POLICY ISSUES FOR THE 98TH CONGRESS
K. Larry Storrs
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division
THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
KAJOR ISSUES SYSTEX
DATE ORIGINATED 02/18/83
DATE UPDATED 12/05/63
FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL 287-5700
Since 1 9 8 1 President Reagan has requested increasing a m o u n t s of military
and economic a?d to assist two embattled
Salvadoran governments in
struggle a g a i n s t leftist guerrillas.
While Congress has generally
rhe Administration's requests for economic a i d , it h a s regularly cut military
assistance t o El Salvador and has made t h e a i d contingent upon a
Presidential certification that human r i g h t s a r e improving in the country..
reprogramning of FY83
T h i s year President Reagan proposed a $ 6 C i ill ion
for the country and a l s o requested
i n FY63
supplemental military assisrance for El Salvador.
For F Y 8 4 he requested
$86.3 million in military aid for the country.
(See chart a t end of paper
for details. )
Administration supporters stress the need to support t h e interim Magana
government in order to prevent the coming to power
f o a communist-style
government t h a t would pose a security threat to the region. C r i t i c s , fearing
that the United States might be drawn i n t o a Vietnam-type quagmire i n support
of a n unpopular regime, a r g u e that the United States should seek a political
solution to t h e conflict through negotiations without placing undue emphasis
upon military means.
BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS
The Background and Policy Analysis
organizes i n t h e following'manner:
1. Terminate Military Aid to E l Salvador
2. Increase Pressure on the Salvadoran Government
by Tightening the Requirements of t h e Aid Conditions
3. Modify the Conditions to Require the Salvadoran
Government t o Negotiate with t h e RDR-FMLN
4. Strengthen t h e Congressional R o l e by Adding a
Legislative Veto t o the Conditions
5. Expand U.S. Aid and Support for the Salvadoran
Congressional a c t i o n i n 1983
Appended t o this issue brief a r e a t a b l e
Assistance t o El Salvador:
FY79-FY84) a n d a map of El Salvador.
Congress i s n o w reassessing U.S.
toward the current Salvadoran
government i n light of more than .two y e a r s of a c t i v e U.S.
s u p p o r t for
civilian-military juntas i n El Salvador a g a i n s t leftist guerrillas.
When junior military officers overthrew the government of General Carlos
Humberto R o m e r o i n October 1 9 7 9 and set u p a civilian-military
promised fundamental r e f o r m s , the Carter A d ~ ~ i n i s t r a t i o welcomed
T h e Romero government was viewed a s a continuation
of the military-elite
alliance that had controlled Salvadoran politics
for more than 3 0 y e a r s ,
partly by repressing emerging opposition forces and partly
the results cf the 1 9 7 2 ' and 1 9 7 7 elections to prevent a victory
coalition of parties dominated by Christian Democrats asserting a need
in early 1 9 6 0 , followihg the collapse of the first junta, t h e military
made a pact with the Christian Democratic Party and
shortly thereafter t h e
resulting civilian-military junta launched extensive reforms, including a
land reform and a banking reform.
S y Karch of 1 9 8 0 , h o w e v e r , important
civilian elements, including the social democratic National Revolutionary
the Christian Democratic P a r t y , had
Kovement (Mh'R) and the left wing of
resigned from the g o v e r n m e ~ t ,charging that he junta was unable co control
h short time l a t e r , these
moderate l e f t groups
security f o r c e repression.
joined f o r c e s with the militant
l e f t "popular organizations" of workers,
peasants, a n d students to create the Democratic Revolutionary Front
The FDR then join.ed with the Farabundo Marti Rational Liberation Front (FMLN)
guerrillas i n the e f f o r t to topple the U.S.-supported junta h e a d e d , in l a t e
1 9 8 0 , by Christian Democrat Jose Napoleon Duarte.
The Carter Administration suspended aid to El Salvador in December 1 9 8 0 ,
fcllowing the murder of f o u r American nuns near San Salvador.
It resumed and
increased aid in mid-January
1 9 8 1 , when
the FMLN guerrillas launched a
S 0 - ~ a l l e 8 "final offensive" that seemed to threater: the collapse of t h e
T h e Reagan Administration
military and economic aid to the Duarte-led junta and
sent a b o u t 5 0 U.S.
military a d v i s e r s t o train the Salvadoran armed f o r c e s in counter-insurgency
While the guerrilla's heraldee "final Offensive"
f a i l e d , renewed
a t t a c k s . o n b r i d g e s , - . t h e electrical
s y s t e m , a.nd the. 1'1,lopango air base
demonstrated their continuing capability These successes prompted the Reagan
Admipistratior, to provi'de $55 million in emergency military
aid in early
By the summer of 1 9 8 1 , the FDR-FKLN, with support from Mexico and F r a n c e ,
called for a negotiated political settlement t o t h e conflict.
government rejected negotiations, a n d , instead, a t U.S.
u r g i n g , called cn
a l l duly constituted parties to participate in junta-held e l e c t i o n s in March
1 9 8 2 for a constituent assembly that would form a temporary g o v e r n m e n t , write
a new Constitution, and establish ground rules f o r f u t u r e elections.
sought to disrupt t h e
While leftwing groups refused to participate and
e l e c t i o n s , a massive turnout of nearly 1.5 million voters cast ballots on
March 2 8 , 1982.
I n these elections, a coalition of rightwing parties jointly
won 60% of t h e vote to insure control of the Constituent Asembly.
Christian D e m o c r a t i c P a r t y (PDC), running on a campaign of
the junta's reforms, emerged a s the single largest party, with
over 40% of
the vote, but seemed likely to be excluded from a meaningful r o l e in t h e
After weeks of delicate discussions, the Constitutent Assembly elected
Alvaro Alfredo Magana, a political
centrist supported by
t h e Salvadoran
military, a s the interim President of the Government of National Unity which
included P D C participation.
Three vice presidents representing the major
political parties were a l s o elected.
After weeks of negotiations t h e parties represented in the
Natiorial Unity signed a basic program of action called the Pact of Apaneca in
August 1962. This called for the creation of three c ~ m m i s s i o n s :
Political Commission to set the rcles for definitive national elections,
a Human Rights Commission to monitor human rights p e r f o r m a n c e , and
P e a c e Comrr,ission to promote peace in the c o u n t r y , possibly throu.gh talks with
the Salvadoran guerrillas.
Simultaneously, the newly
Assembly was to complete action on a n e w constitution.
