El Salvador: Policy Issues for the 98th Congress

EL SALVADOR: POLICY ISSUES FOR THE 98TH CONGRESS ISSUE BRIEF NUKBER IB83051 AUTHOR: K. Larry Storrs Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE KAJOR ISSUES SYSTEX DATE ORIGINATED 02/18/83 DATE UPDATED 12/05/63 FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL 287-5700 1205 CRS- 1 ISSUE DEFINITION Since 1 9 8 1 President Reagan has requested increasing a m o u n t s of military and economic a?d to assist two embattled Salvadoran governments in he struggle a g a i n s t leftist guerrillas. While Congress has generally supported rhe Administration's requests for economic a i d , it h a s regularly cut military assistance t o El Salvador and has made t h e a i d contingent upon a semi-annual Presidential certification that human r i g h t s a r e improving in the country.. reprogramning of FY83 T h i s year President Reagan proposed a $ 6 C i ill ion militaryaid for the country and a l s o requested $50 million i n FY63 supplemental military assisrance for El Salvador. For F Y 8 4 he requested $86.3 million in military aid for the country. (See chart a t end of paper for details. ) Administration supporters stress the need to support t h e interim Magana government in order to prevent the coming to power f o a communist-style government t h a t would pose a security threat to the region. C r i t i c s , fearing that the United States might be drawn i n t o a Vietnam-type quagmire i n support of a n unpopular regime, a r g u e that the United States should seek a political solution to t h e conflict through negotiations without placing undue emphasis upon military means. BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS The Background and Policy Analysis organizes i n t h e following'manner: section of this issue brief is Congressional Options 1. Terminate Military Aid to E l Salvador 2. Increase Pressure on the Salvadoran Government by Tightening the Requirements of t h e Aid Conditions 3. Modify the Conditions to Require the Salvadoran Government t o Negotiate with t h e RDR-FMLN 4. Strengthen t h e Congressional R o l e by Adding a Legislative Veto t o the Conditions 5. Expand U.S. Aid and Support for the Salvadoran Government Congressional a c t i o n i n 1983 (U.S. Economic and Appended t o this issue brief a r e a t a b l e Assistance t o El Salvador: FY79-FY84) a n d a map of El Salvador. Military BACKGROUND Congress i s n o w reassessing U.S. policy toward the current Salvadoran government i n light of more than .two y e a r s of a c t i v e U.S. s u p p o r t for civilian-military juntas i n El Salvador a g a i n s t leftist guerrillas. When junior military officers overthrew the government of General Carlos Humberto R o m e r o i n October 1 9 7 9 and set u p a civilian-military junta that CRS- 2 IBE3051 UPDATE-12/05/83 promised fundamental r e f o r m s , the Carter A d ~ ~ i n i s t r a t i o welcomed n the change. T h e Romero government was viewed a s a continuation of the military-elite alliance that had controlled Salvadoran politics for more than 3 0 y e a r s , partly by repressing emerging opposition forces and partly by manipulating by a the results cf the 1 9 7 2 ' and 1 9 7 7 elections to prevent a victory coalition of parties dominated by Christian Democrats asserting a need for reforms. in early 1 9 6 0 , followihg the collapse of the first junta, t h e military made a pact with the Christian Democratic Party and shortly thereafter t h e resulting civilian-military junta launched extensive reforms, including a land reform and a banking reform. S y Karch of 1 9 8 0 , h o w e v e r , important civilian elements, including the social democratic National Revolutionary the Christian Democratic P a r t y , had Kovement (Mh'R) and the left wing of resigned from the g o v e r n m e ~ t ,charging that he junta was unable co control h short time l a t e r , these moderate l e f t groups security f o r c e repression. joined f o r c e s with the militant l e f t "popular organizations" of workers, peasants, a n d students to create the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR). The FDR then join.ed with the Farabundo Marti Rational Liberation Front (FMLN) guerrillas i n the e f f o r t to topple the U.S.-supported junta h e a d e d , in l a t e 1 9 8 0 , by Christian Democrat Jose Napoleon Duarte. The Carter Administration suspended aid to El Salvador in December 1 9 8 0 , fcllowing the murder of f o u r American nuns near San Salvador. It resumed and increased aid in mid-January 1 9 8 1 , when the FMLN guerrillas launched a S 0 - ~ a l l e 8 "final offensive" that seemed to threater: the collapse of t h e Salvadoran government. T h e Reagan Administration subsequently increased military and economic aid to the Duarte-led junta and sent a b o u t 5 0 U.S. military a d v i s e r s t o train the Salvadoran armed f o r c e s in counter-insurgency methods. While the guerrilla's heraldee "final Offensive" f a i l e d , renewed a t t a c k s . o n b r i d g e s , - . t h e electrical s y s t e m , a.nd the. 1'1,lopango air base demonstrated their continuing capability These successes prompted the Reagan Admipistratior, to provi'de $55 million in emergency military aid in early 1962. ' By the summer of 1 9 8 1 , the FDR-FKLN, with support from Mexico and F r a n c e , called for a negotiated political settlement t o t h e conflict. The Duarte government rejected negotiations, a n d , instead, a t U.S. u r g i n g , called cn a l l duly constituted parties to participate in junta-held e l e c t i o n s in March 1 9 8 2 for a constituent assembly that would form a temporary g o v e r n m e n t , write a new Constitution, and establish ground rules f o r f u t u r e elections. sought to disrupt t h e While leftwing groups refused to participate and e l e c t i o n s , a massive turnout of nearly 1.5 million voters cast ballots on March 2 8 , 1982. I n these elections, a coalition of rightwing parties jointly The won 60% of t h e vote to insure control of the Constituent Asembly. Christian D e m o c r a t i c P a r t y (PDC), running on a campaign of continuation of the junta's reforms, emerged a s the single largest party, with over 40% of the vote, but seemed likely to be excluded from a meaningful r o l e in t h e provisional government. After weeks of delicate discussions, the Constitutent Assembly elected Alvaro Alfredo Magana, a political centrist supported by t h e Salvadoran military, a s the interim President of the Government of National Unity which included P D C participation. Three vice presidents representing the major political parties were a l s o elected. After weeks of negotiations t h e parties represented in the Government of CRS- 3 IBE3351 UPDDkZ-12/05/83 Natiorial Unity signed a basic program of action called the Pact of Apaneca in August 1962. This called for the creation of three c ~ m m i s s i o n s : (1) a Political Commission to set the rcles for definitive national elections, (2) a Human Rights Commission to monitor human rights p e r f o r m a n c e , and (3) a P e a c e Comrr,ission to promote peace in the c