , many d i f f e r e n t p e r s p e c t i v e s a r e developing. P u r s u i n g an i n i t i a l deployment c o n c e p t a l s o r a i s e s q u e s t i o n s a b o u t compliance w i t h t h e ABH T r e a t y and c o n t i n u e d U.S. commitment t o t h e t r e a t y . F i n a l l y , t h e budget c o s t s of p u r s u i n g t h i s e f f o r t r a i s e key c o n c e r n s i n t h i s e r a o f d e c l i n i n g d e f e n s e budgets. ISSUE DEFINITIW A c e n t r a l n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y policy i s s u e t h a t t h i s Nation has faced f o r t h e p a s t 4 0 y e a r s , a n d w i l l f a c e f o r t h e f o r e s e e a b l e f u t u r e , i s what s t r a t e g i c p o s t u r e t o adopt vis-a-vis t h e S o v i e t Union. Among t h e many c h o i c e s t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s must make on s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y t o d a y i s w h e t h e r t o d e v e l o p a c a p a b i l i t y t o d e p l o y a n SDI s y s t e m . Whatever t e c h n o l o g i e s c o u l d u l t i m a t e l y be i n c o r p o r a t e d i n a n i n i t i a l deployment, s e v e r a l controversial policy issues are raised. Given t h e i r i m p l i c a t i o n s and tradeoffs, t h e i s s u e f o r C o n g r e s s i s w h e t h e r t o f u n d t h e Reagan ~ d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s commitment t o and s c h e d u l e f o r p u r s u i n g a n i n i t i a l SDI deployment c o n c e p t . T h i s i s s u e b r i e f d e s c r i b e s Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n p l a n s f o r P h a s e 1 development and f o r an i n i t i a l deployment c o n c e p t , t r a c k s ongoing a c t i o n s and program m o d i f i c a t i o n s , examines key i m p l i c a t i o n s and t r a d e o f f s , and r a i s e s some p o l i c y o p t i o n s f o r C o n g r e s s . BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS Admini s t r a t i o n D e c i s i o n s R e g a r d i n g P h a s e d Deployment I n J u l y 1 9 8 7 , t h e D e f e n s e A c q u i s i t i o n Board (DAB), t h e P e n t a g o n body c h a r g e d w i t h t h e t a s k of r e v i e w i n g a l l D e p a r t m e n t of D e f e n s e (DOD) t h e demonstrat i o n and p r o g r a m s , made a M i l e s t o n e I r e c o m m e n d a t i o n The DAB r e c o r n e n d a t i o n v a l i d a t i o n r e v i e w -- f o r t h e SDI program. i d e n t i f i e d a f u t u r e S o v i e t t h r e a t ( d e t e r m i n e d by t h e D e f e n s e I n t e l l i g e n c e A g e n c y ) a n d a p p r o v e d a s e t o f m i l i t a r y m i s s i o n r e q u i r e m e n t s ( d e t e r m i n e d by t h e J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f , o r JCS) t o be a d d r e s s e d by a n i n i t i a l SDI deployment, and approved t h e c o n c e p t of phased deployment ( d e f i n e d below). The DAB a d v a n c e d s e v e r a l m a j o r SDI t e c h n o l o g y p r o g r a m s ( c o n s i s t i n g o f s e n s o r s , w e a p o n s , a n d b a t t l e management e l e m e n t s ) w i t h a n a c c o m p a n y i n g system a r c h i t e c t u r e , a s t h e c u r r e n t l y favored candidates f o r an i n i t i a l SDI d e p l o y m e n t i n t h e mid-1990s. The DAB r e c o m n e n d a t i o n was a p p r o v e d by D e f e n s e S e c r e t a r y W e i n b e r g e r i n S e p t e m b e r 1 9 8 7 , t h u s b r i n g i n g SDI f o r m a l l y i n t o t h e DOD weapons a c q u i s i t i o n p r o c e s s . -- The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n d e f i n e s p h a s e d d e p l o y m e n t a s t h e i n c r e m e n t a l d e p l o y m e n t o f i n c r e a s i n g 1 y s o p h i s t i c a t e d and c a p a b l e SDI t e c h n o l o g i e s i n d i s t i n c t s t e p s over several decades. W h i l e t h e SDI O r g a n i z a t i o n (SDIO) s a y s t h a t p h a s e d d e p l o y m e n t i s an e f f o r t t o s t r e n g t h e n d e t e r r e n c e by moving t o w a r d a s t a b l e b a l a n c e b e t w e e n o f f e n s i v e a n d d e f e n s i v e f o r c e s , many would a r g u e t h a t P r e s i d e n t Reagan e n v i s i o n s t h e e v e n t u a l r e p l a c e m e n t of d e t e r r e n c e b a s e d o n o f f e n s i v e n u c l e a r weapons w i t h d e f e n s e s . The number o f p h a s e s would b e i n d e t e r m i n a t e . P h a s e d d e p l o y m e n t i s s e e n by t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n a s t h e m o s t r e a s o n a b l e means t o a c h i e v e t h e l e v e l s of b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e d e f e n s e e n v i s i o n e d by P r e s i d e n t Reagan. The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n h a s s a i d t h a t e a c h d e p l o y m e n t p h a s e would b e r e q u i r e d t o p e r f o r m a s p e c i f i c m i l i t a r y m i s s i o n , compel c h a n g e s i n S o v i e t b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e f o r c e s , and l a y t h e f o u n d a t i o n f o r s u b s e q u e n t deployment phases. T h e s e o b j e c t i v e s a r e i m p o r t a n t i n t h e c o n t e x t of c r i t i c a l l y e v a l u a t i n g t h e m e r i t s of a n i n i t i a l SDI d e p l o y m e n t . A S t r a t e g i c D e f e n s e System (SDS) e n v i s i o n e d by t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n would t h e n be t h e c u l m i n a t i o n of s e v e r a l SDI deployment p h a s e s . Each p h a s e would s e e k t o improve t h e i n i t i a l s y s t e m and p r o v i d e a d d i t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t y t o p e r f o r m new and more demanding m i s s i o n s . The SDS would c o n s i s t of a n i n t e g r a t e d s y s t e m of b a t t l e management; command, c o n t r o l , According t o t h e a n d communications ( C 3 ) ; s e n s o r s ; and weapons. Admini s c r a t i o n , t h e SDS would be d e s i g n e d t o be c o s t - e f f e c t i v e , s u r v i v a b l e , and m i l i t a r i l y e f f e c t i v e , t h u s s t a y i n g a h e a d o f a n y e v o l v i n g Soviet threat. F u r t h e r , t h e SDS would s t r i v e t o be r e s p o n s i v e t o U.S. conrnand a u t h o r i t i e s d u r i n g p e a c e , c r i s i s , and war. The E l e m e n t s o f P h a s e 1 As approved f o r advanced development by t h e DAB, t h e P h a s e 1 s t r a t e g i c d e f e n s e s y s t e m would c o n s i s t o f numerous s p a c e - and ground-based i n t e r c e p t o r s and s e n s o r s . These programs, which h a v e r e c e i v e d M i l e s t o n e I a p p r o v a l , a r e b a s e d on more t r a d i t i o n a l t e c h n o l o g i e s . See Figure 1. The s i x c a n d i d a t e SDI e l e m e n t s approved f o r advanced development i n c l u d e : -- two n o n n u c l e a r m i s s i l e i n t e r c e p t o r s -- t h e Space-based I n t e r c e p t o r (SBI) and t h e ground-based Exoatmospheric R e e n t r y V e h i c l e I n t e r c e p t o r Subsystem (ERIS); -- t h r e e sensor elements t h e space-based Boost S u r v e i l l a n c e and T r a c k i n g System (BSTS), Space-based S u r v e i l l a n c e and T r a c k i n g System (SSTS), and Ground-based S u r v e i l l a n c e and T r a c k i n g System (GSTS) ; a n d , -- a B a t t l e ~ a n a g e m e n t / C o m n a n d , C o n t r o l , and Communications ( B M / c ~ )n e t w o r k t h a t w i l l have t o be d e v e l o p e d . -- -- I n a d d i t i o n , t h e development of a n Advanced Launch System (ALS) a i s c o n s i d e r e d e s s e n t i a l t o meet t h e a n t i c i p a t e d new s p a c e v e h i c l e l a u n c h n e e d s of d e p l o y i n g t h e s p a c e e l e m e n t s of t h e P h a s e 1 s y s t e m i n t h e mid- t o l a t e - 1 9 9 0 s . But b e c a u s