By the end of 1 9 8 3 the Magana-led government was receiving mixed
T h e Political Commission, a f t e r announcing elections f o r December 1 9 8 3 , was
forced to postpone i t s plans when the Constituent Assembly
f e l l behind
I n s t e a d , in late November
the government announced t h a t new
elections would be held in March 1984. With the establishment of the Human
Rights Commission in October 1 9 8 2 , the human rights conditions in the country
initially experienced some improvement.
Civilian d e a t h s attributed to
political violence declined significantly, while disappearances continued a t
a b o u t the same rate a s previous years. Toward the end of 1 9 8 3 , h o w e v e r ,
there Was a resurgence of right-wing death squad activity which was publicly
denounced by U.S. Ambassador Pickering i n a speech on Nov. 2 5 , 1983.
President Reagan pocket-vetoed a bill to extend the congressionally mandated
human rights conditions on aid to El Salvador on Nov. 3 0 , Secretary of
S h u l t z was quoted a s saying t h a t i t would h a v e been "very difficult" to make
the required certification i n January 1984.
In the first half of 1 9 8 3 the Salvadoran military appeared t o gain the
initiative i n the struggle with the guerrillas.
T h e n u m b e r of U.S.-trained
battalions increased and the Salvadoran Army launched the so-called National
Strategy Plan in San Vicente province.
Through a combination of military
mobility and civil action projects this was to expand government control in
guerrilla strongholds y h i l e t h e Peace Commission
sought to encourage the
guerrillas to participate in 'upcoming' elections.
members met with guerrillas representatives o n several o c c c s i o n s , a t times
facilitated by Central American Envoy Richard Stone, t h e parties were
to c o m e to terms. Guerrilla leaders insisted on the creation of a broad
coalition government prior to participation i n democratic elections, while
the P e a c e Commission was unwilling to discuss anything other than leftist
participation i n government-held elections.
B y ' t h e end of the y e a r , the
guerrillas had shown surprising resiliency, including a n ability
significant o f f e n s i v e operations, and the Army was
said t o be unable to
maintain the initiative.
T h e Constitution Assembly continued t o m a k e progress o n completion of a
new constitution, but was unable to a g r e e o n several a r t i c l e s , particularly
those dealing with t h e agrarian reform.
While the Christian Democrats argued
that a Continuation of the reform with payment i n bonds was c r u c i a l to
undercut t h e guerrillas a p p e a l s , . m o r e conservative parties urged
expropriation be undertaken only on t h e basis of prior and
T h e lack of consensus on t h i s i s s u e was o n e indication of the
lack of unity within the government that would be resolved only a f t e r the
1 9 8 4 elections.
A variety of o p t i o n s i s available to Congress in i t s consideration of the
Administration's r e q u e s t for FY84 aid. All of the options, h o w e v e r , i n v o l v e
risks and ~ n one way or another r e q u ~ r e trade-offs among
, , options a r e grouped
C.S. o b ~ e c t ~ v e s .For he sake of C ~ s ~ u s s ~ o rtne
f l v e broaC categories.
Terminate Military Aid to El Salvador
During the 97th C o n g r e s s , a sizable number of
res0lUtions introdu.ced by Representative Studds and Senator Kennedy
prohibit military aid and a r m s sales to El Salvador.
regime that had permitted
30,000 of i t s citizens to be
indiSCriminate violence and that %as taken icadequate action in the highly
citizens did not deserve U.S.
publicized cases of the murders
They argued that military aid has only increased the k i l l i n g anC
repression i n the country and has strengthened the role of the military
Believing that many cf the guerrillas' a r m s a r e c a p t u r e d , they
contended that a c u t in U.S. military aid may lead to a reduction i n the
violence in the country. Without open-ended support from the United
a r g u e d , the Salvadoran government would be forced to deai more
realistically with some of the guerrilla's demands and to implement changes
i n order to prevent a guerrilla victory.
Those w h o now support the terminatior~ of military aid by the 98th Congress
argue that U.S. efforts to encourage reform have been
because powerful Salvadoran elites are convinced the United States wili not
tend to f e e l that a
termination of U.S. aid would encourage negotiations betweeR
and the guerrillas.
They foresee a resulting left-of-center
government t h a t would exclude the more extreme elements of the far l e f t and
the far right. They a r e inclined to believe chat the political a i m s cf the
'Democratic Revolutionary F r o n t , which inclu'des social d'emocrats, clissident
Christian D e m o c r a t s , and independents can successfully be moderated by a more
They reject arguments that the Harch
elections demonstrated the weakness of the moderate l e f z since they feel that
the leftist parties had
legitimate reasons to doubt the safety
effectiveness of their participation.
Opponents of a terminatioc of U.S.
aid a r g u e that such a c t i o n would
undermine the legitimacy and the defense capability of the Salvadoran
government and lead to a victory by externally-supported Marxist
many of whom a r e dedicated to totalitarian control of
numerous historical e x a m p l e s , and especially the Cuban and Nicaraguan c a s e s ,
i n support of their contention that extreme leftists who a r e hostile to the
United States will wrest effective control f r o n more moderace elements if the
opposition movement came to power.
They a r g u e that a termination of American
assistance would undermine the growing authority of the central government
and lead to a significant increase in the l e v e l of violence in t h e country.
Without U.S. l e v e r a g e , they argue that those like President Magana and
Defense Minister Garcia who have supported t h e U.S.-sponsored
r e f o r m s might
be weakened to t h e point where they might be overthrown by
rightwing f o r c e s
i n the military determined to pursue a more aggressive anti-guerrilla
If this were to h a p p e n , they feel that the long-range prospects
regime would be
for a guerrilla victory a g a i n s t a reactionary military
Termination of U.S. aid to El Salvador would
have i n j u r i o u s efforts throughout Latin America and
A m e r i c a , they a r g u e , because moderate leaders cf countries presently facing
Cuban-supported guerrilla insurgency would
have reason to
dependability of t h e United States support in time of need.
Congress could terminate aid either by a country-specific
prohibition, or somewhat more gradually by denying any further Administration
funding r e q u e s ~ sfor El Salvador. Any
such termination might
lead to 2
c o n g r e s s i o n a l - e x e c u t i v e ~ c o n t a t i o n t a t i o n , a veto of military
aid l e g i s l a t i o n ,
an^ a major override battle requiring a vote of two-thirds of both Houses.