o u n t r y , possibly throu.gh talks with the Salvadoran guerrillas. Simultaneously, the newly elected Constitutent Assembly was to complete action on a n e w constitution. By the end of 1 9 8 3 the Magana-led government was receiving mixed reviews. T h e Political Commission, a f t e r announcing elections f o r December 1 9 8 3 , was forced to postpone i t s plans when the Constituent Assembly f e l l behind schedule. I n s t e a d , in late November the government announced t h a t new elections would be held in March 1984. With the establishment of the Human Rights Commission in October 1 9 8 2 , the human rights conditions in the country initially experienced some improvement. Civilian d e a t h s attributed to political violence declined significantly, while disappearances continued a t a b o u t the same rate a s previous years. Toward the end of 1 9 8 3 , h o w e v e r , there Was a resurgence of right-wing death squad activity which was publicly denounced by U.S. Ambassador Pickering i n a speech on Nov. 2 5 , 1983. After President Reagan pocket-vetoed a bill to extend the congressionally mandated State human rights conditions on aid to El Salvador on Nov. 3 0 , Secretary of S h u l t z was quoted a s saying t h a t i t would h a v e been "very difficult" to make the required certification i n January 1984. In the first half of 1 9 8 3 the Salvadoran military appeared t o gain the initiative i n the struggle with the guerrillas. T h e n u m b e r of U.S.-trained battalions increased and the Salvadoran Army launched the so-called National Strategy Plan in San Vicente province. Through a combination of military mobility and civil action projects this was to expand government control in guerrilla strongholds y h i l e t h e Peace Commission sought to encourage the guerrillas to participate in 'upcoming' elections. while peace' Commission members met with guerrillas representatives o n several o c c c s i o n s , a t times facilitated by Central American Envoy Richard Stone, t h e parties were unable to c o m e to terms. Guerrilla leaders insisted on the creation of a broad coalition government prior to participation i n democratic elections, while the P e a c e Commission was unwilling to discuss anything other than leftist participation i n government-held elections. B y ' t h e end of the y e a r , the guerrillas had shown surprising resiliency, including a n ability to conduct significant o f f e n s i v e operations, and the Army was said t o be unable to maintain the initiative. T h e Constitution Assembly continued t o m a k e progress o n completion of a new constitution, but was unable to a g r e e o n several a r t i c l e s , particularly those dealing with t h e agrarian reform. While the Christian Democrats argued that a Continuation of the reform with payment i n bonds was c r u c i a l to undercut t h e guerrillas a p p e a l s , . m o r e conservative parties urged that expropriation be undertaken only on t h e basis of prior and complete Compensation. T h e lack of consensus on t h i s i s s u e was o n e indication of the lack of unity within the government that would be resolved only a f t e r the 1 9 8 4 elections. Congressional Options A variety of o p t i o n s i s available to Congress in i t s consideration of the Administration's r e q u e s t for FY84 aid. All of the options, h o w e v e r , i n v o l v e -' CRS- 4 IB83051 UPDATE-L2/05/E3 risks and ~ n one way or another r e q u ~ r e trade-offs among widely acceFteC , , options a r e grouped lntc C.S. o b ~ e c t ~ v e s .For he sake of C ~ s ~ u s s ~ o rtne f l v e broaC categories. Terminate Military Aid to El Salvador During the 97th C o n g r e s s , a sizable number of Members supported res0lUtions introdu.ced by Representative Studds and Senator Kennedy to prohibit military aid and a r m s sales to El Salvador. They argued that a regime that had permitted 30,000 of i t s citizens to be killed in indiSCriminate violence and that %as taken icadequate action in the highly citizens did not deserve U.S. publicized cases of the murders of U.S. support. They argued that military aid has only increased the k i l l i n g anC repression i n the country and has strengthened the role of the military in the society. Believing that many cf the guerrillas' a r m s a r e c a p t u r e d , they contended that a c u t in U.S. military aid may lead to a reduction i n the violence in the country. Without open-ended support from the United States, :hey a r g u e d , the Salvadoran government would be forced to deai more realistically with some of the guerrilla's demands and to implement changes i n order to prevent a guerrilla victory. Those w h o now support the terminatior~ of military aid by the 98th Congress argue that U.S. efforts to encourage reform have been inadequate, precisely because powerful Salvadoran elites are convinced the United States wili not terminate assistanc-e. Supporters of this option tend to f e e l that a termination of U.S. aid would encourage negotiations betweeR the government and the guerrillas. They foresee a resulting left-of-center coalition government t h a t would exclude the more extreme elements of the far l e f t and the far right. They a r e inclined to believe chat the political a i m s cf the 'Democratic Revolutionary F r o n t , which inclu'des social d'emocrats, clissident Christian D e m o c r a t s , and independents can successfully be moderated by a more zccommodating U.S. policy. They reject arguments that the Harch 1982 elections demonstrated the weakness of the moderate l e f z since they feel that the leftist parties had legitimate reasons to doubt the safety and effectiveness of their participation. Opponents of a terminatioc of U.S. aid a r g u e that such a c t i o n would undermine the legitimacy and the defense capability of the Salvadoran government and lead to a victory by externally-supported Marxist guerrillas, many of whom a r e dedicated to totalitarian control of society. They cite numerous historical e x a m p l e s , and especially the Cuban and Nicaraguan c a s e s , i n support of their contention that extreme leftists who a r e hostile to the United States will wrest effective control f r o n more moderace elements if the opposition movement came to power. They a r g u e that a termination of American assistance would undermine the growing authority of the central government and lead to a significant increase in the l e v e l of violence in t h e country. Without U.S. l e v e r a g e , they argue that those like President Magana and Defense Minister Garcia who have supported t h e U.S.