e t h e ALS i s i n t e n d e d t o a d d r e s s a b r o a d e r r a n g e of c i v i l and m i l i t a r y s p a c e l a u n c h n e e d s , DAB a p p r o v a l i s b e i n g pursued s e p a r a t e l y . -- The two m i s s i l e i n t e r c e p t o r s y s t e m s would be d e p l o y e d i n two l a y e r s . The f i r s t l a y e r would u s e t h e SBI t o t r y and a t t a c k S o v i e t b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s i n s p a c e w i t h i n t h e f i r s t s e v e r a l m i n u t e s of t h e i r f l i g h t b u t b e f o r e t h e i r warheads a r e r e l e a s e d . The second t i e r would u s e ERIS ( p e r h a p s s u p p l e m e n t e d by S B I ) t o t r y and a t t a c k s p e c i f i c warheads a f t e r t h e y had been d i s p e n s e d from t h e m i s s i l e d u r i n g t h e m i d c o u r s e p h a s e of t h e warheads' t r a j e c t o r y i n space. V a r i o u s s e n s o r s would b e d e s i g n e d t c t r y and p r o v i d e f o r t a r g e t a c q u i s i t i o n , t r a c k i n g , d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , and k i l l assessment. B M / C ~e l e m e n t s would be r e q u i r e d t o p l a y a c e n t r a l r o l e i n c o o r d i n a t i n g t h e s y s t e m w i t h o t h e r s t r a t e g i c o f f e n s i v e and t a c t i c a l m i l i t a r y f o r c e s , a s w e l l a s n a t i o n a l d i p l o m a t i c and i n t e l l i g e n c e operat ions. C u r r e n t l y , t h e Phase 1 e f f o r t m a i n t a i n s an o p t i o n t o i n c l u d e a t e r m i n a l d e f e n s e l a y e r ( t o t r y and a t t a c k d u r i n g t h e f i n a l m i n u t e o r two of a w a r h e a d ' s t r a j e c t o r y a s i t r e e n t e r s t h e a t m o s p h e r e toward i t s t a r g e t 1. T h e s i x c a n d i d a t e t e c h n o l o g i e s approved by t h e DAB, assuming c o n g r e s s i o n a l a p p r o v a l and f u n d i n g , a r e t o be advanced t o g e t h e r t o a more c o o r d i n a t e d l e v e l o f t e s t i n g , development, and i n t e g r a t i o n . A s a r e s u l t , t h e P e n t a g o n c r e a t e d a new o f f i c e ( O p e r a t i o n a l T e s t O r g a n i z a t i o n ) f o r o v e r s i g h t of Phase 1 d e m o n s t r a t i o n and v a l i d a t i o n . The DAB a l s o d i s c u s s e d t h e need t o b a l a n c e and c o o r d i n a t e t h e development o f more m a t u r e , n e a r - t e r m t e c h n o l o g i e s w i t h l o n g e r - t e r m , more c a p a b l e t e c h n o l o g i e s . A M i l e s t o n e I d e c i s i o n on a follow-on t o P h a s e 1 i s s e e n a s a n i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t o f a M i l e s t o n e I 1 d e c i s i o n f o r P h a s e 1. The DAB h a s s a i d i t w i l l r e v i e w t h e Phase 1 t e c h n o l o g i e s and s y s t e m c o n c e p t on an a n n u a l b a s i s , s t a r t i n g i n A p r i l 1988. The s t a t e d p u r p o s e i s t o e n s u r e development of a n e f f e c t i v e and s u r v i v a b l e system. While some Members have s a i d t h a t M i l e s t o n e I 1 c o u l d b e made i n 1992, SDIO now s a y s t h a t t h e r e d u c e d b u d g e t a v a i l a b l e f o r SDI programs e x t e n d t h a t d e c i s i o n t o A t a n y p o i n t , o t h e r t e c h n o l o g i e s might be s u b s t i t u t e d o r 1993-1994. a d d e d , d e p e n d i n g on t e c h n o l o g i c a l s u c c e s s , t h e p a c e of program f u n d i n g , and c h a n g e s i n t h e p e r c e i v e d S o v i e t t h r e a t . A c t u a l deployment of t h e c u r r e n t P h a s e 1 s y s t e m c o u l d be underway by t h e mid- t o l a t e - 1 9 9 0 8 , a c c o r d i n g t o some r e p o r t s . The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n d i d examine o t h e r deployment i d e a s , b u t s e l e c t e d t h i s P h a s e 1 c o n c e p t on g r o u n d s t h a t i t b e s t s a t i s f i e d t h e JCS m i s s i o n requirements. One a 1 t e r n a t i v e c o n c e p t , f o r example, included t h e deployment o f a c o m p r e h e n s i v e SDI system -- c o n s i s t i n g o f t h e most c a p a b l e a l l a t once o v e r t h e s h o r t e s t p e r i o d of and a d v a n c e d BMD t e c h n o l o g i e s time. A n o t h e r m a j o r c o n c e p t i n c l u d e d deployment o f BM/C3 e l e m e n t s , f o l l o w e d sometime l a t e r by s p a c e - and ground-based m i s s i l e i n t e r c e p t o r s . A n o t h e r m a j o r c o n c e p t c o n s i s t e d of a ground-based weapon s y s t e m o n l y , w i t h s p a c e - b a s e d s e n s o r s and BM/C3. -- The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s C a s e f o r P h a s e 1 Deployment A s mentioned a b o v e , e a c h p h a s e o f t h e SDS would b e r e q u i r e d t o meet t h r e e broad o b j e c t i v e s . According t o t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , t h e P h a s e 1 s y s t e m would s t r i v e t o meet t h e s e o b j e c t i v e s a g a i n s t t h e p e r c e i v e d S o v i e t t h r e a t o f t h e mid- t o l a t e - 1 9 9 0 s i n t h e f o l l o w i n g manner: (1) To perform a r e q u i r e d m i l i t a r y m i s s i o n . The s p e c i f i c m i s s i o n r e q u i r e m e n t s and s y s t e m r e l i a b i l i t y was d e f i n e d by t h e JCS a s SDIO p r e p a r e d f o r t h e DAB r e v i e w . Although t h o s e r e q u i r e m e n t s a r e c l a s s i f i e d , i t c a n be s a i d t h a t t h e major Phase 1 deployment o b j e c t i v e i s t o e n s u r e , a l b e i t w i t h l e s s t h a n 100% e f f e c t i v e n e s s , t h e s u r v i v a l o f an e f f e c t i v e U.S. r e t a l i a t o r y f o r c e c a p a b i l i t y . The p u r p o s e i s t o deny t h e S o v i e t s t h e i r o b j e c t i v e s i n an i n i t i a l b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e a t t a c k , t h u s d e t e r r i n g Soviet aggression. The Phase 1 s y s t e m would c o n t r i b u t e ( a s would a l l p h a s e s of SDS) t o t h e performance of m i s s i o n s t r a d i t i o n a l l y a s s i g n e d t o U.S. and a l l i e d s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s , i n c l u d i n g d e n i a l o f S o v i e t war a i m s , damage 1 i m i t a t i o n , assessment. space control , and tactical warning and attack A c c o r d i n g t o t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , t h e Phase 1 s y s t e m would s t r i v e t o t h i n o u t an i n i t i a l S o v i e t n u c l e a r a t t a c k and s e e k t o p r o t e c t t h e h i g h e s t I t i s s a i d t h a t t h i s o b j e c t i v e c o u l d be a c c o m p l i s h e d v a l u e U.S. a s s e t s . by a d o p t i n g a 2 - t i e r d e f e n s e s t r a t e g y . The g o a l of t h e f i r s t t i e r , composed o f space-based m i s s i l e i n t e r c e p t o r s , would be t o a t t a c k S o v i e t m i s s i l e s randomly a f t e r t h e y a r e l a u n c h e d and b e f o r e t h e i r warheads a r e r e l e a s e d t o b r e a k up t h e s t r u c t u r e of a S o v i e t a t t a c k . Destroying a m i s s i l e a t t h i s p o i n t i s c o n s i d e r e d s i g n i f i c a n t i n t e r m s o f " k i l l i n g 1 ' many warheads and d e c o y s f o r t h e p r i c e of one i n t e r c e p t i o n . I t s significance g o e s much f u r t h e r , however. I n t h e view o f t h e a t t a c k e r , h i s a t t a c k becomes u n c o o r d i n a t e d and u n p r e d i c t a b l e , l e a d i n g t o t h e a t t a c k e r ' s l o s s of confidence i n a t t a i n i n g a l l h i s objectives. The s t a t e d g o a l o f t h e second t i e r , composed o f s p a c e and ground-based m i s s i l e i n t e r c e p t o r s , would be t o a t t a c k o n l y s e l e c t e d S o v i e t warheads t h a t s u r