2. Increase P r e s s u r e on the Salvadoran Government by
Tightening t h e Requirements of the kid Conditions
Proponents of tightened conditions o n U.S. aid to El Salvador f e e l that i t
i s unrealistic to terminate aid to El S a l v a d o r , but a r g u e that stronger
accion must be taken hlith the Salvadoran government to avoid continuing U.S.
support for a government whose actions strengthen guerrilla insurgency.
could be accomplished by adding n e w conditions for U.S.
aid via t h e
Central to t h i s position i s the assumption that
greater U.S. pressure would be successful in promoting
reforms and greater
respect for human rights without provoking a right wing c o u p or an outright
r e j e c ~ i o nof U.S. assistance.
Dissatisfied by what they regard a s a n overly
congressionally-mandated aid conditions, advocates of this approach would
tighten the language of the conditions to require greater compliance with
internationally respected human rights standards.
suspension o r reduction i n U.S. a i d , i n this v i e w , might serve to jolt t h e
Salvadoran government into taking serious actions to i m p r o v e human rights
In the e n d , they a r g u e , this would strengthen the government a n C
g i v e it greater public support in the struggle with the guerrillas.
Opponents of this approach emphasize that the Salvadoran government h a s
made impressive progress under difficult circumstances.
They argGe that mare
demanding certification criteria might very well undermine t h e U.S.-supported
moderate elements i n the government a n d t h e military.
Ambassador Hinton's highly critical speech in October 1 9 8 2 provoked
from a number o f ' s e c t o r s and strengthened the v i e w that U.S.
should b e
rejected s o long a s i t i s accompanied by
significant intervention in t h e
Convinced that the r a t e of progress i s about a s great a s
can be expected given t h e political complexity of the s i t u a t i o n , they a r e
f e a r f u l that the result of more rigorous certification criteria might be a
termination of military assistance to El Salvador, which they believe, would
polarize rather than strengthen moderation i n the country, thereby improving
the prospects of radical Marxist forces.
3. Modify the Conditions To Require the Salvadoran Government
to Negotiate with the FDR-FML,N
P r o p o n e n t s of a political solution a r e convinced
that El Salvador will
f a c e a n unending guerrilla conflict in which neither the government nor t h e
guerrillas a r e likely to be victorious unless negotiations a r e attempted.
They would impose a congressionally mandated requirement t h a t the Salvadoran
government accept the offer made by t h e FDR-FMLN i n October 1 9 8 2 to engage i n
unconditional t a l k s to resolve the conflict.
If successful, this approach
would strengthen t h e moderates in both camps and end t h e killing. Presumably
i t would r e s u l t i n a n interim
coalition government or i n some form of
internationally created and supervised interim government that would
the c o n d i t i o n s for f u t u r e elections f a i r and equitable by a l l parties.
P r o p o n e n t s of this approach a r g u e that nothing i s to be l o s t by talks between
the twc parties.
If the ieftist opposition demands an end
to the k i l l i n g s
and other abuses by the security forces, or if =he moderaze and rightist
F a r t i e s insist upon the democratic process and conditions to guarantee
private property, accommodation to these demands will
only enhance the
Sroadly-baseC consensus'that i s necessary for long-term stability.
Opponents OF negotiations a r g u e that it would be a mistake
with violent Narxist-oriented groups that seek to gain a = the bargaining
tabie what they have been unable to win on t h e battlefield or in the March
1 9 8 2 elections.
They a r g u e that the Magana government i s winning -- or at
least holding i t s own i n the war against the guerrillas with limited U.S.
a s s i s t a n c e , but t h a t success i s dependent on resolure opposition to -- not
compromise with - - the guerrillas. They point to the Karch 1982 eleccions a n C
:h€ failure of the "final offensive" in 1 9 8 1 a s evidence c h a t the guerrilias
Co not have the support of the population.
T h e y fear that the Marxist groups
woulC emerge a s the dominant f o r c e in any governing g r o u p brought a b o u t
through n e g o t i a t i o n s , or would resume the war f r o m a strengthened position,
and point to Nicaragua under t h e Sandinistas a s an example of the inevitable
result. They a l s o a r g u e that American
insistence on negotiations would
constitute an extreme intervention i n Salvadoran affairs.
T h e chances for
successful negotiation a r e a l s o much slimmer i n their v i e w , than a r e the
chances of provoking a rightwing coup or even a wider backlash.
4. Strengthen the Congressional Role by Adding a Legislative
Veto to the Conditions
PrOpOnentS of this approach a r e convinced that the Congress should h a v e a n
o'sp3rtUnity tc review the President's certifications a s a way of i n s u r i n g
that t h e executive will take forceful a c t i o n to i n s i s t upon improved
f e e l that the Reagan
t h e ~ a l v a d o r a n government.
Administration places such importance o n El Salvador that i t will ccntinue to
Certify Compliance with existing or more r i g o r o u s criteria regardless of
a c t u a l situation. T h e r e f o r e , they a r g u e , t h e Congress should have 3 0 d a y s ,
for example, to a p p r o v e or to disapprove t h e Presiaent's certification.
the event that t h e Congress disapproved t h e certification, the military
and a r m s sales t o El Salvador would have t o cease. P r o p o n e n t s feel that the
aid conditions will only be taken seriously when both the Administration
the Salvadoran government realize that t h e certification i s s u b j e c t to
Opponents a r g u e that a legislative
.unnecessarily in t h e day-to-day complexities of Salvadoran
point out that t h e initial proposal for congressionally required 'conditions
on aid to El Salvador contained a legislative veto provision, but that i t was
deleted in committee because of inadequate support and b e c a u s e of P r e s i d e n t
R e a g a n ' s threat to v e t o any legislation containing a legislative veto.
inclusion of a legislative veto would r a i s e problems of t h e constitutional
validity of such m e a s u r e s , especially after
the June 1 9 8 3 Supreme C o u r t
legislative veto t o be
decision in I N S vs. Chadha which held a one-house
UnCOnStitUtiOnal. M o r e o v e r , if Congress w i s h e s to terminate aid on g r o u n d s
related to the certification, opponents a r g u e , it has more
COnStitutiOnaliy Contentious means of doing s o by reducing or prohibiting aid
i n t h e foreign aid authorization bills.
Aid and Support for the Salvadoran Government
Proponents of this view t a k e the position that the United States should do
that a r e facing a g r o ~ i n g
complex of Communist-inspired guerrilla insurgencies ti-,at threaten Central
Maintaining that the Salvadoran government h a s the support of the
people, demonstrated in the recent e l e c t i o n , a g a i n s t externally-supplied
guerrillas, they would f a v o r a n increase in U.S.
support for the
Magana government to insure i t s survival and ultimate victory.
a l s o support elimination of the certification requirement on the grounds that
its conditions f o c u s unnecessary criticism upon the government and provide
propaganda ammunition for t h e guerrillas.
