Coordination of Federal Efforts to Control Illicit Drug Traffic

This report discusses how best to coordinate the Federal government's multi-agency efforts to curb illicit traffic in dangerous drugs has once again become an issue of major interest to the Congress. Critics of the Reagan Administration's anti-drug program contend that it lacks an overall strategy and that it suffers from the absence of a central mechanism for the formulation of general policy as well as for the broad direction of operations

COORDINATION OF F E D E R A L E F F O R T S TO CONTROL ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFIC ISSUE BRIEF NUMBER IB83168 AUTHOR: Harry Hogan Government Division THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE MAJOR ISSUES SYSTEM DATE ORIGINATED DATE UPDATED CRS- 1 ISSUE DEFINITION H o w best to coordinate the Federal government's multi-agency efforts t o c u r b illicit traffic i n dangerous drugs has o n c e again become a n i s s u e of major interest to t h e Congress. Critics of t h e current Administration's anti-drug program contend that i t l a c k s a n overall strategy a n d . t h a t i t suffers from t h e a b s e n c e of a central mechanism f o r t h e formulation of general policy a s well a s for the broad direction of operations. A number o f bills pending i n t h e 9 8 t h Congress a r e designed to remedy t h e perceived deficiency, through t h e establishment of a n agency with explicit authority over the development a n d implementation of a l l Federal g o v e r n m e n t efforts to control drug traffic. Frequently described i n t h e press a s "drug c z a r " proposals, these measures a r e opposed by t h e Reagan Administration on the grounds t h a t such a n agency i s unnecessary and would be potentially disruptive. BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS I. 11. 111. IV. Immediate Background Historical Perspective Alternatives to a D r u g Czar Summary Discussion I. Immediate Background On Jan. 1 4 , 1 9 8 3 , ?resident Reagan exercised a pocket veto o n a n o m n i b u s crime c o n t r o l bill passed during the closing hours of t h e 9 7 t h Congress. His principal objection to t h e measure w a s that i t contained a provision f o r a so-called "8rUg czar" office, to be known a s the " O f f i c e of t h e Director o f National a n d International Drug Operations and Policy." The agency, the director a n d deputy director of which were to be subject to S e n a t e a p p r o v a l , would have been authorized to --(A) d e v e l o p , review, i m p l e m e n t , and enforce U.S. Government policy with respect to illegal clrugs; (B) direct and coordinate a l l U.S. G o v e r n m e n t efforts to halt the f l o w i n t o , and sale and use of i l l e g a l drugs within the U.S.; (C) develop i n concert with other Federal entities concerned with drug control t h e budgetary priorities and allocations of those entities with respect to illegal d r u g s ; and (D) coordinate the collection and dissemination of information necessary to implement U.S. ,!,<t?. r e g - e r t tc i l l $ c s l p - , ' y C . . .- - - -4 - --- - 7 , " In connection with t h e drug czar p r o v i s i o n , the P r e s i d e n t ' s memorandum disapprovai stated: of CRS- 2 IB83168 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - 1 1 / 2 T h e creation of another layer of bureaucracy within the Executive Branch would produce friction, disrupt effective law enforcement, and could threaten the integrity of criminal investigations and prosecutions -- the very opposite of w h a t i t s proponents apparently intend. -- He contended m o r e o v e r , that "although [ t h e provision's] a i m with w h i c h I i s to promote coordination, this c a n be and i s being am in full agreement achieved through existing administrative structures." -- T h e President's assertion that coordination i s being achieved under t h e present system i s challenged i n a report recently i s s u e d by the G e n e r a l Accounting Office. (Federal D r u g Interdiction Efforts Need Strong C e n t r a l Oversight; GGD-83-52; J u n e 1 3 , 1983). F o c u s i n g on drug i n t e r d i c t i o n , t h e G A O found t h a t , although the l e v e l of cooperation among t h e principal a g e n c i e s concerned has been increasing, the fragmentation of authority and responsibility "has a certain amount of inefficiency a n d interagency c o n f l i c t built in." I n particular, t h e G A O points o u t , "congressional o v e r s i g h t a n d executive branch resource allocation decisions relative to drug i n t e r d i c t i o n a r e difficult under these circumstances." Accordingly, t h e agency recommended that the President --- -- direct the development of a m o r e definitive Federal drug strategy that stipulates the roles of t h e various agencies with drug enforcement responsibilities and -- make a clear delegation of responsibility to o n e individual to oversee F e d e r a l drug enforcement programs. Historical Perspective F o r close to 1 0 0 years the Federal government has been involved i n e f f o r t s to c u r b the non-therapeutic u s e of dangerous drugs. Beginning i n 1 8 8 7 , with enactment of a l a w that f o r b a d e the importation of o p i u m i n t o t h e United S t a t e s by subjects of the Emperor of C h i n a , a long s e r i e s o f s t a t u t e s hascreated a major F e d e r a l r o l e i n the regulation of drug c o m m e r c e and in the enforcemeiit cf restricticns designed to prevent the a b a s e of Crugs. As a matter of course, the responsibility for administering and enforcing Federal drug control laws h a s been divided. S i n c e many of t h e most restricted drugs enter t h e country illegally from a b r o a d , the a g e n c i e s charged with policing the national borders -- the Customs S e r v i c e , t h e C o a s t Regulation G u a r d , and the Border P a t r o l -- have a n i m p o r t a n t part t o - play. of ~ h edomestic drug industry i s the province of bot9 the Drug E n f o r c e m e n i Administration (DEA) and the Food and Drug A d m i n i s t r a ~ i o n ,whiie in a d d i t i o n the DEA has authority for t h e investigation 0-f violations invoiving d a n g e r o u s C!rugs and for iiaison with foreign law enforcement o f f i c i a l s in matters - m -p_ C ~ : p "; 7 t? ~ ? ~ T c T ? ~ .c '? ~c, : ? - - .. - - n n C - n l . . - . Other a g e n c l e s wlth drug control responslbllitles are: t h e Federal Bureau of Invest;gat~oii (FBI!; t h e Esreau c f Internaticnal Narcotics Xatterz ~n t h e S t a t e Department; the FeSeral Av:ac:sr~ Agency; he Incernal Revenue Service; -: ~ c c & r c " 2 - 5 St&=:st:-s i C , * ; E z j ; zrle ^"--c cf ;:s=~=e .:-ss:s-a:-.