v i v e d t h e f i r s t t i e r . The warheads t o b e a t t a c k e d would be t h o s e aimed a t t a r g e t s t o be d e f e n d e d . According t o SDIO, t h e u n c e r t a i n t y g e n e r a t e d i n t h e mind of t h e a t t a c k e r by t h i s 2 - t i e r s t r a t e g y would b e p r o f o u n d i n r e d u c i n g S o v i e t c o n f i d e n c e i n a p o t e n t i a l f i r s t s t r i k e a t t a c k and i n a t t a i n i n g S o v i e t o b j e c t i v e s . While t h e p r i m a r y p u r p o s e of Phase 1 deployment i s t o e n s u r e t h e s u r v i v a b i l i t y of a core d e t e r r e n t f o r c e , t h e Administration adds t h a t some l e v e l of p o p u l a t i o n d e f e n s e c o u l d be a f f o r d e d i n two ways. First, b e c a u s e t h e o b j e c t i v e would be t o d e s t r o y S o v i e t m i s s i l e s randomly i n t h e b o o s t and post-boost s t a g e s , many p o t e n t i a l t a r g e t s l o c a t e d n e a r p o p u l a t i o n c e n t e r s would n o t be h i t . P r o p o n e n t s add t h a t t a r g e t s n e a r p o p u l a t i o n a r e a s c o u l d be d e f e n d e d s e l e c t i v e l y w i t h t h e mid-course defense t i e r . Second, t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n a d d s t h a t t h e P h a s e 1 s y s t e m i t s e l f would d e t e r t h e S o v i e t s from s t a r t i n g any war i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e . - - (2) To compel c h a n g e s o p e r a t i o n a l and t e c h n i c a l i n Soviet b a l l i s t i c missiLe forces. Through deployment o f a P h a s e 1 s y s t e m , t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n hopes t o r e d u c e t h e S o v i e t ' s c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e m i l i t a r y u t i l i t y of t h e i r b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e f o r c e . According t o SDIO, P h a s e 1 deployment w i l l compel c h a n g e s ( f a v o r a b l e t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ) i n S o v i e t s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s o p e r a t i o n s and s t r a t e g y by r e d u c i n g t h e c o n f i d e n c e of S o v i e t p l a n n e r s i n p r e d i c t i n g t h e outcome o f a b a l l i s t i c missile a t t a c k and l e a v i n g S o v i e t s t r a t e g i c p l a n n e r s u n c e r t a i n o f t h e number of warheads t o a p p l y t o s p e c i f i c U.S. targets. Such c h a n g e s w i l l r e d u c e S o v i e t c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e i r p r e f e r r e d a t t a c k s t r a t e g y and i n v a l i d a t e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a S o v i e t f i r s t s t r i k e . The S o v i e t s would have two r a t i o n a l c h o i c e s , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e Administration. One would be t o r e d u c e t h e i r emphasis on s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s and i n c r e a s e emphasis on t h e i r s t r a t e g i c bombers and c r u i s e m i s s i l e s , which, i t i s a r g u e d , are l e s s d e s t a b i l i z i n g and d a n g e r o u s b e c a u s e t h e y a r e s l o w e r t h a n b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s , c a n n o t be used r e l i a b l y t o d a y a s f i r s t - s t r i k e weapons, and i n t h e c a s e of bombers c a n be r e c a l l e d . -- -- -- -- The o t h e r c h o i c e the Administration argues is that the development and deployment of a Phase 1 s y s t e m w i l l p r o v i d e arms c o n t r o l leverage. SDIO a r g u e s t h a t Phase 1 deployment w i l l c r e a t e i n c e n t i v e s f o r b o t h s i d e s t o r e d u c e g r e a t l y t h e i r o f f e n s i v e f o r c e s and move toward g r e a t e r r e l i a n c e on d e f e n s e s . P r e s i d e n t Reagan h a s s a i d on many o c c a s i o n s t h a t t h e u l t i m a t e g o a l i s t o e l i m i n a t e o f f e n s i v e n u c l e a r weapons and r e l y i n s t e a d on a defense-dominated s t r a t e g y . The deployment p r o c e s s i t s e l f , i t i s a r g u e d , i s a s t r a t e g y t o d e m o n s t r a t e U.S. i n t e n t i o n t o expand d e f e n s e s i n r e s p o n s e t o any S o v i e t a c t i o n s . According t o t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , " t h e mere development of t h e o p t i o n f o r phased deployment of s t r a t e g i c d e f e n s e c a n h e l p m o t i v a t e S o v i e t a c c e p t a n c e o f U.S. arms r e d u c t i o n s proposals." I f s u c h p r o p o s a l s were t h e n a c c e p t e d , i t i s a r g u e d , phased deployment p l a n s c o u l d be a d j u s t e d a c c o r d i n g l y w i t h l e s s ambitious upgrading. ( 3 ) To l a y t h e f o u n d a t i o n f o r improved, follow-on deployment p h a s e s . The P h a s e 1 s y s t e m i s t o s e t t h e s t a g e f o r a f o l l o r o n deployment i n It w i l l : ( 1 ) provide i n i t i a l p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t b a l l i s t i c s e v e r a l ways. m i s s i l e a t t a c k s and a f o u n d a t i o n on which s u b s e q u e n t p h a s e s c a n b u i l d and e f f i c i e n t l y expand; ( 2 ) e s t a b l i s h U.S. d e f e n s i v e c a p a b i l i t y i n t h e most (3) put i n p l a c e an c r i t i c a l p o r t i o n s of a b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e t r a j e c t o r y ; o r g a n i z e d m i l i t a r y i n f r a s t r u c t u r e ; and ( 4 ) p r o v i d e r e l i a b l e t r a i n i n g and operational experience. No follow-on t o t h e Phase 1 system h a s been d e f i n e d . According t o A d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f f i c i a l s , a Phase 2 deployment c o u l d c o n s i s t of a n y t h i n g from more e f f e c t i v e P h a s e 1 t e c h n o l o g i e s t o more advanced s e n s o r s o r weapons, s u c h a s l a s e r s and p a r t i c l e beams. The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n a s s e r t s t h a t i t w i l l m a i n t a i n program b a l a n c e , but t h e r e i s some a m b i g u i t y a s t o how. Some o f f i c i a l s have s t a t e d t h a t SDIO w i l l a l l o c a t e h a l f o f t h e SDI b u d g e t t o development o f t h e Phase 1 c o n c e p t , and t h e b a l a n c e f o r t h e t e c h n o l o g i e s of s u b s e q u e n t p h a s e s . O t h e r o f f i c i a l s a s s e r t more g e n e r a l l y t h a t SDIO w i l l m a i n t a i n a b a l a n c e d program -- one t h a t i n v e s t i g a t e s b o t h near-term s y s t e m s a n d t e c h n o l o g i e s and more e x o t i c s y s t e m s and technologies. A d e c i s i o n t o p u r s u e a p a r t i c u l a r Phase 2 c o n c e p t would depend i n l a r g e p a r t on w h e t h e r o r how t h e S o v i e t s might r e s p o n d t o P h a s e 1 deployment ( w h e t h e r t h e S o v i e t s a r e c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l o r c o o p e r a t i v e ) , a n y c h a n g e s i n o b j e c t i v e s , and f u r t h e r p r o g r e s s i n t h e SDI program. C r i t i c i s m of Phase 1 S i n c e i t s i n c e p t i o n , SDI h a s proven t o be one of t h e most h i g h l y c o n t e n t i o u s d e f e n s e programs i n h i s t o r y . Much o f t h e c o n t r o v e r s y , f o r example, c e n t e r e d on broad c r i t i q u e s o f t h e f e a s i b i l i t y of a n e f f e c t i v e SDI s y s t e m and t h e tremendous p o l i t i c a l c h a l l e n g e s SDI posed t o U.S. diplomacy. Debate o v e r s p e c i f i c imp1 i c a t i o n s and t e c h n i c a l p r o b l e m s of SDI deployment h a s been d i f f i c u l t , l a r g e l y b e c a u s e of t h e a b s e n c e of w e l l - d e f i n e d deployment g o a l s . Now t h a t