As a variation
on this t h e m e ,
Senator Helms has proposed that the U.S. government be required t o report o n
the hunan r i g h t s abuses by t h e guerrillas a s well a s by
the government i n
Crder to p r o v i d e a more balanced perspective on the situaticn.
everything within its ability to defend allies
Other proponents of a d d i ,lonal
U.S. support would permit a n increase i n
the number of U..S. advisers i n El Salvador, and would be willing to have them
participate i n combat operations if that were necessary t o insure government
Opponents of further U.S. military aid a r g u e that t h e current emphasis o n
economic a s s i s t a n c e i s more likely than increases i n military aid to promote
t h e k i n d s o,f reforms that will undermine support for t h e guerrillas.
greater U.S. military involvement could both
strengthen the FMLN argument
that they a r e fighting against American
imperialism while undermining
domestic American support for U.S. p o l i c y , opponents would closely limit the
number of U.S. advisers and would continue to insist that these advisers
renain out of com.bat areas.
Opponents of a larger U.S.
r o l e stress t h e Vietnam p r e c e d e n t , arguing that in that c a s e increased U.S.
advisers failed to halt 2 crumbling political-military s i t u a t i o n , discredited
a weak g o v e r n m e n t , and in the f a c e of imminent defeat of t h e government, led
to 'the f a t e f u l introduction of U.S.
S o m e doubt t h a t , short
of heavy, d i r e c t U.S. combat i n t e r v e n t i o n , the Salvadoran insurgency can be
defeated by the inept current government.
Congressional Action in 1 9 8 3
On the $60 million reprogramming of FY83 military a i d
While the Senate Appropriations
the $60 million
reprogramming with conditions, subsequent action by
t h e Senate Foreign
Relations C o m m i t t e e and the House Appropriations C o m m i t t e e permitted
Administration to reprogram only $ 3 0 million of the requested amount.
T h e S e n a t e Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee o n Foreign Operations
reprogramming o n
approved o n Mar. 2 3 , 1983 by a vote of 7-2 the $ 6 0 million
the condition t h a t the number of U.S. advisers be limited to 55, that n e w
efforts be m a d e to improve t h e Salvadoran judicial s y s t e m , and that the
administration t a k e the initiative to bring about unconditional
between the Salvadoran government and i t s adversaries.
T h e S e n a t e Foreign Relations Committee, after
lengthy negotiations t o
arrive at a
consensus position, approved only
While the letter to Secretary of State
reprogramming o n Mar. 24, 1983.
S h u l t z did n o t explicitly place conditions on t h e a i d , t h e Committee
expressed i t s belief that " t h e United States should u s e i t s good offices to
encourage a n unconditional dialogue amonq all parties. to the conflict i n Ei
Salvador in the hope of achieving a political resolution," that U.S. nilitary
advisers should be limited ro 5 5 , that any rraining of t h e Salvadoran
military should be conducted i n the Ucited S t a t e s , and
reforms of the Salvadoran judicial system were necessary for Continued ,U.S.
T h e House Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on F o r e i g n Operations
voted 7 to 5 on Apr. 2 6 , 1 9 6 3 , to a p p r o v e $ 3 0 million
of the proposed
million reprogramming on the condition that the administration appoint a
special envoy to facilitate negotiations i n the Central. American region.
On tne request for $ 5 0 m l l l ~ o n in FY63 supplemental nllicary assistance
T h e Conference compromise on the FY83 Supplemenzal Appropriations
(H.R. 3069) Which was passed and became law (P.L. 98-63)'in l a t e , J u l y 1 9 8 3
split the difference between the House and Senate and provided $ 2 5 million in
military aid appropriations for El Salvador.
T h e S e n a t e , following t h e
recommendation of the Senate Appropriations C o m m i t t e e , had a p p r o v e d the f u l l
amount of $ 5 0 m i l l i o n , while the House bill, following action by the Foreign
Operations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee t o defer action
on military aid ro El Salvador, contained n o f u n d s for EL Salvador.
I f committee-recommended bills to authorize the supplemental military
were to be p a s s e d , the available f u n 3 s would
be s t
l e s s than the
appropriated amount mentioned above.
The House Foreign Affairs Comrr~ittee had
approved only $8.7 million of the requested amount ( H - R e p t . 9 8 - 1 9 2 on H.R.
2992) while the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had approved
( ' S - ~ e p t .9 8 - 1 4 6 on S. 1347) with certain conditions.
Language i n P.'L.. 98-63
provides that funds for foreign assistance may not . b e oSligated until the
enactment of authorizinq legislation or until Sept. 1 5 , 1 9 8 3 , whichever comes
On economic and military aid for F Y 6 4
While n o final action was taken by
either House on foreign
authorizations for F Y 8 4 , the foreign a f f a i r s committees generally approved
the Administration's r e q u e s ~for developmental assistance and
Support F u n d s for El Salvador, but approved less than the $86.3
t h e Administration requested for t h e country.
a d d i t i o n , t h e committees attached even tighter conditions on t h e aid than
previously existed. T h e House Foreign Affairs
Committee i n i t s report
( H - R e p t . 9 8 - 1 9 2 on H.R. 2992) limited military aid to $05 m i l l i o n for F Y 8 4
and F Y 8 5 , of which $ 1 5 million could be used only for medical f a c i l i t i e s and
supplies. After limiting the number of U.S.
advisers to 5 5 a n d precluding
the P r e s i d e n t ' s use of special emergency powers aid to El S a l v a d o r , t h e
Committee-recommended conditions would permit the provision
of aid to El
Salvador only if t h e ' p r e s i d e n t r e p o r t e d , without congressional d i s a p p r o v a l ,
that Salvadoran Government was engaged in good faith in a d i a l o g u e without
preconditions with a l l major parties .to the c o n f l i c t , and was a c t i n g to carry
out i t s o w n program to improve conditions in the country.
98-146 o n
T h e S e n a t e F o r e i g n , R e l a t i o n s Committee in i t s report (S.Rept.
S. 1347) recommended a limit of $76.3 million in military aid t o El S a l v a d o r ,
$ 2 0 million of which i s to be usee solely for training Salvadoran troops in
t h e United Stares. The Committee limited t h e number of U.S. advisers i n El
Salvador to 5 5 and
Certifications by the President on Salvadoran Government efforts to i m p r o v e
human rights conditions'in the country.