-sponsored r e f o r m s might be weakened to t h e point where they might be overthrown by rightwing f o r c e s i n the military determined to pursue a more aggressive anti-guerrilla campaign. If this were to h a p p e n , they feel that the long-range prospects regime would be for a guerrilla victory a g a i n s t a reactionary military significantly increased. Termination of U.S. aid to El Salvador would also have i n j u r i o u s efforts throughout Latin America and especially in Central A m e r i c a , they a r g u e , because moderate leaders cf countries presently facing Cuban-supported guerrilla insurgency would have reason to doubt the dependability of t h e United States support in time of need. CRS- 5 Congress could terminate aid either by a country-specific legislative prohibition, or somewhat more gradually by denying any further Administration funding r e q u e s ~ sfor El Salvador. Any such termination might lead to 2 c o n g r e s s i o n a l - e x e c u t i v e ~ c o n t a t i o n t a t i o n , a veto of military aid l e g i s l a t i o n , an^ a major override battle requiring a vote of two-thirds of both Houses. 2. Increase P r e s s u r e on the Salvadoran Government by Tightening t h e Requirements of the kid Conditions Proponents of tightened conditions o n U.S. aid to El Salvador f e e l that i t i s unrealistic to terminate aid to El S a l v a d o r , but a r g u e that stronger accion must be taken hlith the Salvadoran government to avoid continuing U.S. support for a government whose actions strengthen guerrilla insurgency. This could be accomplished by adding n e w conditions for U.S. aid via t h e certification requirement. Central to t h i s position i s the assumption that greater U.S. pressure would be successful in promoting reforms and greater respect for human rights without provoking a right wing c o u p or an outright r e j e c ~ i o nof U.S. assistance. Dissatisfied by what they regard a s a n overly loose interpretation by the Reagan Administration of the congressionally-mandated aid conditions, advocates of this approach would tighten the language of the conditions to require greater compliance with internationally respected human rights standards. Even a resulting suspension o r reduction i n U.S. a i d , i n this v i e w , might serve to jolt t h e Salvadoran government into taking serious actions to i m p r o v e human rights conditions. In the e n d , they a r g u e , this would strengthen the government a n C g i v e it greater public support in the struggle with the guerrillas. Opponents of this approach emphasize that the Salvadoran government h a s made impressive progress under difficult circumstances. They argGe that mare demanding certification criteria might very well undermine t h e U.S.-supported moderate elements i n the government a n d t h e military. They point out that Ambassador Hinton's highly critical speech in October 1 9 8 2 provoked outrage from a number o f ' s e c t o r s and strengthened the v i e w that U.S. aid should b e rejected s o long a s i t i s accompanied by significant intervention in t h e Country's affairs. Convinced that the r a t e of progress i s about a s great a s can be expected given t h e political complexity of the s i t u a t i o n , they a r e f e a r f u l that the result of more rigorous certification criteria might be a termination of military assistance to El Salvador, which they believe, would polarize rather than strengthen moderation i n the country, thereby improving the prospects of radical Marxist forces. 3. Modify the Conditions To Require the Salvadoran Government to Negotiate with the FDR-FML,N P r o p o n e n t s of a political solution a r e convinced that El Salvador will f a c e a n unending guerrilla conflict in which neither the government nor t h e guerrillas a r e likely to be victorious unless negotiations a r e attempted. They would impose a congressionally mandated requirement t h a t the Salvadoran government accept the offer made by t h e FDR-FMLN i n October 1 9 8 2 to engage i n unconditional t a l k s to resolve the conflict. If successful, this approach would strengthen t h e moderates in both camps and end t h e killing. Presumably i t would r e s u l t i n a n interim coalition government or i n some form of internationally created and supervised interim government that would create the c o n d i t i o n s for f u t u r e elections f a i r and equitable by a l l parties. P r o p o n e n t s of this approach a r g u e that nothing i s to be l o s t by talks between CRS- 6 IB83051 UPDATE-12/05/eL the twc parties. If the ieftist opposition demands an end to the k i l l i n g s and other abuses by the security forces, or if =he moderaze and rightist F a r t i e s insist upon the democratic process and conditions to guarantee private property, accommodation to these demands will only enhance the Sroadly-baseC consensus'that i s necessary for long-term stability. Opponents OF negotiations a r g u e that it would be a mistake to negotiate with violent Narxist-oriented groups that seek to gain a = the bargaining tabie what they have been unable to win on t h e battlefield or in the March 1 9 8 2 elections. They a r g u e that the Magana government i s winning -- or at least holding i t s own i n the war against the guerrillas with limited U.S. a s s i s t a n c e , but t h a t success i s dependent on resolure opposition to -- not compromise with - - the guerrillas. They point to the Karch 1982 eleccions a n C :h€ failure of the "final offensive" in 1 9 8 1 a s evidence c h a t the guerrilias Co not have the support of the population. T h e y fear that the Marxist groups woulC emerge a s the dominant f o r c e in any governing g r o u p brought a b o u t through n e g o t i a t i o n s , or would resume the war f r o m a strengthened position, and point to Nicaragua under t h e Sandinistas a s an example of the inevitable result. They a l s o a r g u e that American insistence on negotiations would constitute an extreme intervention i n Salvadoran affairs. T h e chances for successful negotiation a r e a l s o much slimmer i n their v i e w , than a r e the chances of provoking a rightwing coup or even a wider backlash. 4. Strengthen the Congressional Role by Adding a Legislative Veto to the Conditions PrOpOnentS of this approach a r e convinced that the Congress should h a v e a n o'sp3rtUnity tc review the President's certifications a s a way of i n s u r i n g that t h e executive will take forceful a c t i o n to i n s i s t upon improved hey f e e l that the Reagan pe-rformance by t h e ~ a l v a d o r a n government. Administration places such importance o n El Salvador that i t will ccntinue to Certify Compliance with existing or more r i g o r o u s criteria regardless of the a c t u a l situation. T h e r e f o r e , they a r g u e , t h e Congress should have 3 0 d a y s , for example, to a p p r o v e or to disapprove t h e Presiaent's certification. In the event that t h e Congress disapproved t h e certification, the military aid and a r m s sales t o El Salvador would have t o cease. P r o p o n e n t s feel that the aid conditions will only be taken seriously when both the Administration and the Salvadoran government realize that t h e certification i s s u b j e c t to congressional veto. * ' Opponents a r g u e that a legislative veto would involve Congress .unnecessarily in t h e day-to-day complexities of Salvadoran politics. They point out that t h e initial proposal for congressionally required 'conditions on aid to El Salvador contained a legislative veto provision, but that i t was