t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n i s p u r s u i n g a Phase 1 development and deployment c o n c e p t w i t h a p r o v i s i o n a l l y s p e c i f i e d s e t of SDI t e c h n o l o g i e s f o r t h e 1 9 9 0 s , t h e SDI d e b a t e may w e l l s h a r p e n . I888033 CRS- 7 03-07-88 I n b r o a d terms, some s e e The d e b a t e o v e r Phase 1 i s b e g i n n i n g . P h a s e 1 a s a n a t t e m p t t o i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e phased deployment and b u i l d I t i s a l s o s e e n by many a s program momentum b e f o r e Reagan l e a v e s o f f i c e . o v e r l y a m b i t i o u s , complex, and c o s t l y . S t i l l o t h e r s b e l i e v e a comnitment t o P h a s e 1 means a n i r r e v o c a b l e comnitment t o e n d l e s s d e p l o y m e n t s of s t r a t e g i c defenses. Beyond t h i s , t h e r e a r e few d e t a i l e d p u b l i c c r i t i c i s m s a v a i l a b l e f o r discussion. N o n e t h e l e s s , s e v e r a l i s s u e s r a i s e d by t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s Most SDI p u r s u i t of Phase 1 a r e l i k e l y t o r e c e i v e c r i t i c a l examination. c r i t i c s a r e l i k e l y t o q u e s t i o n t h e s u r v i v a b i l i t y and m i l i t a r y e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t h e Phase 1 s y s t e m , a s w e l l a s t h e f e a s i b i l i t y of d e v e l o p i n g and d e p l o y i n g t h e Phase 1 t e c h n o l o g i e s f o r t h e 1990s. Survivability Issues Some c r i t i c s of t h e proposed Phase 1 s y s t e m d o u b t t h a t i t w i l l be survivable. They do n o t b e l i e v e t h e s y s t e m c o u l d p e r f o r m i t s r e q u i r e d m i s s i o n i f t h e S o v i e t s d e c i d e d t o a t t a c k t h e system's s p a c e - b a s e d components w i t h ground- o r a i r - l a u n c h e d a n t i s a t e l l i t e (ASAT) weapons. F o r example, some a r g u e t h a t t h e S o v i e t s c o u l d u s e i n e x p e n s i v e s o u n d i n g ( h i g h a l t i t u d e ) r o c k e t s w i t h m o d e r a t e l y advanced g u i d a n c e s y s t e m s t o a t t a c k some space-based s e n s o r s a n d weapon e l e m e n t s of t h e P h a s e 1 s y s t e m . C o n c e i v a b l y , c r i t i c s c h a r g e , most S o v i e t m i s s i l e s c o u l d be m o d i f i e d f o r such a mission. Also, t h e Administration a s s e r t s t h a t t h e S o v i e t s could h a v e a n o p e r a t i o n a l ground-based l a s e r ASAT weapon by t h e e a r l y 1990s. Many o b s e r v e r s might a g r e e t h a t t h e s u r v i v a b i l i t y o f i n d i v i d u a l space-based Phase 1 elements i s l e s s important t h a n o v e r a l l m i s s i o n s u r v i v a b i l i t y e . , t h e s y s t e m c o u l d l o s e a few e l e m e n t s and s t i l l perform i t s mission). C r i t i c s of Phase 1 c h a r g e t h a t t h e s y s t e m a s p r e s e n t l y c o n t e m p l a t e d i n c l u d e s a n i n a d e q u a t e number of BSTS and SSTS s e n s o r p l a t f o r m s , s o t h a t t h e l o s s of o n l y a few of t h e s e components would make i t u n l i k e l y t h a t t h e Phase 1 m i s s i o n c o u l d be r e a l i z e d . Some c r i t i c s a r g u e t h a t t h e space-based e l e m e n t s of P h a s e 1 c o u l d n o t s u r v i v e t h e e f f e c t s ( e . g . , X-rays) of n u c l e a r e x p l o s i o n s i n s p a c e . (The s o u r c e o f t h e s e e x p l o s i o n s c o u l d be S o v i e t n u c l e a r ASATs o r S o v i e t warheads f u s e d t o d e t o n a t e when a t t a c k e d by i n t e r c e p t o r s . ) The e f f e c t s of n u c l e a r e x p l o s i o n s i n s p a c e , t h e y a r g u e , c a n n o t be f u l l y u n d e r s t o o d w i t h o u t t e s t i n g i n s p a c e , which i s p r o h i b i t e d by t r e a t y . Military E f f e c t i v e n e s s I s s u e s Some c r i t i c s o f Phase 1 a l s o q u e s t i o n i t s m i l i t a r y e f f e c t i v e n e s s . They a r g u e t h a t t h e s y s t e m c o u l d be r e a d i l y c i r c u m v e n t e d i n many ways t h a t a r e r e l a t i v e l y s i m p l e and i n e x p e n s i v e f o r t h e S o v i e t Union t o d e v e l o p , y e t d i f f i c u l t and e x p e n s i v e f o r t h e United S t a t e s t o c o u n t e r . N e a r l y a l l o b s e r v e r s a g r e e t h a t t h e most s i g n i f i c a n t p o t e n t i a l countermeasure a g a i n s t t h e boost-phase t i e r i s f o r t h e S o v i e t s t o reduce While SDI p r o p o n e n t s d i s c o u n t t h i s t h e b o o s t time o f t h e i r ICBMs. p o s s i b i l i t y f o r t h e 1 9 9 0 s , c r i t i c s b e l i e v e t h i s c a n be r e a d i l y a c c o m p l i s h e d by s i m p l e m o d i f i c a t i o n s . T h i s would r e d u c e t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of SBI by d e c r e a s i n g t h e a v a i l a b l e t i m e f o r s e n s i n g , t a r g e t a c q u i s i t i o n , and i n t e r c e p t i o n . While f a s t - b u r n b o o s t e r s would n o t be c o s t - f r e e t o t h e S o v i e t s , t h e y c o u l d more q u i c k l y r e p l a c e t h e i r f o r c e o f o l d e r SS-17 and SS-19 m i s s i l e s , f o r example, w i t h newer, f a s t e r b u r n i n g SS-24s and SS-25s. T h i s would s i g n i f i c a n t l y r e d u c e t h e a v a i l a b l e SBI l a u n c h o p p o r t u n i t y a t These c r i t i c s d o u b t t h a t SBI minimum S o v i e t c o s t , i t i s a r g u e d , v e l o c i t i e s c a n be improved upon t o d e a l w i t h t h i s S o v i e t r e s p o n s e ; t h e f a v o r a b l e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f SBI r o c k e t f u e l s ( l o w c o s t and s t o r a b i l i t ~ ) g i v e i t r e l a t i v e l y Low performance a g a i n s t f a s t - b u r n b o o s t e r s . TO c o u n t e r fast-burn b o o s t e r s would r e q u i r e using high-propellent f u e l s and multiple-stage SBIs. C r i t i c s a r g u e t h a t t h i s would c r e a t e h e a v i e r p l a t f o r m s and i n c r e a s e Phase 1 c o s t s p r o h i b i t i v e l y . Most o b s e r v e r s a g r e e t h a t a key way i n which t h e mid-course t i e r c o u l d b e d e f e a t e d i s S o v i e t development of s i m p l e and i n e x p e n s i v e countermeasures. While SDI p r o p o n e n t s b e l i e v e t h i s i s n o t l i k e l y t o be s i g n i f i c a n t f o r t h e 1990s, c r i t i c s a s s e r t o t h e r w i s e . Suggested c o u n t e r s i n c l u d e : p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f S o v i e t warheads; decoys (e.g., a l u m i n i z e d m y l a r b a l l o o n s and o t h e r r e p l i c a s t o s i m u l a t e w a r h e a d s ) ; a e r o s o l c l o u d s ( t o s i m u l a t e w a r h e a d s ) ; s e n s o r jamming; and a n t i - s i m u l a t i o n t e c h n i q u e s ( f o r warhead masking o r d e c e p t i o n ) . Because SSTS e f f e c t i v e n e s s i s d r i v e n l a r g e l y by t h e s i z e of t h e S o v i e t t h r e a t , i n c r e a s i n g t h a t t h r e a t s i g n i f i c a n t l y w i t h d e c o y s and more warheads, i t i s a r g u e d , r e n d e r s t h e mid-course m i s s i o n i n e f f e c t i v e . F e a s i b i l i t y of Phase 1 Technologies Another major c r i t i c i s m concerns t h e i n a b i l i t y of t h e Phase 1 e l e m e n t s t o meet t h e i r performance g o a l s by t h e mid-1990s. Even p r o p o n e n t s a g r e e t h a t Phase 1 development and deployment w i l l r e q u i r e h u n d r e d s o f m a j o r a d v a n c e s i n d i s p a r a t e f i e l d s of r e s e a r c h and engineering. C r i t i c s a r g u e t h a t t h e p r o b a b i l i t y of a l l t h e s e coming t o g e t h e r between now and t h e mid-1990s