Lacking a foreign aid authorization m e a s u r e , assistance to El Salvador was
set by a n omnibus Continuing Resolution (F.L. 9 8 - 1 5 1 , H.J.Res. 413) which vas
passed by Congress o n Nov. 1 2 a n C signed by t h e President o n Nov.
1 4 , 1983.
T h i s measure provided that not more than $64.8 million i n military a s s i s t a n c e
may b e provided to El Salvador.
it further provided that not more than 70%
of military aid may be expended until Salvadoran authorities have brought the
accused to trial in xhe case of the U.S. n u n s murdered in December 1 9 6 0 , and
that noc more than 9 3 % of this aid may be expended uncil President certifies
that the Salvadoran government i s continuing t o make progress in implementing
t h e land reform progrart decreed in ):arch and April 1980.
T h e Congress a l s o passed a bill (H.R. 4042) to continue through F Y 8 4 the
1 9 8 1 Conditions requiring the President to certify semi-annualiy
Salvadoran government was improving human
continuing major political and economic reforms. T h i s measure was killed by
a pocket veto on Nov. 3 0 , 1 9 8 3 , when President Reagan failed to sign t h e bill
i n the required time..
P.L. 98-63, H.R. 3'069
T h i s omnibus measure providing
supplemental appropriations for FY83
i n c l u d e s $25 million i n military aid for El S a l v a d o r , exactly half of t h e $ 5 0
million in supplementary f u n d s for .El Salvador which
reqaested in Karch
Following t h e recommendation by
the F o r e i g n
Operations Subcommittee and the f u l l House Appropriations Committee to defer
a c t i o n o n the President's request for supplemental military aid t o Z 1
S a l v a d o r (H.Rept.' 98-207), the bill passed
by the House May
contained n o f u n d s for El Salvador. T h e bill passed by t h e Senate J u n e 1 6 ,
1 9 8 3 , on t h e other hand, followed the recommendation of che
Appropriations Committee (S.Rept. 98-148) in approving t h e f u l l request for
T h e compromise conference r e p o r t ( H - R e p t . 98-308),
2 0 , 1 9 8 3 , noted t h e conferees agreement " t h a t not more than $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 shall
be available for El Salvador."
Following t h e resolution of differences on
other i s s u e s , the House and Senate passed t h e bill July 2 9 , 1 9 8 3 , and
P r e s i d e n t signed the measure i n t o law July 3 0 , 1983.
P.L. 98-53, H.R. 1 2 7 1
Amends Section 728(e) of the ,International Security and D e v e l o p m e n t
Cooperation Act of 1 9 8 1 (the conditions on a i d to El Salvador which contain a
one-time requirement of demonstrated progress i n t h e cases of murdered
American citizens) to require that the fourth certification may be made only
if t h e President determines that since the third certification the Salvadoran
Government (1) has made good faith efforts to investigate and bring
justice all those responsible f o r the murders of the U.S.
a d v i s e r s in December 1 9 8 0 and J.anuary 1 9 8 1 ,
(2) has taken a l l reasonable
s t e p s to investigate the January 1 9 8 1 disappearance of
journalist J o h n
S u l l i v a n , and (3) has taken a l l reasonable steps to investigate the kil-ling
of Kichael Kline in October 1982. Congress attached
t h e 2nd and 3rd certifications.
With broad s u p p o r t , the measure was passed
i n t h e House 416-2 on J u n e 7 , 1 9 8 3 , and was passed in the S e n a t e on J u n e 2 9 ,
It became l a w with the President's signature on July 1 5 , 1983.
P.L. 95-151 (E.J.Res. 413)
appropriations f o r F Y 8 4 provides in part thac not more than $64.8 illio ion
military assistance may be provided to El Salvador.
It f u r t h e r provides that
noc more than 70% of this military
authorities have brought the accused to trail in the c a s e of the U.S.
murdered in December 1 9 8 0 , and that not more than 90% of
expended until the President determines and
government h a s continued to make documented prograss in implementing t h e land
reform program decreed in Garch and April 1980.
Introduced in the House Nov.
1 0 , both houses passed differing versions of = h e bill that
report agreed to Nov. 1 2 ; signed into law (P.L. 96-151) Nov. 1 4 , 1983.
H.R. 4 0 4 2 (Barnes)
Continues i n effect the 1 9 8 1 certification requirements on human
i n El Salvador u n t i l Congress enacts new legislation on t h e subject or
Sept. 3 0 , 1 9 8 4 , whichever occurs furst.
the bill passed t h e House Sept. 3 0 , and passed
1 7 , 1983.
President Reagan pocket-vetoed the measure 'Nov. 3 0 , 1 9 8 3 , wher, he
sign the bill within the required time.
X.R. 2 9 9 2 (Zablocki)
International Seccrity and Development Cooperation Act of 1983.
a clean bill reported by the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Kay 1 7 , 1983
( H - R e p t . 98-192) after :he Committee completed markup on Kay 1 2 , 1983.
regard to El
S a l v a d o r , it authorizes
$ 5 0 million
requested i n the F Y 8 3 supplemental, and it authorizes $65 million in military
assistance (rather than the requested
million i n Economic Support Funds for ~ ~ ' 8and
number of U.S. ~ i l i t a r yadvisers to 5 5 , and precluding t h e President's use of
Committee-recommended conditions would permit the provision
Salvador only if t h e Salvadoran Government i s engaged
dialogue without preconditions with all major parties to t h e c o n f l i c t , and i s
a c t i n g to carry o u t i t s own plans to improve conditions i n t h e country.
of the F Y 8 4 aid and all of the F Y 8 5 aid would be contingent upon Presidential
progress reports d u e 6 and 1 1 months after the start of t h e fiscal year.
S. 1 3 4 7 (Percy)
International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1983.
a clean bill reported by the Senate Foreign Relations C o m m i t t e e on
May - 2 3 ,
1 9 8 3 (S.Rept. 9 8 - 1 4 6 ) , after t h e Committee completed markup on Kay 1 2 , 1983.
Salvador, it authorizes
i n military
assistance for E l Salvador for FY83. and
F Y 8 4 , which
authorizing $20 miliion of the requested $ 5 0 million
i n FY83.
It places a l i m i t of 5 5 on the number of military a d v i s e r s in El
and i t provides that $ 2 0 million of the military assistance may be used
for training in the United States.