deleted in committee because of inadequate support and b e c a u s e of P r e s i d e n t R e a g a n ' s threat to v e t o any legislation containing a legislative veto. The inclusion of a legislative veto would r a i s e problems of t h e constitutional validity of such m e a s u r e s , especially after the June 1 9 8 3 Supreme C o u r t legislative veto t o be decision in I N S vs. Chadha which held a one-house UnCOnStitUtiOnal. M o r e o v e r , if Congress w i s h e s to terminate aid on g r o u n d s related to the certification, opponents a r g u e , it has more direct and less COnStitutiOnaliy Contentious means of doing s o by reducing or prohibiting aid i n t h e foreign aid authorization bills. - - Expand U.S. Aid and Support for the Salvadoran Government CRS- 7 IBE3051 UPDATE-12/05/83 Proponents of this view t a k e the position that the United States should do that a r e facing a g r o ~ i n g complex of Communist-inspired guerrilla insurgencies ti-,at threaten Central America. Maintaining that the Salvadoran government h a s the support of the people, demonstrated in the recent e l e c t i o n , a g a i n s t externally-supplied guerrillas, they would f a v o r a n increase in U.S. aid and support for the Magana government to insure i t s survival and ultimate victory. Some would a l s o support elimination of the certification requirement on the grounds that its conditions f o c u s unnecessary criticism upon the government and provide propaganda ammunition for t h e guerrillas. As a variation on this t h e m e , Senator Helms has proposed that the U.S. government be required t o report o n the hunan r i g h t s abuses by t h e guerrillas a s well a s by the government i n Crder to p r o v i d e a more balanced perspective on the situaticn. everything within its ability to defend allies Other proponents of a d d i ,lonal c' U.S. support would permit a n increase i n the number of U..S. advisers i n El Salvador, and would be willing to have them participate i n combat operations if that were necessary t o insure government success. Opponents of further U.S. military aid a r g u e that t h e current emphasis o n economic a s s i s t a n c e i s more likely than increases i n military aid to promote t h e k i n d s o,f reforms that will undermine support for t h e guerrillas. Since greater U.S. military involvement could both strengthen the FMLN argument that they a r e fighting against American imperialism while undermining domestic American support for U.S. p o l i c y , opponents would closely limit the number of U.S. advisers and would continue to insist that these advisers renain out of com.bat areas. Opponents of a larger U.S. military advisory r o l e stress t h e Vietnam p r e c e d e n t , arguing that in that c a s e increased U.S. advisers failed to halt 2 crumbling political-military s i t u a t i o n , discredited a weak g o v e r n m e n t , and in the f a c e of imminent defeat of t h e government, led to 'the f a t e f u l introduction of U.S. gr'ound forces. S o m e doubt t h a t , short of heavy, d i r e c t U.S. combat i n t e r v e n t i o n , the Salvadoran insurgency can be defeated by the inept current government. Congressional Action in 1 9 8 3 On the $60 million reprogramming of FY83 military a i d While the Senate Appropriations Committee approved the $60 million reprogramming with conditions, subsequent action by t h e Senate Foreign Relations C o m m i t t e e and the House Appropriations C o m m i t t e e permitted the Administration to reprogram only $ 3 0 million of the requested amount. T h e S e n a t e Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee o n Foreign Operations reprogramming o n approved o n Mar. 2 3 , 1983 by a vote of 7-2 the $ 6 0 million the condition t h a t the number of U.S. advisers be limited to 55, that n e w efforts be m a d e to improve t h e Salvadoran judicial s y s t e m , and that the administration t a k e the initiative to bring about unconditional discussions between the Salvadoran government and i t s adversaries. T h e S e n a t e Foreign Relations Committee, after lengthy negotiations t o arrive at a consensus position, approved only $30 million of the While the letter to Secretary of State reprogramming o n Mar. 24, 1983. S h u l t z did n o t explicitly place conditions on t h e a i d , t h e Committee expressed i t s belief that " t h e United States should u s e i t s good offices to CRS- 2 IBE3Q5l UFDhTE-12/03/63 encourage a n unconditional dialogue amonq all parties. to the conflict i n Ei Salvador in the hope of achieving a political resolution," that U.S. nilitary advisers should be limited ro 5 5 , that any rraining of t h e Salvadoran military should be conducted i n the Ucited S t a t e s , and that far-reaching reforms of the Salvadoran judicial system were necessary for Continued ,U.S. support. T h e House Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on F o r e i g n Operations voted 7 to 5 on Apr. 2 6 , 1 9 6 3 , to a p p r o v e $ 3 0 million of the proposed $60 million reprogramming on the condition that the administration appoint a special envoy to facilitate negotiations i n the Central. American region. On tne request for $ 5 0 m l l l ~ o n in FY63 supplemental nllicary assistance T h e Conference compromise on the FY83 Supplemenzal Appropriations Bill (H.R. 3069) Which was passed and became law (P.L. 98-63)'in l a t e , J u l y 1 9 8 3 split the difference between the House and Senate and provided $ 2 5 million in military aid appropriations for El Salvador. T h e S e n a t e , following t h e recommendation of the Senate Appropriations C o m m i t t e e , had a p p r o v e d the f u l l amount of $ 5 0 m i l l i o n , while the House bill, following action by the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee t o defer action on military aid ro El Salvador, contained n o f u n d s for EL Salvador. I f committee-recommended bills to authorize the supplemental military aid were to be p a s s e d , the available f u n 3 s would be s t ,111 " l e s s than the appropriated amount mentioned above. The House Foreign Affairs Comrr~ittee had approved only $8.7 million of the requested amount ( H - R e p t . 9 8 - 1 9 2 on H.R. $20 million 2992) while the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had approved ( ' S - ~ e p t .9 8 - 1 4 6 on S. 1347) with certain conditions. Language i n P.'L.. 98-63 provides that funds for foreign assistance may not . b e oSligated until the enactment of authorizinq legislation or until Sept. 1 5 , 1 9 8 3 , whichever comes first. On economic and military aid for F Y 6 4 While n o final action was taken by either House on foreign aid authorizations for F Y 8 4 , the foreign a f f a i r s committees generally approved the Administration's r e q u e s ~for developmental assistance and for Economic Support F u n d s for El Salvador, but approved less than the $86.3 miilion in military aid which t h e Administration requested for t h e country. 1n a d d i t i o n , t h e committees attached even tighter conditions on t h e aid than previously existed. T h e House Foreign Affairs Committee i n i t s report ( H - R e p t . 