i s remote. Some would a l s o q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r t h e Phase 1 e f f o r t can be managed e f f e c t i v e l y and efficiently. They c i t e o t h e r l e s s complex, s t r a t e g i c programs s u c h a s t h e B-1 s t r a t e g i c bomber and t h e MX m i s s i l e , which h a v e had numerous problems even a f t e r t h e i r deployment. Many a l s o e x p r e s s g r a v e c o n c e r n a b o u t s t a r t i n g a n arms r a c e and t h e n h a v i n g t o r e l y upon f u t u r e unproven and e x p e n s i v e t e c h n o l o g i e s t o f o l l o w Phase 1; t h e y f e a r t h a t i f s u c h e x o t i c t e c h n o l o g i e s a r e n o t a v a i l a b l e t o f o l l o w t h e Phase 1, t h e r i s k of n u c l e a r war w i l l a c t u a l l y i n c r e a s e . More s p e c i f i c t e c h n i c a l c r i t i c i s m s f o c u s on t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r m a j o r improvements i n m i n i a t u r i z a t i o n of Phase 1 e l e m e n t s t o k e e p down c o s t s . Many d o n o t b e l i e v e s u c h r e d u c t i o n s i n w e i g h t , s i z e , and power r e q u i r e m e n t s a r e p o s s i b l e d u r i n g t h e proposed time frame f o r P h a s e 1. T h e r e i s a l s o c r i t i c i s m o f t h e BM/C3 network e n v i s a g e d , which i s d e s c r i b e d a s a h i g h l y d i s t r i b u t e d and d e c e n t r a l i z e d system. Critics b e l i e v e t h a t i n s u r m o u n t a b l e problems w i l l a r i s e when a l l t h e component e l e m e n t s o f P h a s e 1 a r e e v e n t u a l l y i n t e g r a t e d . The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n t e n d s t o d e v e l o p a N a t i o n a l T e s t F a c i l i t y (NTF) t o t e s t and i n t e g r a t e t h e s e e l e m e n t s u n d e r a r t i f i c i a l c o n d i t i o n s . C r i t i c s q u e s t i o n t h e u t i l i t y of t h e a n a l y t i c a l p r o d u c t t h a t w i l l t h e n be used t o a p p r o v e F u l l - s c a l e E n g i n e e r i n g Development ( M i l e s t o n e 11) o f P h a s e 1. What t h e y f e a r i s t h a t M i l e s t o n e I1 w i l l b e a p p r o v e d on t h e b a s i s o f i n c r e d i b l y complex c h a r t s and g r a p h s from t h e NTF, d a t a and p r o c e s s e s t h a t no o n e w i l l q u i t e f u l l y understand. They a l s o c h a r g e t h a t i t w i l l be f u n d a m e n t a l l y i m p o s s i b l e t o conduct any o u t s i d e , independent e v a l u a t i o n of t h e r e s u l t s . Finally, t h e y a r e s k e p t i c a l o f P h a s e 1 b e c a u s e i t c o u l d n e v e r be t e s t e d realistically. C r i t i c s p o i n t o u t t h a t mid-course d i s c r i m i n a t i o n o f d e c o y s and warheads i s c r u c i a l t o a n e f f e c t i v e Phase 1 s y s t e m ; s u c h d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i s key t o t h e m i s s i o n o f p r e f e r e n t i a l and a d a p t i v e mid-course d e f e n s e . C r i t i c s a s s e r t i n h e r e n t problems e x i s t w i t h t h e Phase 1 mid-course s e n s o r s A l l sensors a r e subject t o spoofing, i n t e r a c t i v e being developed. d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ( e . g . , t h e n e u t r a l p a r t i c l e beam) t o d e a l w i t h d e c o y s h a s been p o s t p o n e d t o a n o t h e r p h a s e , and t h e SSTS i s a l m o s t a n e n t i r e l y threat-dependent system f a c i n g major c h a l l e n g e s i t s e l f i n improving resolution. A n o t h e r a r e a t h a t w i l l r e c e i v e c r i t i c a l a t t e n t i o n i s t h e development of a new s p a c e - l a u n c h c a p a b i l i t y . Some c r i t i c s a r g u e t h e i n f e a s a b i l i t y of b u i l d i n g a new l a u n c h c a p a b i l i t y by t h e mid-1990s t o r e d u c e P h a s e 1 s y s t e m costs. O t h e r c r i t i c s a r g u e t h a t e n t i r e l y new and e x p e n s i v e l a u n c h f a c i l i t i e s w i l l h a v e t o be b u i l t t o d e p l o y space-based e l e m e n t s of P h a s e 1 o v e r a s h o r t p e r i o d of time. I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e s e more t e c h n i c a l l y - o r i e n t e d i s s u e s , p u r s u i n g P h a s e i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y , arms c o n t r o l , and t h e budget. T h e s e b r o a d e r p o l i c y i s s u e s a r e examined i n t h e f o l l o w i n g s e c t ion. 1 h a s profound Key P o l i c y I s s u e s f o r C o n g r e s s The deployment of a Phase 1 s y s t e m r a i s e s s i g n i f i c a n t q u e s t i o n s and p r o m i s e s c e r t a i n c o n t r o v e r s y r e g a r d i n g f u t u r e U.S. s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y , t h e ABM T r e a t y , and c o s t s . A s n o t e d , t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n h a s made a comnitment t o p u r s u e P h a s e 1, which w i l l consume a s i g n i f i c a n t p o r t i o n o f t h e SDI Because t h e b u d g e t t h a t C o n g r e s s w i l l c o n s i d e r i n t h e FY89 d e f e n s e b i l l . A d m i n i s t r a t i o n h a s p r e s e n t e d a s p e c i f i c deployment c o n c e p t and i s a s k i n g C o n g r e s s t o s u p p o r t s i g n i f i c a n t f u n d i n g f o r Phase 1 d e m o n s t r a t i o n and v a l i d a t i o n f o r t h e n e x t s e v e r a l y e a r s , most o b s e r v e r s would a r g u e t h a t now i s a n a p p r o p r i a t e time t o c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r o r how b e s t t o p u r s u e t h e P h a s e 1 concept. Some o f t h o s e i s s u e s r a i s e d i n t h e growing d e b a t e a r e examined b r i e f l y in t h i s section. S t r a t e g i c P o l i c y and P h a s e 1 Deployment There a r e a v a r i e t y of s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y o p t i o n s t h e United S t a t e s h a s p u r s u e d and might c o n t i n u e p u r s u i n g t o e n s u r e i t s s e c u r i t y o v e r t h e n e x t d e c a d e and beyond. These o p t i o n s may be p u t i n t o f o u r c a t e g o r i e s . The f i r s t i n c l u d e s o f f e n s i v e n u c l e a r f o r c e e f f o r t s t o e n s u r e t h e m i l i t a r y e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f t h e U.S. nuclear deterrent. Examples a r e m o d e r n i z a t i o n and p r o l i f e r a t i o n of n u c l e a r weapons, and f o r c e s t r u c t u r e c h a n g e s ( s u c h a s d e c r e a s i n g U.S. emphasis on i t s ICBM f o r c e and r e l y i n g more on n u c l e a r s u b m a r i n e s ) . . The s e c o n d c a t e g o r y i n c l u d e s d e f e n s e s u p p r e s s i o n e f f o r t s t o r e n d e r S o v i e t m i l i t a r y f o r c e s l e s s e f f e c t i v e s o t h a t U.S. o f f e n s i v e f o r c e s c a n e f f e c t i v e l y penetrate Soviet defenses. Examples a r e a n t i s a t e l l i t e weapons and p e n e t r a t i o n a i d s and d e c o y s on m i s s i l e s . The t h i r d c a t e g o r y i n c l u d e s v a r i o u s d e f e n s i v e measures t o e n s u r e t h e s u r v i v a b i l i t y of t h e U.S. d e t e r r e n t force: passive defenses, such a s i n c r e a s e d a l e r t r a t e s f o r n u c l e a r weapon s y s t e m s , ICBM m o b i l i t y i ~ i d ~ e t m a n o r MX), and s u p e r h a r d e n i n g ICBM s i l o s ; and a c t i v e ( s t r a t e g i c ) d e f e n s e s , s u c h a s a n t i s u b m a r i n e w a r f a r e , c o n t i n e n t a l a i r d e f e n s e , and many t y p e s of BMD. Finally, arms c o n t r o l e f f o r t s can be p u r s u e d t o r e d u c e t h e r i s k of n u c l e a r war, m i n i m i z e S o v i e t t h r e a t s t o U.S. s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r f o r c e