In , a d d i t i o n , the Committee
present requirement for semi-annual certifications of compliance with certain
conditions i n El Salvador in order to continue providing
It a l s o added requirements for reports on
improve the independence and effectiveness of the judiciary, and to eliminate
and control right-wing death s q u a d s , and
T h e Senate Appropriations Committee reported o u t this o ~ i g i n a l bill
ad mini strati or,'^ request For $86.3 milliori i n military aid for
It provided in Section 5 3 1 , h o w e v e r , that 30% of all F Y 8 4 aid to ~ h e country
may not be expended unt,il Salvadoran authorities have brought
in the c a s e of the f o u r murdered American nuns to trial and have
Commi.ttee on Appropriations.
Foreign a s s i s t a n c e and
Foreign Operarions and Related Agencies.
related programs appropriations for i963 -- ?art 1.
9 7 t h C o n g r e s s , 2nd session.
February and K a r c h , 1962.
U.S. Govt. Princ. Off., 1982.
3 0 2 p.
Includes hearings on El Salvador emergency drawdown a n e
overview of the foreign aid a n e security assistance.
Supplemental appropriations for 1982.
P a r t 2.
9 7 t h Congress, 2nd session.
M a y , 1982.
W a s h i n g t o n , U.S.
Govt. Print. Off., 1982.
3 3 9 p.
Includes hearings on El S a l v a d o r , Caribbean Basin I n i t i a t i v e ,
and Security Interests in Latin America.
Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban
Subcommittee on International T r a d e , Investment and
Oversight hearing on the International Konetary
Fund'loan to El Salvador.
H e a r i n g , 97th C o n g r e s s , 2nd session.
Aug. 1 2 , 1982.
Washington, U.S.. Govt. Print. Off., 1982.
serial No. 97-81. . 7 5 p.
Committee on Foreign Affairs.
on Inter-American Affairs.
Foreign assistance legislation for
fiscal year 1 9 6 3 (Part 6 o n security assistance proposals for
Latin America and the Caribbean).
Hearing, 97th C o n g r e s s , 2nd
Apr. 2 1 , 1982.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,
1982. 1 3 2 p.
Presidential certification on El Salvador (Volume I).
Hearings, 9 7 t h C o n g r e s s , 2nd session.
Feb. 2 , 2 3 , 2 5 , a n d
Mar. 2 , 1982.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982.
5 2 2 p.
Presidential certification on El Salvador (Volume 11).
Hearings, 9 7 t h Congress, 2nd session on H.J.Res. 494. J u n e 2,
2 2 ; J u l y 2 9 ; Aug. 3 , 1 0 , and 1 7 , 1982.
Washington, U.S. Govt.
Committee o n Foreign Relations.
H e a r i n g s , 9 7 t h C o n g r e s s , 2nd session
on S. 2237. . M a r . 25 and 3 1 , 1982.
W a s h i n g t o n , U.S. Govt.
Print. Off., 1982.
Certification concerning military aid to El Salvador.
Hearings, 9 7 t h Congress.
Feb. 8 and Mar. 1 1 , 1982.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982.
Presidential certifications on conditions in El Salvador.
H e a r i n g , 97tP. C o n g r e s s , 2nd s e s s i o n .
hug. 3 , i962.
2 6 0 F.
U.S. p o l l c y i n t h e W e s z e r n H e m i s p h e r e .
C o n g r e s s , 2 n d s e s s i o n o n S.J.Res. 1 4 4 , S. 2 1 7 9 , S. 2 2 4 3 , S. 2 3 7 0
a n d S.J.Res. 156.
Apr. 1 , 2 0 , 2 7 , 2 8 ; a n d K a y 4 a n d 2 6 , 1 9 6 2 .
W a s h i n g t o n , U.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , 1 3 6 2 .
1 4 1 p.
Committee on F o r e l g n R e l a t i o n s .
Subcommittee o n W e s t e r n Hemisphere A f f a l r s .
H e a r ~ n g s , 9 7 t h C o n g r e s s , 1 s t a n d 2 n d sessions. D e c . 1 4 , a n d 1 5 ,
19S1; and Feb. 1 , 1982.
W a s h ~ n g t o n ,U.S. Govt. P r l n t . O f f . ,
R Z P O O T S Ah'D
the United States in the midst
of a maelstrorr - - a r e p o r t t o he C o m m i t t e e on F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s
and the Committee on Appropriations [by Senator Claiborne Pell
Joint Committee Print, 97th
a n d S e n a t o r P a t r i c k J. Leahy].
Congress, 2 n C session.
W a s h i n g t o n , U.S. G o v t .
P r i n t . Off., 1 9 6 2 .
2 3 p.
R e p o r t o f t h e U.S. o f f i c i a l o b s e r v e r m i s s i o n t o t h e E l S a l v a d o r
C o n s t i t u e n t A s s e m b l y e i e c t i o n s of Kar. 2 8 , 1 9 6 2 -- a r e p o r t t o
t h e C o m m i t t e e o n F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s b y S e n a t o r N a n c y L. K a s s e b a u n .
C o m m i t t e e P r i n t , 9 7 t h C o n g r e s s , 2nd s e s s i o n .
W a s h i n g t o n , U.S. Govt. P r i n t . Off., 1 9 8 2 .
4 2 p.
C E R O N O L O G Y OF E V E N T S
President Reagan pocket vetoed a bill to continue through
FY84 the certification requirement linking continued
U.S. m i l i t a r y a i d t o p r o g r e s s i n h u m a n r i g h t s p e r f o r m a n c e
in E l S a l v a d o r ' w h e n he failed t o sign the bill within t h e
required time limit.
U.S. A m b a s s a d o r T h o m a s P i c k e r i n g , i n a s p e e c h t o t h e A m e r i c a n
C h a m b e r of C o m m e r c e i n S a n S a l v a d o r , a c c u s e d S a l v a d o r a n
a u t h o r i t i e s of f a i l i n g t o c r a c k d o w n on r i g h t - w i n g d e a t h
s q u a d s , even though individuals responsible f o r the killings
a r e " w e l l k n o w n w t o t h e s e c u r i t y forces.
T h e N e w Y o r k T i m e s r e p o r t e d c l a i m s by l o c a l r e s i d e n t s t h a t
Salvadoran Army troops rounded u p and killed more than 1 0 0
suspected leftist sympathizers, including women and
children, in three small towns i n northern E l Salvador.