9 8 - 1 9 2 on H.R. 2992) limited military aid to $05 m i l l i o n for F Y 8 4 and F Y 8 5 , of which $ 1 5 million could be used only for medical f a c i l i t i e s and supplies. After limiting the number of U.S. advisers to 5 5 a n d precluding the P r e s i d e n t ' s use of special emergency powers aid to El S a l v a d o r , t h e Committee-recommended conditions would permit the provision of aid to El Salvador only if t h e ' p r e s i d e n t r e p o r t e d , without congressional d i s a p p r o v a l , that Salvadoran Government was engaged in good faith in a d i a l o g u e without preconditions with a l l major parties .to the c o n f l i c t , and was a c t i n g to carry out i t s o w n program to improve conditions in the country. 98-146 o n T h e S e n a t e F o r e i g n , R e l a t i o n s Committee in i t s report (S.Rept. S. 1347) recommended a limit of $76.3 million in military aid t o El S a l v a d o r , CRS- 9 IBE305i UPDATE-~~/O~/~~ $ 2 0 million of which i s to be usee solely for training Salvadoran troops in t h e United Stares. The Committee limited t h e number of U.S. advisers i n El exteneed the present requirement for semi-annual Salvador to 5 5 and Certifications by the President on Salvadoran Government efforts to i m p r o v e human rights conditions'in the country. Lacking a foreign aid authorization m e a s u r e , assistance to El Salvador was set by a n omnibus Continuing Resolution (F.L. 9 8 - 1 5 1 , H.J.Res. 413) which vas passed by Congress o n Nov. 1 2 a n C signed by t h e President o n Nov. 1 4 , 1983. T h i s measure provided that not more than $64.8 million i n military a s s i s t a n c e may b e provided to El Salvador. it further provided that not more than 70% of military aid may be expended until Salvadoran authorities have brought the accused to trial in xhe case of the U.S. n u n s murdered in December 1 9 6 0 , and that noc more than 9 3 % of this aid may be expended uncil President certifies that the Salvadoran government i s continuing t o make progress in implementing t h e land reform progrart decreed in ):arch and April 1980. T h e Congress a l s o passed a bill (H.R. 4042) to continue through F Y 8 4 the that the 1 9 8 1 Conditions requiring the President to certify semi-annualiy Salvadoran government was improving human rights conditions and was continuing major political and economic reforms. T h i s measure was killed by a pocket veto on Nov. 3 0 , 1 9 8 3 , when President Reagan failed to sign t h e bill i n the required time.. LEGISLATION P.L. 98-63, H.R. 3'069 T h i s omnibus measure providing supplemental appropriations for FY83 i n c l u d e s $25 million i n military aid for El S a l v a d o r , exactly half of t h e $ 5 0 million in supplementary f u n d s for .El Salvador which the Administration reqaested in Karch 1983. Following t h e recommendation by the F o r e i g n Operations Subcommittee and the f u l l House Appropriations Committee to defer a c t i o n o n the President's request for supplemental military aid t o Z 1 S a l v a d o r (H.Rept.' 98-207), the bill passed by the House May 25, 1963, contained n o f u n d s for El Salvador. T h e bill passed by t h e Senate J u n e 1 6 , 1 9 8 3 , on t h e other hand, followed the recommendation of che Senate Appropriations Committee (S.Rept. 98-148) in approving t h e f u l l request for $50 million. T h e compromise conference r e p o r t ( H - R e p t . 98-308), filed July 2 0 , 1 9 8 3 , noted t h e conferees agreement " t h a t not more than $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 shall be available for El Salvador." Following t h e resolution of differences on other i s s u e s , the House and Senate passed t h e bill July 2 9 , 1 9 8 3 , and the P r e s i d e n t signed the measure i n t o law July 3 0 , 1983. P.L. 98-53, H.R. 1 2 7 1 Amends Section 728(e) of the ,International Security and D e v e l o p m e n t Cooperation Act of 1 9 8 1 (the conditions on a i d to El Salvador which contain a one-time requirement of demonstrated progress i n t h e cases of murdered American citizens) to require that the fourth certification may be made only if t h e President determines that since the third certification the Salvadoran Government (1) has made good faith efforts to investigate and bring to justice all those responsible f o r the murders of the U.S. nuns and labor a d v i s e r s in December 1 9 8 0 and J.anuary 1 9 8 1 , (2) has taken a l l reasonable s t e p s to investigate the January 1 9 8 1 disappearance of journalist J o h n S u l l i v a n , and (3) has taken a l l reasonable steps to investigate the kil-ling of Kichael Kline in October 1982. Congress attached similar provisions to t h e 2nd and 3rd certifications. With broad s u p p o r t , the measure was passed i n t h e House 416-2 on J u n e 7 , 1 9 8 3 , and was passed in the S e n a t e on J u n e 2 9 , 1983. It became l a w with the President's signature on July 1 5 , 1983. P.L. 95-151 (E.J.Res. 413) This omnibus Continuing Resoiution Raking further continuing appropriations f o r F Y 8 4 provides in part thac not more than $64.8 illio ion in military assistance may be provided to El Salvador. It f u r t h e r provides that aid may be expended until Salvadoran noc more than 70% of this military authorities have brought the accused to trail in the c a s e of the U.S. nuns this aid may be murdered in December 1 9 8 0 , and that not more than 90% of expended until the President determines and certifies that the Salvadoran government h a s continued to make documented prograss in implementing t h e land reform program decreed in Garch and April 1980. Introduced in the House Nov. 1 0 , both houses passed differing versions of = h e bill that Cay. Conference report agreed to Nov. 1 2 ; signed into law (P.L. 96-151) Nov. 1 4 , 1983. H.R. 4 0 4 2 (Barnes) Continues i n effect the 1 9 8 1 certification requirements on human rights i n El Salvador u n t i l Congress enacts new legislation on t h e subject or until Sept. 3 0 , 1 9 8 4 , whichever occurs furst. Called up by committee discharge, the bill passed t h e House Sept. 3 0 , and passed the Senate Nov. 1 7 , 1983. failed to President Reagan pocket-vetoed the measure 'Nov. 3 0 , 1 9 8 3 , wher, he sign the bill within the required time. X.R. 2 9 9 2 (Zablocki) International Seccrity and Development Cooperation Act of 1983. This is a clean bill reported by the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Kay 1 7 , 1983 ( H - R e p t . 