s , and l i m i t damage t o U.S. s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s s h o u l d war b r e a k o u t . Because e a c h c a t e g o r y h a s a d v a n t a g e s and d i s a d v a n t a g e s , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s p u r s u e s t h e s e e f f o r t s c o n c u r r e n t l y t o deny t h e S o v i e t s c o n f i d e n c e i n a c h i e v i n g t h e i r o b j e c t i v e s by f o r c e . A s mentioned, t h e r e a r e a r a n g e of o p t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g deployment of SDI, which t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s c a n consider. T h i s t h e n r a i s e s t h e q u e s t i o n of which o p t i o n s s h o u l d be emphasized and w h e t h e r t o p u r s u e Phase 1 deployment. P h a s e 1 deployment c a n be examined i n t h i s s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y c o n t e x t . C u r r e n t l y , t h r e e broad p e r s p e c t i v e s a r e d e v e l o p i n g . Each d i f f e r s p r i m a r i l y o v e r t h e d e g r e e t o which n u c l e a r weapons and d e t e r r e n c e s h o u l d p l a y a c e n t r a l r o l e i n t h e f u t u r e of U.S. s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y . First, there a r e some who oppose p u r s u i n g Phase 1 , f a v o r i n g o t h e r s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y A s e c o n d p e r s p e c t i v e c o u n t e r s t h a t deployment of SDI i s choices. d e s i r a b l e and n e c e s s a r y . O t h e r s c o n t e n d t h a t deployment o f s t r a t e g i c d e f e n s e s i n some form i s b u t o n e of many p o l i c y o p t i o n s open t o s e r i o u s consideration. Most o b s e r v e r s would a r g u e t h a t t h e p o l i c y d e b a t e w i l l t e n d t o be dominated by t h i s l a t t e r p e r s p e c t i v e . Each o f t h e s e p e r s p e c t i v e s a r e examined i n t h e f o l l o w i n g g e n e r a l d i s c u s s i o n . T r a d e o f f i s s u e s a r e a l s o r a i s e d i n t h e c o n t e x t of t h e c u r r e n t o b j e c t i v e s o f a P h a s e 1 s y s t e m ( t o perform a m i l i t a r y m i s s i o n , compel c h a n g e s i n S o v i e t f o r c e s t r u c t u r e , and l a y a f o u n d a t i o n f o r s u b s e q u e n t SDI deployment p h a s e s ) . Competing P e r s p e c t i v e s o f P h a s e 1 Deployment P u r s u e W a s e 1 as a n Element of U.S. S t r a t e g i c Policy? Yes. Those who s u p p o r t Phase 1 do s o based on d i f f e r e n t (some would s a y c o m p e t i n g ) views of n u c l e a r d e t e r r e n c e . Some f i r m l y b e l i e v e t h a t o f f e n s i v e n u c l e a r d e t e r r e n c e s h o u l d be r e p l a c e d a s t h e b a s i s o f U.S. s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y and t h a t p o p u l a t i o n d e f e n s e s h o u l d b e s t r e s s e d ; many i n t h i s group b e l i e v e d e t e r r e n c e i s a morally bankrupt concept. S t i l l others a r g u e t h a t U.S. o f f e n s i v e n u c l e a r d e t e r r e n c e i s n o t c r e d i b l e i n t h e f a c e of S o v i e t s t r a t e g i c m o d e r n i z a t i o n and must be s t r e n g t h e n e d . D e b a t e w i t h i n t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e f o c u s e s upon w h e t h e r and how b e s t t o r e p l a c e o r strengthen nuclear deterrence with defenses. F o r some, t h e i m p e r a t i v e t o d e p l o y SDI t e c h n o l o g i e s s o o n i s a c u t e . Many would a g r e e t h a t t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s Phase 1 c o n c e p t s h o u l d be p u r s u e d b e c a u s e i t would commit t h e United S t a t e s t o SDI, p e r m i t n e a r - t e r m ( w i t h i n 7-10 y e a r s ) SDI deployment, and accommodate t h e i r d i f f e r e n t v i e w s of o f f e n s i v e n u c l e a r d e t e r r e n c e . A key i s s u e f o r t h o s e who want t o r e p l a c e d e t e r r e n c e i s w h e t h e r t h e P h a s e 1 s y s t e m would p r o v i d e enough p o p u l a t i o n p r o t e c t i o n ( a s t h e y s e e i t 1, g i v e n t h e u n c e r t a i n t y o v e r s u b s e q u e n t p h a s e s and t h e f u t u r e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of more advanced d e f e n s i v e c o n c e p t s . A second key i s s u e f o r t h e s e p e o p l e i s w h e t h e r t h e Phase 1 s y s t e m s e r v e s o n l y t o s h o r e up t o which t h e y o b j e c t o r whether Phase 1 offensive nuclear deterrence deployment i s a n a c c e p t a b l e and n e c e s s a r y t r a n s i t i o n t o d e t e r r e n c e b a s e d on d e f e n s e s . -- -- A key i s s u e f o r t h o s e who s u p p o r t n e a r - t e r m deployment o f SDI t o s t r e n g t h e n o f f e n s i v e n u c l e a r d e t e r r e n c e i s w h e t h e r t h e c u r r e n t c o n c e p t of P h a s e 1 r e p r e s e n t s a p r e m a t u r e comnitment t o p u r s u e l i m i t e d BUD technologies. A second key i s s u e f o r t h e s e p e o p l e i s w h e t h e r s u b s e q u e n t f o l l o w - o n p h a s e s o f more advanced SDI t e c h n o l o g i e s w i l l be f e a s i b l e . Yo. C r i t i c s t a k e e x c e p t i o n t o t h e m i l i t a r y r a t i o n a l e f o r t h e Phase 1 c o n c e p t and make a c a s e t h a t c u r r e n t and p r o s p e c t i v e U.S. n u c l e a r f o r c e s a r e a d e q u a t e t o d e t e r S o v i e t a g g r e s s i o n a g a i n s t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and i t s a l l i e s and deny t h e USSR i t s wartime o b j e c t i v e s . They a s s e r t t h a t n u c l e a r d e t e r r e n c e has e f f e c t i v e l y e l i m i n a t e d t h e t h r e a t of g l o b a l w a r f a r e , t h u s e n s u r i n g i n d i r e c t l y t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f t h e U.S. p o p u l a t i o n against nuclear attack. Moreover, t h e y would c o n t e n d t h a t s u r v i v a l of U.S. s o c i e t y c o u l d n o t b e a s s u r e d i n t h e f a c e of a d e t e r m i n e d o r i r r a t i o n a l adversary. F u r t h e r m o r e , any p o p u l a t i o n d e f e n s e a f f o r d e d by P h a s e 1 deployment would be m e a n i n g l e s s g i v e n t h e d e s t r u c t i v e n e s s of e v e n a few n u c l e a r weapons. Some might a l s o a r g u e t h a t c i v i l d e f e n s e m e a s u r e s a r e l e s s c o s t l y and more e f f e c t i v e . Some b e l i e v e t h a t t h e U.S. ICBM f o r c e i s n o t v u l n e r a b l e ( a n d t h a t m o b i l e I C B M s a r e e v e n l e s s v u l n e r a b l e ) , and t h a t t h e y d o n o t need t o be They add t h a t warheads on U.S. bombers and d e f e n d e d by a P h a s e 1 system. submarines c o n t r i b u t e s i g n i f i c a n t l y t o deterrence. According t o t h i s perspective, development and deployment of P h a s e 1 t e c h n o l o g i e s i s u n n e c e s s a r y and p r o h i b i t i v e i n c o s t . In a d d i t i o n , a Phase 1 deployment i s seen a s dangerous because it could c r e a t e i n c e n t i v e s f o r one o r t h e o t h e r side t o attack f i r s t in a crisis. T h e s e o p p o n e n t s would r e j e c t t h e argument t h a t development of a P h a s e 1 s y s t e m ( a n d a comnitment t o phased d e p l o y m e n t ) would compel t h e S o v i e t s t o r e l y l e s s on n u c l e a r b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s . Rather, i t i s a s s e r t e d , t h e S o v i e t s could p r o l i f e r a t e t h e i r b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e f o r c e a t less c o s t than U.S. deployment of SDI. The S o v i e t s , a r g u a b l y , c o u l d a l s o d e v e l o p and d e p l o y a h o s t o f m e a s u r e s t o c o u n t e