U n d e r s e c r e t a r y o f D e f e n s e F r e d C. I k l e , j u s t b a c k f r o m a
t r i p t o E l S a l v a d o r w h e r e h e r e p o r t e d l y e x p r e s s e d U.S.
concerns about rightwing death squads, was reported in the
W a s h i n g t o n P o s t t o b e u r g i n g i n c r e a s e d U.S. m i l i t a r y
assistance to revive the Salvadoran A r m y ' s struggle with
The State Department i n . a prepared statement indicated that
the student arrested for the murder of U.S. military adviser
Commander Albert A. Schaufelberger " w a s not involved i n the
crime" and that "his confession was obEaFned under duress."
Salvadoran authorities arrested three policemen and a small
landowner and charged them with kidnapping in a pattern
'similar to recent death squad activity.
T h e Washington P o s t reported that the Reagan Administration
hopes to set up a large military training center in eastern
E l Salvador where U.S. intructors will g i v e basic training
to 1 , 0 0 0 Salvadcran recruits each month.
J u d g e Bernando Rauda Murcia ordered f i v e National Guardsmen
to trial for the second time f o r the 1 9 8 0 murders of f o u r
American churchwomen following a reinvestigatior, ordered by
a Salvadoran appeals court.
T h e f i v e countries of Cenzral America, i n a
meeting organized by the Contadora g r o u p ,
agreed upon a declaration t h a t outlines i s s u e s
f o r f u t u r e negotiation.
T h e State Department condemned increase right-wing
v i o l e n c e , claiming that it undermines centrist
support necessary for democratic .development in
- - T h e House Foreign Affairs Committee voted
unamimously to extend for o n e year conditions on
'military ,aid to El Salvador which expire a t the
end of fiscal y e a r 1983.
~ 9 / 2 9 / 6 3 -- Salvadoran government o f f i c i a l s met wi.th lefti'st
rebel leaders for the second time in talks.
the m e e t i n g , Francisco Q u i n o n e z , the head of t h e
government P e a c e Commission said that further
progress would not be made unless t h e l e f t changed
i t s position.
Salvadoran military bombing r u n s i n T e n a n c i n g o ,
21 miles northeast of San S a l v a d o r , killed 5 0
civilians and wounded 25 a f t e r rebels interfered
with th'e radio signals to confuse Air F o r c e Pilots.
Salvadoran Colonel Monterrosa publically regretted
T h e New York Times reported that Salvadoran
l e f t i s t s and diplomats have said that the r e b e l
movement h a s gained i n internal unity in t h e
l a s t f e w months.
They a t t r i b u t e this largely to
a n a g r e e m e n t by the Popular Liberation F o r c e s ,
t h e second-largest Salvadoran guerilla g r o u p ,
to submit itself to a centralized military command.
Associated P r e s s reporter Arthur Allen l e f t El
Salvador after t h e American embassy s a i d i t could n o
longer a s s u r e h i s safety.
T h e Chief of Intelligence
of the Treasury Police had earlier criticized two
of &.ller.Is articles ~ o ~ c e r n i nthe
F o r c e ' s arrest of a suspect in the m u r d e r - o f Lt.
Commander Albert Shaufelberger.
D e f e n s e Secretary Caspar Weinberger visiting the
Salvadorar. Front Lines said the army i s "making
very great progress," but that C o n g r e s s ' s reluctance
to authorize more aid could jeopardize further
R e f e r r ~ n g to che recent meetlng held between
government o f i i c ~ a l sa n t t h e ~ rg u e r ~ l i aopponects
R i c n a r C S t c n e , Specla1 Envoy to Central k m e r ~ c a ,
sald that the Salvadoran government w ~ l lnot accept
azy plan to snare power w ~ t hthe guerillas f l g h t ~ n g ~ t .
R e b e l f o r c e s attacked t h e third largest El Salvadoran
city of San Miguel with the strongest mortar barrage
they have y e t fired in the current conflict. T h e
attack w a s the g u e r i l l a s f first major show of f o r c e
P e d r o D. Alvarado R i v e r a , a Popular Liberation F r o n t
(FPL) guerilla arrested on August 25, reportedly
claimed responsibility for the murder of U.S.
military a d v i s o r , Navy it. Commander Albert
Schaufelberger 1 1 1 , who w a s killed on Kay 25.
U.S. Special Envoy to Central A m e r i c a , Richard S t o n e ,
met with 'the representatives of the Salvadoran
T a l k s were inconclusive; only
promises of further communications were made.
Washington Post reported that senior officials on
both sides s e e major barriers to a negotiated settlement.
In B o g o t a , Columbia, representatives of the
Salvadoran government's P e a c e Commission met with
l e f t wing opposition leaders for the f i r s t time i n
a t t e m p t s to negotiate a settlement of the three-year
T h e latest class of Salvadoran governmenr troops
trained by the United States military graduated from
F o r t Benning in Georgia.
Italian citizen Vittorio Andretto was killed b y
Salvadoran troops who said he was shot after t h e
pickup truck he was riding in ran through a military
President Reagan announced that he will not i n c r e a s e
t h e number of U.S. rniiitary trainers i n El Salvador
beyond t h e presently existing limit of 5 5 .
decision came a f e w days after the Pentagon and t h e
State Department reversed their original requests
for a n increase cf a d v i s o r s to 125.
T h e amnesty program for political prisoners which began
Kay 4 came to a n e n d ; 1 , 1 1 6 people were granted amnesty
urider ~ t .
T h e Los Angeles T i m e s reported chat U.S. advisors in
El Salvador a r e increasingly involved in training
excersises which a r e potentially dangerous.
- - T h e Washington P o s t reported that twice a s many
T h e El Salvador,an army and t h e Guatemalan government
have denied reports by the Kew Pork Times of August ;4.
"These reports said tnat the t w o countries had agreed
tnat members of El Salvador's 2 4 , 0 0 0 U.S.-backed
army w o u i d . r e c e i v e :raining from Guatemalan counter
insurgency experts a t bases in Guatemala'. In r e t u r n ,
- t h e reports s a i d , Guatemala would be providee with
l i g h t weapons and ammunition from El Sal.vador1s U.S.
Salvadoran soldiers were killed i n combat this year
than were i n 1982. Also, t h e casualty count this
year totaled a b o u t one-fifth of E l Salvador's 3 3 , 0 0 0
As a demonstration of President R e a g a n ' s economic
support f o r El S a l v a d o r , Agriculture Secretary
John Block said the country will receive more than
$58 million in n e w U.S. food aid reported the
For chronology of 1 9 8 2 e v e n t s , request " 1 9 8 2 Chronology" from archived
Srief 80064. For chro.nology prior to 1 9 8 2 , request CRS Report entitled
Salvador -- From 1 9 3 1 to the March 1 9 8 2 Elections."