=o, tr-e h ~ e r = y - _ i _ i L CRS- 3 IB83168 UPDATE-11/23/83 for International Development; the Bureau of Alcohol, T o b a c c o a n d Firearms; and the D e p a r t m e n t of Agriculture. Additionally, there i s t h e necessary participation of the Criminal Division of the Justice D e p a r t m e n t a n d of U.S. Attorneys. Especially during t h e past 1 5 y e a r s , t h e level of t h e F e d e r a l commitment Spending f o r "law t o Control of drug a b u s e has increased substantially. i n FY 1 9 6 9 to enforcement" related to this purpose r o s e from $37 million approximately $1.05 billion in FY83. T h e same years s a w the i n i t i a t i o n , o r significant i n c r e a s e , of Federal programs to reduce t h e demand f o r drugs -through t r e a t m e n t , education and primary prevention. Given t h e number of agencies chat have i n some way become involved i n drug Control during recent y e a r s , and t h e inevitable conflicts generated in consequence, i t would b e surprising if Calls for coordination had n o t been sounded previously. I n d e e d , along with a number of other a p p r o a c h e s , the in a structure 'loverlord" system itself has already been tried established, i n 1 9 7 1 , by former P r e s i d e n t Richard Nixon. -- In declaring a "War o n D r u g A b u s e v President Nixon w a s r e s p o n s i b l e for a number of i n i t i a t i v e s to alleviate t h e problem that w a s a t t h e t i m e causing such a high d e g r e e of public concern. Among them was t h e creation of t h e S p e c i a l Action Office f o r Drug Abuse Prevention (SAODAP)', h e a d e d by a director which t h e press a t that time labelled " t h e drug czar." P l a c e d i n t h e Executive O f f i c e of t h e P r e s i d e n t , t h e a g e n c y was authorized to supervise and b e responsible for a l l Federal drug a b u s e programs involving prevention, education, t r e a t m e n t , training and research. In initial discussions a t t h e W h i t e H o u s e , the Nixon drug c z a r plan had envisioned t h e inclusion of l a w enforcement functions. within the s c o p e of t h e -- by office's concerns. However, reportedly i t was argued with persuasion t h e J u s t i c e Department and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous D r u g s -t h a t a director w h o would have t h e necessary stature in both the law enforcement a n d the treatment-prevention communities could n o t be found. It w a s further a r g u e d , a l s o with effect, that of these t w o general a r e a s t h e treatment-prevention s i d e was a t t h a t time i n greater need o f central direction. In 1 9 7 2 , t h e year following P r e s i d e n t i a l establishment of t h e n e w a g e n c y , Congress provided a statutory base, f o r a 3-year period, through t h e D r u g Abuse Office and Treatment Act. T w o k e y congressional f i n d i n g s noted in the Ieqislaticn w e r e a s folloks: T h e effectiveness of efforts by S t a t e and local governments and by the Federal G o v e r n m e n t to c o n t r o l a n d treat drug a b u s e i n t h e United States h a s been hampered by a lack of coordination a m o n g ;he S t a t e s , bet wee^ Sraces and l o c a l i t i e s , a n d throughout the Federal establlsnment. Contrcl of drug a S u s e requires t h e development of -. -- - -- .- r n-h -g.y. c ; ~ r n : 2 I h - l - t p y m Tf3er~' strategy that encompasses both effective l a w enforcement against illegal drug traffic and s rekabilitate victirr.~ .effeztive health ~ r ~ g r a r nto of drug abuse. IB83168 CRS- 4 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - 1 1 / 2 Although finding substantial s u p p o r t for t h e addition of l a w enforceme-nt efforts t o the coordinative jurisdiction of S A O D A P , a f a c t reflected i n t h e above f i n d i n g s , Congress acceded t o the Administration v i e w t h a t the o f f i c e should have n o effective power o v e r drug l a w enforcement agencies. The exclusion of such authority continued, during the years of the a g e n c y ' s operation, to draw criticism. D e s p i t e the existence of S A O D A P , conflicts and the lack o f . a unified 2 y e a r s after the objective continued i n evidence, and i n 1 9 7 3 coordinating agency had been created -- the National C o m m i s s i o n on Marihuana and D r u g Abuse could still find that i n S A O D A P ' s designated sphere o f operation "the fragmentation of authority threatens to d e f e a t i t s attempt to organize federal a n d s t a t e activities into a n integrated r e s p o n s e , u n d e r Clear and understandable policy guidelines." -- T h e National Commission on Marihuana and D r u g Abuse, established by a n a c t been given t h e of Congress and partially appointed by President Nixon, had o n e o n the c o u n t r y ' s task of conducting t w o comprehensive s t u d i e s marihuana problem a n d what to d o a b o u t it a n d t h e second o n t h e problem of drug a b u s e i n general a n d the appropriate n a t i o n a l response. I n its detailed report o n t h e general drug problem, the Commission described t h e development, during t h e preceding f i v e years, o f a "drug a b u s e i n d u s t r i a l complex" -marked by duplication of effort, uncertainty of direction ' a n d a lack of interagency coordination.'' Above a l l , the Commission noted t h e emergence o f a large Federal drug bureaucracy, "displaying the common propensity of bureaucratic infrastructures to turn short-term programs i n t o never-ending projects." -- D e s p i t e the f a c t t h a t coordination and a unified policy w e r e still e l u d i n g the government when t h e ~ a t i o n a lCommission w r o t e i t s r e p o r t , t h e panel g a v e SAODAP c r e d i t for m a k i n g progress i n that direction. However, the commission reCCmmended a far m o r e radical approach to t h e coordination problem than a n y proposed before or since: the creation of a s i n g l e agency with responsibility fCr a l l primarily drug-related f u n c t i o n s , both f o r t h e f o r m u l a t i o n of policy T h e recommendation envisioned t h a t t h e and f o r a c t u a l day-to-day operations. agency director would have sub-cabinet rank but would n e v e r t h e l e s s r e p o r t directly t o the President. Although