r t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s and s u r v i v a b i l i t y of t h e P h a s e 1 system. O t h e r , l e s s p r o v o c a t i v e , and l e s s c o s t l y a l t e r n a t i v e s c o n t r o l , m o b i l e ICBMs, and p a s s i v e d e f e n s e s , f o r example -- -- s u c h a s arms can l e a d t o f a v o r a b l e c h a n g e s ( f o r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ) i n S o v i e t f o r c e s t r u c t u r e and s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y , a c c o r d i n g t o t h i s view. Therefore, these options should be pursued i n s t e a d . A t h i r d p e r s p e c t i v e i s t h a t t h e U.S. s t r a t e g i c d e t e r r e n t Maybe. n e e d s s t r e n g t h e n i n g t o remain c r e d i b l e i n t h e e y e s of t h e S o v i e t s , and t h a t t h e o p t i o n t o d e p l o y SDI i n some form s h o u l d n o t be d i s m i s s e d o r accepted without c r i t i c a l review. Here, t h e key i s s u e s a r e which c o m p a r a b l e s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y g o a l s can be r e a c h e d a t l e a s t c o s t t o s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y and w i t h g r e a t e s t e f f e c t i v e n e s s . On t h i s p o i n t , i t c o u l d be s a i d t h a t t h e j u r y i s s t i l l o u t . As s t a t e d by t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , t h e m i l i t a r y m i s s i o n o f t h e P h a s e 1 s y s t e m i s t o e n h a n c e s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y i n peace and c r i s i s and p r e s e r v e a c r e d i b l e s t r a t e g i c f o r c e i n t h e event d e t e r r e n c e f a i l s . According t o SDIO, t h e p u r p o s e o f Phase 1 deployment i s t o add u n c e r t a i n t y t o a n y S o v i e t c a l c u l a t i o n s of a t t a c k a s a phase i n an o v e r a l l c h a n g e t o a d e f e n s e dominated world. Increasing Soviet uncertainty t o strengthen deterrence many would p o i n t o u t compares r e a d i l y w i t h U.S. strategic modernization o b j e c t i v e s t o deploy f o r c e s s u f f i c i e n t t o convince t h e S o v i e t s t h e y c a n n o t a c h i e v e t h e i r p r i n c i p a l war aims by a n u c l e a r a t t a c k , n e u t r a l i z e t h e United S t a t e s , ensure continued S o v i e t p a r t y c o n t r o l i n t h e USSR i n t h e e v e n t of war, and l i m i t damage t o t h e i r w a r f i g h t i n g capabilities, -- -- I f t h e P h a s e 1 deployment g o a l s a r e comparable w i t h t h o s e of s t r a t e g i c m o d e r n i z a t i o n and arms c o n t r o l , t h e n q u e s t i o n s o f c o s t ( i n a b r o a d s e n s e ) and e f f e c t i v e n e s s become c r u c i a l . C u r r e n t l y , no s t u d i e s a r e a v a i l a b l e a n a l y z i n g Phase 1 deployment, comparing i t w i t h t h e r a n g e of s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y a l t e r n a t i v e s , and a s s e s s i n g t h e v a r i o u s t r a d e o f f s . N o n e t h e l e s s , some c r i t i c i s m s of Phase 1 have begun t o t a k e shape. One i s t h a t l i m i t e d d e f e n s e s coupled with e f f e c t i v e o f f e n s i v e c a p a b i l i t i e s can i n c r e a s e t h e r i s k of n u c l e a r war, e s p e c i a l l y i n a c r i s i s . Indeed, P r e s i d e n t Reagan warned o f t h i s i n h i s Mar. 23, 1983, s o - c a l l e d " S t a r wars" s p e e c h , s a y i n g t h a t d e f e n s e s , " i f p a i r e d w i t h o f f e n s i v e s y s t e m s , [ c o u l d ] be viewed a s f o s t e r i n g a n a g g r e s s i v e p o l i c y , and no o n e w a n t s that ." A c r u c i a l i s s u e f o r P h a s e 1 c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n t h e minds of many observers i s t h e current Soviet negotiating proposal t o reduce t h e i r s t r a t e g i c warheads by h a l f , i n c l u d i n g i n p a r t i c u l a r h a l f o f t h o s e o n a l l SS-18 missiles. The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n h a s l o n g c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h e SS-18s a s t h e s i n g l e most d a n g e r o u s and p r o v o c a t i v e of S o v i e t s t r a t e g i c s y s t e m s . Some have u r g e d t h a t t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n s e r i o u s l y c o n s i d e r t h e S o v i e t o f f e r because i t seen a s h i g h l y competitive with t h e Phase 1 m i s s i o n o b j e c t i v e s , and i t would c e r t a i n l y c o s t l e s s . ABM T r e a t y and P h a s e 1 D e v e l o p a n t and Deployment Deployment o f t h e Phase 1 e l e m e n t s i s i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e ABM T r e a t y ( a n d i t s 1974 P r o t o c o l ) , which l i m i t deployment t o 100 ground-based i n t e r c e p t o r s a t one s i t e and a ground-based ABM g u i d a n c e and s e n s o r system. Moreover, many o b s e r v e r s a g r e e t h a t t h e ABM T r e a t y was d e s i g n e d to restrict the development of a nationwide defense capability, though this is contested by Administration spokesmen and others. A key policy issue is therefore whether and when to abandon the ABM Treaty's constraints in pursuit of the President's vision of SDI. Those who agree with the ~dministration's plans for a Phase 1 system argue that the ABM Treaty should not stand in the way of developing a comprehensive defense system that would reduce the risk of nuclear war and make possible significant reductions in U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces . Another view maintains that Treaty limits on deployment of ABM systems have averted a potentially costly and dangerous offense-defense arms race. It is asserted that abandonment of the ABM Treaty would only result in a strategic environment made more complex and dangerous with the introduction of the limited capabilities envisaged for Phase 1 deployment. The potential for instability is further heightened by the inherent uncertainty of follow-on deployment capabilities, i t is argued. Still others might suggest that the ABM Treaty could be amended to allow more than the limited deployment now permitted in ways that would retain the Treaty's central purpose of precluding deployment of a nationwide defense capability. Phase 1 development raises two crucial issues with respect to the ABM Treaty. The first is whether development and testing of some Phase 1 elements is compatible with the traditional interpretation of the ABM Treaty, which prohibits testing and development of ABM componentp unless they are part of a fixed, ground-based ABM system. Although the Administration has said that SDI research, development, and testing will comply with the traditional interpretation, some people raise compliance questions over particular programs and tests, such as SBI. Some also believe concerns about potential conflicts with the Treaty will increase as Phase 1 proceeds. The second issue raised is whether Phase 1 development will soon require the adoption of a new (i.e., broader) interpretation of the ABM Treaty, which permits testing and development of ABM systems based on physical principles other than those in use in 1972, regardless of basing mode. The Administration has said that while this broader interpretation is legally justified, it would adhere to the traditional interpretation in conducting the SDI program. Congress also passed legislation having the practical affect of requiring any FY88 funds spent on SDI to be compliant with the traditional Treaty interpretation. Some argue, however, that the United States should soon adopt the broader interpretation to conduct realistic testing of some Phase 1 technologies. They would add that doing so will save time and money, and reduce technological risk (because of being able to conduct realistic tests). Budgetary Issues and Phase 1 Deployment According to SDIO, current Administration cost estimates of the Phase 1 system range between $75 billion and $150 billion (FY88) for the demonstration, validation, full-scale engineering development, and p r o d u c t i o n of t h e Phase 1 system. T h i s r a n g e o f c o s t , s a y s SDIO, i s d u e t o u n c e r t a i n t y i n t h e t e c h n i c a l c o n f i g u r a t i o n of t h e h a r d w a r e and a l t e r n a t i v e a c q u i s i t i o n approaches. These e s t i m a t e s , f o r t h e most p a r t , r e f l e c t t h e a s s u m p t i o n of 1I b u s i n e s s a s u s u a l " and do n o t r e f l e c t r e d u c t i o n s f o r e x t r a o r d i n a r y b r e a k t h r o u g h s , e f f i c i e n c i e s , management, o r production techniques. Launch c o s t s , a r g u e s SDIO, a r e r e d u c e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e e x p e c t a t i o n s f o r t h e ALS. Some h a v e s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h i s SDIO c o s t r a n g e i s h i g h l y o p t i m i s t i c , Many p o i n t t o t h e and t h a t t h e f i n a l c o s t s w i l l a c t u a l l y be much h i g h e r . need f o r g r e a t l y reduced s p a c e - l a u n c h c o s t s t o k e e p down t h e t o t a l P h a s e 1 s y s t e m deployment c o s t s , which i s n o t i n c l u d e d i n t h e SDIO r a n g e ; t h e y r a i s e s e r i o u s d o u b t s a s t o whether s u c h s i g n i f i c a n t c o s t r e d u c t i o n s e n v i s i o n e d f o r t h e ALS c a n b e a t t a i n e d . One b u d g e t a r y i s s u e r a i s e d t h e r e f o r e i s s i m p l y o n e of a f f o r d a b i l i t y . The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e Phase 1 deployment when s p r e a d o u t o v e r a number of y e a r s , and i n c l u d i n g c o s t s a v i n g s from o t h e r U.S. s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r weapons programs ( t h e need f o r which i t i s a r g u e d would is affordable. d e c l i n e over time) -- -- O t h e r s might a r g u e t h a t t h e c o s t s o f d e p l o y i n g t h e P h a s e 1 s y s t e m c a n n o t be accomnodated i n an e r a of d e c l i n i n g d e f e n s e b u d g e t s . They c o n t e n d t h a t c o m p e t i t i o n f o r f u n d s w i t h i n t h e Defense Department w i l l make f u n d i n g a n SDI phased development and deployment program i n c r e a s i n g l y difficult. A t t h e same time, c o m p e t i t i o n between c o n v e n t i o n a l a n d s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s r e s e a r c h and development f u n d s w i l l become k e e n e r . The p r o s p e c t o f r e d u c e d f u n d i n g f o r t h e development o f t h e P h a s e 1 system, some w o u l d a r g u e , r a i s e s an i m p o r t a n t i s s u e : Can t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n p u r s u e t h e c u r r e n t Phase 1 c o n c e p t i n a f i s c a l l y c o n s t r a i n e d environment? I n many c a s e s , DOD weapons programs a r e " s t r e t c h e d o u t " o v e r time t o r e d u c e n e a r - t e r m c o s t s o r t o cope w i t h reduced budgets. Should Phase 1 development be s t r e t c h e d o u t , i t might r e n d e r P h a s e 1 deployment o b s o l e t e b e c a u s e i t i s i n t e n d e d t o d e a l w i t h a mid- t o l a t e - 1 9 9 0 s S o v i e t t h r e a t . A f t e r t h e l a t e 19908, t h e c u r r e n t P h a s e 1 s y s t e m , i f d e p l o y e d , might be i n c a p a b l e o f m e e t i n g t h e c u r r e n t m i s s i o n requirements. Budget c o n s t r a i n t s t h e r e f o r e c o u l d p l a y a d e c i s i v e r o l e i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e u l t i m a t e f a t e of t h e c u r r e n t Phase 1 c o n c e p t . The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n A second major i s s u e concerns c o s t - e f f e c t i v e n e s s . h a s c o n t e n d e d , and t h e Congress h a s a g r e e d t h r o u g h l e g i s l a t i o n , t h a t a n y deployment of SDI must b e c o s t - e f f e c t i v e a t t h e margin. T h i s , t o many, means t h a t t h e c o s t t o t h e S o v i e t s of m a i n t a i n i n g a g i v e n l e v e l o f o f f e n s i v e c a p a b i l i t y would be g r e a t e r t h a n i t would b e f o r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o degrade t h a t c a p a b i l i t y with defenses. Some A d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f f i c i a l s would a r g u e t h a t c o s t - e f f e c t i v e n e s s a t t h e m a r g i n , however, i s more t h a n a n economic term. The i s s u e i n t h e minds of many i s how and should t h e Phase when t o c a l c u l a t e c o s t - e f f e c t i v e n e s s f o r d e p l o y i n g SDI: 1 s y s t e m be c o s t - e f f e c t i v e by i t s e l f a g a i n s t p o s s i b l e S o v i e t c o u n t e r s , o r s h o u l d c o s t - e f f e c t i v e n e s s c r i t e r i o n be c a l c u l a t e d i n t h e c o n t e x t o f a more c o m p r e h e n s i v e , m u l t i p h a s e s t r a t e g i c d e f e n s e system. Such i s s u e s h a v e y e t t o be r e s o l v e d . . Options for Congress Because pursuing Phase 1 will require funding approval, Congress will play an important role in determining the appropriate goal of the SDI program, as well as any deployment objectives. Briefly mentioned here for illustrative purposes only are some of the options the Congress could pursue in deciding upon SDI funding this year for development and testing of Phase 1 elements. Support the Phase 1 Concept Congress could endorse the Reagan ~dministration's plans for the demonstration and validation of Phase 1 elements, urge timely progress toward deployment of Phase 1, continue to fund Phase 1 without necessarily committing to its deployment, or grant the funding request without restrictions on the SDI program, or any of these concurrently. Modify the Phase 1 Concept Congress could support President Reagan by funding Phase 1 demonstration and validation at the level of the Administration's request, seek to legislate balance (instead of relying on the Administration's assurances to do so) between demonstration and validation of Phase 1 Congress elements and longer-term programs (Phases 2 and 3, for example). might also recommend that these longer-term, more advanced technologies be required to play a role in a different Phase 1 system to be deployed later than currently envisioned. Congress might also develop and pursue its own set of objectives for SDI through framework legislation and funding; deployment of SDI over the near- or long-term may or may not be a specific goal. Stop or Slow Developmnt of the Phase 1 Concept Congress might legislate balance between nearer- and longer-term technologies, while reducing significantly the overall SDI funding request in the aggregate to slow Phase 1 development or stop deployment. Congress might also prohibit development and testing of all or some Phase 1 weapons elements, such as the space-based interceptor, to slow Phase 1 development or stop deployment. Congress might seek to limit the general scope of SDI by approving greatly reduced funding levels and legislating various prograamatic restrictions. The purpose of slowing all or some of the SDI program (such as nearer-term technologies) would be to restrict the possibility of deploying SDI for an indeterminate period of time. LEG1 SLATIOY P.L. 99-145 FY86 Defense Authorization Act. Requires that any strategic defense system deployed in whole or in part be survivable and cost-effective at the margin. Furthermore, funding for the deployment of such a system must be specifically authorized by legislation. Signed into law Nov. 8, 1985.