AGCITIOKAL .REFERENCE SOURCES
Araujo, Richard. Congress a n d aid to El Salvador.
Heritage F o u n d a r i o n , 1982.
1 4 p.
El Salvador - - a revolution confronts the United
States. W a s h i n g t o n , Institute for Policy S t u d i e s , 1982. 1 2 2 p.
F i s h e r , Stewart W.
Human r i g h t s in El Salvador and U.S. foreign
Human rights quarterly, v. 4, spring 1982:
El Salvador after t h e elections.
Gayner, Jeffrey B.
Heritage F o u n d a t i o n , 1982. 1 0 p.
G e t t l e m a n , Marvin E., et. al. (eds.) El Salvador:
in t h e n e w cold war.
New Y o r k , Grove P r e s s , 1981.
3 9 7 p.
H o r t o n , Scott. T h e utility of Presidential certification of
compliance with United States human rights policy:
t h e c a s e of
Wisconsin l a w r e v i e w , vol. 1 9 8 2 , no. 5:
K r u g e r , Alexander.
El Salvador's Marxist revolution.
Heritage F o u n d a t i o n , Apr. 1 0 , 1981.
1 8 p.
KcColm, Bruce R.
El Salvador - - peaceful revolution or armed struqgle?
Kew Y o r k , Freedom H o u s e , 1982.
4 7 p.
Montgomery, Tommie S'Ae. Zevolution ~ r .Ei Salvador -- origins and
e V o l ~ t i o n . a o u l d e r , Westview P r e s s , 1982.
P r o s t e r m a n , Roy L.
The unmaking of a land reform.
V. 1 8 7 , Aug. 9 , 1982:
Report o n human rights in El Salvador -- a report t o the Board of
the Americac Clvil Liberties U n i o n , January 19E2.
Center for National Security S t u d i e s , l9E2.
280 p .
Report on human rights i n El Salvador - - July 2 0 , 1 9 8 2 s u p p l e n e ~ t .
New York, Americas Watch Committee and T h e American Civii
Liberties Union, 1982.
Congress and Zi Salvador.
In Congress and foreign
S t o r r s , K. Larry.
policy -- 1981.
Cornnittee P r i n t by Eouse Committee on Foreign
Washingtori, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982:
El Salvador - - from 1 3 3 1 to the Karch 1 9 8 2 elections: a
chronological scudy of politics, p a r t i e s , and conflicts.
R e p o r t , Kar. 2 3 , 1982.
8 2 p.
Builc2ing the peace i n Central America [ a
Department of State.
speech by Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs T h o m a s
Washington, Bureau of Public Affairs, Current Policy
no. 4 1 4 , ~ u g .2 0 , 1982.
Country reports on human rights practices for 1982.
Committee P r i n t by House Committee on Foreign Affairs and S e n a t e
Committee on Foreign Relations.
9 8 t h Congress, 1 s t s e s s i o n ,
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1963:
Communist interference in El Salvador.
W a s h i n g t o n , Bureau of
Public A f f a i r s , Special report no. 8 0 , Feb. 2 3 , 1981.
Cuba's renewed support for violence in Latin America.
W a s h i n g t o n , Bureau of Public Affairs, Special r e p o r t no. 9 0 ,
Dec. 1 4 , 1981.
1 2 p.
Report o n the situation in El Salvador with respect to the
subjects covered in s e c t i o n , 7 2 6 ( d ) of the International Security
and Development Cooperation Act of 1 9 8 1 (P.L. 97-113),
Jan. 2 1 , 1983.
W e b r e , Stephen.
J o s e Napoleon Duarte and the Christian Democratic
Party i n Salvadoran politics, 1960-1972.
Baton R o u g e , L o u i s i a n a
S t a t e University P r e s s , 1979.
Base 500097 1-72
G U A
P A C I F I C
BOUNDARY REPAESSNTATION IS
NOT NLCESSARILY A U T H O l l T A T I V I
O C E A N
69.1 5 1
91.9 2 1
of aid reprogrammed after the formation of the Salvadoran civilian-military junta in October 1979.
Includes $35 million over the Administration's FY83 request of $105 million which the Administration announced in February 1983 vould b. reprogr.awd.
$ 5 0 million in MAP grant8 to be reprogrammed from fund8 in pending FY83 Supplemental. This $50 million plur the $60 million mentioned iradiately
above make up the $110 million of new FY83 military aid for El Salvador announced by the President on March 10, 1983.
Includes $60 million of reprogramed Fl4S loana announced on March 10, 1983.
Includes $5.1 million of Development Assistance over the Administration'r FY83 request which the Adminiatration indicated in February 1983 would be
reprogrameed. Also include8 $18 million of reprogramed Development Assistance announced in March 1983 a8 well a8 l $9 million i n c r e a m in P.L. 4 8 0
funds announced at the mame time.
(P.L. 97-377) set aid at levels appropriated for FY82 unless reprograming procedure8 are utilized.
in FY82 under the emergency drawdown authority of Section 506.
Allocated to El Salvador from rupplerental fund8 appropriated for international military training (IHET).
101 The Continuing Appropriations Act for FY83
would not include the $55 million provided
Includes $55 million in MP grant8 provided by President Reagan under Section 506 emergency proviaion in February 1982.
Administration request for El Salvador a8 part of Caribbean Basin Initiative.
Include. $5 million provided by President Carter and $20 million provided by President Reagan under the apecia1 emergency drawdown authority of Section
506 of the Foreign Aamimtance Act that doer not require approval of Congress.
Include. $9.1 million reprogramed for FY80 and $24.9 million reprogrammed for PY81.
Includes significant amount.'
Military A88iatance Program grants, Foreign Military Sales loans, international military training (IIIET), and tranmferm of excerr
Military aid include.
Economic Support Funds (ESP) are quick disbursing, balance of payment8 support funds, provided for security-related rea8onr. While ESP wa8 once called
"Security Supporting Asairtance," and ir included in Security Assistance, it is listed separately becaure the aid i8 economic in nature, ir adminirterad
by AID, and i8 generally included in Administration figure8 on economic aeeietance to El Salvador.
Feb. 1983 Uar. 1983
(P.L. 97-377) by M m .
ECONOWIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO EL SALVADOR, FY79-FY&
(Obligations in millionr of $1
Economic aid includes Development Assistance, P.L. 480 Food for Peace programs, and Peace Corps.
49.2 A /
Military Aid 1 1