98-192) after :he Committee completed markup on Kay 1 2 , 1983. With regard to El S a l v a d o r , it authorizes $8.7 million of the $ 5 0 million requested i n the F Y 8 3 supplemental, and it authorizes $65 million in military assistance (rather than the requested amount of $86.3 million) anC $120 million i n Economic Support Funds for ~ ~ ' 8and 4 FY85. After limiting the number of U.S. ~ i l i t a r yadvisers to 5 5 , and precluding t h e President's use of special emergency powers to provide aid to El Salvador, the Committee-recommended conditions would permit the provision of aid to El Salvador only if t h e Salvadoran Government i s engaged in good faith in a dialogue without preconditions with all major parties to t h e c o n f l i c t , and i s a c t i n g to carry o u t i t s own plans to improve conditions i n t h e country. Half of the F Y 8 4 aid and all of the F Y 8 5 aid would be contingent upon Presidential progress reports d u e 6 and 1 1 months after the start of t h e fiscal year. S. 1 3 4 7 (Percy) International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1983. This is a clean bill reported by the Senate Foreign Relations C o m m i t t e e on May - 2 3 , 1 9 8 3 (S.Rept. 9 8 - 1 4 6 ) , after t h e Committee completed markup on Kay 1 2 , 1983. With regard to El Salvador, it authorizes $76.3 million i n military assistance for E l Salvador for FY83. and F Y 8 4 , which has the effect of authorizing $20 miliion of the requested $ 5 0 million supplemental i n FY83. It places a l i m i t of 5 5 on the number of military a d v i s e r s in El Salvador, and i t provides that $ 2 0 million of the military assistance may be used only for training in the United States. In , a d d i t i o n , the Committee extended the present requirement for semi-annual certifications of compliance with certain conditions i n El Salvador in order to continue providing assistance to the country. It a l s o added requirements for reports on government efforts to improve the independence and effectiveness of the judiciary, and to eliminate and control right-wing death s q u a d s , and on terrorist activities by the guerrillas. T h e Senate Appropriations Committee reported o u t this o ~ i g i n a l bill on 27, i983, with provisions that essentially approved the ad mini strati or,'^ request For $86.3 milliori i n military aid for El Salvador. It provided in Section 5 3 1 , h o w e v e r , that 30% of all F Y 8 4 aid to ~ h e country may not be expended unt,il Salvadoran authorities have brought those accused a in the c a s e of the f o u r murdered American nuns to trial and have obtained verdict. Sept. HEARINGS U.S. Conqress. House. Commi.ttee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on Foreign a s s i s t a n c e and Foreign Operarions and Related Agencies. Bearings, related programs appropriations for i963 -- ?art 1. 9 7 t h C o n g r e s s , 2nd session. February and K a r c h , 1962. Washington, U.S. Govt. Princ. Off., 1982. 3 0 2 p. Includes hearings on El Salvador emergency drawdown a n e overview of the foreign aid a n e security assistance. ----- Supplemental appropriations for 1982. P a r t 2. Hearings, 9 7 t h Congress, 2nd session. M a y , 1982. W a s h i n g t o n , U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982. 3 3 9 p. Includes hearings on El S a l v a d o r , Caribbean Basin I n i t i a t i v e , and Security Interests in Latin America. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs. Subcommittee on International T r a d e , Investment and Monetary Policy. Oversight hearing on the International Konetary Fund'loan to El Salvador. H e a r i n g , 97th C o n g r e s s , 2nd session. Aug. 1 2 , 1982. Washington, U.S.. Govt. Print. Off., 1982. serial No. 97-81. . 7 5 p. 3.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs. Foreign assistance legislation for fiscal year 1 9 6 3 (Part 6 o n security assistance proposals for Latin America and the Caribbean). Hearing, 97th C o n g r e s s , 2nd session. Apr. 2 1 , 1982. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982. 1 3 2 p. ----- Presidential certification on El Salvador (Volume I). Hearings, 9 7 t h C o n g r e s s , 2nd session. Feb. 2 , 2 3 , 2 5 , a n d Mar. 2 , 1982. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982. 5 2 2 p. ----- Presidential certification on El Salvador (Volume 11). Hearings, 9 7 t h Congress, 2nd session on H.J.Res. 494. J u n e 2, 2 2 ; J u l y 2 9 ; Aug. 3 , 1 0 , and 1 7 , 1982. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print:Off., 1982. 543 p. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee o n Foreign Relations. Caribbean Initiative. H e a r i n g s , 9 7 t h C o n g r e s s , 2nd session on S. 2237. . M a r . 25 and 3 1 , 1982. W a s h i n g t o n , U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982. 261 p. ----- Certification concerning military aid to El Salvador. Hearings, 9 7 t h Congress. 2nd session. Feb. 8 and Mar. 1 1 , 1982. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982. 265 p. ----- Presidential certifications on conditions in El Salvador. H e a r i n g , 97tP. C o n g r e s s , 2nd s e s s i o n . hug. 3 , i962. 2 6 0 F. ----- U.S. p o l l c y i n t h e W e s z e r n H e m i s p h e r e . Hearings, 97th C o n g r e s s , 2 n d s e s s i o n o n S.J.Res. 1 4 4 , S. 2 1 7 9 , S. 2 2 4 3 , S. 2 3 7 0 a n d S.J.Res. 156. Apr. 1 , 2 0 , 2 7 , 2 8 ; a n d K a y 4 a n d 2 6 , 1 9 6 2 . W a s h i n g t o n , U.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , 1 3 6 2 . 1 4 1 p. U.S. Congress. Senace. Committee on F o r e l g n R e l a t i o n s . Subcommittee o n W e s t e r n Hemisphere A f f a l r s . Central Amerlca. H e a r ~ n g s , 9 7 t h C o n g r e s s , 1 s t a n d 2 n d sessions. D e c . 1 4 , a n d 1 5 , 19S1; and Feb. 1 , 1982. W a s h ~ n g t o n ,U.S. Govt. P r l n t . O f f . , 1962. 141 p. R Z P O O T S Ah'D CONGPESSiOKAL DOCUMEKTS U.S. Congress. Senate. El Salvador: the United States in the midst of a maelstrorr - - a r e p o r t t o he C o m m i t t e e on F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s and the Committee on Appropriations [by Senator Claiborne Pell Joint Committee Print, 97th a n d S e n a t o r P a t r i c k J. Leahy]. Congress, 2 n C session. Karch 1982. W a s h i n g t o n , U.S. G o v t . P r i n t . Off., 1 9 6 2 . 2 3 p. ----- R e p o r t o f t h e U.S. o f f i c i a l o b s e r v e r m i s s i o n t o t h e E l S a l v a d o r C o n s t i t u e n t A s s e m b l y e i e c t i o n s of Kar. 2 8 , 1 9 6 2 -- a r e p o r t t o t h e C o m m i t t e e o n F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s b y S e n a t o r N a n c y L. K a s s e b a u n . C o m m i t t e e P r i n t , 9 7 t h C o n g r e s s , 2nd s e s s i o n . November 1982. W a s h i n g t o n , U.S. Govt. P r i n t . Off., 1 9 8 2 . 4 2 p. C E R O N O L O G Y OF E V E N T S 11/30/83 -- President Reagan pocket vetoed a bill to continue through FY84 the certification requirement linking continued U.S. m i l i t a r y a i d t o p r o g r e s s i n h u m a n r i g h t s p e r f o r m a n c e in E l S a l v a d o r ' w h e n he failed t o sign the bill within t h e required time limit. 1lj25/83 -- U.S. A m b a s s a d o r T h o m a s P i c k e r i n g , i n a s p e e c h t o t h e A m e r i c a n C h a m b e r of C o m m e r c e i n S a n S a l v a d o r , a c c u s e d S a l v a d o r a n a u t h o r i t i e s of f a i l i n g t o c r a c k d o w n on r i g h t - w i n g d e a t h s q u a d s , even though individuals responsible f o r the killings a r e " w e l l k n o w n w t o t h e s e c u r i t y forces. 