supporting t h e concept of a s i n g l e drug control agency -- w i t h the suggestion that i t b e called t h e Controlled Substances Administration the National Commission acknowledged two alternatives: -- (1) that the system in effect a t t h e t i m e might be continued " i n the hope that SAODAP will more effectively utilize i t s statutory authority t o bring s o m e order o u t of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e chaos" o r (2) that SAODAP could be retained but given specifically detailed program a u t h o r i t y a s well a s t h e budgetary control i t already haC. authorization for SAODAF explred in 1975. The Ford T h e 3-year Admlnlstratlon took t h e posltlon t h a t the a g e n c y ' s duratlon should n o t be extended. T h e emergency s ~ t u a t i o c that had called fcr tb.e extraoralnary therefore tke measure no lonaer e x l s t e d , the Adrnlnlstratlcn rnalntalned, a n 5 c l ~ s - y , e s s sf +~-g=t-ng ~ f c e ~ -T C ~ J - .. -~ ; - -- .. - c -,-A .. C f f C r Z 5 S t 2 - 1 5 L E Iff: -- i. - - - LC -- -\ - F ~ - -I . L ~ $ ~ . CRS- 5 to t h e National Institute o n D r u g Abuse, which had been 'established by t h e same statute a s SAODAP. General policy concerning a l l drug matters w e r e to be developed by several Cabinet committees a s well a s by t h e Strategy Council o n D r u g Abuse, a l s o created by the SAODAP law. In spite of t h e Ford policy, SAODAP never entirely f a d e d away. In 1 9 7 6 , Congress amended the SAODAP statute to establish a successor agency -- t h e O f f i c e of Drug Abuse Policy (ODAP) o n a scaled-down b a s i s , t h e n e w office being smaller in s i z e than SAODAP and lacking i t s powerful tool of budget review. -- P r e s i d e n t F o r d , w h o was defeated i n 1 9 7 6 i n his bid f o r re-election, declined to implement the ODAP amendment. In March 1 9 7 7 , F o r d ' s successor -P r e s i d e n t Jimmy Carter filled the vacant ODAP Director position with Dr. P e t e r Bourne. Dr. Bourne was confirmed by the S e n a t e i n l a t e May a n d installed in o f f i c e i n June. A month l a t e r , President Carter submitted a plan for t h e reorganization of the Executive Office of t h e P r e s i d e n t , which T h e plan (Reorganization included a provision f o r the a olition of ODAP. P l a n No. 1 , 1977) w a s n o t disa proved by Congress, and ODAP w e n t o u t of e x i s t e n c e in early 1978. In a l l the successor agency to SAODAP w a s i n operation for l i t t l e more than a half-year. -- 3 After ODAP's d e m i s e , however, Dr. Bourne became a presidential a s s i s t a n t for international health and drug a b u s e a n d , a s s u c h , o v e r s a w t h e operations of a drug policy unit within t h e Domestic Policy Staff. After Dr. Bourne's r e s i g n a t i o n , in mid-1978, t h e unit was supervised by t h e former Deputy Director of 0DAP;Lee Dogoloff. T h e Reagan Administration h a s continued roughly t h e same a r r a n g e m e n t , and i n J u n e 1 9 8 2 the P r e s i d e n t issued a n E x e c u t i v e order (No. 12368) officially designating t h e unit the " D r u g A b u s e P o l i c y 0 f f i c e W , . a n d naming a director (Dr. Carlton Turner) to be "primarily r e s p o n s i b l e for a s s i s t i n g the President i n formulating policy .for, a n d i n coordinating and overseeing, international a s well a s d o m e s t i c drug a b u s e f u n c t i o n s by all Executive agencies." Alternatives to a D r u g Czar If w e a c c e p t t h e proposition t h a t t h e v a r i o u s F e d e r a l drug l a w enforcement e f f o r t s , o r the d r u g a b u s e prevention and treatment e f f o r t s , .suffer from a lack of coordinated policies and g o a l s , i s a super-agency -- i.e., a druq czar - - the only sclution? Certainly, otl-,er ways of approaching thls problem have been conceived and tried during the past ten years. F i r s t , the same legislation that established S A O D A P a l s o created a Strategy Council, comprised of the department and agency heads w h o had the g r e a t e s t interest i n the drug problem, t h e SAODAP d i r e c t o r , a n d other o f f i c i a l s "as t h e President may deein appropriate." T h e mandate o f t h e C o u n c i l i s to d e v e l o p a " c o m p r e h e n s i v e , coordinated long-term F e d e r a l strategy for all drug abuse prevention functions a n d a l l d r u g traffic prevention f u n c t i o n s w of any agency of the Federal Government.' T h e strategy i s to be reviewed and revised a t least o n c e a year. It i s intended to cover h ~ t hh r h ~ ey 2 ; i t ~ c ~?;ec5iy7es z r d c > e r a t i c ? z l ~ a t t e r s ; Certainly the c 2 s o could be made that i n the policy-making a r e a , the Strategy Council could perform much of t h e function of a drug czar. T h e question i s , a f t e r a strategy has Seen framed and p r o m u l g a t e d , who will f o l l o w up? T h o s e who s u p p o r t rhe super-agency idea maintain that continual monitoring i s required ,. see ::;a= z s z r a z e g y i s impleRencsC. , , (1:cz~': altkough the legislatlex - CRS- 6 IE83168 UPDATE-11/23/83 requiring t h e establishment of the Council has never been r e p e a l e d , t h e o n e Strategy prepared by the Reagan Administration, for 1982, involved participation by government agencies o n l y , without t h e members of t h e public specified by amendments enacted i n 1976). The second alternative -- i n t h e law enforcement f i e l d -- i s e m b o d i e d , a t least partially, by the D r u g Enforcement Administration (DEA) itself. Established by Reorganization P l a n No. 2 of 1 9 7 3 , t h e agency was intended by President Nixon to be t h e f i n a l answer t o those w h o were c h a r g i n g t h a t enforcement w a s i n disarray due to inter-agency rivalries a n d lack of cooperation. Absorbing the manpower of t h r e e separate o r g a n i z a t i o n s , a l o n g with a l l C u s t o m s personnel who specialized i n drug l a w enforcement, D E A w a s -- by embracing t h e majority of enforcement people within o n e meant in the "unified command" organizational structure -- to provide a "counteroffensive" against d r u g abuse. D e s p i t e thls m o v e , which did n o t involve t h e narcotics control efforts of t h e State D e p a r t m e n t o r t h e C o a s t Guard, t h e rivalry problems have c o n t i n u e d , according to many observers. Cited most frequently a s the biggest t r o u b l e a r e a i s t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between DEA and Customs. A l s o , until t h e recent shift within the J u s t i c e D e p a r t m e n t (Jan. 2 1 , 1982) that g a v e the FBI concurrent jurisdiction with D E A o v e r drug l a w enforcement, the former agency was i n a c t i v e in the f i e l d , t h u s providing i t s a g e n t s with little incentive to share intelligence o r o t h e r w i s e cooperate with their D E A brethren. T h e third coordinating mechanism that .has been tried -- by P r e s i d e n t s The Ford Nixon, F o r d , a n d Reagan -- i s t h e inter-agency committee. Administration argued against the extension of SAODA? o n t h e g r o u n d s t h a t t h e agency had achieved i t s purpose a s a n emergency measure and that t h e t i m e had c o m e to return t o normal institutional s t r u c t u r e a n d procedure. In a n s w e r t o the contention that a continued White House-level a g e n c y w a s necessary to give t h e anti-drug effort t h e needed " c l o u t , " Administration defenders poicted o u t t h a t if this l i n e were followed with r e s p e c t to every i m p o r t a n t Federal u n d e r t a k i n g , there would be an overwhelming number of W h i t e H o u s e agencies. F u r t h e r m o r e , it w a s held that a more effective and a p p r o p r i a t e way to a c h i e v e coordination was t h e o n e recommended by a special task f o r c e of the P r e s i d e n t ' s Domestic Council in the f a l l of 1 9 7 5 a n d subsequently taken by P r e s i d e n t Ford: creation of a Cabinet C o m m i t t e e o n D r u g Abuse P r e v e n t i o n T h e members of t h e latter and a Cabinet C o m m i t t e e o n D r u g L a w Enforcement. were the Attorney General a n d the Secretaries of t h e Treasury a n d of T r a n s p o r t a t i o n , with t h e D E A Administrator a c t i n g a s Executive Director. The t w o committees were modeled on the C a b i n e t C o m m i t t e e for International ,,,=its C a n t r o l , created by fsrmer P r e s i d e n t N i p.,,., nwhich the D o n e s t i c 1;aY-n Council g r o u p evaluated a s having been " q u i t e successful." Growing o u t of t h e two cabinet committees created by P r e s i d e n t F o r d was the so-called "Principals Group," comprised of the c h i e f s of t h e operating a g e n c i e s having the greatest responsibility f o r drug a b u s e control. The g r o u p was a t o n e time given high marks f o r resolving confl-icts a n d promoting (An expanded version c o o p e r a t i o n , especially among the enforcement agencies. of the P r i n c i p a l s G r o u p i s still f u n c t i o n i n g , under ~ n e designation "White A separste e n t i t y , t h e House Oversight Working G r o u p I t tmeeting o n c e a month. law enforcemenk "Working G r o u p on Dru@ Supply Reduction" i s concern,e",ith - nr-,, . '/ F i n a l l y , :he Reagan Administratior. has established i t s own versions of the the cabinet cornnittee: t h e Cabinet Ccuncil o n Legal P o l i c y , chaired by Attorney G e n e r a l , and - - in connection with tPe P r e s i d e n t ' s n e w anti-eruq -r=.c:. - - - - L . k 1 r i 3 125;: f ; r = E 1;;- L > 3 = 1 T > - e - - 2 "p:r.cf= "m,F=tef c.: Zrq2'iZEz z y ; ~ -- -7. ' - ~ , CRS- 7 a l s o chaired by t h e Attorney General. IV. Summary Discussion T h e argument over t h e drug czar proposals reflects a disagreement over t h e Value and appropriateness of various k i n d s of government mechanisms. Neither side denies t h e need for coordination, both in policy-making and i n operations, although there i s disagreement over t h e degree t o which i t h a s been achieved by t h e Reagan Administration under t h e present system. Essentially, t h e opponents of t h e czar concept see i t as' h o s t i l e to t h e cabinet system of government. That system allots authority and responsibility to various departments along reasonably coherent jurisdictional l i n e s , they a r g u e , a n d when a r e a s of responsibility overlap a s frequently happens the a p p r o p r i a t e mechanism for a c h i e v i n g coordination A special " o v e r l o r d w a g e n c y of a n y k i n d i s o n e o f a n inter-cabinet nature. depreciates t h e s y s t e m , opponents say. -- -- On t h e other s i d e , proponents have been dissatisfied with the inter-cabinet and inter-agency structures tried i n the past. W h i l e many of them may a g r e e that t h e czar solution d o e s v i o l a t e the l o g i c ' o f t h e c a b i n e t system, they make the case that t h e drug problem i s special -- that t h e dimensions of t h e threat and t h e necessary complexity of t h e government's response demand a departure from "business a s usual." T h e y hold that only a n entity with direct a c c e s s to the P r e s i d e n t -- and o n e w i t h ' budget r e v i e w authority a s w e l l a s t h e power to influence a c t u a l agency o p e r a t i o n s -- c a n SUCCeSSfUlly overcome the inherent impediments t o c o o r d i n a t i o n of e f f o r t a m o n g F e d e r a l agencies. To what extent d o e s past experience offer guidance for judging positions? the above Although a p p r a i s a l s made both by Members of Congress and e x e c u t i v e branch officials a r e a v a i l a b l e , it i s difficult to f o r m a clear i d e a o f the r e s u l t s of the various a p p r o a c h e s taken. I n o n e of t h e f e w outsider assessments of examined t h e agency f r o m S A O D A P , a political scientist -- writing i n 1981 t h e a s p e c t of t h e l i g h t i t shed o n styles of P r e s i d e n t i a l management. While noting certain early successes, G. Larry Mays pointed to a n e v e n t u a l f a i l u r e in meeting original expectations (The Special Action Office f o r Drug A b u s e International Prevention: Drug Coctrol During the Kixon Administratiori. T h e reason he cited was a n J o u r n a l o f Public Administration, v. 3 , 1981). apparent l o s s of confidence in the agency's d i r e c t o r , Dr. J e r o m e J a f f e , by influential presidential aides and t h u s , p r e s u m a b l y , a l s o by t h e President. -- Crediting P r e s i d e n t Nixon wlth a genulne i n t e r e s t i n the d r u g problem, Mays noted that Dr. J a f f e r s contact man in the Nlxon Whit-e H o u s e was E g i l ("BuB") K r o g h , a trusted h ~ g n - l e v e l a l d e who could guarafltee t h a t the S A O C A P dlrector wouid have ready access to he P r e s ~ d e n t . E o w e v e r , Mays stated, "after J a f f e e waivered on the matter of replacrng ~ r .