11/18/83 -- T h e N e w Y o r k T i m e s r e p o r t e d c l a i m s by l o c a l r e s i d e n t s t h a t Salvadoran Army troops rounded u p and killed more than 1 0 0 suspected leftist sympathizers, including women and children, in three small towns i n northern E l Salvador. 11/13/63 -- U n d e r s e c r e t a r y o f D e f e n s e F r e d C. I k l e , j u s t b a c k f r o m a t r i p t o E l S a l v a d o r w h e r e h e r e p o r t e d l y e x p r e s s e d U.S. concerns about rightwing death squads, was reported in the W a s h i n g t o n P o s t t o b e u r g i n g i n c r e a s e d U.S. m i l i t a r y assistance to revive the Salvadoran A r m y ' s struggle with leftist guerrillas. 11/12/83 -- The State Department i n . a prepared statement indicated that the student arrested for the murder of U.S. military adviser Commander Albert A. Schaufelberger " w a s not involved i n the crime" and that "his confession was obEaFned under duress." 11/09/63 -- Salvadoran authorities arrested three policemen and a small landowner and charged them with kidnapping in a pattern 'similar to recent death squad activity. 11/05/83 -- T h e Washington P o s t reported that the Reagan Administration hopes to set up a large military training center in eastern E l Salvador where U.S. intructors will g i v e basic training to 1 , 0 0 0 Salvadcran recruits each month. 10/2€?/63 -- J u d g e Bernando Rauda Murcia ordered f i v e National Guardsmen to trial for the second time f o r the 1 9 8 0 murders of f o u r American churchwomen following a reinvestigatior, ordered by a Salvadoran appeals court. 10/05/63 -- T h e f i v e countries of Cenzral America, i n a meeting organized by the Contadora g r o u p , agreed upon a declaration t h a t outlines i s s u e s f o r f u t u r e negotiation. 10/03/63 -- T h e State Department condemned increase right-wing v i o l e n c e , claiming that it undermines centrist support necessary for democratic .development in El Salvador. 09/33/83 - - T h e House Foreign Affairs Committee voted unamimously to extend for o n e year conditions on 'military ,aid to El Salvador which expire a t the end of fiscal y e a r 1983. ~ 9 / 2 9 / 6 3 -- Salvadoran government o f f i c i a l s met wi.th lefti'st rebel leaders for the second time in talks. After the m e e t i n g , Francisco Q u i n o n e z , the head of t h e government P e a c e Commission said that further progress would not be made unless t h e l e f t changed i t s position. 09/26/83 -- Salvadoran military bombing r u n s i n T e n a n c i n g o , 21 miles northeast of San S a l v a d o r , killed 5 0 civilians and wounded 25 a f t e r rebels interfered with th'e radio signals to confuse Air F o r c e Pilots. Salvadoran Colonel Monterrosa publically regretted the bombings. 09/24/83 -- T h e New York Times reported that Salvadoran l e f t i s t s and diplomats have said that the r e b e l movement h a s gained i n internal unity in t h e l a s t f e w months. They a t t r i b u t e this largely to a n a g r e e m e n t by the Popular Liberation F o r c e s , t h e second-largest Salvadoran guerilla g r o u p , to submit itself to a centralized military command. 09/09/83 -- Associated P r e s s reporter Arthur Allen l e f t El Salvador after t h e American embassy s a i d i t could n o longer a s s u r e h i s safety. T h e Chief of Intelligence of the Treasury Police had earlier criticized two of &.ller.Is articles ~ o ~ c e r n i nthe g Salvadoran Security F o r c e ' s arrest of a suspect in the m u r d e r - o f Lt. Commander Albert Shaufelberger. 03/C7/83 -- D e f e n s e Secretary Caspar Weinberger visiting the Salvadorar. Front Lines said the army i s "making very great progress," but that C o n g r e s s ' s reluctance to authorize more aid could jeopardize further progress. 09/05/83 -- R e f e r r ~ n g to che recent meetlng held between government o f i i c ~ a l sa n t t h e ~ rg u e r ~ l i aopponects R i c n a r C S t c n e , Specla1 Envoy to Central k m e r ~ c a , sald that the Salvadoran government w ~ l lnot accept azy plan to snare power w ~ t hthe guerillas f l g h t ~ n g ~ t . 09/04/83 -- R e b e l f o r c e s attacked t h e third largest El Salvadoran city of San Miguel with the strongest mortar barrage they have y e t fired in the current conflict. T h e attack w a s the g u e r i l l a s f first major show of f o r c e since February. C9/~1/83 -- P e d r o D. Alvarado R i v e r a , a Popular Liberation F r o n t (FPL) guerilla arrested on August 25, reportedly claimed responsibility for the murder of U.S. military a d v i s o r , Navy it. Commander Albert Schaufelberger 1 1 1 , who w a s killed on Kay 25. 08/30/83 -- U.S. Special Envoy to Central A m e r i c a , Richard S t o n e , met with 'the representatives of the Salvadoran guerilla movement. T a l k s were inconclusive; only promises of further communications were made. The Washington Post reported that senior officials on both sides s e e major barriers to a negotiated settlement. a 08/29/83 -- In B o g o t a , Columbia, representatives of the Salvadoran government's P e a c e Commission met with l e f t wing opposition leaders for the f i r s t time i n a t t e m p t s to negotiate a settlement of the three-year old conflict. 06/24/63 -- T h e latest class of Salvadoran governmenr troops trained by the United States military graduated from F o r t Benning in Georgia. 08/23/83 -- Italian citizen Vittorio Andretto was killed b y Salvadoran troops who said he was shot after t h e pickup truck he was riding in ran through a military checkpoint. 08/1S/E3 -- President Reagan announced that he will not i n c r e a s e t h e number of U.S. rniiitary trainers i n El Salvador beyond t h e presently existing limit of 5 5 . This decision came a f e w days after the Pentagon and t h e State Department reversed their original requests for a n increase cf a d v i s o r s to 125. 08/16/83 -- 08/15/13 -- T h e amnesty program for political prisoners which began Kay 4 came to a n e n d ; 1 , 1 1 6 people were granted amnesty urider ~ t . 08/14/83 -- T h e Los Angeles T i m e s reported chat U.S. advisors in El Salvador a r e increasingly involved in training excersises which a r e potentially dangerous. 08/11/83 - - T h e Washington P o s t reported that twice a s many T h e El Salvador,an army and t h e Guatemalan government have denied reports by the Kew Pork Times of August ;4. "These reports said tnat the t w o countries had agreed tnat members of El Salvador's 2 4 , 0 0 0 U.S.-backed army w o u i d . r e c e i v e :raining from Guatemalan counter insurgency experts a t bases in Guatemala'. In r e t u r n , - t h e reports s a i d , Guatemala would be providee with l i g h t weapons and ammunition from El Sal.vador1s U.S. supplied arsenal. Salvadoran soldiers were killed i n combat this year than were i n 1982. Also, t h e casualty count this year totaled a b o u t one-fifth of E l Salvador's 3 3 , 0 0 0 man military. 