[ ~ e r t r a m ]Brown of t h e National Institute of Mental H e a l t h , Krogh w a s n o longer his c o n t a c t and h e T . -" C . T O : P ~ ~ - - +F- ~ + z l l m - 7.1- -- A-h h l = - n C - * h e V -. II... - 2 7 . n --- h r ? = ~ P C = n the 1 7 h l t ~ 3ouse." T h l s , Nays concluded, marked "an end to Jaffe's e f f e c t i v e contact wlth the President and consequently a loss of influence." Under the n e x t C l r e c t ~ r ,2 o S e r t D u P o r t , the agency was moved physically out of the Executive O f f ~ C eof = h e Presldent ( E O P ) and located ln R o c k v l l l e , M a r y l a n d , and h-as "cq=r--7 c .- 2 . E . . . =i - r - Cf ItS ITFbZt 2 . E.le CRS- 8 process of P r e s i d e n t i a l decision-making. Professional employees of t h e a g e n c i e s directly responsible for dealing with t h e drug problem offer varying informal evaluations of SAODAP. While many appear to welcome any move that highlights t h e d r u g problem and that projects t h e i m a g e o f a higher level of p r i o r i t y , others express t h e d o u b t t h a t a n y f o r m a l e n t i t y , such a s SAODAP or t h e proposed drug czar o f f i c e , c a n accomplish what i s intended. According to t h e l a t t e r , t o t h e e x t e n t that all of the there indeed r e m a i n coordination difficulties -- a f t e r what i s needed i s not a n e w consolidating moves of t h e past 1 0 years overlord office but rather (1) a definite. and sustained interest i n the problem o n the part of the President and (2) one high-level P r e s i d e n t i a l a i d e whc h a s access to t h e P r e s i d e n t , to monitor the o p e r a t i n g ' a g e n c i e s a n d to bring important conflicts to the President's attention. One veteran enforcement official has commented p r i v a t e i y , "We've already had a d r u g c z a r , t h e only kind t h a t w o r k s , and that was Bud KrOgh." (See above.) -- U l t i m a t e l y , in trying to answer t h e question " D o we need a drug czar?", t h e Congress i s f a c e d with a series of additional q u e s t i O n ~ , of both a theoretical and a pragmatic nature. Is t h e general principle sound? D o e s the c o n c e p t of a super-agency, which would coordinate and direct a g r o u p o f operating a g e n c i e s having some common f u n c t i o n , d o violence t o . t h e l o g i c of Executive Branch departmental structure? Is that structure sacrosanct, o r d o e s t h e growth of t h e White House Staff a n d the EOP i n d i c a t e that i n many r e s p e c t s it h a s already been found wanting? T o solve a coordination problem in a n y a r e a , i s t h e r e a better and more a p p r o p r i a t e a l t e r n a t i v e to Creation of a super-agency, such a s the c a b i n e t - c o m m i t t e e o r other similar inter-agency mechanism? Alternatively, have such arrangements been fruitful i n the past? Assuming that there a r e indeed exceptional problems t h a t warrant creation of a super-agency, i s drug a b u s e o n e of them? Are the present organizations and arrangements -- the Reagan Administration's Cabinet C o u n c i l on L e g a l P o l i c y , t h e Organized Crime D r u g Enforcement Task F o r c e P r o g r a m , the border interdiction task f o r c e program under t h e direction of t h e Vice P r e s i d e n t , the D r u g Abuse Policy Office i n t h e E O P , a n d t h e general lead or taken by the Attorney General i n the drug enforcement field -- working not? Have they been given enough time to demonstrate their potential? Can a n y office such a s o n e of those now proposed be successful if the P r e s i d e n t i n office i s not i n sympathy with the idea? On t h e other h a n d , i s i t n o t t h e responsibility of Congress t o c r e a t e effective government institutions t h a t w i l l survive the preferences and style of a particular administration? ' LEGISLATION H.R. 3326 (Shaw) Establishes t h e lCOffice o f t h e Dlrector of Natlonal a n d International D r u g O p e r a t i o n s and P o l i c y " to ensure (1) t h e development of a natlonal pollcy b;;tn r e s ~ e c cz o illegal d r k g s , ( ) = h e d ~ r e c t l o n and coordlriac~on of a -_ -F e d e r a l agencres lnvolved rn the effort to lmpiemenr. such a p o l l c y , a n d (31 t h a t a single hlgh-level o f f r c l a l , "accountable to t h e Congress a n d the American people," will be chargee wzth the responsi5lllty of coordlnatlng the < . - - - -- ?- -- a-c-*-.r n h f I _ I m I C _ e c C L T ~ C - -- --- - - - - , -' " T ? - " C , 3 T S Y 1 ^ " - -.- respect to the l l l e g a l arug problem. S p e c l f l e s that there shall be both a Dlrector and a D e p u t y Dlrector -- the Dlrector to be appointed by the Presiier: from a m o n g the Vlce ?resslCer.t a n 2 the hea2s o f . the e x e c ~ t ~ v f C e p a r t ~ e n t o of t h e U . S . and the Deputy 32rector also to be appolzted by :fie -'',.V,E s r n z = e . ?rocis-:_ 15 r,zcf 3r€cSeE7.: "LC F-z";' '5i-ICe a 2 = zzssezt ,- ~ 7 5 - , 3 , --- - 7 7 , ' ? a C h l \ ' - C C 4-t- CRS- 9 IB83168 UPDATE-11/23/83 Specifically for the participation of t h e Office i n the development budgetary priorities and allocations of t h e operative agencies. H.R. of 4 0 2 8 (Hughes, S a w y e r , Smith of Fla., a n 8 Gilman) Reestablishes a n Office of Drug Abuse Policy (ODAP). i n the Executive Office of t h e President. Amends the D r u g Abuse P r e v e n t i o n , T r e a t m e n t , a n d Rehabilitation Act to r e v i s e the authority (still contained i n t h e statute) of ODAP, to provide for a Deputy Director for D r u g A b u s e Prevention and a Deputy D i r e c t o r for D r u g Enforcement. Sets forth authorities for the Director of t h e o f f i c e , which include . t h e establishment of policy and priorities for a l l Federal drug abuse functions and t h e coordination and oversight of such functions. Stipulates that the Vice-president may be appoidted Director. Among specific powers provided i s r e v i e w of a l l a n n u a l budgets of departments a n d a g e n c i e s engaged i n d r u g a b u s e functions. Authorizes appropriations of $500,000 for F Y 8 4 f o r carrying o u t t h e act. Requires t h e Director t o submit a written report t o C o n g r e s s annually o n t h e activities conducted under the statute. H.R. 3 6 6 4 introduced July 2 6 , 1 9 8 3 ; referred jointly to t h e Committees o n t h e Judiciary and o n Energy a n d Commerce. H.R. 4 0 2 8 , a clean bill i n l i e u . o f H.R. 3 6 6 4 , introduced Sept. 29; referred to t h e Committees o n Judiciary a n d on Energy and Commerce. Ordered to be reported (amended) by the Judiciary Committee a n d referred to C o m m i t t e e o n Energy a n d Commerce, Oct. 4. S. 1 7 8 7 (Biden et al.) National Narcotids A c t of 1983. Creates a n "Office of th'e Director of and International Drug Operations and P o l i c y " , t o b e headed by a Director a n d a Deputy D i r e c t o r who a r e appointed by t h e P r e s i d e n t , by a n d with the c o n s e n t of the Senate. Provides that the D i r e c t o r i s a u t h o r i z e d t o (1) d e v e l o p , review, i m p l e m e n t , and enforce U.S. G o v e r n m e n t policy with respect to illegal drugs; (2) direct and coordinate a l l U.S. ' G o v e r n m e n t efforts to h a l t the f l o w i n t o , and sale and use of i l l e g a l d r u g s within the U.S.; (3) d e v e l o p , in c o n c e r t with the appropriate governmental e n t i t i e s , budgetary priorities a n d allocations relating to c o n t r o l of illegal d r u g s ; a n d (4) c o o r d i n a t e the collection and dissemination o f information necessary to implement government policy with r e s p e c t to i l l e g a l drugs. Authorizes appropriations of $ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 for F Y 8 4 for carrying o u t t h e act. Introduced 4. Aug. 4 , 1 9 8 3 ; referred to Judiciary. R e p o r t e d , without a m e n d m e n t , Aug. Written r e p o r t filed Oct. 2 5 (S.Rept; 98-278). (Contents of bill a d d e d b y floor a m e n d m e n t on Oct. 26, 1 9 8 3 , to H.R. 3 9 5 9 , a supplemental appropriation b i l l that passed z!-~eS e n a t e 3ct. 27, 19E3. A ~ ~ e c S m e n CroppeB t ;n conference.) pia+ ,,anal ; HEARINGS U.S. Congress. House. Committee o n Interstate a n d F o r e i g n Commerce. Subcommittee o n Health and t h e Environment. Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse a r ~ d k i c o h o l i s m P r e v e n t i o n , Treatment and R e h a b i i i L a ~ i o n Act and the D r u g A b u s e Office a n d Treatment Act authorizations. H e a r i n g , 9 6 t h C o n g r e s s , 1 s t s e s s i o n , . . Y.Q. ?C?7. - , ‘ 0 ~ 0 . l ! ; ~ < $ i ".." - - -" . . 'T.C. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. 254 p. n - V Z Y , ?-I Washirrgton, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. ----- ----- U.S. 214 p. Drug a b u s e office and treatment amendments of 1978. Hearing, 95th Congress, 2d session, on H.R. 11660. Apr. 1 0 , 1978. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1978. 220 p. Subcommittee on Public Health and Environment. Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention. Hearings, 9 2 d Congress, 1 s t sesssion, on H.R. 9 2 6 4 , and H.R. 9059. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971. 4 v. Congress. House. Com'mittee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Crime. Merger of the F B I and the DEA. Joint hearing before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights and the Subcommittee 97th Congress, 2d session. on Crime Mar. 29, 1982. Washington, G.P.O., 1983. 84 p. ..., U.S. . ----. . Congress. House. Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control. DEA/FBI reorganization. Hearing, 9 7 t h Congress, 2d session. Mar. 3 0 , 1962. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982. 3 8 p. Federal d r a g l a w enforcement coordination. H e a r i n g , 97th Congress, 2C session.' Kar. 23, 1982. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982. 8 7 p. 3.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations. Drug abuse prevention and control. Joint hearings before the Subcommittee on Executive Reorganization and Government Research and the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations-.., 9 2 d Congress, 1st session, on S. 1 9 4 5 and S. 2097. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971. 6 0 0 p. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations. Subcommittee o n Reorganization, Research, and International Organizations. - Reorganization P l a n No. 2 of 1973. Hearings, 93d Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Frict. 3ff., 1973-:974. 7 v. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Human Resources. Drug a b u s e office, prevention, and treatment amendments of 1978. Hearing, 95th Congress, 2d s e s s i o n , on S. 2916. Apr. 1 9 , 1978. Washington, U.S. Govt. Frlnt. Of:., 264 p. m-?. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. Drug aSuse prevention and treatment L ? " : ! 9 F L- : .. , 1-75. U P Z ~ ~ - ? C 0; 4 t ~C F ~ C ~ P C CL ,C ? s ~ l ~ + i c r . Mar. 24-25, 1975. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 3 4 2 p. m m Federal narcotics enforcement; interim report. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. 1 9 1 p. (94th congress, 2d session. senate. ~ e p o r tno. 94-1039) U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Human Resources. Drug Abuse [office] and Treatment Act -- 1972; report together with minority views to accompany S. 525. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. 73 p. (96th Congress, 1 s t session. Senate. Report no. 96-104) U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on. Labor and P u b l i c Welfare. Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act amendments of 1 9 7 5 ; report to accompany S. 1608. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 5 1 p. (94th Congress, 1st session. Senate. Report no. 94-218) ----- D r u g Abuse Office, Control and Treatment Act of 1 9 7 1 ; report to accompany S. 2097. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971. 29 p. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. National Narcotics Act of 1983. Report .... on S. 1787. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1983. 6 3 p. (98th Congress, 1st session. Senate. Report no. 98-278) U.S. President 1965-1969 (Johnson). Reorganization P l a n No. 1 of 1 9 6 8 -- creating a n e w Bureau o f ' ~ ~ a r c o t i c s and Dangerous Drugs. Message from the President of the United States. Feb. 7 , 1968. (90th Congress, 2d session. House Doc. 249). E.S. President, 1969-1974 (Nixon). Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1 9 7 3 , establishing a Drug Enforcement Administration. Message from the President of t h e United States. Mar. 2 3 , 1973. (93rd Congress, 1 s t session. House Doc. 93-69). U.S. President, 1977-1981 (Carter). Reorganization P l a n No. 1 of 1 9 7 7 , to reorganize the Executive Office of t h e President. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. (95th Congress, 1st session. H o u s e Coc. 185). CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 11/15/83 -- 10/26/83 -- T h e drug czar" and drug commission provisions of the Senate-passed supplemental appropria.tions biil were dropped by t h e Eouse-Senace conferecce committee. T h e Senate added the contents of S. 17B7, a so-called c z a r " - 2 1 1 , tc 5 . F . ? ? ? a , c - ~ n - l o - n n ~ = - - - - - - approprlatlons bill that was subsequently passed by the Senate on Oct. 27. Also added was a proposal to create a "Commlsslon on Drug 1nterdlct:cc and Enforcement. l 09/15/83 -- T h e House Subcommittee o n Crime approved a clean a bill to amend T i t l e I1 of the D r u g Abuse O f f i c e and Treatment Act f o r the purpose of recreating the Office of Drug Abuse Policy i n t h e Executive O f f i c e of the President (EoP). Deputy D i r e c t o r s both f o r Drug Enforcement and f o r D r u g ~ b u s e Prevention would be appointed under t h e bill's provisions. An amendment accepted i n subcommittee mark-up would a l l o w the President t o name t h e Vice President a s Director. T h e bill was introduced Sept. 2 9 a s H.R. 4027. 08/04/83 -- An altered version of the Administration o m n i b u s crime control bill was reported by t h e Senate Judiciary Committee (S. 1762). A separate bill to establish a "drug czar" office w a s a l s o reported (S. 1787). 03/23/83 -- T h e W h i t e House announced the creation o f a n e w drug interdiction g r o u p headed by Vice ?resident Bush. T h e National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) was charged with coordinating the work o f Federal a g e n c i e s that have responsibilities f o r interdiction of sea-borne, air-borne and a ~ r ~ s s - b ~ r dimportation er of narcotics and other d a n g e r o u s drugs -- principally t h e Customs S e r v i c e , t h e C o a s t Guard ,"and t h e armed ' s'ervices. . 01/14/83 -- President Reagan withheld his a p p r o v a l of H.R. 3963 (97th Congress), thus exercising a pocket veto. H e w a s especially critical of a provision establishing a "drug c z a r w o f f i c e to coordinate Federal drug l a w enforcement. 12/20/82 -- A scaled-down version of t h e Violent C r i m e a n d D r u g Enforcement Improvement Act (H.R. 3 9 6 3 , 9 7 t h Congress) was cleared for t h e Presid.ent. It contained provisions for t h e creation of a so-called "drug czar" o f f i c e t o coordinate F e d e r a l drug l a w enforcement. 1C/li/E2 -- T 5 e Presieent a r ~ n o u n c e 8 a r,ajor n e w drive a g a i n s t illicit drug trafficking. Subsequently designated the Organized Crime D r u g Enforcement (OCDE) task f o r c e program, the i n i t i a t i v e involved creation of 1 2 regional task f o r c e s for t h e investigation and prosecution of major trafficking cases. It was anticipated to .require the hiring of 1 , 2 0 0 cew i n v e s t i g a t o r s and prosecutors. 06/24/82 -- Ey Executive Order the President established the n r..rr p c l l " T- 7 " C C - - c 'he ?fflTE ,.= -. - - p ^- '---" -' . Deve1opner.t (EOP) f o r the purpose of performing the dutles specifled under Tltle I 1 of the D r u g ASuse Cffzce and Treatrent Act. Accordlnq to the ~ r d e r ,z h e 3:rectcr of the Cfflce would be ,- ,... . c r ~ l : :r s s g c ~ s ~ r l:,-s-.. z S S 2 E ---..3 - - - -r.e -- P " 3 : c e J f,-,-- A - President i n formulating policy f o r , and in coordinating a n d overseeing, international a s w e l l a s domestic drug a b u s e functions by a l l Executive agencies." Dr. Carlton T u r n e r , t h e President's senior advisor o n drug abuse p o l i c y , w a s appointed Director. 01/29/82 -- T h e President announced creation of the C a b i n e t C o u n c i l on Legal P o l i c y , to b e chaired by t h e Attorney General. T h e C o u n c i l w a s charged w i t h t h e review of matters pertaining to interdepartmental aspects of l a w enforcement p o l i c y , with a n initial emphasis on n a r c o t i c s enforcement and immigration and refugee policy. Subsequently, t h e Council formed the Working G r o u p for D r u g Supply R e d u c t i o n , under t h e chairmanship of the Associate Attorney General. 01/28/82 -- P r e s i d e n t Reagan announced t h e establishment of a special task f o r c e to combat illicit drug traffic in S o u t h Florida. Composed of o f f i c i a l s from a number of Federal a g e n c i e s , to work with S t a t e and l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s , t h e task f o r c e w a s placed under t h e direction of Vice President Bush. 01/21/82 A-- 07/00/81 -- Dr. Carlton Turner was appointed a s P r e s i d e n t R e a g a n ' s "senior advisor o n d r u g abuse policy. 03/00/78 -- T h e Office of D r u g Abuse P o l i c y (ODAP) w a s terminated. ODAP Director P e t e r Bourne w a s designated a presidential a s s i s t a n t for international health and d r u g a b u s e a n d , a s s u c h , supervised the operation of a u n i t of the Dsrnestic Poiicy Staff charge3 with formulation of policy on matters pertainig to d r u g abuse. T h i s arrangement was continued under his s u c c e s s o r , L e e Dogoloff. 07/15/77 -- P r e s i d e n t Carter submitted Reorganization P l a n No. 1 of 1 9 7 7 to Congress. T h e plan proposed a reorganizaticn of the Z x e c u t i v e Office of t h e P r e s i d e n t , o n e a s p e c t of which was abolition of the Office o f D r u g Abuse Policy. T h e Federal 'Bureau of Investigation w a s - g i v e n concurrent jurisdiction, with t h e D r u g Enforcement Administration, over the enforcement of da?gerous d r u g laws. Under the n e w a r r a n g e m e n t , t h e D E A i s required to r e p o r t to the Attorney General through t h e F B I Director. Strategies would be "revitalized." 04/27/76 -- A presidential "Drug Abuse Message to t h e Congress" announced the creation of t h e Cabinet Committee on Drug L a w Enforcement (CCDLE) and the Cabinet Committee o n D r u g Abuse P r e v e n t i o n , Treatment and Rehabilitation (CCDAPTR). Modeled o n the Cabinet Committee o n International Narcotics Control, established by P r e s i d e n t Nixon (see below), the t w o committees w e r e charged With t h e development and implementation of overall Federal strategy and the strengthening of interagency coordination. 