08/06/83 -- As a demonstration of President R e a g a n ' s economic support f o r El S a l v a d o r , Agriculture Secretary John Block said the country will receive more than $58 million in n e w U.S. food aid reported the Washington Post. For chronology of 1 9 8 2 e v e n t s , request " 1 9 8 2 Chronology" from archived fssue "El Srief 80064. For chro.nology prior to 1 9 8 2 , request CRS Report entitled Salvador -- From 1 9 3 1 to the March 1 9 8 2 Elections." AGCITIOKAL .REFERENCE SOURCES Araujo, Richard. Congress a n d aid to El Salvador. Heritage F o u n d a r i o n , 1982. 1 4 p. Washington, Arnson, Cynthia. El Salvador - - a revolution confronts the United States. W a s h i n g t o n , Institute for Policy S t u d i e s , 1982. 1 2 2 p. F i s h e r , Stewart W. Human r i g h t s in El Salvador and U.S. foreign 1-38. policy. Human rights quarterly, v. 4, spring 1982: El Salvador after t h e elections. Gayner, Jeffrey B. Heritage F o u n d a t i o n , 1982. 1 0 p. Washington, G e t t l e m a n , Marvin E., et. al. (eds.) El Salvador: Central America in t h e n e w cold war. New Y o r k , Grove P r e s s , 1981. 3 9 7 p. H o r t o n , Scott. T h e utility of Presidential certification of compliance with United States human rights policy: t h e c a s e of El Salvador. Wisconsin l a w r e v i e w , vol. 1 9 8 2 , no. 5: 825-861. K r u g e r , Alexander. El Salvador's Marxist revolution. Heritage F o u n d a t i o n , Apr. 1 0 , 1981. 1 8 p. Washington, KcColm, Bruce R. El Salvador - - peaceful revolution or armed struqgle? Kew Y o r k , Freedom H o u s e , 1982. 4 7 p. Montgomery, Tommie S'Ae. Zevolution ~ r .Ei Salvador -- origins and e V o l ~ t i o n . a o u l d e r , Westview P r e s s , 1982. 255 p. - P r o s t e r m a n , Roy L. The unmaking of a land reform. V. 1 8 7 , Aug. 9 , 1982: 21-25. New republic, Report o n human rights in El Salvador -- a report t o the Board of the Americac Clvil Liberties U n i o n , January 19E2. Washing<on, Center for National Security S t u d i e s , l9E2. 280 p . Report on human rights i n El Salvador - - July 2 0 , 1 9 8 2 s u p p l e n e ~ t . New York, Americas Watch Committee and T h e American Civii Liberties Union, 1982. 270 p. Congress and Zi Salvador. In Congress and foreign S t o r r s , K. Larry. policy -- 1981. Cornnittee P r i n t by Eouse Committee on Foreign Affairs. Washingtori, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982: 115-132. ----- El Salvador - - from 1 3 3 1 to the Karch 1 9 8 2 elections: a chronological scudy of politics, p a r t i e s , and conflicts. CRS R e p o r t , Kar. 2 3 , 1982. 8 2 p. U.S. Builc2ing the peace i n Central America [ a Department of State. speech by Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs T h o m a s 0. Enders]. Washington, Bureau of Public Affairs, Current Policy no. 4 1 4 , ~ u g .2 0 , 1982. 4 p. ----- Country reports on human rights practices for 1982. In Joint Committee P r i n t by House Committee on Foreign Affairs and S e n a t e Committee on Foreign Relations. 9 8 t h Congress, 1 s t s e s s i o n , February.1983. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1963: 490-506. ----- Communist interference in El Salvador. W a s h i n g t o n , Bureau of Public A f f a i r s , Special report no. 8 0 , Feb. 2 3 , 1981. 8 p. ----- Cuba's renewed support for violence in Latin America. W a s h i n g t o n , Bureau of Public Affairs, Special r e p o r t no. 9 0 , Dec. 1 4 , 1981. 1 2 p. ----- Report o n the situation in El Salvador with respect to the subjects covered in s e c t i o n , 7 2 6 ( d ) of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1 9 8 1 (P.L. 97-113), Jan. 2 1 , 1983. W e b r e , Stephen. J o s e Napoleon Duarte and the Christian Democratic Party i n Salvadoran politics, 1960-1972. Baton R o u g e , L o u i s i a n a S t a t e University P r e s s , 1979. 233 p. Base 500097 1-72 G U A P A C I F I C BOUNDARY REPAESSNTATION IS NOT NLCESSARILY A U T H O l l T A T I V I -- O C E A N Nalional capital Departamento &pita1 @ 0 Departamento boundary International boundary 88 A- Road Railroad - -.- - EL SALVADOR 2/ 149.5. 61 5.9 -35.5 64.2 21 44.9 69.1 5 1 - FY81 192.1 81.0 1 1 40.0 71.1 163.0 35.0 81 76.0 1.0 91 75.0 -- 128.0 Approved (P.L. 97-257) Adm Request . FY82 Supplemental 268.1 82.0 115.0 .71.1 FY82 Total 226.2 61.3 105.0 59.9 Adm. Request 191.2 26.3 101 105.0 59.9 140.0121 91.9 2 1 318.2 50.0 50.0 141 281.8 120.0 75.5 '- FY 84 Adm. Requeet FY83 Suppl. of aid reprogrammed after the formation of the Salvadoran civilian-military junta in October 1979. 141 - Includes $35 million over the Administration's FY83 request of $105 million which the Administration announced in February 1983 vould b. reprogr.awd. 121 131 - $ 5 0 million in MAP grant8 to be reprogrammed from fund8 in pending FY83 Supplemental. This $50 million plur the $60 million mentioned iradiately above make up the $110 million of new FY83 military aid for El Salvador announced by the President on March 10, 1983. Includes $60 million of reprogramed Fl4S loana announced on March 10, 1983. Includes $5.1 million of Development Assistance over the Administration'r FY83 request which the Adminiatration indicated in February 1983 would be reprogrameed. Also include8 $18 million of reprogramed Development Assistance announced in March 1983 a8 well a8 l $9 million i n c r e a m in P.L. 4 8 0 funds announced at the mame time. Thir 111 - (P.L. 97-377) set aid at levels appropriated for FY82 unless reprograming procedure8 are utilized. in FY82 under the emergency drawdown authority of Section 506. Allocated to El Salvador from rupplerental fund8 appropriated for international military training (IHET). 101 The Continuing Appropriations Act for FY83 would not include the $55 million provided 91 - Includes $55 million in MP grant8 provided by President Reagan under Section 506 emergency proviaion in February 1982. -71 -81 Administration request for El Salvador a8 part of Caribbean Basin Initiative. Include. $5 million provided by President Carter and $20 million provided by President Reagan under the apecia1 emergency drawdown authority of Section 506 of the Foreign Aamimtance Act that doer not require approval of Congress. 61 - Include. $9.1 million reprogramed for FY80 and $24.9 million reprogrammed for PY81. Includes significant amount.' -4 1 -51 Military A88iatance Program grants, Foreign Military Sales loans, international military training (IIIET), and tranmferm of excerr Military aid include. defense stocks. Economic Support Funds (ESP) are quick disbursing, balance of payment8 support funds, provided for security-related rea8onr. While ESP wa8 once called "Security Supporting Asairtance," and ir included in Security Assistance, it is listed separately becaure the aid i8 economic in nature, ir adminirterad by AID, and i8 generally included in Administration figure8 on economic aeeietance to El Salvador. 231.2 86.3 131 26.3 -- 140.0 64.9 Regular FY83 Feb. 1983 Uar. 1983 Approved Allocated Allocated (P.L. 97-377) by M m . by Adm. ECONOWIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO EL SALVADOR, FY79-FY& (Obligations in millionr of $1 Economic aid includes Development Assistance, P.L. 480 Food for Peace programs, and Peace Corps. 11.4 -- ?/ - 9.1 49.2 A / 11.4 -31 -I/ -21 TQTAL AID Military Aid 1 1 ESF Economic Aid FY80 - - FY79 - U.8. Regular FY82 (P.L. 97-113) TABLE 1