03/19/76 -- Amendments to the Drug A b u s e Office a n d Treatment Act became law. Among o t h e r t h i n g s , they provided f o r the establishment of a successor a g e n c y to S A O D A P , to be known a s t h e Office o'f D r u g Abuse Policy (ODAP), on a scaled-down basis, t o b e k n o w n a s t h e Office of D r u g Abuse Policy (ODAP). S u b s e q u e n t l y , President Ford declined to implement the legislation and proposed a rescission of appropriations for t h e proposed agency. 00/00/76 -- . . T h e House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control was established, for the purpose of studying and reviewing, fr.0m.a unified perspective, the problem of narcotics a b u s e and i t s control. T h e initial panel included members from a l l standing committees with jurisdiction over significant a s p e c t s of drug a b u s e control. 06/30/75 -- 00/00/73 -- T h e Alcohol, D r u g Abuse, and Mental Health Administration (ADAMHA) w a s established i n t h e Department of Health, Education, and Welfare -- comprised of three institutes of equal status: the National Institute of Menzal HealtF., t h e National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, and the National Institute o n Drug Abuse. T h e n e w agency w a s subsequently authorized by statute (Title I1 of P.L. 93-282). 00/00/73 -- T h e D r u g Enforcement Administration w a s established by R e o r g a n i z a t ~ o n Flan Kc. 2 of 1973. T o create the new Justice Department a g e n c y , t h e Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous D r u g s was combiged with' t h e Office f o r Drug Abuse L a w E n f o r c e m e n t , the ~ . - c_ -. - 7 - ;--. c-~ y'tif"~: ~ ?12y",-+F?c - .. - " l L i " C " ." .C. - - , 2- .-. .6- - .-C u s ~ o m sService perscncel principally involved in drug law enforcement. T h e Special Action Office f o r Drug Abuse Prevention statutory authorization expired. The Ford Administration declined to s u p p o r t extension. 'n- 2 - - those (1) providing statutory backing for t h e Special Action Office for Drug Abuse P r e v e n t i o n , with specific authorities and appropriation authorizations for three fiscal y e a r s , a t t h e end of which the agency w a s to be t e r m i n a t e d , , ( 2 ) establishing a Strategy Council, to be appointed by t h e President, f o r formulation a n d continual revision of a "comprehensive, coordinated long-term Federal strategy for a l l drug a b u s e prevention functions and a l l drug traffic prevention functions c o n d u c t e d , s p o n s o r e d , o r supported by any department or a g e n c y of t h e Federal Government. I' (3) further expansion of Federal treatment and prevention g r a n t programs, including initiation of a program of f o r m u l a g r a n t s to the S t a t e s , and ( 4 ) establishment of a National Institute o n D r u g Abuse, within the National Institute of Mental H e a l t h , to a d m i n i s t e r a l l programs and authorities of t h e Secretary of H e a l t h , Education, and Welfare with respect to d r u g abuse prevention functions. 06/00/71 -- President Richard Nixon appointed Dr. Jerome . J a f f e , a psychiatrist, a s a special consultant to t h e President for narcotics and dangerous drugs a n d i n a Message to Congress announced the establishment of t h e Special Action Office for D r u g Abuse P r e v e n t i o n , located within t h e Executive Office of t h e President,, to coordinate and broadly Cirect all F e d e r a l drug-abuse programs concerned with prevention, e d u c a t i o n , treatment, rehabilitation, training and research. 10/15/68 -- T h e President signed P.L. 90-574, which contained amendments to the Community Mental Health C e n t e r s Act establishing the f i r s t program of Federal grants specifically f o r funding t h e treatment of narcotic addiction. 00/00/68 -- Under Reorganization P l a n No. 1 of 1 9 6 8 , the E,, ,Leac of Karcstics (Treasury) and t h e S a r e a c of D r u g Abuse Control (FDA) were combined i n t o the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs i n t h e J u s t i c e Department. 11/00/63 -- T h e President's Advisory Commission o n Narcotic and D r u g Abuse ("Prettyman C o m m i s s i o n w ) issued i t s i i n a i repsrt. A r . 0 ~ 5 recommendations h-as one that tne Fresident appoint a S p e c i a l Assistant for Narcotic a n d Drug A b u s e , from t h e White House s t a f f , to provide continuous a d v i c e .- -... 2 - 4 - 2 " i E - = " " -P - . - 4 " 3 " , " " h ' " " .. - -. . - attack on drug abuse. .. = -' - - .- - - r 3 :.e 5 " " f i ' i - ADDITIONAL R E F E R E N C E SOURCES B r o w n , Lawrence S., Jr. Who's o n first? Anatomy of t h e Federal response to drug abuse. J o u r n a l of t h e National Medical Association, v. 7 3 , no. 2 , 1981: 145-159. Mays, G. Larry. T h e Special Action Office f o r D r u g Abuse Prevention: drug control during the Nixon Administration. International journal of public administration, v. 3 , 1981: 355-372. U.S. Comptroller General. Federal drug enforcement: strong guidance needed (Departments o f J u s t i c e and t'he Treasury). [ w a s h i n g t o n ] 1975. (GGD-76-32) 9 1 p. U.S. Comptroller General. F e d e r a l drug interdiction efforts need strong central oversight. Report t o the Congress. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., J u n e 1 3 , 1983. 1 3 6 p. (GAO/GGD-83-52). U.S. Domestic Council D r u g Abuse Task Force. White A report to t h e President. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 1 1 6 p. . p.aper on d r u g abuse. U.S. D r u g Abuse Policy Office. Federal strategy f o r prevention o f drug a b u s e a n d drug t r a f f i c k i n g , 1982. P r e p a r e d for t h e President pursuant to the D r u g Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off. [ 1 9 8 2 ] 7 5 p. U.S. Strategy Council o n D r u g Abuse. F e d e r a l strategy for drug a b u s e 'and drug traffic prevention. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1 9 7 3 Published irregularly. .,L . S . h'aticna; Commission cn Karihuana a n 6 D r u g Abuse. Drug use i n America: problem in perspective. Second report. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. 481 p. Off., 1973. U.S. Office of D r u g Abuse Policy. Supply control: drug l a w enforcement; a n intergency review. ~ W a s k i n g t o n j 1977. 6 1 F. plus appenbices. ----- Border management and interdiction: an interagency review. [ W a s h i n g t o n ] 1977. 5 9 p. plus ? ?- ?- ? ? 5 : ? 9 : . U.S. P r e s i d e n t ' s Advisory Commission on Narcotic and 3rug Abcse. Final report. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. O f f . , 1963. 123 p.